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Title: The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

Author: George Berkeley

Release Date: May 20, 2012 [Ebook 39746]

Eanguage: English

***START OE THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK
THE WORKS OE GEORGE BERKEEEY. VOE. 1 OE

4 ***

The Works of George Berkeley D.D.
Formerly Bishop of Cloyne
Including his Posthumous Works
With Prefaces, Annotations,
Appendices, and An Account of his
Life, by

Alexander Campbell Fraser
Hon. D.C.L., Oxford
Hon. LL.D. Glasgow and
Edinburgh; Emeritus Professor of
Logic and Metaphysics in the
University of Edinburgh
In Four Volumes
Vol. 1: Philosophical Works,
1705-21

Oxford

At the Clarendon Press
1901

Contents

Preface. 2

George Berkeley, By The Editor. 10

Errata. 73

Commonplace Book. Mathematical, Ethical, Physical,

And Metaphysical. 74

Editor's Preface To The Commonplace Book. 74

Commonplace Book . 78

An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision .181

Editor's Preface To The Essay Towards A New Theory

Of Vision.181

Dedication.202

An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision .206

An Appendix To The Essay On Vision.299

A Treatise Concerning The Principies Of Human Knowledge304
Editor's Preface To The Treatise Concerning The Prin¬
cipies Of Human Knowledge.305

Dedication.324

The Preface.326

Introduction.328

Part Eirst.350

Three Dialogues Between Hylas And Philonous The De-
sign Of Which Is Plainly To Demónstrate The Reality
And Perfection Of Human Knowledge, The Incorpo-
real Nature Of The Soul, And The Immediate Prov-

idence Of A Deity, In Opposition To Sceptics And
Atheists, Also To Open A Method Por Rendering The

Sciences More Easy, Useful, And Compendious .... 452

Editor's Preface.453

Dedication.472

iv The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

The Preface.474

The First Dialogue .478

The Second Dialogue.524

The Third Dialogue.548

De Motu: Sive; De Motus Principio Et Natura, Et De

Causa Communicationis Motuum.596

Editor's Preface To De Motu.597

De Motu.607

Eootnotes.639

[V]

Preface

More than thirty years ago I was honoured by a request to
prepare a eomplete edition of the Works of Bishop Berkeley,
with Notes, for the Clarendon Press, Oxford. That edition, whieh
eontains many of bis writings previously unpublished, appeared
in 1871. It was followed in 1874 by a volume of annotated
Seleetions from bis philosophieal works; and in 1881 1 prepared
a small volume on “Berkeley” for Blaekwood's “Philosophieal
Classies.”

The 1871 edition of the Works originated, 1 believe, in
an essay on “The Real World of Berkeley,” whieh 1 gave to
Macmillan's Magazine in 1862, followed by another in 1864, in
the North British Review. These essays suggested advantages to
eontemporary thought whieh might be gained by a eonsideration
of final questions about man and the universe, in the form in
whieh they are presented by a philosopher who has suffered more

Preface

from misunderstanding than almost any other modern thinker.
During a part of his lifetime, he was the foremost metaphysician
in Europe in an unmetaphysical generation. And in this country,
after a revival of philosophy in the later part of the eighteenth
century, idea, matter, substance, cause, and other terms which
play an important part in his writings, had lost the meaning that
he intended; while in Germany the sceptical speculations of [vi]
David Hume gave rise to a reconstructive criticism, on the part
of Kant and his successors, which seemed at the time to have
little concern with the a posteriori methods and the principies of
Berkeley.

The success of the attempt to recall attention to Berkeley has
far exceeded expectation. Nearly twenty thousand copies of the
three publications mentioned above have found their way into the
hands of readers in Europe and America; and the critical estimates
of Berkeley, by eminent writers, which have appeared since 1871,
in Britain, Erance, Germany, Denmark, Holland, Italy, America,
and India, confirm the opinión that his Works contain a word
in season, even for the twentieth century. Among others who
have delivered appreciative criticisms of Berkeley within the last
thirty years are J.S. Mili, Mansel, Huxley, T.H. Green, Maguire,
Collyns Simón, the Right Hon. A.J. Balfour, Mr. Eeslie Stephen,

Dr. Hutchison Stirling, Professor T.K. Abbott, Professor Van der
Wyck, M. Penjon, Ueberweg, Erederichs, Ulrici, Janitsch, Eugen
Meyer, Spicker, Eoewy, Professor Hoffding of Copenhagen,

Dr. Eorenz, Noah Porter, and Krauth, besides essays in the
chief British, Continental, and American reviews. The text
of those Works of Berkeley which were published during his
lifetime, enriched with a biographical Introduction by Mr. A.J.
Balfour, carefully edited by Mr. George Sampson, appeared
in 1897. In 1900 Dr. R. Richter, of the University of Eeipsic,
produced a new translation into Germán of the Dialogues between
Hylas and Philonous, with an excellent Introduction and notes, [vü]
These estimates form a remarkable contrast to the denunciations.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[viii]

founded on misconception, by Warburton and Beattie in the
eighteenth century.

In 1899 I was unexpectedly again asked by the Delegates
of the Oxford University Press to prepare a New Edition of
Berkeley's Works, with some account of bis life, as the edition of
1871 was out of print; a circumstance which I had not expected to
occur in my lifetime. It seemed presumptuous to undertake what
might have been entrusted to some one probably more in touch
with living thought; and in one's eighty-second year, time and
strength are wanting for remóte research. But the recollection that
I was attracted to philosophy largely by Berkeley, in the morning
of life more than sixty years ago, combined with the pleasure
derived from association in this way with the great University
in which he found an academic borne in bis oíd age, moved me
in the late evening of life to make the attempt. And now, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, I offer these volumes, which
still imperfectly realise my ideal of a final Oxford edition of the
philosopher who spent his last days in Oxford, and whose mortal
remains rest in its Cathedral.

Since 1871 materials of biographical and philosophical interest
have been discovered, in addition to the invaluable collection of
MSS. which Archdeacon Rose then placed at my disposal, and
which were included in the supplementary volume of Life and
Letters. Through the kindness of the late Earl of Egmont I had
access, some years ago, to a large number of letters which passed
between his ancestor, Sir John (afterwards Eord) Percival, and
Berkeley, between 1709 and 1730. I have availed myself freely
of this correspondence.

Some interesting letters from and concerning Berkeley,
addressed to his friend Dr. Samuel Johnson of Stratford in
Connecticut, afterwards President of King's College in New
York, appeared in 1874, in Dr. Beardsley's Life of Johnson,

Preface

illustrating Berkeley's history from 1729 till his death. For these
and for further information I am indebted to Dr. Beardsley.

In the presen! edition of Berkeley's Works, the Introductions
and the annotations have been mostly re-written. A short account
of his romantic life is prefixed, intended to trace its progress in
the gradual development and application of his initial Principie;
and also the external incidents of his life in their continuity,
with the help of the new material in the Percival MSS. and the
correspondence with Johnson. It forms a key to the whole. This
biography is not intended to supersede the Life and Letters of
Berkeley that accompanied the 1871 edition, which remains as a
magazine of facts for reference.

The rearrangement of the Works is a feature in the presen!
edition. Much of the new material that was included in the 1871
edition reached me when the book was far advanced in the press,
and thus the chronological arrangement, strictly followed in the
presen! edition, was not possible. A chronological arrangement
is suggested by Berkeley himself. “1 could wish that all the [ix]
things 1 have published on these philosophical subjects were read
in the order wherein 1 published them,” are his words in one of
his letters to Johnson; “and a second time with a critical eye,
adding your own thought and observation upon every part as you
went along.”

The first three volumes in this edition contain the Philosophical
Works exclusively; arranged in chronological order, under the
three periods of Berkeley's life. The First Volume ineludes those
of his early life; the Second those produced in middle life; and
the Third those of his later years. The Miscellaneous Works are
presented in like manner in the Fourth Volume.

The four little treatises in which Berkeley in early life unfolded
his new thought about the universe, along with his college
Commonplace Book published in 1871, which prepared the way
for them, form, along with the Life, the contents of the First

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

Volume. It is of them that the author writes thus, in another of
his letters to Johnson:—“I do not indeed wonder that on first
reading what I have written men are not thoroughly convinced.
On the contrary, I should very much wonder if prejudices which
have been many years taking root should be extirpated in a few
hours' reading. I had no inclination to trouble the world with
large volumes. What I have done was rather with a view of
giving hints to thinking men, who have leisure and curiosity to
go to the bottom of things, and pursue them in their own minds.
Two or three times reading these small tracts, and making what
is read the occasion of thinking, would, I believe, render the
whole familiar and easy to the mind, and take off that shocking
appearance which hath often been observed to attend speculative
truths.” Except Johnson, none of Berkeley's eighteenth-century
critics seem to have observed this rule.

Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher, with its supplement
in the Theory of Visual Language Vindicated, being the
philosophical works of his middle life, associated with its
American enterprise, form the Second Volume. In them the
conception of the universe that was unfolded in the early writings
is applied, in vindication of religious morality and Christianity,
against the Atheism attributed to those who called themselves
Free-thinkers; who were treated by Berkeley as, at least by
implication, atheistic.

The Third Volume contains the Analyst and Siris, which
belong to his later life, Siris being especially characteristic of its
serene quiet. In both there is a deepened sense of the mystery
of the universe, and in Siris especially a more comprehensive
conception of the final problem suggested by human life. But the
metaphysics of the one is lost in mathematical controversy; that
of the other in medical controversy, and in undigested ancient and
mediseval learning. The metaphysical importance of Siris was
long unrecognised, although in it Berkeley's thought culminates,
not in a paradox about Matter, but in the conception of God as the

Preface

concatenating principie of the universe; yet this reached through
the conception of Matter as real only in and through living Mind.

The Miscellaneous Works, after the two juvenile Latin tracts in
mathematics, deal with observations of nature and man gathered
in his travels, questions of social economy, and lessons in [xi]
religious life. Several are posthumous, and were first published
in the 1871 edition. Of these, perhaps the most interesting is
the Journal in Italy. The Discourse on Passive Obedience is the
nearest approach to ethical theory which Berkeley has given to
US, and as such it might have taken its place in the First Volume;
but on the whole it seemed more appropriately placed in the
Fourth, where it is easily accessible for those who prefer to read
it immediately after the book of Principies.

I have introduced, in an Appendix to the Third Volume, some
matter of philosophical interest for which there was no place
in the editorial Prefaces or in the annotations. The historical
significance of Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Edwards, as
pioneers of American philosophy, and also advócales of the
new conception of the material world that is associated with
Berkeley, is recognised in Appendix C. Illustrations of the
misinterpretation of Berkeley by his early critics are presented
in Appendix D. A lately discovered tractate by Berkeley forms
Appendix E. In the Eourth Volume, numerous quedes contained
in the first edition of the Querist, and omitted in the later editions,
are given in an Appendix, which enables the reader to reconstruct
that interesting tract in the form in which it originally appeared.

The presen! edition is thus really a new work, which possesses,

I hope, a certain philosophical unity, as well as pervading
biographical interest.

As Berkeley is the immediate successor of Eocke, and as
he was educated by collision with the Essay on Human [xü]
Understanding, perhaps Eocke ought to have had more
prominence in the editorial portion of this book. Eimitation

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xiii]

of space partly accounts for the omission; and I venture instead
to refer the reader to the Prolegomena and notes in my edition of
Locke's Essay, which was published by the Clarendon Press in
1894.1 may add that an expansión of thoughts which run through
the Life and many of the annotations, in this edition of Berkeley,
may be found in my Philosophy ofTheism^.

The reader need not come to Berkeley in the expectation of
finding in his Works an all-comprehensive speculative system
like Spinoza's, or a reasoned articulation of the universe of reality
such as Hegel is supposed to offer. But no one in the succession of
great English philosophers has, I think, proposed in a way more
apt to invite reflexión, the final alternative between Unreason, on
the one hand, and Moral Reason expressed in Universal Divine
Providence, on the other hand, as the root of the unbeginning
and endless evolution in which we find ourselves involved; as
well as the further question, Whether this tremendous practical
alternative can be settled by any means that are within the
reach of man? His Philosophical Works, taken collectively, may
encourage those who see in a reasonable via media between
Omniscience and Nescience the true path of progress, under
man's inevitable venture of reasonable Faith.

One is therefore not without hope that a fresh impulse may be
given to philosophy and religious thought by this reappearance
of George Berkeley, under the auspices of the University of
Oxford, at the beginning of the twentieth century. His readers
will at any rate find themselves in the company of one of the
most attractive personalities of English philosophy, who is also
among the foremost of those thinkers who are masters in English
literature—Erancis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes, George Berkeley
and David Hume.

* Philosophy ofTheism: The Gifford Lecturas delivered before the University
of Edinburgh in 1894-96. (Second Edition, 1899.)

Preface

A. Campbell Fraser.

Gorton, Hawthornden, Midlothian,
March, 1901.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

[xxiv]

I. Early Life (1685-1721).

Towards the end of the reign of Charles the Second a certain
William Berkeley, according to credible tradition, occupied a
cottage attached to the ancient Castle of Dysert, in that part of
the county of Kilkenny which is watered by the Nore. Little
is known about this William Berkeley except that he was Irish
by birth and English by descent. It is said that his father went
over to Ireland soon after the Restoration, in the suite of his
reputed kinsman, Lord Berkeley of Stratton, when he was Lord
Lieutenant. William Berkeley's wife seems to have been of Irish
blood, and in some remóte way related to the family of Wolfe,
the hero of Quebec. It was in the modest abode in the valley of
the Nore that George, the eldest of their six sons, was born, on
March 12, 1685.

There is nothing in the recorded family history of these Dysert
Berkeleys that helps to explain the singular personality and career
of the eldest son. The parents have left no mark, and make no
appearance in any extant records of the family. They probably
made their way to the valley of the Nore among families of
English connexion who, in the quarter of a century preceding the
birth of George Berkeley, were finding settlements in Ireland.
The family, as it appears, was not wealthy, but was recognised as
of gentle blood. Robert, the fifth son, became rector of Middleton
and vicar-general of Cloyne; and another son, William, held a
commission in the army. According to the Register of Trinity

George Berkeley, By The Editor

College, one of the sons was born “near Thurles,” in 1699, and
Thomas, the youngest, was born in Tipperary, in 1703, so that the
family may have removed from Dysert after the birth of George.
In what ean be gleaned of the younger sons, one finds little
appearanee of sympathy with the religious and philosophieal
genius of the eldest.

Regarding this famous eldest son in those early days, we have
this signifieant autobiographieal fragment in bis Commonplace
Book: “1 was distrustful at eight years oíd, and eonsequently
by nature disposed for the new doetrines.” In his twelfth year
we find the boy in Kilkenny Sehool. The register reeords his
entranee there in the summer of 1696, when he was plaeed at
onee in the seeond elass, whieh seems to imply preeoeity, for it
is almost a solitary instanee. He spent the four following years
in Kilkenny. The Sehool was in high repute for learned masters
and famous pupils; among former pupils were the poet Congreve
and Swift, nearly twenty years earlier than George Berkeley;
among his sehool-fellows was Thomas Prior, his life-long friend
and eorrespondent. In the days of Berkeley and Prior the head
master was Dr. Hinton, and the Sehool was still suffering from
the eonsequenees of “the warre in Ireland” whieh followed the
Revolution.

Berkeley in Kilkenny Sehool is hardly visible, and we have no
means of estimating his mental State when he left it. Tradition says
that in his sehool-days he was wont to feed his imagination with
airy visions and romanee, a tradition whieh perhaps originated
long after in popular miseoneeptions of his idealism. Dimly
diseernible at Kilkenny, only a few years later he was a
eonspieuous figure in an island that was then beginning to
share in the intelleetual movement of the modern world, taking
his plaee as a elassie in English literature, and as the most subtle
and ardent of eontemporary English-speaking thinkers.

[xxv]

In Mareh, 1700, at the age of fifteen, George Berkeley entered

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xxvi]

Trinity College, Dublin. This was his home for more than twenty
years. He was at first a mystery to the ordinary undergraduate.
Some, we are told, pronounced him the greatest dunce, others
the greatest genius in the College. To hasty judges he seemed
an idle dreamer; the thoughtful admired his subtle intelligence
and the beauty of his character. In his undergraduate years, a
mild and ingenuous youth, inexperienced in the ways of men,
vivacious, humorous, satirical, in unexpected ways inquisitivo,
often paradoxical, through misunderstandings he persisted in his
own way, full of simplicity and enthusiasm. In 1704 (the year
in which Locke died) he passed Bachelor of Arts, and became
Master in 1707, when he was admitted to a Fellowship, “the only
reward of learning which that kingdom had to bestow.”

In Trinity College the youth found himself on the tide of
modern thought, for the “new philosophy” of Newton and Locke
was then invading the University. Locke's Essay, published in
1690, was already in vogue. This early recognition of Locke in
Dublin was chiefly due to William Molyneux, Locke's devoted
friend, a lawyer and member of the Irish Parliament, much given
to the experimental methods. Descartes, too, with his sceptical
criticism of human beliefs, yet disposed to spiritualise powers
commonly attributed to matter, was another accepted authority in
Trinity College; and Malebranche was not unknown. Hobbes was
the familiar representative of a finally materialistic conception
of existence, reproducing in modern forms the atomism of
Democritus and the ethics of Epicurus. Above all, Newton
was acknowledged master in physics, whose Principia, issued
three years sooner than Locke's Essay, was transforming the
conceptions of educated men regarding their surroundings, like
the still more comprehensive law of physical evolution in the
nineteenth century.

John Toland, an Irishman, one of the earliest and ablest of
the new sect of Free-thinkers, made his appearance at Dublin in
1696, as the author of Christianity not Mysterious. The book was

George Berkeley, By The Editor

condemned by College dignitaries and dignified clergy with even
more than Irish fervour. It was the opening of a eontroversy that
lasted over half of the eighteenth eentury in England, in whieh
Berkeley soon beeame prominent; and it was resumed later on,
with greater intelleetual foree and in finer literary form, by David
Hume and Voltaire. The eollision with Toland about the time of
Berkeley's matrieulation may have awakened bis interest. Toland
was supposed to teaeh that matter is eternal, and that motion is its
essential property, into whieh all ehanges presented in the outer
and inner experienee of man may at last be resolved. Berkeley's
life was a eontinual protest against these dogmas. The Provost of
Trinity College in 1700 was Dr. Peter Browne, who had already
entered the lists against Toland; long after, when Bishop of Cork,
he was in eontroversy with Berkeley about the nature of man's
knowledge of God. The Arehbishop of Dublin in the early years
of the eighteenth eentury was William King, still remembered
as a philosophieal theologian, whose book on the Origin ofEvil,
published in 1702, was eritieised by Boyle and Eeibniz.

Dublin in those years was thus a plaee in whieh a studious
youth, who had been “distrustful at eight years oíd,” might be
disposed to entertain grave questions about the ultímate meaning
of his visible environment, and of the self-eonseious life to whieh
he was beeoming awake. Is the universe of existenee eonfined
to the visible world, and is matter the really aetive power in
existenee? Is God the root and eentre of all that is real, and if
so, what is meant by God? Can God be good if the world is a
mixture of good and evil? Questions like these were ready to
meet the inquisitive Kilkenny youth in his first years at Dublin.

One of his earliest interests at College was mathematieal.
His first appearanee in print was as the anonymous author of
two Eatin traets, Arithmetica and Miscellanea Mathematica,
published in 1707. They are interesting as an índex of his
intelleetual inelination when he was hardly twenty; for he says
they were prepared three years before they were given to the

[xxvii]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xxviii]

World. His disposition to curious questions in geometry and
algebra is further shewn in his College Commonplace Book.

This lately discovered Commonplace Book throws a flood of
light upon Berkeley's State of mind between his twentieth and
twenty-fourth year. It is a wonderful revelation; a record under
his own hand of his thoughts and feelings when he first carne
under the inspiration of a new conception of the nature and office
of the material world. It was then struggling to find adequate
expression, and in it the sanguine youth seemed to find a spiritual
panacea for the errors and confusions of philosophy. It was able
to make short work, he believed, with atheistic materialism, and
could dispense with arguments against sceptics in vindication
of the reality of experience. The mind-dependent existence
of the material world, and its true function in the universe of
concrete reality, were to be disclosed under the light of a new
transforming self-evident Principie. “1 wonder not at my sagacity
in discovering the obvious and amazing truth. 1 rather wonder
at my stupid inadvertency in not finding it out before—'tis no
witchcraft to see.” The pages of the Commonplace Book give
vent to rapidly forming thoughts about the things of sense and
the “ambient space” of a youth entering into reflective life, in
company with Descartes and Malebranche, Bacon and Hobbes,
above all, Locke and Newton; who was trying to transíate into
reasonableness his faith in the reality of the material world and
God. Under the influence of this new conception, he sees the
world like one awakening from a confused dream. The revolution
which he wanted to inaugúrate he foresaw would be resisted.
Men like to think and speak about things as they have been
accustomed to do: they are offended when they are asked to
exchange this for what appears to them absurdity, or at least
when the change seems useless. But in spite of the ridicule and
dislike of a world long accustomed to put empty words in place
of living thoughts, he resolves to deliver himself of his burden,
with the politic conciliation of a skilful advócate however; for he

George Berkeley, By The Editor

characteristically reminds himself that one who “desires to bring
another over to his own opinions must seem to harmonize with
him at first, and humour him in his own way of talking.”

In 1709, when he was twenty-four years oíd, Berkeley
presented himself to the world of empty verbal reasoners as
the author of what he ealls modestly An Essay towards a New
Theory of Vision. It was dedieated to Sir John Pereival, his
eorrespondent afterwards for more than twenty years; but 1 have
not diseovered the origin of their friendship. The Essay was a
pioneer, meant to open the way for the diselosure of the Seeret
with whieh he was burdened, lest the world might be shoeked by
an abrupt diselosure. In this prelude he tries to make the reader
reeognise that in ordinary seeing we are always interpreting visual
signs; so that we have daily presented to our eyes what is virtually
an intelligible natural language; so that in all our intereourse with
the visible world we are in intereourse with all-pervading aetive
Intelligenee. We are reading absent data of toueh and of the
other senses in the language of their visual signs. And the visual [xxix]
signs themselves, whieh are the immediate objeets of sight, are
neeessarily dependent on sentient and pereipient mind; whatever
may be the ease with the tangible realities whieh the visual data
signify, a faet evident by our experienee when we make use
of a looking-glass. The material world, so far at least as it
presents itself visibly, is real only in being realised by living
and seeing beings. The mind-dependent visual signs of whieh
we are eonseious are eontinually speaking to us of an invisible
and distan! world of tangible realities; and through the natural
eonnexion of the visual signs with their taetual meanings, we are
able in seeing praetieally to pereeive, not only what is distan! in
spaee, but also to antieipate the future. The Book of Vision is in
literal truth a Book of Propheey. The ehief lesson of the tentative
Essay on Vision is thus summed up:—

“Upon the whole, 1 think we may fairly eonelude that the

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xxx]

proper objects of Vision constitute the Universal Language of
Nature; whereby we are instructed how to regúlate our actions in
order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation
and well-being of our bodies, as also to avoid whatever may
be hurtful and destructive of them. And the manner wherein
they signify and mark out unto us the objects which are at a
distance is the same with that of languages and signs of human
appointment; which do not suggest the things signified by any
likeness or identity of nature, but only by an habitual connexion
that experience has made us to observe between them. Suppose
one who had always continued blind be told by his guide that
after he has advanced so many steps he shall come to the brink
of a precipice, or be stopped by a wall; must not this to him
seem very admirable and surprising? He cannot conceive how it
is possible for mortals to frame such predictions as these, which
to him would seem as strange and unaccountable as prophecy
does to others. Even they who are blessed with the visive
faculty may (though familiarity make it less observed) find
therein sufficient cause of admiration. The wonderful art and
contrivance wherewith it is adj usted to those ends and purposes
for which it was apparently designed; the vast extent, number,
and variety of objects that are at once, with so much case and
quickness and pleasure, suggested by it—all these afford subject
for much and pleasing speculation, and may, if anything, give us
some glimmering analogous prsenotion of things that are placed
beyond the certain discovery and comprehension of our present
state^.”

Berkeley took orders in the year in which his Essay on Vision
was published. On February 1, 1709, he was ordained as
deacon, in the chapel of Trinity College, by Dr. George Ashe,
Bishop of Clogher. Origen and Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas,
Malebranche, Fenelon, and Pascal, Cudworth, Butler, Jonathan

^ Essay on Vision, sect. 147, 148.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

Edwards, and Schleiermacher, along with Berkeley, are among
those who are illustrious at onee in the history of philosophy and
of the Christian Chureh. The Chureh, it has been said, has been
for nearly two thousand years the great Ethieal Soeiety of the
World, and if under its restrietions it has been less eonspieuous on
the field of philosophieal eritieism and free inquiry, these ñames
remind us of the immense serviee it has rendered to meditative
thought.

The light of the Pereival eorrespondenee first falls on
Berkeley's life in 1709. The earliest extant letters from Berkeley
to Sir John Pereival are in September, Oetober, and Deeember
of that year, dated at Trinity College. In one of them he
pronounees Soerates “the best and most admirable man that the
heathen world has produeed.” Another letter, in Mareh, 1710,
aeeompanies a eopy of the seeond edition of the Essay on Vision.

“1 have made some alterations and additions in the body of
the treatise,” he says, “and in the appendix have endeavoured
to meet the objeetions of the Arehbishop of Dublin;” whose [xxxi]
sermón he proeeeds to depreeate, for “denying that goodness
and understanding are more to be affirmed of God than feet or
hands,” although all these may, in a metaphorieal sense. How
far, or whether at all, God is knowable by man, was, as we shall
see, matter of diseussion and eontroversy with Berkeley in later
life; but this shews that the subjeet was already in bis thoughts.
Returning to the Essay on Vision, he tells Sir John that “there
remains one objeetion, that with regard to the uselessness of that
book of mine; but in a little time 1 hope to make what is there laid
down appear subservient to the ends of morality and religión, in a
Treatise 1 have in the press, the design of whieh is to demónstrate
the existenee and attributes of God, the immortality of the soul,
the reeoneiliation of God's foreknowledge and the freedom of
man; and by shewing the emptiness and falsehood of several
parts of the speeulative seienees, to induee men to the study of
religión and things useful. How far my endeavours will prove

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xxxii]

successful, and whether I have been all this time in a dream or
no, time will shew. I do not see how it is possible to demónstrate
the being of a God on the principies of the Archbishop—that
strictly goodness and understanding can no more be assumed of
God than that He has feet or hands; there being no argument
that I know for God's existence which does not prove Him at the
same time to be an understanding and benevolent being, in the
strict, literal, and proper meaning of these words.” He adds, “I
have written to Mr. Clarke to give me bis thoughts on the subject
of God's existence, but have got no answer.”

The Work foreshadowed in this letter appeared in the siimmer
of 1710, as the “First part” of a Treatise concerning the Principies
of Human Knowledge, wherein the chief causes of error and
difficulty in the Sciences, with the grounds ofScepticism, Atheism,
and Irreligión, are inquired into. In this fragment of a larger
Work, never finished, Berkeley's spiritual conception of matter
and cosmos is unfolded, defended, and applied. According
to the Essay on Vision, the world, as far as it is visible, is
dependen! on living mind. According to this book of Principies
the whole material world, as far as it can have any practical
concern with the knowings and doings of men, is real only by
being realised in like manner in the percipient experience of
some living mind. The concrete world, with which alone we
have to do, could not exist in its concrete reality if there were no
living percipient being in existence to actualise it. To suppose
that it could would be to submit to the illusion of a metaphysical
abstraction. Matter unrealised in its necessary subordination to
some one's percipient experience is the chief among the illusions
which philosophers have been too ready to encourage, and which
the mass of mankind, who accept words without reflecting on
their legitímate meanings, are ready to accept blindly. But we
have only to reflect in order to see the absurdity of a material
world such as we have experience of existing without ever being
realised or made concrete in any sentient Ufe. Try to conceive

George Berkeley, By The Editor

an eternally dead universo, empty for ever of God and all finito
spirits, and yon find yon eannot. Reality ean be real only in a
living form. Pereipient Ufe underlies or eonstitutes all that is
real. The esse of the eonerete material world is percipi. This was
the “New Prineiple” with whieh the young Dublin Fellow was
burdened—the Seeret of the universo whieh he had been longing
to diseharge upon mankind for their benefit, yet without sign of
desire to gain fame for himself as the diseoverer. It is thus that
he unfolds it:—

“Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that
a man need only opon bis oyes to see them. Sueh 1 take this
important one to be, viz. that all the ehoir of heaven and furniture
of the earth, in a word, all those bodies whieh eompose the mighty
frame of the world, have not any subsistenee without a Mind;
that their being is to be pereeived or known; that eonsequently
so long as they are not aetually pereeived by me, or do not exist
in my mind, or that of any other ereated spirit, they must either
have no existenee at all, or else subsist in the mind of some
Eternal Spirit: it being perfeetly unintelligible, and involving all
the absurdity of abstraetion, to attribute to any single part of them
an existenee independent of a Spirit^.”

This does not mean denial of the existenee of the world that
is daily presented to our senses and whieh ineludes our own
bodies. On the eontrary, it affirms, as intuitively true, the
existenee of the only real matter whieh our senses presen! to
US. The only material world of whieh we have any experienee
eonsists of the appearanees (misleadingly ealled ideas of sense by
Berkeley) whieh are eontinually rising as real objeets in a passive
proeession of interpretable signs, through means of whieh eaeh
finite person realises bis own individual personal!ty; also the
existenee of other finite persons; and the sense-symbolism that is
more or less interpreted in the natural seienees; all signifieant of

^ Principies, sect. 6.

[xxxiii]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xxxiv]

God. So the material world of concrete experience is presented
to US as mind-dependent and in itself powerless: the deepest and
truest reality must always be spiritual. Yet this mind-dependent
material world is the occasion of innumerable pleasures and pains
to human percipients, in so far as they conform to or contradict
its customary laws, commonly called the laws of nature. So the
sense-symbolism in which we live is found to play an important
part in the experience of percipient beings. But it makes us
sceptics and atheists when, in its ñame, we put a supposed dead
abstract matter in room of the Divine Active Reason of which all
natural order is the continuous providential expression.

Accordingly, God must exist, because the material world, in
order to be a real world, needs to be continually realised and
regulated by living Providence; and we have all the certainty of
sense and sanity that there is a (mind-dependent) material world,
a boundless and endlessly evolving sense-symbolism.

In the two years after the disclosure of his New Principie we
see Berkeley chiefly through his correspondence with Percival.
He was eager to hear the voice of criticism; but the critics were
slow to speak, and when they did speak they misconceived the
question, and of course his answer to it. “If when you receive my
book,” he writes fromDublin, in July, 1710, to Sir John, who was
then in London, “you can procure me the opinión of some of your
acquaintances who are thinking men, addicted to the study of
natural philosophy and mathematics, I shall be extremely obliged
to you.” He also asks Percival to present the book of Principies
to Lord Pembroke, to whom he had ventured to dedícate it, as
Locke had done his Essay. The reply was discouraging.

“I did but ñame the subject-matter of your book of Principies
to some ingenuous friends of mine,” Percival says, “and they
immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same time refusing
to read it; which I have not yet got one to do. A physician of
my acquaintance undertook to describe your person, and argued

George Berkeley, By The Editor

you must needs be mad, and that yon ought to take remedies. A
bishop pitied you, that a desire and vanity of starting something
new should put you upon sueh an undertaking; and when I
justified you in that part of your eharaeter, and added other
deserving qualities you have, he eould not tell what to think
of you. Another told me an ingenious man ought not to be
diseouraged from exerting his wit, and said Erasmus was not
worse thought of for writing in praise of folly; but that you are
not gone as far as a gentleman in town, who asserts not only that
there is no sueh thing as Matter, but that we ourselves have no
being at all.”

It is not surprising that a book whieh was supposed to deny the
existenee of all that we see and toueh should be ridieuled, and its
author ealled a madman. What vexed the author was, “that men
who had never eonsidered my book should eonfound me with
the seepties, who doubt the existenee of sensible things, and are
not positivo of any one thing, not oven of their own being. But
whoever reads my book with attention will see that 1 question not
the existenee of anything we pereeive by our senses. Eine spun
metaphysies are what on all oeeasions 1 deelaim against, and if
any one shall show anything of that sort in my Treatise 1 will
willingly eorreet it.” A material world that was real enough to
yield physieal seienee, to make known to us the existenee of other
persons and of God, and whieh signified in very praetieal ways
happiness or misery to sentient beings, seemed to him suffieiently
real for human seienee and all other purposes. Nevertheless, in
the ardour of youth Berkeley had hardly fathomed the depths
into whieh his New Prineiple led, and whieh he hoped to eseape
by avoiding the abstraetions of “fine-spun metaphysies.”

In Deeember Pereival writes from Eondon that he has “given
the book to Eord Pembroke,” who “thought the author an
ingenious man, and to be eneouraged”; but for himself he “eannot
believe in the non-existenee of Matter”; and he had tried in vain
to induee Samuel Clarke, the great English metaphysieian, either

[xxxv]

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[xxxvi]

to refute or to accept the New Principie. In February Berkeley
sends an explanatory letter for Lord Pembroke to Percival's care.
In a letter in June he turns to social questions, and suggests
that if “some Irish gentlemen of good fortune and generous
inclinations would constantly reside in England, there to watch
for the interests of Ireland, they might bring far greater advantage
than they could by spending their incomes at borne.” And so 1711
passes, with responsos of ignoran! critics; vain endeavours to
draw worthy criticism from Samuel Clarke; the author all the
while doing work as a Tutor in Trinity College on a modest
income; now and then on holidays in Meath or elsewhere in
Ireland. Three discourses on Passive Obedience in the College
Chapel in 1712, misinterpreted, brought on him the reproach of
Jacobitism. Yet they were designed to shew that society rests
on a deeper foundation than forcé and calculations of utility,
and is at last rooted in principies of an immutable morality.
Locke's favourite opinión, that morality is a demonstrable, seems
to weigh with him in these Discourses.

But Berkeley was not yet done with the exposition and
vindication of his new thought, for it seemed to him charged with
supreme practical issues for mankind. In the two years which
followed the publication of the Principies he was preparing to
reproduce his spiritual conception of the universe, in the dramatic
form of dialogue, convenient for dealing popularly with plausible
objections. The issue was the Three Dialogues between Hylas
and Philonous, in which Philonous argües for the absurdity
of an abstrae! matter that is unrealised in the experience of
living beings, as against Hylas, who is put forward to justify
belief in this abstrae! reality. The design of the Dialogues is
to presen! in a familiar form “such principies as, by an easy
solution of the perplexities of philosophers, together with their
own native evidence, may at once recommend themselves as
genuine to the mind, and rescue philosophy from the endless
pursuits it is engaged in; which, with a plain demonstration of

George Berkeley, By The Editor

the Immediate Providence of an all-seeing God, should seem the
readiest preparation, as well as the strongest motive to the study
and praetiee of virtue^.”

When the Dialogues were eompleted, at the end of 1712,
Berkeley resolved to visit London, as he told Pereival, “in order
to print my new book of Dialogues, and to make aequaintanee [xxxvii]
with men of merit.” He got leave of absenee from his College
“for the reeovery of his health,” whieh had suffered from study,
and perhaps too he remembered that Baeon eommends travel as
“to the younger sort a part of edueation.”

Berkeley made his appearanee in London in January, 1713.
On the 26th of that month he writes to Pereival that he “had
erossed the Channel from Dublin a few days before,” deseribes
adventures on the road, and enlarges on the beauty of rural
England, whieh he liked more than anything he had seen in
London. “Mr. Clarke” had already introdueed him to Lord
Pembroke. He had also ealled on his eountryman Riehard Steele,
“who desired to be aequainted with him. Somebody had given
him my Treatise on the Principies of Human Knowledge, and
that was the ground of his inelination to my aequaintanee.” He
antieipates “mueh satisfaetion in the eonversation of Steele and
his friends,” adding that “there is lately published a bold and
pernieious book, a Discourse on Free-thinking^ In Lebruary he
“diñes often with Steele in his house in Bloomsbury Square,” and
tells in Mareh “that you will soon hear of Mr. Steele under the
eharaeter of the Guardian-, he designs his paper shall eome out
every day as the Spectator.” The night before “a very ingenious
new poem upon ‘Windsor Lorest’ had been given to him by the
author, Mr. Pope. The gentleman is a Papist, but a man of
exeellent wit and learning, one of those Mr. Steele mentions

Preface to the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous.

^ By Anthony Collins.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xxxviii]

in his last paper as having writ some of the Spectator.” A few
days later he has met “Mr. Addison, who has the same talents
as Steele in a high degree, and is likewise a great philosopher,
having applied himself to the speculative studies more than any
of the wits I know. I breakfasted with him at Dr. Swift's lodgings.
His Corning in while I was there, and the good temper he showed,
was construed by me as a sign of the approaching coalition of
parties. A play of Mr. Steele's, which was expected, he has
now put off till next winter. But Cato, a most noble play of Mr.
Addison, is to be acted in Easter week.” Accordingly, on April
18, he writes that “on Tuesday last Cato was acted for the first
time. I was present with Mr. Addison and two or three more
friends in a side box, where we had a talk and two or three flasks
of Burgundy and Champagne, which the author (who is a very
sober man) thought necessary to support his spirits, and indeed
it was a pleasant refreshment to us all between the Acts. Some
parts of the prologue, written by Mr. Pope, a Tory and even a
Papist, were hissed, being thought to savour of Whiggism; but
the clap got much the better of the hiss. Lord Harley, who sat
in the next box to us, was observed to clap as loud as any in the
house all the time of the play.” Swift and Pope have described
this famous first night of Cato', now for the first time we have
Berkeley's report. He adds, “This day I dined at Dr. Arbuthnot's
lodging in the Queen's Palace.”

His countryman, Swift, was among the first to welcome him to
London, where Swift had himself been for four years, “lodging
in Bury Street,” and sending the daily Journal to Stella, which
records so many incidents of that memorable London life. Mrs.
Vanhomrigh and her daughter, the unhappy Vanessa, were living
in rooms in the same Street as Swift, and there he “loitered, hot
and lazy, after his morning's work,” and “often dined out of mere
listlessness.” Berkeley was a frequent visitar at Swift's house,
and this Vanhomrigh connexion with Swift had an influence on
Berkeley's fortune long afterwards. On a Sunday in April we

George Berkeley, By The Editor

find him at Kensington, at the Court of Queen Anne, in the
company of Swift. “I went to Court to-day,” Swift's Journal
records, “on purpose to present Mr. Berkeley, one of the Fellows
of Trinity. College, to Lord Berkeley of Stratton. That Mr. [xxxix]
Berkeley is a very ingenious man, and a great philosopher, and
I have mentioned him to all the ministers, and have given them
some of his writings, and I will favour him as much as I can.” In
this, Swift was as good as his word. “Dr. Swift,” he adds, “is
admired hoth hy Steele and Addison, and I think Addison one of
the best natured and most agreeable men in the world.”

One day about this time, at the instance of Addison, it seems
that a meeting was arranged between Berkeley and Samuel
Clarke, the metaphysical rector of St. James's in Piccadilly, whose
opinión he had in vain tried to draw forth two years before through
Sir John Percival. Berkeley's personal charm was felt wherever
he went, and even “the fastidious and turbulent Atterbury,”
after intercourse with him, is reported to have said: “So much
understanding, so much knowledge, so much innocence, and
such humility, I did not think had been the portion of any but
angels till I saw this gentleman.” Much was expected from the
meeting with Clarke, but Berkeley had again to complain that
although Clarke had neither refuted his arguments ñor disproved
his premisses, he had not the candour to accept his conclusión.

It was thus that Berkeley became known to “men of merit”
in that brilliant society. He was also brought among persons on
whom he would hardly have conferred this title. He tells Percival
that he had attended several free-thinking clubs, in the pretended
character of a learner, and that he there heard Anthony Collins,
author of “the bold and pernicious book on free-thinking,” boast
“that he was able to demónstrate that the existence of God is an
impossible supposition.” The promised “demonstration” seems
to have been Collins' Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, which
appeared two years later, according to which all that happens in
mind and matter is the issue of natural necessity. Steele invited

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xi] Berkeley to contribute to the Guardian during its short-lived
existence between March and September, 1713. He took the
Discourse of Collins for the subject of bis first essay. Three other
essays are concerned with man's hope of a future Ufe, and are
among the few passages in bis writings in which bis philosophy
is a meditation upon Death.

In May, Percival writes to him from Dublin that he hears the
“new book of Dialogues is printed, though not yet published,
and that your opinión has gained ground among the learned; that
Mr. Addison has come over to your view; and that what at first
seemed shocking is become so familiar that others envy yon the
discovery, and make it their own.” In bis reply in June, Berkeley
mentions that “a clergyman in Wiltshire has lately published a
treatise wherein he advances something published three years
ago in my Principies of Human Knowledge.” The clergyman was
Arthur Collier, author of the Clavis Universalis, or demonstration
of the impossibility of an external world^.

Berkeley's Three Dialogues were published in June. In the
middle of that same month he was in Oxford, “a most delightful
place,” where he spent two months, “witnessed the Act and grand
performances at the theatre, and a great concourse from London
and the country, amongst whom were several foreigners.” The
Drury Lañe Company had gone down to Oxford, and Cato was
on the stage for several nights. The Percival correspondence now
first discloses this prolonged visit to Oxford in the summer of
1713, that ideal home from whence, forty years after, he departed
on a more mysterious journey than any on this planet. In a letter
from thence to Percival, he had claimed Arbuthnot as one of
the converts to the “new Principie.” Percival replied that Swift
demurred to this, on which Berkeley rejoins: “As to what you

[xii] say of Dr. Arbuthnot not being of my opinión, it is true there
has been some difference between us concerning some notions

® See vol. III, Appendix B.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

relating to the necessity of the laws of nature; but this does not
touch the main points of the non-existenee of what philosophers
eall material substanee; against whieh he aeknowledges he ean
assert nothing.” One would gladly have got more than this
from Berkeley, about what touehed his favourite eoneeption of
the “arbitrariness” of law in nature, as distinguished from the
“neeessity” whieh some modern physieists are ready vaguely to
take for granted.

The seene now ehanges. On Oetober 15 Berkeley
suddenly writes from London: “I am on the eve of going to
Sieily, as ehaplain to Lord Peterborough, who is Ambassador
Extraordinary on the eoronation of the new king.” He had been
reeommended by Swift to the Ambassador, one of the most
extraordinary eharaeters then in Europe, who a few years before
had astonished the world in the war of the Sueeession in Spain,
and afterwards by his genius as a diplomatist: in Holland, nearly a
quarter of a eentury before, he had formed an intimate friendship
with John Loeke. Ten months in Eranee and Italy in the suite of
Lord Peterborough brought the young Irish metaphysieian, who
had lately been introdueed to the wits of London and the dons
of Oxford, into a new world. It was to him the beginning of a
eareer of wandering and soeial aetivity, whieh lasted, with little
interruption, for nearly twenty years, during whieh metaphysies
and authorship were in the baekground. On November 25 we find
him in Paris, writing letters to Pereival and Prior. “Erom London
to Calais”, he tells Prior, “I eame in eompany of a Elamand, a
Spaniard, a Erenehman, and three English servants of my Lord.

The three gentlemen, being of three different nations, obliged
me to speak the Ereneh language (whieh is now familiar), and
gave me the opportunity of seeing mueh of the world in little
eompass.... On November 1 (O.S.) I embarked in the stage- [xiü]
eoaeh, with a eompany that were all perfeet strangers to me.

There were two Seoteh, and one English gentleman. One of the

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xliii]

former happened to be the author of the Voyage to St. Kilda
and the Account of the Western Isles^. We were good company
on the road; and that day se'ennight carne to París. I have since
been taken up in viewing churches, convents, palaces, colleges,
&c., which are very numerous and magnificent in this town. The
splendour and riches of these things surpasses belief; but it were
endless to descend to particulars. I was present at a disputation
in the Sorbonne, which indeed had much of the French fire in
it. I saw the Irish and the English Colleges. In the latter I
saw, enclosed in a coffin, the body of the late King James....
To-morrow I intend to visit Father Malebranche, and discourse
him on certain points.”

The Abbé D'Aubigné, as he informs Percival, was to introduce
him to Malebranche, then the chief philosopher of France, whose
Vision of the world in God had some affinity with Berkeley's
own thought. Unfortunately we have no record of the intended
interview with the French idealist, who fourteen years before
had been visited by Addison, also on his way to Italy, when
Malebranche expressed great regard for the English nation, and
admiration for Newton; but he shook his head when Hobbes
was mentioned, whom he ventured to disparage as a “poor silly
creature.” Malebranche died nearly two years after Berkeley's
proposed interview; and according to a story countenanced by
Dugald Stewart, Berkeley was the “occasional cause” of his
death. He found the venerable Father, we are told, in a cell,
cooking, in a pipkin, a medicine for a disorder with which he
was troubled. The conversation naturally turned on Berkeley's
System, of which Malebranche had received some knowledge
from a translation. The issue of the debate proved tragical to poor
Malebranche. In the heat of disputation he raised his voice so
high, and gave way so freely to the natural impetuosity of a man
of genius and a Frenchman, that he brought on a violent increase

’ Murdoch Martin, a native of Skye, author of a Voyage to St. Kilda (1698),
and a Description ofthe Western Islands ofScotland (1703).

George Berkeley, By The Editor

of his disorder, which carried him off a few days after^. This
romantic tale is, I suspeet, mythieal. The Pereival eorrespondenee
shews that Berkeley was living in London in Oetober, 1715, the
month in whieh Malebranehe died, and I find no traee of a short
sudden visit to Paris at that time.

After a month spent in Paris, another fortnight earried Berkeley
and two travelling eompanions to Italy through Savoy. They
erossed Mont Genis on New Year's Day in 1714—“one of the
most diffieult and formidable parts of the Alps whieh is ever
passed over by mortal man,” as he tells Prior in a letter from
Turin. “We were earried in open ehairs by men used to seale these
roeks and preeipiees, whieh at this season are more slippery and
dangerous than at other times, and at the best are high, eraggy,
and steep enough to eause the heart of the most valiant man to
melt within him.” At the end of other six weeks we find him
at Leghorn, where he spent three months, “while my lord was
in Sieily.” He “prefers England or Ireland to Italy: the only
advantage is in point of air.” Erom Eeghorn he writes in May a
eomplimentary letter to Pope, on the oeeasion of the Rape of the
Lock: “Style, painting, judgment, spirit, I had already admired in
your other writings; but in this I am eharmed with the magie of
your invention, with all those images, allusions, and inexplieable
beauties whieh yon raise so surprisingly, and at the same time
so naturally, out of a trifle.... I remember to have heard yon
mention some half-formed design of eoming to Italy. What [xiiv]
might we not expeet from a muse that sings so well in the bleak
elimate of England, if she felt the same warm sun and breathed
the same air with Virgil and Horaee.” In July we find Berkeley
in Paris on his way baek to England. He had “parted from Eord
Peterborough at Genoa, where my lord took post for Turin, and
thenee designed passing over the Alps, and so through Savoy,

* See Stewart's Works (ed. Hamilton), vol. I. p. 161. There is a versión of
this story by DeQuincey, in his quaint essay on Murder considered as one of
the Fine Arls.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xlv]

on his way to England.” In August they are in London, where
the aspect of English politics was changed by the death of the
Queen in that month. He seems to have had a fever soon after
his return. In October, Arbuthnot, in one of his chatty letters to
Swift, writes thus: “Poor philosopher Berkeley has now the idea
of health, which was very hard to produce in him, for he had an
idea of a strange fever upon him, so strange that it was very hard
to destroy it by introducing a contrary one.”

Our record of the two following years is a long blank, first
broken by a letter to Percival in July, 1715, dated at Eondon.
Whether he spent any time at Eulham with Eord Peterborough
after their return from Italy does not appear, ñor whether he
visited Ireland in those years, which is not likely. We have
no glimpses of brilliant Eondon society as in the preceding
year. Steele was now in Parliament. Swift had returned to
Dublin, and Addison was the Irish chief secretary. But Pope
was still at Binfield, among the glades of Windsor, and Berkeley
congratulated him after receiving the first volume of his Homer.
Of his own literary pursuits we hear nothing. Perhaps the Second
Part of the Principies, which was lost afterwards in his travels,
engaged him. In the end of July he wrote to Eord Percival^ from
Elaxley^® on the Severn; and in August, September, October, and
November he wrote from Eondon, chiefly interested in reports
about “the rebels in Scotland,” and “the forces under Eord Mar,
which no doubt will languish and disperse in a little time. The
Bishop of Bristol assured me the other day that the Court expect
that the Duke of Orleans would, in case of need, supply them
with forces against the Pretender.” Our next glimpse of him is in
May, 1716, when he writes to Eord Percival that he is “like soon
to go to Ireland, the Prince of Wales having recommended him
to the Eords Justices for the living of St. Paul's in Dublin.” This
opening was soon closed, and the visit to Ireland was abandoned.

® Sir John became Lord Percival in that year.

A place more than once visited by Berkeley.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

A groundless suspicion of Jacobitism was not overeóme by the
interest of Caroline, Prineess of Wales. In June, 1716, Charles
Dering wrote from Dublin, that “the Lords Justiees have made a
strong representation against him.” He had to look elsewhere for
the immediate future.

We find him at Turin in November, 1716, with a fresh leave
of absenee for two years from his College. It seems that Ashe,
Bishop of Clogher, had engaged him as travelling tutor to his
son, a means not then uneommon for enabling young authors
of modérate fortune to see new eountries and mix with soeiety.
Addison had visited Italy in this way sixteen years before, and
Adam Smith long afterwards travelled with the young Duke of
Bueeleueh. With young Ashe, Berkeley erossed Mont Genis a
seeond time. They reaehed Rome at the beginning of 1717. His
Journal in Italy in that year, and oeeasional letters to Percival,

Pope, and Arbuthnot, shew ardent interest in nature and art.

With the widest views, “this very great though singular sort of
man deseended into a minute detail, and begrudged neither pains
ñor expense for the means of information. He travelled through
a great part of Sieily on foot; elambered over the mountains
and erept into the eaverns, to investígate its natural history and
diseover the eauses of its voleanoes; and 1 have known him sit
for hours in forges and foundries to inspeet their sueeessive [xivi]
operations^^” If the Journal had been transformed by his own
hand into a book, his letter to Pope from Inarime shews that the
book might have rivalled Addison's Remarles on Parts of Italy in
grace of style and large human interest.

In the summer of 1720 we find the travellers at Florenee,
afterwards for some time at Lyons, and in London at the beginning
of the next year. On the way home his metaphysieal inspiration
was revived. The “Cause of Motion” had been proposed by the
Freneh Aeademy as the subjeet of aprize dissertation. The subjeet

'* Bakewell's Memoirs ofthe Court of Augustas, vol. II. p. 177.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xlvii]

gave an opportunity for further unfolding his early thought. In
the Principies and the Dialogues he had argued for the necessary
dependence of matter, for its concrete substantial reality, upon
living percipient mind. He would now shew its powerlessness
as it is presented to us in sense. The material world, chiefly
under the category of substance, inspired the Principies. The
material world, under the category of cause or power, inspired
the De Motu. This Latin Essay sums up the distinctive thought
of Berkeley, as it appears in the authorship of his early life.
Moles evolvit et agitat mentes might be taken as the formula of
the materialism which he sought to dissolve. Mens percipit et
agitat molem significantem, cujas esse estpercipi expresses what
Berkeley would substitute for the materialistic formula.

The end of the summer of 1721 found Berkeley still in London.
England was in the social agitation and misery consequent upon
the failure of the South Sea Company, a gigantic commercial
speculation connected with British trade in America. A new
inspiration took possession of him. He thought he saw in this
catastrophe signs of a decline in public moráis worse than that
which followed the Restoration. “Political corruption”, “decay
of religión,” “growth of atheism,” were descriptive words used
by the thoughtful. Berkeley's eager imagination was apt to
exaggerate the evil. He became inspired by social idealism, and
found vent for his fervour in An Essay towards preventing the
Ruin of Great Britain, which, as well as the De Motu, made
its appearance in 1721. This Essay is a significan! factor in his
career. It was the Cassandra wail of a sorrowful and indignan!
prophet, prepared to shake the dust from his feet, and to transfer
his eye of hope to other regions, in which a nearer approach to
Utopia might be realised. The true personality of the individual
is unrealisable in selfish isolation. His favourite non sibi, sed toti
mundo was henceforward more than ever the ruling maxim of
his life.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

II. Middle Life (1722-34).

In October, 1721, Berkeley was in Dublin. The register of the
College shews that “on November 14, 1721, Mr. Berkeley had
the graee of the House for the Degree of Baehelor and Doetor of
Divinity.” There is no ground for the report that he returned to
Ireland at this time as Chaplain to the Duke of Grafton, the Lord
Lieutenant^^. But preferment in the Chureh seemed within bis
reaeh. “1 had no sooner set foot on shore,” he wrote to Pereival
in that Oetober, “than 1 heard that the Deanery of Dromore was
vaeant.” Pereival used bis influenee with the Lord Lieutenant,
and in Lebruary, 1722, Berkeley's patent was “passing the Seáis [xiviü]
for the Deanery of Dromore.” But the Bishop of Dromore elaimed
the patronage, and this led to a protraeted and ineffeetual lawsuit,
whieh took Berkeley to London in the following winter, “to see
friends and inform himself of points of law,” and he tells that
“on the way he was nearly drowned in erossing to Holyhead^^.”

Berkeley's interest in ehureh preferment was not personal. He
saw in it only means to an end. In Mareh, 1723, he surprised Lord
Pereival by announeing, in a letter from London, a projeet whieh
it seems for some time had oeeupied his thoughts. “It is now
about ten months,” he says, “sinee 1 have determined to spend
the residue of my days in Bermuda, where 1 trust in Providenee
1 may be the mean instrument of doing great good to mankind.
Whatever happens, go 1 am resolved, if 1 live. Half a dozen of
the most ingenious and agreeable men in our College are with

A letter in Berkeley's Life and Letters, p. 93, whieh led me to a different
Opinión, I have now reason to believe was not written by him, ñor was it written
in 1721. The research of Dr. Lorenz, confirmed by intemal evidence, shews
that it was written in October, 1684, before Berkeley the philosopher was born,
and when the Duke of Ormond was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. The writer was
probably the Hon. and Rev. George Berkeley, a Prebendary of Westminster in
1687, who died in 1694. The wife of the “pious Robert Nelson” was a daughter
of Earl Berkeley, and this “George” was her younger brother.

Pereival MSS.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[xlix]

me in this project, and since I carne hither I have got together
about a dozen Englishmen of quality, who intend to retire to
those islands.” He then explains the project, opening a visión
of Christian civilisation radiating from those fair islands of the
West, whose idyllic bliss poets had sung, diffused over the New
World, with its magnificent possibilities in the future history of
mankind.

I find no further record of the origin of this bright visión.
As it had become a practical determination “ten months” before
March, 1723, one is carried back to the first months after his
return to Dublin and to the Essay that was called forth by the
South Sea catastrophe. One may conjecture that despair of
England and the Oíd World—“such as Europe breeds in her
decay”—led him to look westward for the hopeful future of
mankind, moved, perhaps, by the connexion of the catastrophe
with America. His active imagination pictured a better Republic
than Plato's, and a grander Utopia than More's, emanating from
a College in the isles of which Waller had sung.

In the meantime a curious fortune unexpectedly favoured him.
Swift's unhappy Vanessa, associated with Bury Street in 1713,
had settled on her property at Marley Abbey near Dublin; and
Swift had privately married Stella, as she confessed to Vanessa,
who thereafter revoked the bequest of her fortune to Swift, and
left it to be divided between Berkeley and Marshal, afterwards
an Irish judge. Vanessa died in May, 1723. A few days
after Berkeley wrote thus to Eord Percival: “Here is something
that will surprise your lordship as it doth me. Mrs. Hester
Vanhomrigh, a lady to whom I was a perfect stranger, having
never in the whole course of my life exchanged a word with her,
died on Sunday. Yesterday her Will was opened, by which it
appears that I am constituted executor, the advantage whereof
is computed by those who understand her affairs to be worth
£3000.... My Bermuda scheme is now stronger in my mind
than ever; this providential event having made many things easy

George Berkeley, By The Editor

which were otherwise before.” Lord Percival in reply concludes
that he would “persist more than ever in that noble seheme,
whieh may in some time exalt your ñame beyond that of St.
Xavier and the most famous missionaries abroad.” But he warns
him that, “without the proteetion of Government,” he would
eneounter insurmountable diffieulties. The Vanessa legaey, and
the obstruetions in the way of the Deanery of Dromore, were the
subjeets of a tedious eorrespondenee with his friend and business
faetotum, “Tom Prior,” in 1724 and the three following years. In
the end, the debts of Vanessa absorbed most of the legaey. And
as to the Deanery of Dromore, he tells Pereival, on September 19,
1723: “I despair of seeing it end to my advantage. The truth is,
my fixed purpose of going to Bermuda sets me above solieiting
anything with earnestness in this part of the world. It ean be
of no use to me, but as it may enable me the better to proseeute
that design; and it must be owned that the present possession
of something in the Chureh would make my applieation for an
establishment in those islands more eonsidered.”

Nevertheless, he got a Deanery at last. In May, 1724,
he informs Lord Pereival from Trinity College: “Yesterday I
reeeived my patent for the best Deanery in the kingdom, that
of Derry. It is said to be worth £1500 per annum. But as I do
not eonsider it with an eye to enriehing myself, so I shall be
perfeetly eontented if it faeilitates and reeommends my seheme
of Bermuda, whieh I am in hopes will meet with a better
reeeption if it eomes from one possessed of so great a Deanery.”
In September he is on his way, not to Derry, but to London, “to
raise funds and obtain a Charter for the Bermuda College from
George the Lirst,” fortified by a remarkable letter from Swift to
Lord Carteret, the new Lord Lieutenant, who was then in Bath^^.
As Swift predieted in this letter, Berkeley's eonquests spread far
and fast in England, where he organised his resourees during the

For the letter, see Editor's Preface to the Proposalfor a College in Bermuda,
vol. IV. pp. 343-44.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

four following years. Nothing shews more signally the magic
of his personality than the story of his life in London in those
years of negotiation and endeavour. The proposal met with a
response wonderful in a generation represented by Walpole. The
subscriptions soon reached five thousand pounds, and Walpole
was among the subscribers. The Scriblerus Club, meeting at Lord
Bathurst's, agreed to rally Berkeley, who was among them, on his
Bermuda scheme. He asked to be heard in defence, and presented
the case with such forcé of enthusiasm that the company “were
struck dumb, and after a pause simultaneously rose and asked
leave to accompany him.” Bermuda for a time inspired London.

Berkeley was not satisfied with this. He remembered
what Lord Percival had said about failure without help from
Government. Accordingly he obtained a Charter from George
the First early in 1726, and after canvassing the House of
Commons, secured a grant of £20,000, with only two dissentient
votes, in May of that year. This was the beginning of his
difficulties. Payment was indefinitely delayed, and he was kept
negotiating; besides, with the help of Prior, he was unravelling
legal perplexities in which the Vanessa legacy was involved. It
was in these years that he was seen at the receptions of Caroline at
Leicester Fields, when she was Princess of Wales, and afterwards
at St. James's or at Kensington, when she became Queen in 1727;
not, he says, because he loved Courts, but because he loved
America. Clarke was still rector of St. James's, and Butler had
not yet migrated to his parsonage at Stanhope; so their society
was open to him. The Queen liked to listen to a philosophical
discussion. Ten years before, as Princess of Wales, she had
been a royal go-between in the famous correspondence between
Clarke and Leibniz. And now, Berkeley being in London, he too
was asked to her weekly reunions, when she loved to hear Clarke
arguing with Berkeley, or Berkeley arguing with Hoadley. Also
in 1726 Voltaire made his lengthened visit to England, a familiar
figure in the circle of Pope's friends, attracted to the philosophy

George Berkeley, By The Editor

of Locke and Newton; and Voltaire mentions that he met “the
diseoverer of the true theory of visión” during his stay in London.

From the snmmer of 1727 until the spring of 1728 there is
no extant eorrespondenee either with Pereival or “Tom Prior” to
throw light on his movements. In Fehruary, 1728, he was still
in Fondon, but he “hoped to set out for Dublin in Mareh, and to
Ameriea in May.” There is a mystery about this visit to Dublin.
“1 propose to set out for Dublin about a month henee,” he writes
to “dear Tom,” “but of this you must not give the least intimation
to anybody. It is of all things my earnest desire (and for very
good reasons) not to have it known that 1 am in Dublin. Speak
not, therefore, one syllable of it to any mortal whatsoever. When
1 formerly desired you to take a plaee for me near the town, you
gave out that you were looking for a retired lodging for a friend
of yours; upon whieh everybody surmised me to be the person.
1 must beg you not to aet in the like manner now, but to take for
me an entire house in your own ñame, and as for yourself; for,
all things eonsidered, 1 am determined upon a whole house, with
no mortal in it but a maid of your own putting, who is to look
on herself as your servant. Fet there be two bed-ehambers: one
for you, another for me; and, as you like, you may ever and anón
lie there. 1 would have the house, with neeessary furniture, taken
by the month (or otherwise, as you ean), for 1 propose staying
not beyond that time; and yet perhaps 1 may. Take it as soon as
possible.... Fet me entreat you to say nothing of this to anybody,
but to do the thing direetly.... 1 would of all things ... have a
proper plaee in a retired situation, where 1 may have aeeess to
fields and sweet air provided against the moment 1 arrive. 1 am
inelined to think one may be better eoneealed in the outermost
skirt of the suburbs, than in the eountry or within the town.... A
house quite detaehed in the eountry 1 should have no objeetion
to, provided you judge that 1 shall not be hable to diseovery in
it. The plaee ealled Bermuda 1 am utterly against. Dear Tom,
do this matter eleanly and eleverly, without waiting for further

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

advice.... To the person from whom you hire it (whom alone I
would have you speak of it to) it will not seem strange you should
at this time of the year be desirous, for your own convenience or
health, to have a place in a free and open air.” This mysterious
letter was written in April. From April till September Berkeley
again disappears. There is in all this a curious secretiveness of
which one has repeated examples in his life. Whether he went to
Dublin in that spring, or why he wanted to go, does not appear.

But in September he emerges unexpectedly at Gravesend,
newly married, and ready to sail for Rhode Island, “in a ship
of 250 tons which he had hired.” The marriage, according to
Stock, took place on August 1, whether in Ireland or in England
I cannot tell. The lady was Anne, daughter of John Forster, late
Chief Justice, and then Speaker of the Irish House of Commons.
She shared his fortune when he was about to engage in the
most romantic, and ideally the grandest, Christian mission of the
eighteenth century. According to tradition she was a devoutly
religious mystic: Fénelon and Madame Guyon were among her
favourites. “I chose her,” he tells Lord Percival, “for her qualities
of mind and her unaffected inclination to books. She goes with
great thankfulness, to live a plain farmer's life, and wear stuff of
her own spinning. I have presented her with a spinning-wheel.”
A letter to Prior, dated “Gravesend September 5, 1728,” thus
describes the little party on the eve of their departure:—“To-
morrow, with God's blessing, I set sail for Rhode Island, with my
wife and a friend of hers, my Lady Handcock's daughter, who
bears us company. I am married since I saw you to Miss Lorster,
whose humour and turn of mind picases me beyond anything
that I know in her whole sex. Mr. James^^, Mr. Dalton, and Mr.
Smibert^^ go with us on this voyage. We are now all together
at Gravesend, and are engaged in one view.” We are further

Afterwards Sir John James.

Smibert the artist, who made a picture of Berkeley in 1725, and afterwards
in America of the family party then at Gravesend.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

told^^ that they carried stores and goods to a great valué, and
that the Dean “embarked 20,000 books, besides what the two
gentlemen earried. They sailed in September for Rhode Island, [liv]
where the Dean intends to winter, and to purehase an estáte, in
order to settle a eorrespondenee and trade between that island
and Bermudas.” Berkeley was in bis forty-fourth year, when,
full of glowing visions of Christian Empire in the West, “Time's
noblest offspring,” he left England, on bis way to Bermuda, with
the promise of Sir Robert Walpole that he should reeeive the
promised grant after he had made an investment. He bought land
in Ameriea, but he never reaehed Bermuda.

Towards the end of January, in 1729, the little party, in the
“hired ship of 250 tons,” made their appearanee in Narragansett
Bay, on the western side of Rhode Island. “Blundering about
the oeean,” they had touehed at Virginia on the way, whenee a
eorrespondent, seeptieal of the enterprise, informs Eord Pereival
that the Dean “had dined with the Governor, and visited our
College,” but thinks that “when the Dean eomes to put his
visionary seheme into praetiee, he will find it no better than a
religious frenzy,” and that “he is as mueh a Don Quixote in zeal
as that renowned knight was in ehivalry. I wish the good Dean
may not find out at last that Waller really kidnapt him o ver to
Bermuda, and that the projeet he has been drawn into may not
prove in every point of it poetieal.”

We have a pieture of the landing at Newport, on a winter
day early in 1729. “Yesterday arrived here Dean Berkeley of
Eondonderry, in a pretty large ship. He is a gentleman of
middle stature, of an agreeable, pleasant, and ereet aspeet. He
was ushered into the town with a great number of gentlemen,
to whom he behaved himself after a very eomplaisant manner.

'Tis said he proposes to tarry here with his family about three
months ^ ^Newport was then a flourishing town, nearly a eentury

Historical Register, vol. XIII, p. 289 (1728).

** New England Weekly Courier, Feb. 3, 1729.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

oíd, an emporium of American commerce, in those days the rival
[iv] of Boston and New York. He was “never more agreeably

surprised,” he says, than “at the size of the town and harbour.”
Around him was some of the softest rural and grandes! ocean
scenery in the world, which had fresh charms even for one whose
boyhood was spent in the valley of the Nore, who had lingered
in the Bay of Naples, and wandered in Inarime and among the
mountains of Sicily. He was seventy miles from Boston, and
about as far from Newhaven and Yale College. A range of
bilis crosses the centre of the island, whence meadows slope to
the rocky shore. The Gulf Stream tempers the surrounding sea.
“The people,” he tells Percival, “are industrious; and though less
orthodox have not less virtue, and I am sure they have more
regularity, than those I left in Europe. They are indeed a strange
medley of different persuasions.” The gentry retained the customs
of the squires in England: tradition tells of a cheerful society: the
fox Chase, with hounds and horses, was a favourite recreation.
The society, for so remóte a región, was well informed. The
family libraries and pictures which remain argüe culture and
refinement. Smibert, the artist of the missionary party, who had
moved to Boston, soon found employment in America, and his
pictures still adorn houses in Rhode Island^^.

The Dean and his young wife lived in Newport for some
months after their arrival. Mr. Honeyman, a missionary of
the English Society, had been placed there, in Trinity Church,
in 1704. The church is still a conspicuous object from the
harbour. Berkeley preached in it three days after his arrival, and
occasionally afterwards. Notes of his sermons are included in
this edition among his Miscellaneous Works.

In the summer of 1729 he moved from Newport to a quiet
[ivi] valley in the interior of the island, where he bought a farm, and

For valuable information about Rhode Island, reproduced in Berkeley's Life
and Correspondence and here, I am indebted to Colonel Higginson, to whom I
desire to make this tardy but grateful acknowledgement.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

built a house. In this island-home, named Whitehall, he lived
for more than two years—years of domestie happiness, and of
resumed study, mueh interrupted sinee he left Dublin in 1713.
The house may still be seen, a little aside from the road that runs
eastward from Newport, about three miles from the town. It is
built of wood. The south-west room was probably the library.
The oeean is seen in the distanee, while orehards and groves offer
the shade and silenee whieh soothed the thinker in bis reeluse
life. No invitations of the three eompanions of bis voyage^*^,
who had migrated to Boston, eould allure him from this retreat,
where he diverted his anxieties about Bermuda by the thoughts
whieh found expression in the dialogues of Alciphron, redolent
of Rhode Island and the invigorating breezes of its oeean shore.
Tradition tells that mueh oí Alciphron was the issue of meditation
in the open air, at a favourite retreat, beneath the Hanging Roeks,
whieh eommands an extensive view of the beaeh and the oeean;
and the ehair in whieh he sat in this aleove is still preserved with
veneration.

While Berkeley lo ved domestie quiet at Whitehall^ ^ and the
“still air of delightful studies,” he mixed oeeasionally in the
soeiety of Newport. He found it not uneongenial, and soon
after he was settled at Whitehall he led the way in forming a
elub, whieh held oeeasional meetings, the germ of the Redwood
Library, still a useful Newport institution. His own house was a
plaee of meeting for the New England missionaries.

James, Dalton, and Smibert.

Whitehall, having fallen into decay, has been lately restored by the pious
effoits of Mrs. Livingston Masón, in conceit with the Rev. Dr. E. E. Hale, and
others. This good work was completed in the summer of 1900; and the house
is now as nearly as possible in the State in whieh Berkeley left it.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ivii]

Whitehall, Berkeley's Residence in Rhode Island

Soon after his arrival in Rhode Island, Berkeley was visited
by the Reverend Samuel Johnson, missionary at Stratford, an
acute and independen! thinker, one of the two contemporary
representatives of philosophy in America. The other was
Jonathan Edwards, at that time Congregational minister at
Northampton on the Connecticut river. They had both adopted
a conception of the meaning and office of the material world in
the economy of existence that was in many respects similar to
Berkeley's^^. It seems that Berkeley's book of Principies had
before this fallen into Johnson's hands. He hastened to visit
the author when he heard of his arrival. A succession of visits
and a life-long correspondence followed. The “non-existence of
Matter,” interpreted as a whimsical and even insane paradox, was
found by Johnson to mean the absence of unrealisable Substance
behind the real material world that is presented to our senses,
and of unrealisable Power in the successive sense-presented
appearances of which alone we are percipient. He carne to see
the real existence of the things of sense in the constan! order of
the data of sense, through which we gain our knowledge of the
existence of our fellow men, and of the omnipresent constan!
Providence of God; whose Ideas are the true archetypes of the
22

See vol. III, Appendix C.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

visible World. He adopted and applied this eoneeption with a
lueidity and foree whieh give him a high plaee among Ameriean
thinkers.

All the while a eloud darkened the reeluse Ufe at Whitehall. In
June, 1729, Berkeley explains to Pereival the eireumstanees and
seereey of bis departure from England:—

“Before I left England I was redueed to a diffieult situation.
Had I eontinued there, the report would have obtained (whieh I
had found beginning to spread) that I had dropped the design,
after it had eost me and my friends so mueh trouble and expense.
On the other hand, if I had taken leave of my friends, even
those who assisted and approved my undertaking would have
eondemned my eoming abroad before the King's bounty was
reeeived. This obliged me to eome away in the prívate manner
that I did, and to run the risque of a tedious winter voyage.
Nothing less would have eonvineed the world that I was in
earnest, after the report I knew was growing to the eontrary.”

Months passed, and Walpole's promise was still unfulfilled.
“I wait here,” he tells Eord Pereival in Mareh, 1730, “with all
the anxiety that attends suspense, until I know what I ean depend
upon, or what eourse I am to take. On the one hand I have no
notion that the Court would put what men eall a bite upon a poor
elergyman, who depended upon eharters, grants, votes, and the
like engagements. On the other hand, I see nothing done towards
payment of the money.” Eater on he writes—“As for the raillery
of European wits, I should not mind it, if I saw my College go on
and prosper; but I must own the disappointments I have met with
in this partieular have nearly touehed me, not without affeeting
my health and spirits. If the founding a College for the spread
of religión and learning in Ameriea had been a foolish projeet, it
eannot be supposed the Court, the Ministers, and the Parliament
would have given sueh publie eneouragement to it; and if, after
all that eneouragement, they who engaged to endow and proteet

[Iviii]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

it let it drop, the disappointment indeed may be to me, but the
censure, I think, will light elsewhere.”

The suspense was at last ended. Gibson, the Bishop of London,
pressed Walpole for a final answer. “If,” he replied, “you put
this question to me as a Minister, I must, and can, assure you that
the money shall most undoubtedly be paid, as soon as suits with
public convenience; but if you ask me as a friend, whether Dean
Berkeley should continué in America expecting the payment of
twenty thousand pounds, I advise him by all means to return borne
to Europe, and to give up bis present expectations.” It was thus
that in 1731 the Prime Minister of England crushed the project
conceived ten years before, and to which the intervening period
had, under bis encouragement, been devoted by the projector
with a singular enthusiasm.

Berkeley's Alcove, Rhode Island

A few months after this heavy blow, Berkeley, with bis
wife, and Henry their infant child, bade farewell to the island
borne. They sailed from Boston in the late autumn of 1731,
and in the following Eebruary we find them in Eondon. Thus
ended the romantic episode of Rhode Island, with its ideal of

George Berkeley, By The Editor

Christian civilisation, which so moves the heart and touches the
imagination in our retrospect of the eighteenth eentury. Of all
who have ever landed on the Ameriean shore, none was ever
moved by a purer and more self-saerifieing spirit. Ameriea still
aeknowledges that by Berkeley's visit on this mission it has been
invested with the halo of an illustrious ñame, and assoeiated with
religious devotion to a magnifieent ideal, even if it was sought to
be realised by impraetieable means. To reform the New World,
and mankind at last, by a College on an island in the Atlantie, six
hundred miles from Ameriea, the Indians whom it was intended
to eivilise being mostly in the interior of the eontinent, and none
in Bermuda, was not unnaturally eonsidered Quixotie; and that
it was at first supported by the British Court and Parliament is
a wonderful tribute to the persuasive genius of the projeetor.
Perhaps he was too mueh influeneed by Lord Pereival's idea,
that it eould not be realised by prívate benevolenee, without
the intervention of the Crown. But the indireet influenee of
Berkeley's Ameriean inspiration is apparent in many ways in
the intelleetual and spiritual life of that great eontinent, during
the last eentury and a half, espeeially by the impulse given to
aeademieal edueation. It is the testimony of an Ameriean author
that, “by methods different from those intended by Berkeley, and
in ways more manifold than even he eould have dreamed, he has
sinee aeeomplished, and through all eoming time, by a thousand
ineffaeeable influenees, he will eontinue to aeeomplish, some [ix]
portion at least of the results whieh he had aimed at in the
founding of his university. It is the oíd story over again; the
tragedy of a Providenee wiser than man's foresight; God giving
the vietory to His faithful servant even through the bitterness of
overruling him and defeating him^^.” Ameriean Empire, as we
now see it with its boundless benefieent influenee, is at least an

Three Men of Letters, by Moses Coit Tyler (New York, 1895). He records
some of the American aeademieal and other institutions that are directly or
indirectly, due to Berkeley.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

imperfect realisation of Berkeley's dream.

Berkeley's head quarters were in London, in Green Street, for
more than two years after the return to England in the beginning
of 1732. Extant correspondence with Eord Percival ends in
Rhode Island, and our picture of the two years in Eondon is
faintly formed by letters to Prior and Johnson. These speak of
ill-health, and breathe a less sanguino spirit. The brilliant social
life of former visits was less attractive now, even if oíd friends
had remained. But Swift had quitted England for ever, and Steele
had followed Addison to the grave. Gay, the common friend of
Berkeley and Pope, died soon after the return from Rhode Island,
and Arbuthnot was approaching his end at Hampstead. Samuel
Clarke had passed away when Berkeley was at Whitehall; but
Seeker now held the rectory of St. James's, and Butler was in
studious retirement on the Wear; while Pope was at Twickenham,
publishing his Essay on Man, receiving visits from Bolingbroke,
or visiting Eord Bathurst at Cirencester Park. Queen Caroline,
too, was holding her receptions at Kensington; but “those who
imagine (as you write),” he tells Prior in January, 1734, “that
1 have been making my court here all this time, would never
believe (what is most true) that 1 have not been at the Court or
at the Minister's but once these seven years. The care of my
health and the love of retirement have prevailed over whatsoever
ambition might have come to my share.” There is a hint of a visit
to Oxford, at Commemoration in 1733, when his friend Seeker
received the honorary degree.

Soon after he had settled in Eondon, the fruit of his studies in
Rhode Island was given to the world in the Seven Dialogues of
Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher. Here the philosophical
inspiration of his early years is directed to sustain faith in Divine
Moral Order, and in the Christian Revelation. Alciphron is

George Berkeley, By The Editor

the longest, and in literary form perhaps the most finished of
his Works, unsurpassed in lively strokes of irony and satire.
Yet if it is to be regarded as a philosophieal justifieation of
religión, as against modern agnostieism, one may ineline to the
judgment of Mr. Leslie Stephen, that it is “the least admirable
of all its author's admirable works.” As we have seen, the seet
of free-thinkers was early the objeet of Berkeley's ridieule and
sareasm. They elaimed for themselves wide intelleetual visión,
yet they were blind to the deep realities of the universe; they took
exelusive eredit for freedom of thought, although their thinking
was eonfined within the narrow eompass of our data in sense.
The book of Principies, the Dialogues, and the De Motu of his
early years, were designed to bring into elear light the absolute
dependenee of the world that is presented to our senses on
Omnipresent Spirit; and the neeessary subjeetion of all ehanges
in our surroundings to the immediate ageney or providenee of
God. Boasted “free-thinking” was really a narrow atheism, so
he believed, in whieh meaningless Matter usurped the plaee that
belonged in reason to God, and he employed reason to diselose
Omnipotent Intelligenee in and behind the phenomena that are
presented to the senses in impotent natural sequenee.

The eauses of the widespread moral eorruption of the Oíd
World, whieh had moved Berkeley so profoundly, seem to have
been pondered anew during his reeluse life in Rhode Island. The
deeline of moráis was explained by the deifieation of Matter:
eonsequent life of sensuous pleasure aeeounted for deeay of
religión. That viee is hurtful was argued by free-thinkers like
Mandeville to be a vulgar error, and a fallaeious demonstration
was offered of its utility. That virtue is intrinsieally beautiful
was taught by Shaftesbury; but Berkeley judged the abstraet
beauty, with whieh “minute philosophers” were eontented, unfit
to move ordinary human beings to self-saerifieing aetion; for
this involves devotion to a Perfeet Person by whom goodness is
finally distributed. Religión alone inspires the larger and higher

[Ixii]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixiii]

Ufe, in presenting distributive justice personified on the throne
of the universe, instead of abstract virtue.

The turning-point in Alciphron is in man's visión of God.
This is pressed in the Fourth Dialogue. The free-thinker asserts
that “the notion of a Deity, or some invisible power, is of all
prejudices the most unconquerable; the most signal example of
belief without reason for believing.” He demands proof—“such
proof as every man of sense requires of a matter of fact.... Should
a man ask, why I believe there is a king of Great Britain? I might
answer, Because I had seen him. Or a king of Spain? Because
I had seen those who saw him. But as for this King of kings, I
neither saw Him myself, ñor any one else that ever did see Him.”
To which Euphranor replies, “What if it should appear that God
really speaks to man; would this content yon? What if it shall
appear plainly that God speaks to men by the intervention and use
of arbitrary, outward, sensible signs, having no resemblance or
necessary connexion with the things they stand for and suggest; if
it shall appear that, by innumerable combinations of these signs,
an endless variety of things is discovered and made known to us;
and that we are thereby instructed or informed in their different
natures; that we are taught and admonished what to shun and
what to pursue; and are directed how to regúlate our motions,
and how to act with respect to things distant from us, as well
in time as place: will this content you?” Euphranor accordingly
proceeds to shew that Visible Nature is a Eanguage, in which
the Universal Power that is continually at work is speaking to us
all, in a way similar to that in which our fellow men speak to
us; so that we have as much (even more) reason to believe in the
existence of the Universal Person who is the Speaker, as we have
to believe in the existence of persons around us; who become
known to us, when they too employ sense-symbols, in the words
and actions by which we discover that we are not alone in the
universe. Por men are really living spirits: their bodies are only
the sign of their spiritual personality. And it is so with God, who

George Berkeley, By The Editor

is also revealed in the visible world as a Spirit. “In a striet sense,”
says Euphranor, “I do not see Aleiphron, but only sueh visible
signs and tokens as suggest and infer the being of that invisible
thinking prineiple or soul. Even so, in the self-same manner,
it seems to me that, though I eannot with eyes of flesh behold
the invisible God, yet I do, in the sttietest sense, behold and
pereeive, by all my senses, sueh signs and tokens ... as suggest,
indieate, and demonsttate an invisible God as eertainly, and with
the same evidenee, at least, as any other signs, pereeived by
sense, do suggest to me the existenee of your soul, spirit, or
thinking prineiple; whieh I am eonvineed of only by a few signs
or effeets, and the motions of one small organised body; whereas
I do, at all times, and in all plaees, pereeive sensible signs whieh
evinee the being of God.” In short, God is the living Soul of
the Universe; as you and I are the living souls that keep our
bodies and their organs in signifieant motion. We ean interpret
the eharaeter of God in the history of the universe, even as we
ean interpret the eharaeter of our neighbour by observing bis [ixiv]
words and outward aetions.

This overwhelmed Aleiphron. “You stare to find that God
is not far from any one of us, and that in Him we live and
move and have our being,” rejoins Euphranor. “You who, in the
beginning of this eonferenee, thought it strange that God should
leave Himself without a witness, do now think it strange the
witness should be so full and elear.” “I must own I do,” was
the reply. “I never imagined it eould be pretended that we saw
God with our fleshly eyes, as plain as we see any human person
whatsoever, and that He daily speaks to our senses in a manifest
and elear dialeet.”

Although this reasoning satisfied Aleiphron, others may think
it ineonelusive. How one is able to diseover the existenee of
other persons, and even the meaning of finite personality, are
themselves questions full of speeulative diffieulty. But, waiving
this, the analogy between the relation of a human spirit to its

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixv]

body, and that of the Omnipresent and Omnipotent Spirit to the
Universa of things and persons, fails in several respects. God
is supposed to be continually creating the world by constant
and continuous Providence, and His Omniscience is supposed
to comprehend all its concrete relations: a man's body is not
absolutely dependent on the man's own power and providence;
and even his scientific knowledge of it, in itself and in its
relations, is scanty and imperfect, as his power over it is limitad
and conditioned. Then the little that a man gradually learns of
what is going on in the surrounding universa is dependent on
his senses: Omniscience comprehends Immensity and Eternity
(so we suppose) in a single intuition. Our bodies, moreover, are
visible things: the universa, this organism of God, is crowded
with persons, to whom there is nothing corresponding within the
organism which reveáis one man to another.

But this is not all. After Euphranor has found that the Universal
Power is Universal Spirit, this is still an inadequate God; for
what we want to know is what sort of Spirit God is. Is God
omnipotent or of limited power, regarded ethically, fair or unfair
in His treatment of persons; good or evil, according to the
highest yet attained conception of goodness; a God of love, or
a devil omnipotent? I infer the character of my neighbour from
his words and actions, patent to sense in the gradual outward
evolution of his life. I am asked to infer the character of the
Omnipresent Spirit from His words and actions, manifested in
the universe of things and persons. But we must not attribute to
the Cause more than it reveáis of itself in its effects. God and
men alike are known by the effects they produce. The Universal
Power is, on this condition, righteous, fair, and loving to the
degree in which those conceptions are implied in His visible
embodiment: to affirm more or other than this, on the basis of
analogy alone, is either to indulge in baseless conjecture, or to
submit blindly to dogma and authority.

Now the universe, as far as it comes within the range of

George Berkeley, By The Editor

human experience on this planet, is full of suffering and moral
disorder. The “religious hypothesis” of a perfeetly righteous and
benevolent God is here offered to aeeount for the appearanees
whieh the universe presents to us. But do these signify exaet
distributivo justiee? Is not visible nature apparently eruel and
unrelenting? If we infer eruelty in the eharaeter of a man, beeause
bis bodily aetions eause undeserved suffering, must we not, by
this analogy, infer in like manner regarding the eharaeter of the
Supremo Spirit, manifested in the progressive evolution of the
universal organism?

We find it impossible to determine with absoluto eertainty
the eharaeter oven of our fellow men, from their imperfeetly
interpreted words and aetions, so that eaeh man is more or less
a mystery to his fellows. The mystery deepens when we try to
read the eharaeter of animáis,—to interpret the motives whieh
determine the overt aets of dogs or horses. And if we were [ixvi]
able to eommunieate by visible signs with the inhabitants of
other planets, with how mueh greater diffieulty should we draw
eonelusions from their visible aets regarding their eharaeter?

But if this is so when we use the data of sense for reading the
eharaeter of finito persons, how infinite must be the diffieulty
of reading the eharaeter of the Eternal Spirit, in and through the
gradual evolution of the universe of things and persons, whieh
in this reasoning is supposed to be His body; and the history of
that universe the faets of His biography, in and by whieh He
is eternally revealing Himself! Eor we know nothing about the
unbeginning and unending. The universe of persons is assumed
to have no end', and 1 know not why its evolution must be
supposed to have had a beginning, or that there ever was a time
in whieh God was unmanifested, to finito persons.

Shall we in these eireumstanees turn with Euphranor, in the
Eifth and Sixth Dialogues, to professed revelation of the eharaeter
of the Universal Mind presented in miraeulous revelation, by
inspired prophets and apostles, who are brought forward as

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixvii]

authorities able to speak infallibly to the character of God? If
the whole course of nature, or endless evolution of events, is
the Divine Spirit revealed in omnipresent activity, what room
is there for any other less regular revelation? The universe of
common experience, it is implied by Berkeley, is essentially
miraculous, and therefore absolutely perfect. Is it consistent with
fairness, and benevolence, and love of goodness in all moral
agents for its own sake, that the Christian revelation should have
been so long delayed, and be still so incompletely made known?
Is not the existence of wicked persons on this or any other planet,
wicked men or devils, a dark spot in the visible life of God?
Does not perfect goodness in God mean restoration of goodness
in men, for its own sake, apart from their merit; and must not
Omnipotent Goodness, infinitely opposite to all evil, either
convert to goodness all beings in the universe who have made
themselves bad, or else relieve the universe of their perpetual
presence in ever-increasing wickedness?

Sceptical criticism of this sort has found expression in the
searching minute philosophy of a later day than Berkeley's
and Alciphron's; as in David Hume and Voltaire, and in the
agnosticism of the nineteenth century. Was not Euphranor
too ready to yield to the demand for a visible God, whose
character had accordingly to be determined by what appears
in nature and man, under the conditions of our limited and
contingent experience? Do we not need to look below data
of sensuous experience, and among the presuppositions which
must consciously or unconsciously be taken for granted in all
man's dealings with the environment in which he finds himself,
for the root of trustworthy experience? On merely physical
reasoning, like that of Euphranor, the righteous love of God is
an unwarranted inference, and it even seems to be contradicted
by visible facts presented in the history of the world. But
if Omnipotent Goodness must a priori be attributed to the
Universal Mind, as an indispensable condition for man's having

George Berkeley, By The Editor

reliable intercourse of any sort with nature; if this is the primary
postúlate neeessary to the existenee of truth of any kind—then
the “religious hypothesis” that God is Good, aeeording to the
highest eoneeption of goodness, is no groundless faney, hut the
fundamental faith-venture in whieh man has to live. It must stand
in reason; unless it ean be demonstrated that the mixture of good
and evil whieh the universe presents, neeessarily eontradiets this
fundamental presupposition: and if so, man is lost in pessimistie
Pyrrhonism, and ean assert nothing about anything^^.

The religious altruism, however inadequate, whieh Berkeley [ixviü]
offered in Alciphron made some noise at the time of its
appearanee, although its theistie argument was too subtle to
be popular. The eoneeption of the visible world as Divine Visual
Language was “reeeived with ridieule by those who make ridieule
the test of truth,” although it has made way sinee. “I have not
seen Dean Berkeley,” Gay the poet writes to Swift in the May
following the Dean's return, and very soon after the appearanee
of Alciphron, “hut I have been reading his book, and like many
parts of it; hut in general think with you that it is too speeulative.”
Warburton, with admiration for Berkeley, eannot eomprehend
his philosophy, and Hoadley shewed a less friendly spirit. A
Letter from a Country Clergyman, attributed to Lord Hervey,
the “Sporus” of Pope, was one of several ephemeral attaeks
whieh the Minute Philosopher eneountered in the year after its
appearanee. Three other erities, more worthy of eonsideration,
are mentioned in one of Berkeley's letters from London to his
Ameriean friend Johnson at Stratford: “As to the Bishop of
Cork's book, and the other book you allude to, the author of
whieh is one Baxter, they are both very little eonsidered here;

The thought implied in this paragraph is pursued in my Philosophy of
Theism, in whieh the ethical perfection of the Universal Mind is taken as the
fundamental postúlate in all human experience. If the Universal Mind is not
ethically perfect, the universe (including our spiritual constitution) is radically
untrustworthy.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixix]

for which reason I have taken no public notice of them. To
answer objections already answered, and repeat the same things,
is a needless as well as disagreeable task. Ñor should I have
taken notice of that Letter about Vision, had it not been printed
in a newspaper, which gave it course, and spread it through the
kingdom. Resides, the theory of Vision I found was somewhat
obscure to most people; for which reason I was not displeased at
an opportunity to explain it^^.” The explanation was given in The
Theory of Visual Language Vindicated, in January, 1733, as a
supplement to Alciphron. Its blot is a tone of polemical bitterness
directed against Shaftesbury^^.

Although Berkeley “took no public notice” of “the Bishop of
Cork's book^^” it touched a great question, which periodically
has awakened controversy, and been the occasion of mutual
misunderstanding among the controversialists in past ages. “Is
God knowable by man; or must religión be devotion to an object
that is iinknowahle?” In one of his first letters to Lord Percival, as
we saw, Berkeley animadverted on a sermón by the Archbishop
of Dublin, which seemed to deny that there was goodness, or
understanding God, any more than feet or hands. An opinión
somewhat similar had been attributed to Bishop Browne, in his
answer to Toland, and afterwards in 1728, in his Procedure and
Limits of Human Understanding.

This touched to the quick Berkeley's ultimate conception of

Life and Letters of Berkeley, p. 222.

The third Earl of Shaftesbury, the pupil of Locke, and author of the
Characteristics. In addition to the well-known biography by Dr. Fowler, the
present eminent Vice-Chancellor of Oxford, Shaftesbury has been interpreted
in two other lately published works—a Life by Benjamin Rand, Ph.D. (1900),
and an edition of the Characteristics, with an Introduction and Notes, by John
M. Robertson (1900).

The title of this book is— Things Divine and Supernatural conceived by
Analogy with Things Natural and Human, by the Author of The Procedure,
Extent and Limits ofthe Human Understanding. The Divine Analogy appeared
in 1733, and the Procedure in 1728.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

the universe, as realisable only in, and therefore necessarily
dependen! on, living mind. We are reminded of the famous
analogy of Spinoza^^. If the omnipresent and omnipotent
Mind, on whieh Euphranor rested, ean be ealled “mind” only
metaphorieally, and ean be ealled “good” only when the term
is used without human meaning, it may seem to be a matter of
indifferenee whether we have unknowable Matter or unknowable
Mind at the root of things and persons. Both are empty words.
The Power universally at work is equally unintelligible, equally
unfit to be the objeet of worship in the final venture of faith,
whether we use the term Matter or the term Mind. The universe
is neither explained ñor sustained by a “mind” that is mind only
metaphorieally. To eall this “God” is to eonsole us with an
empty abstraetion. The minutes! philosopher is ready to grant
with Aleiphron that “there is a God in this indefinito sense”;
sinee nothing ean be inferred from sueh an aeeount of God about
eonduet or religión.

The Bishop of Cork replied to the strietures of Euphranor in
the Minute Philosopher. He qualified and explained bis former
utteranees in some two hundred dull pagos of his Divine Analogy,
whieh hardly toueh the root of the matter. The question at issue
is the one whieh underlies modern agnostieism. It was raised
again in Britain in the nineteenth eentury, with deeper insight, by
Sir William Hamilton; followed by Dean Mansel, in eontroversy
with E. D. Mauriee, at the point of view of Arehbishop King and
Bishop Browne, in philosophieal vindieation of the mysteries
of Christian faith; by Mr. Herbert Speneer and by Huxley in a
minute philosophy that has been deepened by Hume's eritieism
of the rationale of theism in Berkeley^^.

Spinoza argües that what is ealled “understanding” and “will” in God, has
no more in common with human understanding and will than the dog-star in
the heavens has with the animal we cali a dog. See Spinoza's Ethica, I. 17,
Scholium.

The question of the knowableness of God, or Omnipotent Moral Perfection

[Ixx]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixxi]

Andrew Baxter's Inquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul,
referred to in Berkeley's letter to Johnson, appeared in 1733.
It has a chapter on “Dean Berkeley's Scheme against the
existence of Matter and a Material World,” which is worthy
of mention because it is the earliest elabórate criticism of the
New Principie, although it had then been before the world for
more than twenty years. The title of the chapter shews Baxter's
imperfect comprehension of the proposition which he attempts
to refute. It suggests that Berkeley argued for the non-existence
of the things we see and touch, instead of for their necessary
dependence on, or subordination to, realising percipient Mind, so
far as they are concrete realities. Baxter, moreover, was a Scot;
and his criticism is interesting as a foretaste of the protracted
discussion of the “ideal theory” by Reid and his friends, and
later on by Hamilton. But Baxter's book was not the first sign of
Berkeley's influence in Scotland. We are told by Dugald Stewart,
that “the novelty of Berkeley's paradox attracted very powerfully
the attention of a set of young men who were then prosecuting
their studies at Edinburgh, who formed themselves into a Society
for the express purpose of soliciting from him an explanation
of some parts of his theory which seemed to them obscurely or
equivocally expressed. To this correspondence the amiable and
excellent prelate seems to have given every encouragement; and
1 have been told on the best authority that he was accustomed
to say that his reasoning had been nowhere better understood
than by this club of young Scotsmen^*’.” Thus, and afterwards
through Hume and Reid, Berkeley is at the root of philosophy in
Scotland.

in the concrete, enters into recent philosophical and theological discussion in
Britain. Calderwood, in his Philosophy of the Infinite (1854), was one of the
earliest, and not the least acute, of Hamilton's critics in this matter. The subject
is lucidly treated by Professor Andrew Seth (Pringle-Pattison) in his Lectures
on Theism (1897) and in a supplement to Calderwood's Life (1900). So also
Huxley's David Hume and Professor Iverach's Is God Knowable?

Stewart's Works, vol. I. pp. 350-1.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

The two years of indifferent health and authorship in London
sum up what may be ealled the Ameriean period of Berkeley's
life. Early in 1734 letters to Prior open a new vista in bis
history. He was nominated to the bishoprie of Cloyne in the
South of Ireland, and we have now to follow him to the remóte
región whieh was his home for eighteen years. The interest
of the philosophie Queen, and perhaps some eompensation for
the Bermuda disappointment, may explain the appearanee of the
metaphysieal and soeial idealist in the plaee where he shone as a
star of the first magnitude in the Irish Chureh of the eighteenth
eentury.

[Ixxii]

III. Later Years (1734-53).

In May, 1734, Berkeley was eonseerated as Bishop of Cloyne, in
St. Paul's Chureh, Dublin. Exeept oeeasional visits, he had been
absent from Ireland for more than twenty years. He returned to
spend eighteen years of almost unbroken seelusion in his remóte
dioeese. It suited a growing inelination to a reeluse, meditativo
life, whieh had been eneouraged by eireumstanees in Rhode
Island. The eastern and northern part in the eounty of Cork
formed his dioeese, bounded on the west by Cork harbour, and
on the east by the beautiful Blaekwater and the mountains of
Waterford; the sea, whieh was its Southern boundary, approaehed
within two miles of the episeopal residenee in the village of
Cloyne.

As soon as he was settled, he resumed study “with unabated
attention,” but still with indifferent health. Travelling had
become irksome to him, and at Cloyne he was almost as mueh
removed as he had been in Rhode Island from the thinking

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixxiii]

World. Cork took the place of Newport; bul Cork was twenty
miles from Cloyne, while Newport was only three miles from
Whitehall. His episcopal neighbour at Cork was Bishop Browne,
the critic of Alciphron. Isaac Gervais, afterwards Dean of Tuam,
often enlivened the “manse-house” at Cloyne by his wit and
intercourse with the great world. Secker, the Bishop of Bristol,
and Benson, the Bishop of Gloucester, now and then exchanged
letters with him, and correspondence was kept up as of oíd with
Prior at Dublin and Johnson at Stratford. But there is no trace
of intercourse with Swift, who was wearing out an unhappy
oíd age, or with Pope, almost the only survivor of the brilliant
society of other years. We are told, indeed, that the beauty of
Cloyne was so described to the bard of Twickenham, by the
pen which in former days had described Ischia, that Pope was
almost moved to visit it. And a letter from Secker in February,
1735^\ contains this scrap: “Your friend Mr. Pope is publishing
small poems every now and then, full of much wit and not a
little keenness^^.” “Our common friend, Dr. Butler,” he adds,
“hath almost completed a set of speculations upon the credibility
of religión from its analogy to the constitution and course of
nature, which I believe in due time yon will read with pleasure.”
Butler's Analogy appeared in the folio wing year. But I ha ve
found no remains of correspondence between Berkeley and their
“common friend”; the two most illustrious religious thinkers of

Berkeley MSS. possessed by Archdeacon Rose.

Pope's poetic tribute to Berkeley belongs to this period—
“Even in a bishop I can spy desert;

Secker is decent; Rundle has a heart:

Manners with candour are to Benson given,

To Berkeley—every virtue under heaven.”

Epilogue to the Satires.

Also his satirical tribute to the critics of Berkeley—
“Truth's sacred fort th' exploded laugh shall win;

And Coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin.”

Essay on Satire, Part II.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

the Anglican commiinion.

When he left London in 1734 Berkeley was on the eve
of what sounded like a mathematieal eontroversy, although
it was in his intention metaphysieal, and was suggested by
the Seventh Dialogue in Alciphron. In one of his letters to
Prior, early in that year, he told him that though he “eould
not read, owing to ill health,” yet his thought was as distinet
as ever, and that for amusement “he passed his early hours in
thinking of eertain mathematieal matters whieh may possibly
produee something^^.” This turned, it seems, upon a form of
seeptieism among eontemporary mathematieians, oeeasioned by
the presenee of mysteries of religión. The Analyst was the
issue. It was followed by a eontroversy in whieh some of the [ixxiv]
most eminent mathematieians took part. Mathematica exeunt
in mysteria might have been the motto of the Analyst. The
assumptions in mathematies, it is argued, are as mysterious as
those of theologians and metaphysieians. Mathematieians eannot
transíate into perfeetly intelligible thought their own doetrines in
fluxions. If man's knowledge of God is rooted in mystery, so
too is mathematieal analysis. Puré seienee at last loses itself in
propositions whieh usefully regúlate aetion, but whieh eannot be
eomprehended. This is the drift of the argument in the Analyst,
but perhaps Berkeley's inelination to extreme eonelusions, and
to what is verbally paradoxieal, led him into doubtful positions
in the eontroversy to whieh the Analyst gave rise. Instead
of ultímate imperfeet eomprehensibility, he seems to attribute
absoluto eontradietion to the Newtonian fluxions. Baxter, in his
Inquiry, had asserted that things in Berkeley's book of Principies
foreed the author “to suspeet that even mathematies may not
be very sound knowledge at the bottom.” The metaphysieal
argument of the Analyst was obseured in a eloud of mathematies.

Berkeley's Life and Letters, p. 210.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixxv]

The social condition of Ireland attracted Berkeley almos! as
soon as he was settled in Cloyne. He was surrounded by a large
native Irish population and a small group of English colonists.
The natives, long governed in the Ínteres! of !he stranger, had
never learned !o exer! and govern themselves. The self-reliance
which Berkeley preached fifteen years before, as a mean for
“preventing !he ruin of Grea! Britain,” was more wanting in
Ireland, where the simples! maxims of social economy were
neglected. l! was a State of things fitted to move one who was
too independen! to permit his aspirations to be confined to the
ordinary routine of the Irish episcopate, and who could not forget
the favourite moral maxim of his life.

The social chaos of Ireland was the occasion of what to
some may be the most interesting of Berkeley's writings. His
thoughts found vent characteristically in a series of penetrating
practical quedes. The First Part of the Querist appeared in 1735,
anonymously, edited by Dr. Madden of Dublin, who along with
Prior had lately founded a Society for promoting industrial arts
in Ireland. The Second and Third Parts were published in the two
following years. A Discourse to Magistrales occasioned by the
Enormous Licence and Irreligión ofthe Times, which appeared in
1736, was another endeavour, with like philanthropic intention.
And the only importan! break in his secluded life at Cloyne, in
eighteen years of residence, was when he went for some months
to Dublin in 1737, to render social Service to Ireland in the Irish
House of Lords.

His metaphysic, at first encountered by ridicule, was now
beginning to receive more serious treatment. A Scotsman
had already recognised it. In 1739 another and more famous
Scotsman, David Hume, refers thus to Berkeley in one of the
opening sections of his Treatise of Human Nature: “A very
material question has been started concerning abstrae! or general
ideas—whether they be general or particular in the mind's

George Berkeley, By The Editor

conception of them. A great philosopher, Dr. Berkeley, has
disputed the reeeived opinión in this partieular, and has asserted
that all general ideas are nothing hut partieular ones, annexed to
a eertain term whieh gives them a more extensive signifieation,
and makes them reeall upon oeeasion other individuáis whieh
are similar to them. I look upon this to he one of the greatest
and most valuable diseoveries that has heen made of late years
in the repuhlie of letters.” It does not appear that Berkeley heard
of Hume.

A eurious interest began to engage him about this time.

The years foliowing 1739 were years of suffering in the Irish [ixxvi]
dioeese. It was a time of famine followed by widespread
disease. His eorrespondenee is full of allusions to this. It had
eonsequenees of lasting importanee. Surrounded by disease,
he pondered remedies. Experienee in Rhode Island and among
Ameriean Indians suggested the healing properties of tar. Eurther
experiments in tar, eombined with meditation and mueh eurious
reading, deepened and expanded his metaphysieal philosophy.

Tar seemed to grow under his experiments, and in his thoughts,
into a Panaeea for giving health to the organism on whieh living
mind in man is meanwhile dependent. This natural dependenee
of health upon tar introdueed thoughts of the interdependenee of
all things, and then of the immediate dependenee of all in nature
upon Omnipresent and Omnipotent Mind. The living Mind that
underlies the phenomena of the universe began to be eoneeived
under a new light. Sinee his return to the life of thought in
Rhode Island, he had heen immersed in Platonie and Neoplatonie
literature, and in books of mystieal Divinity, eneouraged perhaps
by the mystieal disposition attributed to his wife. An eeeentrie
ingenuity eonneeted the seientifie experiments and preseriptions
with the Idealism of Plato and Plotinus. The natural law aeeording
to whieh tar-water was universally restorative set his mind to
Work about the immanenee of living Mind. He mused about a

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixxvii]

medicine thus universally beneficial, and the thought occurred
that it must be naturally charged with 'puré invisible fire, the
most subtle and elastic of bodies, and the vital element in the
universe'; and water might be the natural cause which enables
this elementary fire to be drawn out of tar and transferred to
vegetable and animal organisms. But the vital fire could be only
a natural cause; which in truth is no efficient cause at all, but
only a sign of divine efficiency transmitted through the world of
sense: the true cause of this and all other natural effects must be
the immanent Mind or Reason in which we all particípate; for in
God we live and move and have our being.

It is thus that Berkeley's thought culminates in Siris, that Chain
of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquines conceming the Virtues
of Tar-water, and divers other subjects connected together and
arising one from another, which appeared in 1744. This little
book made more noise at the time of its appearance than any of
bis books; but not because of its philosophy, which was lost in
its medicinal promise to mankind of immunity from disease. Yet
it was Berkeley's last attempt to express his ultímate conception
of the universe in its human and divine relations. When Siris is
compared with the book of Principies, the immense difference
in tone and manner of thought shews the change wrought in
the intervening years. The sanguine argumentative gladiatorship
of the Principies is exchanged for pensive speculation, which
acknowledges the weakness of human understanding, when it is
face to face with the Immensities and Eternities. Compare the
opening sections of the Introduction to the Principies with the
closing sections of Siris. The contingent data of our experience
are now felt to be insufficient, and there is a more or less
conscious grounding of the Whole in the eternal and immutable
Ideas of Reason. “Strictly, the sense knowsnothing. Weperceive,
indeed, sounds by hearing and characters by sight. But we are
not therefore said to understand them.... Sense and experience
acquaint us with the course and analogy of appearances and

George Berkeley, By The Editor

natural effects: thought, reason, intellect, introduce us into the
knowledge of their causes.... The principies of Science are neither
objects of sense ñor imagination: intellect and reason are alone
the sure guides to truth.” So the shifting basis of the earlier
thought is found to need support in the intellectual and moral
faith that must be involved in all reasonable human intercourse
with the phenomena presented in the universe.

The inadequate thought of God, as only a Spirit or Person
supreme among the spirits or persons, in and through whom the
material world is realised, a thought which pervades Alciphron,
makes way in Siris for the thought of God as the infinite
omnipresent Ground, or final sustaining Power, immanent in
Nature and Man, to which Berkeley had become accustomed
in Neoplatonic and Alexandrian metaphysics. “Comprehending
God and the creatures in One general notion, we may say that
all things together (God and the universe of Space and Time)
make One Universe, or tó Bciv. But if we should say that all
things make One God, this would be an erroneous notion of God;
but would not amount to atheism, as long as Mind or Intellect
was admitted to be to fiyepoviKÓv, or the governing part.... It
will not seem just to fix the imputation of atheism upon those
philosophers who hold the doctrine of tó "Ev.” It is thus that
he now regards God. Metaphysics and theology are accordingly
one.

No attempt is made in Siris to articúlate the universe in the
light of unifying Mind or Reason. And we are still apt to ask
what the truth and goodness at the heart of all really mean; seeing
that, as conceived in human minds, they vary in the gradual
evolution of intellect and conscience in men. Omnia exeunt in
mysteria is the tone of Siris at the end. The universe of reality
is too much for our articúlate intellectual digestión: it must be
left for omniscience; it transcends finite intelligence and the via
media of human understanding. Man must be satisfied to pass
life, in the infinitesimal interval between birth and death, as a

[Ixxviii]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixxix]

faith-venture, which he may convert into a growing insight, as
the generations roll on, but which can never be converted into
complete knowledge. “In this State we must be satisfied to make
the best of those glimpses within our reach. It is Plato's remark
in his Thecetetus, that while we sit still we are never the wiser;
but going into the river, and moving up and down, is the way
to discover its depths and shallows. If we exercise and bestir
ourselves, we may even here discover something. The eye by
long use comes to see even in the darkest cavern; and there is
no subject so obscure but we may discern some glimpse of truth
by long poring on it. Truth is the cry of all, but the game of a
few. Certainly where it is the chief passion it doth not give way
to vulgar cares and views; ñor is it contented with a little ardour
in the early time of life: a time perhaps to pursue, but not so
fit to weigh and revise. He that would make a real progress in
knowledge must dedícate his age as well as his youth, the later
growth as well as the first-fruits, at the altar of Truth.” Such was
Berkeley, and such were his last words in philosophy. They may
suggest the attitude of Bacon when, at a different view-point, he
disclaims exhaustive system: “I have made a beginning of the
Work: the fortune of the human race will give the issue. For the
matter in hand is no mere felicity of speculation, but the real
business and fortunes of the human race^^.”

While Berkeley's central thought throughout his life is
concerned with God as the one omnipresent and omnipotent
Providential Agent in the universe, he says little about the
other final question, of more exclusively human interest, which
concerns the destiny of men. That men are born into a universe
which, as the visible expression of Moral Providence, must be
scientifically and ethically trustworthy; certain not to put man
to confusión intellectually or morally, seeing that it could not

Bacon's Novuin Organum. Distributio Operis.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

otherwise be trusted for sueh in our ultímate venture of faith—this
is one thing. That all persons born into it are eertain to eontinue
living self-eonseiously for ever, is another thing. This is not
obviously implied in the former presupposition, whether or not
it ean be dedueed from it, or else diseovered by other means. [ixxx]
Although man's environment is essentially Divine, and wholly in
its smallest details Providential, may not bis body, in its living
organisation from physieal birth until physieal death, be the
measure of the eontinuanee of bis self-eonseious personality? Is
eaeh man's immortal existenee, like God's, indispensable?

Doubt about the destiny of men after they die is, at the
end of the nineteenth eentury, probably more prevalent than
doubt about the underlying Providenee of God, and His eonstant
ereative aetivity; more perhaps than it was in the days of Toland,
and Collins, and Tindal. Enture life had been made so familiar
to the imagination by the early and mediaeval Chureh, and
afterwards by the Puritans, as in Milton, Bunyan, and Jonathan
Edwards, that it then seemed to the religious mind more real than
anything that is seen and touehed. The habit wholly formed by
natural seienee is apt to dissipate this and to make a human life
lived under eonditions wholly strange to its “minute philosophy”
appear illusory.

A seetion in the book of Principles^^ in whieh the common
argument for the “natural immortality” of the human soul is
reprodueed, strengthened by his new eoneeption of what the
reality of body means, is Berkeley's metaphysieal eontribution
for determining between the awful alternatives of annihilation or
eontinued self-eonseious life after physieal death. The subjeet
is touehed, in a less reeondite way, in two of his papers in the
Guardian, and in the Discourse delivered in Trinity College
Chapel in 1708, in whieh a revelation of the immortality of men
is presented as the speeial gospel of Jesús Christ. To argüe, as

Seetion 141.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixxxi]

Berkeley does in the Principies, that men cannot be annihilated
at death, because they are spiritual substances having powers
independent of the sequences of nature, implies assumptions
regarding finite persons which are open to criticism. The
justification in reason for our venture of faith that Omnipotent
Goodness is at the heart of the universe is—that without this
presupposition we can have no reasonable intercourse, scientific
or otherwise, with the world of things and persons in which we
find ourselves; for reason and will are then alike paralysed by
universal distrust. But it can hardly be maintained a priori that
men, or other spiritual beings in the universe, are equally with
God indispensable to its natural order; so that when they have
once entered on conscious existence they must always continué to
exist consciously. Is not the philosophical justification of man's
hope of endless life ethical rather than metaphysical; founded
on that faith in the justice and goodness of the Universal Mind
which has to be taken for granted in every attempt to interpret
experience, with its mixture of good and evil, in this evanescent
embodied life? Can a life such as this is be all for men, in
a universe that, because it is essentially Divine, must opérate
towards the extinction of the wickedness which now makes it a
mystery of Omnipotent Goodness?

A cheerful optimism appears in Berkeley's habit of thought
about death, as we have it in his essays in the Guardian: a
sanguine apprehension of a present preponderance of good, and
consequent anticipation of greater good after death; unlike those
whose pessimistic temperament induces a lurid picture of eternal
moral disorder. But his otherwise active imagination seldom
makes philosophy a meditation upon death. He does not seem
to have exercised himself in the way those do who find in the
prospect of being in the twenty-first century as they were in the
first, what makes them appalled that they have ever come at all
into transitory percipient life; or as those others who recoil from
an unbodied life after physical death, as infinitely more appalling

George Berkeley, By The Editor

than the thought of being transported in this body into another
planet, or even to a material world outside our solar system. In
one of his letters to Johnson^^ he does approaeh the unbodied
life, and in a eharaeteristie way:—

“I see no diffieulty in eoneeiving a ehange of State, sueh as is
vulgarly ealled death, as well without as with material substanee.
It is suffieient for that purpose that we allow sensible bodies,
i.e. sueh as are immediately pereeived by sight and toueh; the
existenee of whieh I am so far from questioning, as philosophers
are used to do, that I establish it, I think, upon evident prineiples.
Now it seems very easy to eoneeive the soul to exist in a sepárate
State (i.e. divested from those limits and laws of motion and
perception with whieh she is embarrassed here) and to exereise
herself on new ideas, without the intervention of these tangible
things we eall bodies. It is even very possible to apprehend how
the soul may have ideas of eolour without an eye, or of sounds
without an ear^’.”

But while we may thus be supposed to have all our present
sensuous experienee in an unbodied State, this does not enable
one to eoneeive how unbodied persons ean eommunieate with
one another in the absenee of all sense signs; whether of the sort
derived from our present senses, or from other senses of whose
data we ean in this life have no imagination.

Berkeley's tar-water enthusiasm lasted throughout the rest of
his life, and found vent in letters and pamphlets in support of his
Panaeea, from 1744 till 1752. Notwithstanding this, he was not
forgetful of other interests—eeelesiastieal, and the soeial ones
whieh he ineluded in his large meaning of “eeelesiastieal.” The
Rising under Charles Edward in 1745 was the oeeasion of a Letter
to the Román Catholics ofCloyne, eharaeteristieally humane and

See “Editor's Preface to Alciphron.”

Compare Essay II in the Guardian with this.

[Ixxxii]

[Ixxxiii]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixxxiv]

liberal. It was followed in 1749 by an Exhortation to the Román
Catholic Clergy ofireland in a similar spirit; and Ibis unwonted
courtesy of an Irish Protestan! bishop was received by those to
whom it was addressed in a corresponding temper.

It is difficult to determine Berkeley's relation to rival schools
or partios in Church and State. His disposition was too singular
and independen! for a partisan. Some of his early writings, as we
have seen, were suspected of high Tory and Jacobite leanings; but
his arguments in the suspected Discourse were such as ordinary
Tories and Jacobites failed to understand, and the tenor of his
words and actions was in the best sense liberal. In religious
thought Siris might place him among latitudinarians; perhaps in
affinity with the Cambridge Platonists. His true place is foremost
among the religious philosophers of the Anglican Church; the
first to prepare the religious problem for the light in which we
are invited to look at the universo by modern agnostics, and
under the modern conception of natural evolution. He is the
most picturesque figure in that Anglican succession which, in
the seventeenth century, ineludes Hooker and Cudworth; in the
eighteenth, Clarke and Butler; and in the nineteenth, may we
say Coleridge, in lack of a representative in orders; although
Mansel, Maurice, Mozley, and Jowett are not to be forgotten, ñor
Isaac Taylor among laymen^^: Newman and Arnold, illustrious
otherwise, are hardly representatives of metaphysical philosophy.

A more pensive tone runs through the closing years at Cloyne.
Attempts were made in vain to withdraw him from the “remóte
córner” to which he had been so long confined. His friends
urged his claims for the Irish Primacy. “I am no man's rival or
competitor in this matter,” were his words to Prior. “I am not
in love with feasts, and crowds, and visits, and late hours, and
strange faces, and a hurry of affairs often insignificant. For my

Taylor, in later lite, conformed to the Anglican Church.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

own prívate satisfaetion, I had rather be master of my time than
wear a diadem.” Letters to his Ameriean friends, Johnson and
Clap, shew him still moved by the inspiration whieh earried him
over the Atlantie, and reeord his influenee in the development
of Ameriean eolleges^^. The borne edueation of his three sons
was another interest. We are told by his widow that “he would
not trust his sons to mereenary hands. Though oíd and siekly, he
performed the eonstant tedious task himself.” Of the fruit of this
borne edueation there is little to tell. The death of William, his
favourite boy, in 1751, “was thought to have struek too elose to
his father's heart.” “I am a man,” so he writes, “retired from the
amusements, polities, visits, and what the world ealls pleasure. I
had a little friend, edueated always under mine own eye, whose
painting delighted me, whose musie ravished me, and whose
lively gay spirit was a eontinual feast. It has pleased God to take
him henee.” The eldest son, Henry, born in Rhode Island, did
not long survive his father. George, the third son, was destined
for Oxford, and this destiny was eonneeted with a new projeet.
The “life aeademieo-philosophieal,” whieh he sought in vain to
realise in Bermuda, he now hoped to find for himself in the eity
of eolleges on the Isis. “The truth is,” he wrote to Prior as early
as September 1746, “I have a seheme of my own for this long
time past, in whieh I propose more satisfaetion and enjoyment
to myself than I eould in that high station^°, whieh I neither
solieited, ñor so mueh as wished for. A greater ineome would
not tempt me to remove from Cloyne, and set aside my Oxford
seheme; whieh, though delayed by the illness of my son^\ yet I
am as intent upon it and as mueh resolved as ever.”

The last of Berkeley's letters whieh we have is to Dean
Gervais. It expresses the feeling with whieh in April, 1752, he
was eontemplating life, on the eve of his departure from Cloyne.

See Berkeley's Life and Letters, chap. viii.

The Primacy.

This seems to have been his eldest son, Henry.

[Ixxxv]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[Ixxxvi]

“I submit to years and infirmities. My views in this world are
mean and narrow; it is a thing in which I ha ve small share, and
which ought to give me small concern. I abhor business, and
especially to have to do with great persons and great affairs. The
evening of life I choose to pass in a quiet retreat. Ambitious
projects, intrigues and quarrels of statesmen, are things I have
formerly been amused with, but they now seem to be a vain,
fugitive dream.”

Four months after this, Berkeley saw Cloyne for the last time.
In August he quitted it for Oxford, which he had long pictured in
imagination as the ideal borne of his oíd age. When he left Cork
in the vessel which carried his wife, his daughter, and himself to
Bristol, he was prostrated by weakness, and had to be taken from
Bristol to Oxford on a horse-litter. It was late in August when
they arrived there^^.

Our picture of Berkeley at Oxford is dim. According to
tradition he occupied a house in Holywell Street, near the gardens
of New College and not far from the cloisters of Magdalen. It
was a changed world to him. While he was exchanging Ireland
for England, death was removing oíd English friends. Before he
left Cloyne he must have heard of the death of Butler in June,
at Bath, where Benson, at the request of Secker, affectionately
watched the last hours of the author of the Analogy. Benson
followed Butler in August.

We hear of study resumed in improved health in the borne in
Holy well Street. In October a Miscellany, containing several
Tracts on various Subjects, “by the Bishop of Cloyne,” appeared
simultaneously in Eondon and Dublin. The Tracts were reprints,
with the exception of Further Thoughts on Tar-water, which

His son George was already settled at Christ Church. Henry, the eldest son,
bom in Rhode Island, was then “abroad in the south of France for his health,”
as one of his brother George's letters tells us, found among the Johnson MSS.

George Berkeley, By The Editor

may have been written before he left Ireland. The third edition
of Alciphron also appeared in this autumn. But Siris is the
latest reeord of his philosophieal thought. A eomparison of
the Commonplace Book and the Principies with the Analyst
and Siris gives the measure of his advaneement. After the
sanguine beginning perhaps the eomparison leaves a sense
of disappointment, when we find metaphysies mixed up with
mathematies in the Analyst, and metaphysies obseurely mixed
up with medieine in Siris.

It is eurious that, although in 1752 David Hume's Treatise of
Human Nature had been before the world for thirteen years and
his Inquiry concerning Human Understanding for four years,
there is no abusión to Hume by Berkeley. He was Berkeley's
immediate sueeessor in the eighteenth-eentury evolution of
European thought. The seeptieal eritieism of Hume was applied
to the dogmatie religious philosophy of Berkeley, to be followed
in its turn by the abstraetly rational and the moral reeonstruetive
eritieism of Kant. Alciphron is, however, expressly referred to
by Hume; indireetly, too, throughout the religious agnostieism of
his Inquiry, also afterwards in the Dialogues on Natural Religión,
in a vindieation of minute philosophy by profounder reasonings
than those whieh satisfied Eysieles and Aleiphron. Berkeley,
Hume, and Kant are the three signifieant philosophieal figures of
their eentury, eaeh holding the supreme plaee sueeessively in its
beginning, middle, and later years. Perhaps Reid in Seotland did
more than any other in his generation to make Berkeley known;
not, however, for his true work in eonstruetive religious thought,
but for his supposed denial of the reality of the things we see and
toueh.^^

See Appendix D. Reid, like Berkeley, held that “matter cannot be the cause
of anything,” but this not as a consequence of the new conception of the world
presented to the senses, through which alone Berkeley opens his way to its
powerlessness; although Reid supposes that in his youth he followed Berkeley
in this too. See Thomas Reid (1898), in “Famous Scots Series,” where I have

[Ixxxvii]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

The ideal life in Oxford did not last long. On the evening of
Sunday, January 14, 1753, Berkeley was suddenly confronted
by the mystery of death. “As he was sitting with my mother,
my sister, and myself,” so his son wrote to Johnson at Stratford,
in October, “suddenly, and without the least previous notice or
pain, he was removed to the enjoyment of eternal rewards; and
although all possible means were instantly used, no symptom
of life ever appeared after; ñor could the physicians assign any
cause for his death. He arrived at Oxford on August 25, and
had received great benefit from the change of air, and by God's
blessing on tar-water, insomuch that for some years he had not
been in better health than he was the instant before he left us^^.”

Six days later he was buried in Oxford, in the Cathedral of
Christ Church^^, where his tomb bears an appropriate inscription
by Dr. Markham, afterwards Archbishop of York.

[Ixxxviii]

enlarged on this.

Johnson MSS.

That Berkeley was huried in Oxford is mentioned in his son's letter to
Johnson, in which he says : “His remains are interred in the Cathedral of Christ
Church, and next week a monument to his memory will he erected with an
inscription by Dr. Markham, a Student of this College.” As the son was present
at, and superintended the arrangements for his father's funeral, it can be no
stretch of credulity to believe that he knew where his father was buried. It
may be added that Berkeley himself had provided in his Will “that my body
be buried in the churchyard of the parish in which I die.” The Will, dated July
31, 1752, is given in extenso in my Life and Letters of Berkeley, p. 345. We
have also the record of burial in the Register of Christ Church Cathedral, which
shews that “on January ye 20^^ 1753, ye Right Reverend John {sic) Berkley,

Bishop of Cloyne, was buryed” there. This disposes of the statement on
p. 17 of Diprose's Account of the Parish of Saint Clement Danés (1868), that
Berkeley was buried in that church.

I may add that a beautiful memorial of Berkeley has lately been placed
in the Cathedral of Cloyne, by subscriptions in this country and largely in
America.

Errata

Vol. I

Page 99, Une 3for 149-80 read 149-60.

Page 99, Une 22 for —and to be “suggested,” not signified
read —instead of being only suggested.

Page 100, Une 10/or hearing read seeing.

Page 103, note. Unes 5, 6/orpp. 111, 112 readp. 210.

Page 200, note. Une 14/or Adam read Robert.

Page 364, Une 8 from foot for and read whieh.

Page 512, note 6, Une 3 for imminent read immanent.

Vol. II

Page 194, note. Une 3 for Tyndal read Tindal.
Page 207, Une 1, insert 13. before Ale..

Page 377, Une 6 for antethesis read antithesis.

Vol. IV

Page 285, Unes 4, 5 for Thisus Alus Cujus, &e. read Ursus.
Alus. Cuius. &e. The inseription, strietly speaking, appears on
the Palaee of the Counts Orsini, and is dated MD.

[ 001 ]

Commonplace Book. Mathematical,
Ethical, Physical, And Metaphysical

[ 002 ]

Written At Trinity College, Dublin, In 1705-8
First published in 1871

Editor's Preface To The Commonplace
Book

Berkeley's juvenile Commonplace Book is a small quarto volume,
in bis handwriting, found among the Berkeley manuscripts in
possession of the late Arehdeaeon Rose. It was first published in
1871, in my edition of Berkeley's Works. It consists of occasional
thoughts, mathematical, physical, ethical, and metaphysical, set
down in miscellaneous fashion, for prívate use, as they aróse
in the course of his studies at Trinity College, Dublin. They
are full of the fervid enthusiasm that was natural to him, and of
sanguino expectations of the issue of the prospective authorship
for which they record preparations. On the title-page is written,
“G. B. Trin. Dub. alum.,” with the date 1705, when he was
twenty years of age. The entries are the gradual accumulation
of the next three years, in one of which the Arithmetica and
the Miscellanea Mathematica made their appearance. The New
Theory of Vision, given to the world in 1709, was evidently much
in his mind, as well as the sublime conception of the material
world in its necessary subordination to the spiritual world, of
which he delivered himself in his book of Principies, in 1710.

Editor's Preface To The Commonplace Book

This disclosure of Berkeley's thoughts about things, in the
years preceding the publication of his first essays, is indeed a
precious record of the initial struggles of ardent philosophical
genius. It places the reader in intímate companionship with him
when he was beginning to awake into intellectual and spiritual
life. We hear him soliloquising. We see him trying to transíate
into reasonableness our crude inherited beliefs about the material
World and the natural order of the universe, self-conscious
personality, and the Universal Power or Providence—all under
the sway of a new determining Principie which was taking
profound possession of his soul. He finds that he has only to look
at the concrete things of sense in the light of this great discovery
to see the artificially induced perplexities of the oíd philosophers
disappear, along with their imposing abstractions, which turn
out empty words. The thinking is throughout fresh and sincere;
sometimes impetuous and one-sided; the outcome of a mind
indisposed to take things upon trust, resolved to inquire freely, a
rebel against the tyranny of language, morally burdened with the
consciousness of a new world-transforming conception, which
duty to mankind obliged him to reveal, although his message was
sure to offend. Men like to regard things as they have been wont.
This new conception of the surrounding world—the impotence
of Matter, and its subordínate office in the Supreme Economy
must, he foresees, disturb those accustomed to treat outward
things as the only realities, and who do not care to ask what
constitutes reality. Notwithstanding the ridicule and ill-will that
his transformed material world was sure to meet with, amongst
the many who accept empty words instead of genuine insight, he
was resolved to deliver himself of his thoughts through the press,
but with the politic conciliation of a persuasivo Irish pleader.

The Commonplace Book steadily recognises the adverse
influence of one insidious foe. Its world-transforming-Principle
has been obscured by “the mist and veil of words.” The
abstractions of metaphysicians, which poison human language.

[ 003 ]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[ 004 ]

had to be driven out of the author's mind before he could see
the light, and must be driven out of the minds of others before
they could be got to see it along with him: the concrete world as
realisable only in percipient mind is with difficulty introduced
into the vacant place. “The chief thing I pretend to is only to
remove the mist and veil of words.” He exults in the transformed
mental scene that then spontaneously rises before him. “My
speculations have had the same effect upon me as visiting
foreign countries,—in the end I return where I was before, get
my heart at case, and enjoy myself with more satisfaction. The
philosophers lose their abstrae! matter; the materialists lose their
abstrae! extensión; the profane lose their extended deity. Fray
what do the rest of mankind lose?” This beneficent revolution
seemed to be the issue of a simple recognition of the fact, that the
true way of regarding the world we see and touch is to regard it
as consisting of ideas or phenomena that are presented to human
senses, somehow regularly ordered, and the occasions of pleasure
or pain to us as we conform to or rebel against their natural order.
This is the surrounding universe—at least in its relations to us,
and that is all in it that we have to do with. “I know not,” he
says, “what is meant by things considered in themselves, i.e. in
abstraction. This is nonsense. Thing and idea are words of much
about the same extent and meaning. Existence is not conceivable
without perception and volition. I only declare the meaning of
the Word existence, as far as I can comprehend it.”

In the Commonplace Book we see the youth at Trinity College
forging the weapons which he was soon to direct against the
materialism and scepticism of the generation into which he
was born. Here are rough drafts, crude hints of intended
arguments, probing of unphilosophical mathematicians—even
Newton and Descartes, memoranda of facts, more or less
relevan!, on their way into the Essay on Vision and the
treatise on Principies —seeds of the philosophy that was to
be gradually unfolded in his life and in his books. We watch the

Editor's Preface To The Commonplace Book

intrepid thinker, notwithstanding the inexperience of youth, more
disposed to give battle to mathematicians and metaphysicians
than to submit even provisionally to any human authority. It
does not seem that bis scholarship or philosophical learning
was extensive. Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke were bis
intimates; Hobbes and Spinoza were not unknown to him;
Newton and some lesser lights among the mathematicians are
often confronted. He is more rarely in company with the ancients
or the mediaevalists. No deep study of Aristotle appears, and there
is even a disposition to disparage Plato. He seeks for his home
in the “new philosophy” of experience; without anticipations
of Kant, as the critic of what is presupposed in the scientific
reliability of any experience, against whom his almost blind zeal
against abstractions would have set him at this early stage. “Puré
intellect I understand not at all,” is one of his entries. He asks
himself, “What becomes of the aetemae veritatesT and his reply
is, “They vanish.” When he tells himself that “we must with the
mob place certainty in the senses,” the words are apt to suggest
that the senses are our only source of knowledge, but I suppose
his meaning is that the senses must be trustworthy, as 'the mob'
assume. Yet occasionally he uses language which looks like an
anticipation of David Hume, as when he calis mind “a congeries
of perceptions. Take away perceptions,” he adds, “and you take
away mind. Put the perceptions and you put the mind. The
understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions and
ideas.” He seems unconscious of the total scepticism which such
expressions, when strictly interpreted, are found to involve. But
after all, the reader must not apply rigorous rules of interpretation
to random entries or provisional memoranda, meant only for [005]
prívate use, by an enthusiastic student who was preparing to
produce books.

I have followed the manuscript of the Commonplace Book,
omitting a few repetitions of thought in the same words. Here

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

and there Berkeley's writing is almost obliterated and difficult to
decipher, apparently through accident by water in the course of
his travels, when, as he mentions long after in one of his letters,
several of his manuscripts were lost and others were injured.

The letters of the alphabet which are interpreted on the first
page, and prefixed on the margin to some of the entries, may
so far help to bring the apparent chaos of entries under a few
articúlate heads.

I have added some annotations here and there as they happened
to occur, and these might have been multiplied indefinitely had
space permitted.

[007]

Commonplace Book

I. = Introduction.

M. = Matter.

P. = Primary and Secondary qualities.
E. = Existence.

T. = Time.

S. = Soul—Spirit.

G. = God.

Mo. = Moral Philosophy.

N. = Natural Philosophy.

Commonplace Book

Qu. If there be not two kinds of visible extensión—one perceiv'd
by a confus'd view, the other by a distinct successive direction of
the optique axis to each point?

No general ideas^^. The contrary a cause of mistake or
confusión in mathematiques, &c. This to be intimated in y®
Introduction"*^.

The Principie may be apply'd to the difficulties of conservation,
co-operation, &c.

Trifling for the [natural] philosophers to enquire the cause of n.
magnetical attractions, &c. They onely search after co-existing
ideas^^.

Qusecunque in Scriptura militant adversus Copernicum, m. p.
militant pro me.

All things in the Scripture w side with the vulgar against the m. p.
learned, side with me also. I side in all things with the mob. [oos]

I know there is a mighty sect of men will oppose me, but yet m.

I may expect to be supported by those whose minds are not so
far overgrown w* madness. These are far the greatest part of
mankind—especially Moralists, Divines, Politicians; in a word,
all but Mathematicians and Natural Philosophers. I mean only
the hypothetical gentlemen. Experimental philosophers have
nothing whereat to be offended in me.

Newton begs his Principies; I demónstrate mine^^.

I must be very particular in explaining w*^ is meant by e.

“General ideas,” i.e. abstract general ideas, distinguished, in Berkeley's
nominalism, from concrete general ideas, or from general ñames, which are
signs of any one of an indefinite number of individual objects. Cf. Principies,
Introduction, sect. 16.

Introduction to the Principies of Human Knowledge.

“co-existing ideas,” i.e. phenomena presented in uniform order to the
senses.

Newton postulates a world of matter and motion, govemed mechanically
by laws within itself: Berkeley finds himself charged with New Principies,
demanded by reason, with which Newton's postúlate is inconsistent.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

things existing—in houses, chambers, fields, caves, &c.—w“
not perceiv'd as well as w" perceived; and shew how the vulgar
notion agrees with mine, when we narrowly inspect into the
meaning and definition of the word existence, is no simple
idea, distinct from perceiving and being perceived^*^.

The Schoolmen have noble subjects, but handle them ill.
The mathematicians have trifling subjects, but reason admirably
about them. Certainly their method and arguing are excellent.

God knows how far our knowledge of intellectual beings may
be enlarg'd from the Principies.

M. The reverse of the Principie I take to have been the chief

source of all that scepticism and folly, all those contradictions
and inextricable puzzling absurdities, that have in all ages been a
reproach to human reason, as well as of that idolatry, whether of
images or of gold, that blinds the greatest part of the world, and
that shamefull immorality that turns us into beasts.

E. ^^^Ivixit & fuit.

oüaía, the ñame for substance, used by Aristotle, the Fathers,
&c.

If at the same time we shall make the Mathematiques much
[009] more easie and much more accurate, w^ can be objected to us^^ ?

We need not forcé our imagination to conceive such very
small lines for infinitesimals. They may every whit as well be
imagin'd big as little, since that the integer must be infinite.

Evident that w has an infinite number of parts must be
infinite.

We cannot imagine a line or space infinitely great—therefore
absurd to talk or make propositions about it.

He attempts this in many parts of the Principies and Dialogues. He
recognises the difficulty of reconciling his New Principies with the identity and
permanence of sensible things.

He contemplated thus early applications of his New Principies to
Mathematics, afterwards made in his book of Principies, sect. 118-32.

Commonplace Book

We cannot imagine a Une, spaee, &e., quovis lato majus.
Since what we imagine must be datum aliquod; a thing can't
be greater than itself.

If yon cali infinite that w is greater than any assignable by
another, then 1 say, in that sense there may be an infinite square,
sphere, or any other figure, w is absurd.

Qu. if extensión be resoluble into points it does not consist of?

No reasoning about things whereof we have no ideas^^;
therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals.

No Word to be used without an idea.

If uneasiness be necessary to set the Will at work, Qu. how
shall we will in heaven?

Bayle's, Malbranch's, &c. arguments do not seem to pro ve
against Spaee, but onely against Bodies.

1 agree in nothing w the Cartesians as to y existence of
Bodies & Qualities^^.

Aristotle as good a man as Euclid, but he was allowed to have
been mistaken.

Lines not proper for demonstration.

We see the house itself, the church itself; it being an idea and
nothing more. The house itself, the church itself, is an idea, i.e.
an object—immediate object—of thought^"*.

Instead of injuring, our doctrine much benefits geometry.

Existence is percipi, or percipere, [or velle, i.e. agere^^]. The

What Berkeley calis ideas are either perceptible by the senses or imagined:
either way they are concrete: abstract ideas are empty words.

i.e. the existence of bodies and qualities independently of—in abstraction
from—all percipient mind. While the spiritual theism of Descartes is acceptable,
he rejects his mechanical conception of the material world.

But a “house” or a “church” ineludes more than visible ideas, so that we
cannot, strictly speaking, be said to see it. We see immediately only visible
signs of its invisible qualities.

M. P.

[ 010 ]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

horse is in the stable, the books are in the study as before.

N. In physiques I have a vast view of things soluble hereby, but

have not leisure.

N. Hyps and such like unaccountable things confirm my doctrine.

Angle not well defined. See Pardies' Geometry, by Harris, &c.
This one ground of trifling.

N. One idea not the cause of another—one power not the cause

of another. The cause of all natural things is onely God. Henee
trifling to enquire after second causes. This doctrine gives a most
suitable idea of the Divinity^^.

N. Absurd to study astronomy and other the like doctrines as

speculative Sciences.

N. The absurd account of memory by the brain, &c. makes for

me.

How was light created before man? Even so were Bodies
created before man^’.

E. Impossible anything besides that w thinks and is thought on

should exist^*.

That w is visible cannot be made up of invisible things.

M.S. is that wherein there are not contain'd distinguishable
sensible parts. Now how can that w hath not sensible parts be
divided into sensible parts? If you say it may be divided into
insensible parts, I say these are nothings.

This is added in the margin.

The total impotence of Matter, and the omnipotence of Mind or Spirit in
Nature, is thus early becoming the dominant thought with Berkeley.

This refers to an objection to the New Principies that is apparently reinforced
by recent discoveries in geology. But if these contradict the Principies, so does
the existence of a table while I am only seeing it.

Existence, in short, can be realised only in the form of living percipient
mind.

Commonplace Book

Extensión abstract from sensible qualities is no sensation, I
grant; but then there is no sueh idea, as any one may try^^. There
is onely a eonsidering the number of points without the sort of
them, & this makes more for me, sinee it must be in a eonsidering
thing. [ 011 ]

Mem. Before I have shewn the distinetion between visible &
tangible extensión, I must not mention them as distinet. I must
not mention M. T. & M. V., but in general M. S., &c.^^

Qu. whether a M. V. be of any eolour? a M. T. of any tangible
quality?

If visible extensión be the objeet of geometry, 'tis that whieh
is survey'd by the optique axis.

I may say the pain is in my finger, &e., aeeording to my p.
doetrine^^

Mem. Nieely to diseuss is meant when we say a Une
eonsists of a eertain number of inehes or points, &e.; a eirele of
a eertain number of square inehes, points, &e. Certainly we may
think of a eirele, or have its idea in our mind, without thinking of
points or square inehes, &e.; whereas it should seem the idea of
a eirele is not made up of the ideas of points, square inehes, &e.

Qu. Is any more than this meant by the foregoing expressions,
viz. that squares or points may be pereeived in or made out of a
eirele, &e., or that squares, points, &e. are aetually in it, i.e. are
perceivable in it?

Berkeley hardly distinguishes uncontingent mathematical relations, to
which the sensible ideas or phenomena in which the relations are concretely
manifested must conform.

M. T. = matter tangible; M. V. = matter visible; M. . = matter sensible. The
distinctions n question were made prominent in the Essay on Vision. See sect.
1, 121-45.

Which the common supposition regarding primary qualities seems to
contradict.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

A line in abstract, or Distance, is the number of points between
two points. There is also distance between a slave & an emperor,
between a peasant & philosopher, between a drachm & a pound,
a farthing & a crown, &c.; in all which Distance signifies the
number of intermediate ideas.

Halley's doctrine about the proportion between infinitely great
quantities vanishes. When men speak of infinite quantities, either
they mean finite quantities, or else talk of [that whereof they
have®^] no idea; both which are absurd.

If the disputations of the Schoolmen are blam'd for intricacy,
[ 012 ] triflingness, & confusión, yet it must be acknowledg'd that in

the main they treated of great & important subjects. If we admire
the method & acuteness of the Math[ematicians]—the length,
the subtilty, the exactness of their demonstrations—we must
nevertheless be forced to grant that they are for the most part
about trifling subjects, and perhaps mean nothing at all.

Motion on 2d thoughts seems to be a simple idea,
p. Motion distinct from y® thing moved is not conceivable.

N. Mem. To take notice of Newton for defining it [motion]; also

of Locke's wisdom in leaving it undefin'd^^.

Ut ordo partium temporis est immutabilis, sin etiam ordo
partium spatii. Moveantur hse de loéis suis, et movebuntur (ut ita
dicam) de seipsis. Truly number is immensurable. That we will
allow with Newton.

p. Ask a Cartesian whether he is wont to imagine his globules

without colour. Pellucidness is a colour. The colour of ordinary
light of the sun is white. Newton in the right in assigning colours
to the rays of light.

A man born blind would not imagine Space as we do. We
give it always some dilute, or duskish, or dark colour—in short,

[That need not have been blotted out—'tis good sense, if we do but determine
w'' we mean by thing and idea.] —AUTHORfFNS, on blank page of the MS.

See Locke's Essay, Bk. III. ch. 4, § 8, where he criticises attempts to define
motion, as involving a petitio.

Commonplace Book

we imagine it as visible, or intromitted by the eye, w he would
not do.

Proinde vim inferunt saeris literis qui voees hasee (v. tempus, n.
spatium, motus) de quantitatibus mensuratis ibi interpretantur.
Newton, p. 10.

I differ from Newton, in that I think the reeession ab axe motus n.
is not the effeet, or Índex, or measure of motion, but of the vis
impressa. It sheweth not is truly moved, but has the foree
impressed on it, or rather that w hath an impressed foree.

D and P are not proportional in all eireles. d disto l/4d p as d
to p/4; but d and p/4 are not in the same proportion in all eireles.

Henee 'tis nonsense to seek the terms of one general proportion
whereby to reetify all peripheries, or of another whereby to
square all eireles.

N. B. If the eirele be squar'd arithmetieally, 'tis squar'd
geometrieally, arithmetie or numbers being nothing but lines
& proportions of lines when apply'd to geometry. [0i3]

Mem. To remark Cheyne^^ & bis doetrine of infinites.

Extensión, motion, time, do eaeh of them inelude the idea of
sueeession, & so far forth they seem to be of mathematieal
eonsideration. Number eonsisting in sueeession & distinet
pereeption, w also eonsists in sueeession; for things at onee
pereeiv'd are jumbled and mixt together in the mind. Time and
motion cannot be eoneeiv'd without sueeession; and extensión,

qua mathemat., eannot be eoneeiv'd but as eonsisting of parts w
may be distinetly & sueeessively pereeiv'd. Extensión pereeived
at onee & in confuso does not belong to math.

The simple idea eall'd Power seems obseure, or rather none at
all, but onely the relation 'twixt Cause and Effeet. When I ask

^ George Cheyne, the physician (known afterwards as author of the English
Malady), published in 1705 a work on Fluxions, which procured him admission
to the Royal Society. Fie was born in 1670.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[014]

whether A can move B, if A be an intelligent thing, I mean no
more than whether the volition of A that B move be attended
with the motion of B? If A be senseless, whether the impulse of
A against B be followed by y® motion of B^^?

Barrow's arguing against indivisibles, lect. i. p. 16, is a petitio
principii, for the Demonstration of Archimedes supposeth the
circumference to consist of more than 24 points. Moreover it
may perhaps be necessary to suppose the divisibility ad infinitum,
in order to demónstrate that the radius is equal to the side of the
hexagon.

Shew me an argument against indivisibles that does not go on
some false supposition.

A great number of insensibles—or thus, two invisibles, say
you, put together become visible; therefore that M. V. contains or
is made up of invisibles. I answer, the M. V. does not comprise,
is not composed of, invisibles. All the matter amounts to this,
viz. whereas I had no idea awhile agoe, I have an idea now. It
remains for you to prove that I carne by the present idea because
there were two invisibles added together. I say the invisibles are
nothings, cannot exist, inelude a contradiction^^.

I am young, I am an upstart, I am a pretender, I am vain.
Very well. I shall endeavour patiently to bear up under the most
lessening, vilifying appellations the pride & rage of man can
devise. But one thing I know I am not guilty of. I do not pin my
faith on the sleeve of any great man. I act not out of prejudice
or prepossession. I do not adhere to any opinión because it is an
oíd one, a reviv'd one, a fashionable one, or one that I have spent
much time in the study and cultivation of.

This reminds us of Hume, and inclines towards the empirical notion
of Causation, as merely constaney in sequence—not even continuous
metamorphosis.

^ This is Berkeley's objection to abstract, i.e. unperceived, quantities and
infinitesimals—important in the sequel.

Commonplace Book

Sense rather than reason or demonstration ought to be
employed about Unes and figures, these being things sensible;
for as for those you eall insensible, we have pro ved them to be
nonsense, nothing^^.

If in some things I differ from a philosopher I profess to
admire, 'tis for that very thing on aeeount whereof I admire him,
namely, the love of truth. This &e.

Whenever my reader finds me talk very positively, I desire
he'd not take it ill. I see no reason why eertainty should be
eonfined to the mathematieians.

I say there are no ineommensurables, no surds. I say the side
of any square may be assign'd in numbers. Say you assign unto
me the side of the square 10. I ask 10—10 feet, inehes, &e.,
or 10 points? If the later, I deny there is any sueh square, 'tis
impossible 10 points should eompose a square. If the former,
resolve y*^ 10 square inehes, feet, &e. into points, & the number
of points must neeessarily be a square number whose side is
easily assignable.

A mean proportional eannot be found betwixt any two given
Unes. It ean onely be found betwixt those the numbers of
whose points multiply'd together produee a square number. Thus
betwixt a Une of 2 inehes & a Une of 5 inehes a mean geometrieal
eannot be found, exeept the number of points eontained in 2
inehes multiply'd by y® number of points eontained in 5 inehes
make a square number.

If the wit and industry of the Nihilarians were employ'd about
the usefull & praetieal mathematiques, what advantage had it
brought to mankind!

You ask me whether the books are in the study now, when

The “lines and figures” of puré mathematics, that is to say; which he rejects
as meaningless, in his horror unrealisable abstractions.

[015]

M. E.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

no one is there to see them? I answer, Yes. Yon ask me,
Are we not in the wrong for imagining things to exist when
they are not actually perceiv'd by the senses? I answer, No.
The existence of our ideas consists in being perceiv'd, imagin'd,
thought on. Whenever they are imagin'd or thought on they do
exist. Whenever they are mentioned or discours'd of they are
imagin'd & thought on. Therefore yon can at no time ask me
whether they exist or no, but by reason of y^ very question they
must necessarily exist.

E. But, say yon, then a chimara does exist? I answer, it doth

in one sense, i.e. it is imagin'd. But it must be well noted that
existence is vulgarly restrain'd to actuall perception, and that I
use the word existence in a larger sense than ordinary.^^

N. B.—According to my doctrine all things are entia rationis,
i.e. solum habent esse in intellectum.

E. According to my doctrine all are not entia rationis. The

distinction between ens rationis and ens reale is kept up by it as
well as any other doctrine.]

You ask me whether there can be an infinite idea? I answer,
in one sense there may. Thus the visual sphere, tho' ever so
small, is infinite, i.e. has no end. But if by infinite you mean an
extensión consisting of innumerable points, then I ask y*^ pardon.
Points, tho' never so many, may be numbered. The multitude of
points, or feet, inches, &c., hinders not their numbrableness (i.e.
hinders not their being numerable) in the least. Many or most
are numerable, as well as few or least. Also, if by infinite idea
you mean an idea too great to be comprehended or perceiv'd all
at once, you must excuse me. I think such an infinite is no less

[ 016 ] than a contradiction™.

Things really exist, that is to say, in degrees, e.g. in a lesser degree, when
they are imagined than when they are actually perceived by our senses; but, in
this wide meaning of existence, they may in both cases be said to exist.

Added on blank page of the MS.

In Berkeley's limitation of the term idea to what is presented objectively in
sense, or represented concretely in imagination. Accordingly “an infinite idea”

Commonplace Book

The sillyness of the current doctrine makes much for me. They m.
commonly suppose a material world—figures, motions, bulks of
various sizes, &c.—according to their own confession to no
purpose. All our sensations may be, and sometimes actually are,
without them; ñor can men so much as conceive it possible they
should concur in any wise to the production of them.

Ask a man, I mean a philosopher, why he supposes this vast m.
structure, this compages of bodies? he shall be at a stand; he'll

not have one word to say. W sufficiently shews the folly of the
hypothesis.

Or rather why he supposes all y® Matter? For bodies and their m.
qualities I do allow to exist independently of our mind.

Qu. How is the soul distinguish'd from its ideas? Certainly if s.
there were no sensible ideas there could be no soul, no perception,
remembrance, love, fear, &c.; no faculty could be exerted^^

The soul is the Will, properly speaking, and as it is distinct s.
from ideas.

The grand puzzling question, whether I sleep or wake, easily s.
solv'd.

Qu. Whether minima or meer minima may not be compar'd
by their sooner or later evanescence, as well as by more or less
points, so that one sensible may be greater than another, though
it exceeds it not by one point?

Circles on several radius's are not similar figures, they having
neither all ñor any an infinite number of sides. Henee in vain to

would be an idea which transcends ideation—an express contradiction.

Does the human spirit depend on sensible ideas as much as they depend
on spirit? Other orders of spiritual beings may be percipient of other sorts
of phenomena than those presented in those few senses to which man is
confined, although self-conscious activity abstracted from all sorts of presented
phenomena seems impossible. But a self-conscious spirit is not necessarily
dependent on our material world or our sense experience.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

enquire after 2 terms of one and y® same proportion that should
constantly express the reason of the d to the p in all circles.

Mem. To remark Wallis's harangue, that the aforesaid
proportion can neither be expressed by rational numbers ñor
[017] surds.

We can no more have an idea of length without breadth or
visibility, than of a general figure.

One idea may be like another idea, tho' they contain no
common simple idea’^. Thus the simple idea red is in some sense
like the simple idea bine; 'tis liker it than sweet or shrill. But
then those ideas w are so said to be alike, agree both in their
connexion with another simple idea, viz. extensión, & in their
being receiv'd by one & the same sense. But, after all, nothing
can be like an idea but an idea.

No sharing betwixt God & Nature or second causes in my
doctrine.

M. Materialists must allow the earth to be actually mov'd by the

attractive power of every stone that falls from the air, with many
other the like absurditys.

Enquire concerning the pendulum dock, &c.; whether those

inventions of Huygens, &c. be attained to by my doctrine.

The ... & ... & ... &c. of time are to be cast away and

neglected, as so many noughts or nothings.

Mem. To make experiments concerning minimums and their

colours, whether they have any or no, & whether they can be of
ch

that green w seems to be compounded of yellow and blue.

Qu. Whether it were not better not to cali the operations of the

[This I do not altogether approve of.]—AUTHORfFNS, on margin.

Commonplace Book

mind ideas—confining this term to things sensible’^?

Mem. diligenüy to set forth how that many of the aneient e.
philosophers run into so great absurditys as even to deny the
existenee of motion, and of those other things they pereeiv'd
aetually by their senses. This sprung from their not knowing
Existenee was, and wherein it eonsisted. This the souree of all
their folly. 'Tis on the diseovering of the nature and meaning
and import of Existenee that I ehiefly insist. This puts a wide
differenee betwixt the seepties &e. & me. This I think wholly [ 0 i 8 ]
new. I am sure this is new to me^^.

We have learn'd from Mr. Eoeke that there may be, and that
there are, several glib, eoherent, methodieal diseourses, whieh
nevertheless amount to just nothing. This by him intended
with relation to the Seholemen. We may apply it to the
Mathematieians.

Qu. How ean all words be said to stand for ideas? The word
bine stands for a eolour without any extensión, or abstraet from
extensión. But we have not an idea of eolour without extensión.

We eannot imagine eolour without extensión.

Eoeke seems wrongly to assign a double use of words: one
for eommunieating & the other for reeording our thoughts. 'Tis
absurd to use words for reeording our thoughts to ourselves, or
in our prívate meditations^^.

No one abstraet simple idea like another. Two simple ideas
may be eonneeted with one & the same 3^^ simple idea, or
be intromitted by one & the same sense. But eonsider'd in

He afterwards guarded the differenee, by contrasting notion and idea,
confining the latter to phenomena presented objectively to our senses, or
represented in sensuous imagination, and applying the former to intellectual
apprehension of “operations of the mind,” and of “relations” among ideas.

See Principies, sect. 89.

Is thought, then, independent of language? Can we realise thought worthy
of the ñame without use of words? This is Berkeley's excessive juvenile
reaction against verbal abstractions.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

themselves they can have nothing common, and consequently no
likeness.

Qu. How can there be any abstract ideas of colours? It seems
not so easily as of tastes or sounds. But then all ideas whatsoever
are particular. I can by no means conceive an abstract general
idea. 'Tis one thing to abstract one concrete idea from another
of a different kind, & another thing to abstract an idea from all
particulars of the same kind’^.

N. Mem. Much to recommend and approve of experimental

philosophy.

s. What means Cause as distinguish'd from Occasion? Nothing

but a being w wills, when the effect follows the volition.
Those things that happen from without we are not the cause of.
Therefore there is some other Cause of them, i.e. there is a Being

[019] that wills these perceptions in us^’.

s. [’^It should be said, nothing but a Will—a Being which wills

being unintelligible.]

One square cannot be double of another. Henee the Pythagoric
theorem is false.

Some writers of catoptrics absurd enough to place the apparent
place of the object in the Barrovian case behind the eye.

Blew and yellow chequers still diminishing termínate in green.
This may help to prove the composition of green.

There is in green 2 foundations of 2 relations of likeness to
blew & yellow. Therefore green is compounded.

A mixt cause will produce a mixt effect. Therefore colours
are all compounded that we see.

Mem. To consider Newton's two sorts of green.

Every general notion is ideally realisable in one or other of its possible
concrete or individual applications.

This is the germ of Berkeley's notion of the objectivity of the material world
to individual percipients and so of the rise of individual self-consciousness.

Added by Berkeley on blank page of the MS.

Commonplace Book

N. B. My abstract & general doetrines ought not to be
eondemn'd by the Royall Soeiety. 'Tis their meeting did
ultimately intend. V. Sprat's History S.

Mem. To premise a definiüon of idea^°.

The 2 great prineiples of Morality—the being of a God & the
freedom of man. Those to be handled in the beginning of the
Seeond Book*^

Subvertitur geometría ut non praetiea sed speeulativa.

Archimedes's proposition about squaring the eirele has nothing
to do with eireumferenees eontaining less than 96 points; & if the
eireumferenee eontain 96 points it may be apply'd, but nothing
will follow against indivisibles. V. Barrow.

Those eurve Unes that yon ean reetify geometrieally. Compare
them with their equal right Unes & by a mieroseope yon shall
diseover an inequality. Henee my squaring of the eirele as good
and exaet as the best.

Qu. whether the substanee of body or anything else be any
more than the eolleetion of eonerete ideas ineluded in that thing?
Thus the substanee of any partieular body is extensión, solidity,
figure^^. Of general abstrae! body we ean have no idea.

Mem. Most earefully to ineuleate and set forth that the

Cf. p. 420, note 2. Bishop Sprat's History ofthe Royal Soeiety appeared in
1667.

Much need; for what he means by idea has not been attended to by his
critics.

What “Seeond Book” is this? Does he refer to the “Seeond Part” of the
Principies, whieh never appeared? God is the eulmination of his philosophy,
in Siris.

This is Berkeley's material substanee. Individual material substanees are
for him, steady aggregates of sense-given phenomena, having the effieient and
final eause of their aggregation in eternally aetive Mind—aetive mind, human
and Divine, being essential to their realisation for man.

I. Mo.

[ 020 ]

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

endeavouring to express abstract philosophic thoughts by words
unavoidably runs a man into difficulties. This to be done in the
Introduction^^.

Mem. To endeavour most accurately to understand what is
meant by this axiom: Quse sibi mutuo congruunt sequalia sunt.

Qu. what the geometers mean by equality of lines, & whether,
according to their definition of equality, a curve line can possibly
be equal to a right line?

If w* me you cali those lines equal contain an equal
number of points, then there will be no difficulty. That curve is
equal to a right line w contains the same points as the right one
doth.

M. I take not away substances. I ought not to be accused of

discarding substance out of the reasonable world*^. I onely
reject the philosophic sense (w in effect is no sense) of the
Word substance. Ask a man not tainted with their j argón w^ he
means by corporeal substance, or the substance of body. He shall
answer, bulk, solidity, and such like sensible qualitys. These
I retain. The philosophic nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale,
whereof I have no idea, I discard; if a man may be said to discard
that which never had any being, was never so much as imagin'd
or conceiv'd.

M. In short, be not angry. You lose nothing, whether real or

chimerical. w'^ever you can in any wise conceive or imagine, be
it never so wild, so extravagant, & absurd, much good may it do
[ 021 ] you. You may enjoy it for me. I'll never deprive you of it.

Cf. Introduction to the Principies, especially sect. 18-25.

Stillingfleet charges Locke with “discarding substance out of the reasonable
part of the world.”

Commonplace Book

N. B. I am more for reality than any other philosophers*^.
They make a thousand doubts, & know not certainly but we may
be deeeiv'd. I assert the direet eontrary.

A line in the sense of mathematieians is not meer distanee.
This evident in that there are eurve Unes.

Curves perfeetly ineomprehensible, inexplieable, absurd,
exeept we allow points.

If men look for a thing where it's not to be found, be they never i.
so sagaeious, it is lost labour. If a simple elumsy man knows
where the game lies, he though a fool shall eateh it sooner than
the most fleet & dexterous that seek it elsewhere. Men ehoose to
hunt for truth and knowledge anywhere rather than in their own
understanding, where 'tis to be found.

Ah knowledge onely about ideas. Loeke, B. 4. e. 1. m.

It seems improper, & hable to diffieulties, to make the word s.
person stand for an idea, or to make ourselves ideas, or thinking
things ideas.

Abstraet ideas eause of mueh trifling and mistake. i.

Mathematieians seem not to speak elearly and eoherently of
equality. They nowhere define w^ they mean by that word when
apply'd to lines.

Loeke says the modes of simple ideas, besides extensión and
number, are eounted by degrees. I deny there are any modes or
degrees of simple ideas. What he terms sueh are eomplex ideas,
as I have proved.

The philosophers supposed the real things to exist hehind our ideas, in
concealment: Berkeley was now beginning to think that the objective ideas
or phenomena presented to the senses, the existence of which needs no proof,
were themselves the significant and interpretable realities of physical Science.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[ 022 ]

do the mathematicians mean by considering curves as
polygons? Either they are polygons or they are not. If they are,
why do they give them the ñame of curves? Why do not they
constantly cali them polygons, & treat them as such? If they are
not polygons, I think it absurd to use polygons in their stead.
is this but to pervert language? to adapt an idea to a ñame that
belongs not to it but to a different idea?

The mathematicians should look to their axiom, Quse
congruunt sunt sequalia. I know not what they mean by bidding
me put one triangle on another. The under triangle is no
triangle—nothing at all, it not being perceiv'd. I ask, must sight
be judge of this congruentia or not? If it must, then all lines seen
under the same angle are equal, w they will not acknowledge.
Must the touch be judge? But we cannot touch or feel lines and
surfaces, such as triangles, &c., according to the mathematicians
themselves. Much less can we touch a line or triangle that's
cover'd by another line or triangle.

Do you mean by saying one triangle is equall to another, that
they both take up equal spaces? But then the question recurs,
what mean you by equal spaces? If you mean spatia congruentia,
answer the above difficulty truly.

I can mean (for my part) nothing else by equal triangles than
triangles containing equal numbers of points.

I can mean nothing by equal lines but lines w ’tis indifferent

whether of them I take, lines in w I observe by my senses no
difference, & w therefore have the same ñame.

Must the imagination be judge in the aforementioned cases?
but then imagination cannot go beyond the touch and sight. Say
you, puré intellect must be judge. I reply that lines and triangles
are not operations of the mind.

If I speak positively and with the air of a mathematician in
things of which I am certain, 'tis to avoid disputes, to make men
careful to think before they answer, to discuss my arguments

Commonplace Book

before they go to refute them. I would by no means injure
truth and eertainty by an affeeted modesty & submission to
better judgments. I lay before you are undoubted theorems;
not plausible eonjeetures of my own, ñor learned opinions of
other men. I pretend not to prove them by figures, analogy, or
authority. Let them stand or fall by their own evidenee.

When you speak of the eorpuseularian essenees of bodys, to n.
refleet on seet. 11. & 12. b. 4. e. 3. Loeke. Motion supposes
not solidity. A meer eolour'd extensión may give us the idea of
motion. [ 023 ]

Any subjeet ean have of eaeh sort of primary qualities but one p.
partieular at onee. Lib. 4. e. 3. s. 15. Loeke.

Well, say you, aeeording to this new doetrine, all is but meer m.
idea—there is nothing w is not an ens rationis. I answer, things
are as real, and exist in rerum natura, as mueh as ever. The
differenee between entia realia & entia rationis may be made as
properly now as ever. Do but think before you speak. Endeavour
rightly to eomprehend my meaning, and you'll agree with me in
this.

Fruitless the distinetion ’twixt real and nominal essenees. n.

We are not aequainted with the meaning of our words. Real,
extensión, existenee, power, matter. Unes, infinite, point, and
many more are frequently in our mouths, when little, elear, and
determin'd answers them in our understandings. This must be
well ineuleated.

Vain is the distinetion 'twixt intelleetual and material world^^. m.
V. Loeke, lib. 4. e. 3. s. 27, where he says that is far more
beautiful than this.

Foolish in men to despise the senses. If it were not for s.

them the mind eould have no knowledge, no thought at all. All Mo.

If the material world can be real only in and through a percipient intelligence,
as the realising factor.

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

... of introversión, meditation, contemplation, and spiritual acts,
as if these could be exerted before we had ideas from without by
the senses, are manifestly absurd. This may be of great use in that
it makes the happyness of the Ufe to come more conceivable and
agreeable to our present nature. The schoolemen & refiners in
philosophy gave the greatest part of mankind no more tempting
idea of heaven or the joys of the blest.

The vast, wide-spread, universal cause of our mistakes is,
that we do not consider our own notions. I mean consider them
in themselves—fix, settle, and determine them,—we regarding
them with relation to each other only. In short, we are much out in
study[ing] the relations of things before we study them absolutely
and in themselves. Thus we study to find out the relations of
figures to one another, the relations also of number, without
endeavouring rightly to understand the nature of extensión and
number in themselves. This we think is of no concern, of no
difficulty; but if I mistake not 'tis of the last importance,

I allow not of the distinction there is made 'twixt profit and
pleasure.

I'd never blame a man for acting upon interest. He's a fool that
acts on any other principies. The not considering these things
has been of ill consequence in morality.

My positivo assertions are no less modest than those that are
introduced with “It seems to me,” “I suppose,” &c.; since I
declare, once for all, that all I write or think is entirely about
things as they appear to me. It concerns no man else any further
than his thoughts agree with mine. This in the Preface.

Two things are apt to confound men in their reasonings one
with another. Ist. Words signifying the operations of the mind
are taken from sensible ideas. 2ndly. Words as used by the
vulgar are taken in some latitude, their signification is confused.
Henee if a man use words in a determined, settled signification,
he is at a hazard either of not being understood, or of speaking
improperly. All this remedyed by studying the understanding.

Commonplace Book

Unity no simple idea. I have no idea meerly answering the
Word one. All number eonsists in relations^^.

Entia realia et entia rationis, a foolish distinetion of the
Sehoolemen.

We have an intuitive knowledge of the existenee of other things m. p.
besides ourselves & order, príeeedaneous*^. To the knowledge
of our own existenee—in that we must have ideas or else we
eannot think.

We move our legs ourselves. 'Tis we that will their movement. s.
Herein I differ from Malbraneh^^.

Mem. Nieely to diseuss Lib. 4. e. 4. Loeke^*^. Mo.

Mem. Again and again to mention & illustrate the doetrine of m.
the reality of things, rerum natura, &e.

I say is demonstration—^perfeet demonstration. Wherever m.
men have fix'd & determin'd ideas annexed to their words they [025]
ean hardly be mistaken. Stiek but to my definition of likeness,
and 'tis a demonstration y^ eolours are not simple ideas, all reds
being like, &e. So also in other things. This to be heartily insisted
on.

The abstraet idea of Being or Existenee is never thought of e.
by the vulgar. They never use those words standing for abstraet
ideas.

I must not say the words thing, substanee, &e. have been the m.
eause of mistakes, but the not refleeting on their meaning. I will
be still for retaining the words. I only desire that men would
think before they speak, and settle the meaning of their words.

I approve not of that whieh Eoeke says, viz. truth eonsists in Mo.

Cf. Principies, sect. 13, 119-122, which deny the possibility of an idea or
mental picture corresponding to abstraet number.

** “Praecedaneous,” i.e. precedent.

** Who refunds human as well as natural causation into Divine ageney.

In which Locke treats “Of the Reality of Knowledge,” including questions
apt to lead Berkeley to inquire, Whether we could in reason suppose reality in
the absence of all realising mind.

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the joining and separating of signs.

I. Locke cannot explain general truth or knowledge without

treating of words and propositions. This makes for me against
abstrae! general ideas. Vide Locke, lib. 4. ch. 6.

I. Men have been very industrious in travelling forward. They

have gone a great way. But none have gone backward beyond
the Principies. On that side there lies much térra incógnita to be
travel'd over and discovered by me. A vast field for invention.

Twelve inches not the same idea with a foot. Because a man
may perfectly conceive a foot who never thought of an inch.

A foot is equal to or the same with twelve inches in this
respect, viz. they contain both the same number of points.

[Forasmuch as] to be used.

Mem. To mention somewhat w may encourage the study of
politiques, and testify of me y*^ I am well dispos'd toward them.

If men did not use words for ideas they would never have
thought of abstrae! ideas. Certainly genera and species are not
abstrae! general ideas. Abstrae! ideas inelude a contradiction in
their nature. Vide Locke^^ lib. 4. c. 7. s. 9.

A various or mixt cause must necessarily produce a various or
mixt effect. This demonstrable from the definition of a cause;
which way of demonstrating must be frequently made use of in
my Treatise, & to that end definitions often prsemis'd. Henee 'tis
evident that, according to Newton's doctrine, colours cannot be
simple ideas.

M. I am the farthest from scepticism of any man. I know with

an intuitivo knowledge the existence of other things as well as

Locke's “abstract idea” is misconceived and caricatured by Berkeley in bis
impetuosity.

[ 026 ]

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101

my own soul. This is Locke ñor scarce any other thinking
philosopher will pretend to^^.

Doctrine of abstraction of very evil consequence in all the i.
Sciences. Mem. Barrow's remark. Entirely owing to language.

Locke greatly out in reckoning the recording our ideas by
words amongst the uses and not the abuses of language.

Of great use & y® last importance to contémplate a man put i.
into the world alone, with admirable abilitys, and see how after
long experience he would know w*out words. Such a one would
never think of genera and species or abstrae! general ideas.

Wonderful in Locke that he could, w" advanced in years, i.
see at all thro' a mist; it had been so long a gathering, & was
consequently thick. This more to be admir'd than y^ he did not
see farther.

Identity of ideas may be taken in a double sense, either as
including or excluding identity of circumstances, such as time,
place, &c.

I am glad the people I converse with are not all richer, wiser, Mo.
&c. than I. This is agreeable to reason; is no sin. 'Tis certain
that if the happyness of my acquaintance encreases, & mine
not proportionably, mine must decrease. The not understanding
this & the doctrine about relative good, discuss'd with Lrench,
Madden^^, &c., to be noticed as 2 causes of mistake in judging
of moral matters.

Mem. To observe (w“ you talk of the división of ideas into
simple and complex) that there may be another cause of the [ 027 ]
undefinableness of certain ideas besides that which Locke gives;
viz. the want of ñames.

This and other passages refer to the scepticism, that is founded on the
impossibility of our comparing our ideas of things with unperceived real
things; so that we can never escape from the circle of subjectivity. Berkeley
intended to refute this scepticism.

Probably Samuel Madden, who afterwards edited the Querist.

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M. Mem. To begin the First Book^^ not with mention of sensation

and reflection, but instead of sensation to use perception or
thought in general.

I. I defy any man to imagine or conceive perception without an

idea, or an idea without perception.

E. Locke's very supposition that matter & motion should exist

before thought is absurd—ineludes a manifest contradiction.

Locke's harangue about coherent, methodical discourses
amounting to nothing, apply'd to the mathematicians.

They talk of determining all the points of a curve by an
equation. mean they by this? would they signify by the
Word points? Do they stick to the definition of Euclid?

s. We think we know not the Soul, because we have no

imaginable or sensible idea annex'd to that sound. This the
effect of prejudice.

s. Certainly we do not know it. This will be plain if we examine

what we mean by the word knowledge. Neither doth this argüe
any defect in our knowledge, no more than our not knowing a
contradiction.

The very existence of ideas constitutes the Soul^^.

s. Consciousness^^, perception, existence of ideas, seem to be

all one.

r t

Consult, ransack y understanding. W find you there besides
several perceptions or thoughts? mean you by the word mind?
You must mean something that you perceive, or y^ you do not
perceive. A thing not perceived is a contradiction. To mean
(also) a thing you do not perceive is a contradiction. We are in
all this matter strangely abused by words.

This “First Book” seems to be “Part I” of the projected Principies —the only
Part ever published. Here he inclines to “perception or thought in general,” in
the language of Descartes; but in the end he approximates to Locke's “sensation
and reflection.” See Principies, sect. 1, and notes.

Does he mean, like Flume afterwards, that ideas or phenomena constitute
the ego, so that I am only the transitory conscious State of each moment?

“Consciousness”—a term rarely used by Berkeley or his contemporaries.

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103

Mind is a congeries of perceptions^^. Take away perceptions [ 028 ]
and yon take away the mind. Put the perceptions and yon put the
mind.

Say yon, the mind is not the perception, not that thing which
perceives. I answer, yon are abused by the words “that a thing.”

These are vague and empty words with us.

The having ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man s.
may have ideas when he only imagines. But then this imagination
presupposeth perception.

oh t

That w extreamly strengthens us in prejudice is y we think m.

we see an empty space, which I shall demónstrate to be false in
the Third Book^^.

There may be demonstrations used even in Divinity. I mean
in revealed Theology, as contradistinguish'd from natural; for
tho' the principies may be founded in faith, yet this hinders
not but that legitimate demonstrations might be built thereon;
provided still that we define the words we use, and never go
beyond our ideas. Henee 'twere no very hard matter for those
who hold episcopacy or monarchy to be establishedjnre Divino
to demónstrate their doctrines if they are true. But to pretend to
demónstrate or reason anything about the Trinity is absurd. Here
an implicit faith becomes us.

Qu. if there be any real difference betwixt certain ideas s.
of reñection & others of sensation, e.g. betwixt perception
and white, black, sweet, &c.? Wherein, 1 pray you, does the
perception of white differ from white men....

This too, if strictly interpreted, looks like an anticipation of Hume's reduction
of the ego into successive “impressions”—“nothing but a bundle or collection of
different perceptions, which succeed one another with inconceivable rapidity,
and are in a perpetual flux and movement.” See Hume's Treatise, Part IV. sect.

6 .

What “Third Book” is here projected? Was a “Third Part” of the Principies
then in embryo?

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I shall demónstrate all my doctrines. The nature of
demonstration to be set forth and insisted on in the Introduction^^.
In that I must needs differ from Locke, forasmuch as he makes
all demonstration to be about abstract ideas, w 1 say we have
not ñor can have.

s. The understanding seemeth not to differ from its perceptions

or ideas. Qu. What must one think of the will and passions?

E. A good proof that Existence is nothing without or distinct

from perception, may be drawn from considering a man put into
the World without company^®*’.

E. There was a smell, i.e. there was a smell perceiv'd. Thus we

see that common speech confirms my doctrine.

T. No broken intervals of death or annihilation. Those intervals

are nothing; each person's time being measured to him by bis
own ideas.

I. We are frequently puzzl'd and at a loss in obtaining olear and

determin'd meanings of words commonly in use, & that because
we imagine words stand for abstract general ideas which are
altogether inconceivable.

I. “A stone is a stone.” This a nonsensical proposition, and such

as the solitary man would never think on. Ñor do 1 believe he
would ever think on this: “The whole is equal to its parts,” &c.

E. Let it not be said that 1 take away existence. 1 only declare the

meaning of the word, so far as 1 can comprehend it.

I. If you take away abstraction, how do men differ from beasts?

1 answer, by shape, by language. Rather by degrees of more and
less.

W^ means Locke by inferences in words, consequences of
words, as something different from consequences of ideas? 1

This is scarcely done in the “Introduction” to the Principies.

Berkeley, as we find in the Commonplace Book, is fond of conjecturing
how a man all alone in the world, freed from the abstractions of language,
would apprehend the realities of existence, which he must then face directly,
without the use or abuse of verbal symbols.

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105

conceive no such thing.

N. B. Much complaint about the imperfection of language^®^ i.

But perhaps some man may say, an inert thoughtless Substance m.
may exist, though not extended, moved, &c., but with other
properties whereof we have no idea. But even this I shall
demónstrate to be impossible, w“ I come to treat more particularly
of Existence.

Will not rightly distinguish'd from Desire by Locke—it
seeming to superadd nothing to the idea of an action, but the
uneasiness for its absence or non-existence.

Mem. To enquire diligently into that strange mistery, viz. s.
How it is that I can cast about, think of this or that man, place,
action, w“ nothing appears to introduce them into my thoughts,
w" they have no perceivable connexion with the ideas suggested
by my senses at the present?

'Tis not to be imagin'd a marvellous emptiness & scarcity i.
of ideas that man shall descry who will lay aside all use of words
in his meditations.

Incongruous in Locke to fancy we want a sense proper to see m.
substances with.

Locke owns that abstract ideas were made in order to naming. i.

The common errour of the opticians, that we judge of distance m.
by angles^*’^, strengthens men in their prejudice that they see
things without and distant from their mind.

I am persuaded, would men but examine w^ they mean by the e.
Word existence, they wou'd agree with me.

c. 20. s. 8. b. 4. of Locke makes for me against the
mathematicians.

The supposition that things are distinct from ideas takes away m.

**** This “N. B.” is expanded in the Introduction to the Principies.

Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 4.

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all real truth, & consequently brings in a universal scepticism;
since all our knowledge and contemplation is confin'd barely to
our own ideas

I. Qu. whether the solitary man would not find it necessary

to make use of words to record bis ideas, if not in memory
or meditation, yet at least in writing—without which he could
scarce retain his knowledge.

We read in history there was a time when fears and
jealousies, privileges of parliament, malignant party, and such
like expressions of too unlimited and doubtful a meaning, were
words of much sway. Also the words Church, Whig, Tory, &c.,
contribute very much to faction and dispute,
s. The distinguishing betwixt an idea and perception of the idea

has been one great cause of imagining material substances^®^.
s. That God and blessed spirits have Will is a manifest argument

against Locke's proofs that the Will cannot be conceiv'd, put into
action, without a previous uneasiness.

s. The act of the Will, or volition, is not uneasiness, for that

uneasiness may be without volition.

s. Volition is distinct from the object or idea for the same reason.

s. Also from uneasiness and idea together.

The understanding not distinct from particular perceptions or
ideas.

The Will not distinct from particular volitions.
s. It is not so very evident that an idea, or at least uneasiness,

may be without all volition or act.

The understanding taken for a faculty is not really distinct
from y® will.

This allow'd hereafter.

What is immediately realised in our percipient experience must be presumed
or trusted in as real, if we have any hold of reality, or the moral right to postúlate
that our universe is fundamentally trustworthy.

But he distinguishes, in the Principies and elsewhere, between an idea of
sense and a percipient ego.

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107

To ask whether a man can will either side is an absurd question, s.
for the Word can presupposes volition.

Anima mundi, substantial form, omniscient radical heat, n.
plástic vertue, Hylaschic principie—all these vanish^*’^.

Newton proves that gravity is proportional to gravity. I think m.
that's all^*’^.

Qu. whether it be the vis inertise that makes it difficult to move
a stone, or the vis attractivEe, or both, or neither?

Mem. To express the doctrines as fully and copiously and
clearly as may be. Also to be full and particular in answering
objections^*’^.

To say y® Will is a power; [therefore] volition is an act. This s.
is Ídem per ídem.

makes men despise extensión, motion, &c., & sepárate
them from the essence of the soul, is that they imagine them to
be distinct from thought, and to exist in unthinking substance. [032]

An extended may have passive modes of thinking good actions.

There might be idea, there might be uneasiness, there might
be the greatest uneasiness w*out any volition, therefore the....

Matter once allow'd, I defy any man to prove that God is not m.
Matter^°^

They reappear in Siris.

**** In one of Berkeley's letters to Johnson, a quarter of a century after
the Commonplace Book, when he was in America, he observes that “the
mechanical philosophers pretend to demónstrate that matter is proportional to
gravity. But their argument concludes nothing, and is a mere circle”—as he
proceeds to show.

***’ In the Principies, sect. 1-33, he seeks to fulfil the expository part of this
intention; in sect. 33-84, also in the Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,
he is “particular in answering objections.”

**** If Matter is arbitrarily credited with omnipotence.

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s. Man is free. There is no difficulty in this proposition, if we

but settle the signification of the word/ree—if we had an idea
annext to the word free, and would but contémplate that idea,
s. We are imposed on by the words will, determine, agent, free,

can, &c.

s. Uneasiness precedes not every volition. This evident by

experience.

s. Trace an infant in the womb. Mark the train & succession of

its ideas. Observe how volition comes into the mind. This may
perhaps acquaint you with its nature.

s. Complacency seems rather to determine, or precede, or

coincide w* & constitute the essence of volition, than uneasiness.
s. You tell me, according to my doctrine a man is not free. I

answer, tell me you mean by the word free, and I shall resolve

N. Qu. W^ do men mean when they talk of one body's touching

another? I say you never saw one body touch, or (rather) I say,

I never saw one body that I could say touch'd this or that other;

for that if my optiques were improv'd, I should see intervalls and

other bodies behind those wh now seem to touch.

Mem. Upon all occasions to use the utmost modesty—to
confute the mathematicians w* the utmost civility & respect, not
to style them Nihilarians, &c.

N. B. To rein in y® satyrical nature.

Blame me not if I use my words sometimes in some latitude.
[033] 'Tis w^ cannot be helpt. 'Tis the fault of language that you

cannot always apprehend the olear and determínate meaning of
my words.

Say you, there might be a thinking Substance—something
ch

unknown—w perceives, and supports, and ties together the

On freedom as implied in a moral and responsible agent, cf. Siris, sect. 257
and note.

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ideas^^*’. Say I, make it appear there is any need of it and yon
shall have it for me. I care not to take away anything I can see
the least reason to think should exist.

I affirm 'tis manifestly absurd—no excuse in the world can be
given why a man should use a word without an idea^^^ Certainly
we shall find that ever word we make use of in matter of puré
reasoning has, or ought to have, a compleat idea, annext to it,
i.e. its meaning, or the sense we take it in, must be compleatly
known.

'Tis demonstrable a man can never be brought to imagine
anything should exist whereof he has no idea. Whoever says he
does, banters himself with words.

We imagine a great difference & distance in respect of G.
knowledge, power, &c., betwixt a man & a worm. The like
difference betwixt man and God may be imagin'd; or infinitely
greater^^^ difference.

We find in our own minds a great number of different ideas. G.
We may imagine in God a greater number, i.e. that ours in
number, or the number of ours, is inconsiderable in respect
thereof. The words difference and number, oíd and known,
we apply to that w^^^ is unknown. But I am embrangled^^^ in
words—'tis scarce possible it should be otherwise.

The chief thing I do or pretend to do is onely to remove
the mist or veil of words^^^. This has occasion'd ignorance &
confusión. This has ruined the schoolmen and mathematicians,
lawyers and divines.

Is not this one way of expressing the Universal Providence and constant
uniting agency of God in the material world?

Here idea seems to be used in its wider signification, including notion.
“infinitely greater”—Does infinity admit of imaginable degrees?
’embrangled'—perplexed—involved in disputes.

* See Principies, Introduction, sect. 24.

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s. The grand cause of perplexity & darkness in treating of the

Will, is that we imagine it to be an object of thought: (to
speak with the vulgar), we think we may perceive, contémplate,
[034] and view it like any of our ideas; whereas in truth 'tis no

idea, ñor is there any idea of it. 'Tis toto ccelo different from the
understanding, i.e. from all our ideas. If you say the Will, or rather
volition, is something, 1 answer, there is an homonymy^^^ in the
Word thing, w" apply'd to ideas and volition and understanding
and will. All ideas are passive^^^.

s. Thing & idea are much what words of the same extent and

meaning. Why, therefore, do 1 not use the word thing? Ans.
Because thing is of greater latitude than idea. Thing comprehends
also volitions or actions. Now these are no ideas^'^.
s. There can be perception w*out volition. Qu. whether there

can be volition without perception?

E. Existence not conceivable without perception or volition—not

distinguish'd therefrom.

T. N. B. Several distinct ideas can be perceived by sight and

touch at once. Not so by the other senses. 'Tis this diversity of
sensations in other senses chiefly, but sometimes in touch and
sight (as also diversity of volitions, whereof there cannot be more
than one at once, or rather, it seems there cannot, for of that 1
doubt), gives us the idea of time—or is time itself.

W^ would the solitary man think of number?
s. There are innate ideas, i.e. ideas created with us^'^.

“homonymy,” i.e. equivocation.

Voluntary or responsible activity is not an idea or datum of sense, ñor can
it be realised in sensuous imagination. He uses “thing” in the wide meaning
which comprehends persons.

*** Is this consistent with other entries?

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Locke seems to be mistaken he says thought is not essential s.
to the mind'^^.

Certainly the mind always and eonstantly thinks: and we know s.
this too. In sleep and tranees the mind exists not —there is no
time, no sueeession of ideas

To say the mind exists without thinking is a eontradietion, s.
nonsense, nothing.

Folly to inquire determines the Will. Uneasiness, &e. are s.
ideas, therefore unaetive, therefore ean do nothing, therefore
eannot determine the Will^^^. [035]

Again, w* mean yon by determine? s.

For want of rightly understanding time, motion, existenee, n.
&e., men are fore'd into sueh absurd eontradietions as this, viz. ^
light moves 16 diameters of earth in a seeond of time.

’Twas the opinión that ideas eould exist unpereeiv'd, or before s.
perception, that made men think pereeption^^^ was somewhat
different from the idea pereeived, i.e. y^ it was an idea of
refleetion; whereas the thing pereeiv'd was an idea of sensation.

1 say, 'twas this made 'em think the understanding took it in,
reeeiv'd it from without; w eould never be did not they think it
existed without^^^.

Properly speaking, idea is the pieture of the imagination's m.
making. This is y® likeness of, and refer'd to the real idea, or (if
you will) thing

Essay, Bk. II. ch. i. sect. 9-19.

This is one way of meeting the difficulty of supposed interruptions of
conscious or percipient activity.

This seems to imply that voluntary action is mysteriously self-originated.

“perception.” He does not inelude the percipient.

“without,” i.e. unrealised by any percipient.

This would make idea the term only for what is imagined, as distinguished
from what is pereeived in sense.

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s. To ask, have we an idea of Will or volition, is nonsense. An

idea can resemble nothing but an idea.

s. If yon ask thing it is that wills, 1 answer, if yon mean idea

by the word thing, or anything like any idea, then 1 say, 'tis no
thing at all that wills^^^. This how extravagant soever it may
seem, yet is a certain truth. We are cheated by these general
terms, thing, is, &c.

s. Again, if by is yon mean is perceived, or does perceive, 1 say

nothing w is perceived or does perceive wills.

s. The referring ideas to things w are not ideas, the using the

term “idea of^^^,” is one great cause of mistake, as in other
matters, so also in this.

s. Some words there are w do not stand for ideas, viz. partióles,

will, &c. Partióles stand for volitions and their concomitant ideas.

s. There seem to be but two colours w are simple ideas,

viz. those exhibited by the most and least refrangible rays;
[the others], being the intermedíate ones, may be formed by

[036] composition.

s. 1 have no idea of a volition or act of the mind, neither has any

other intelligence; for that were a contradiction.

N. B. Simple ideas, viz. colours, are not devoid of all sort
of composition, tho' it must be granted they are not made up of
distinguishable ideas. Yet there is another sort of composition.
Men are wont to cali those things compounded in which we do
not actually discover the component ingredients. Bodies are said
to be compounded of chymical principies, which, nevertheless,

come not into view till after the dissolution of the bodies—w
were not, could not, be discerned in the bodies whilst remaining
entire.

I. All our knowledge is about particular ideas, according to

In a strict use of words, only persons exercise will—not things.

As we must do in imagination, which (unlike sense) is representativo; for

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113

Locke. All our sensations are particular ideas, as is evident.
use then do we make of abstract general ideas, since we neither
know ñor perceive them?

'Tis allow'd that partióles stand not for ideas, and yet they are s.
not said to be empty useless sounds. The truth really is, they
stand for operations of the mind, i.e. volitions.

Locke says all our knowledge is about particulars. If so, pray Mo.

is the following ratiocination but a jumble of words? “Omnis
homo est animal; omne animal vivit: ergo omnis homo vivit.”

It amounts (if you annex particular ideas to the words “animal”
and “vivit”) to no more than this: “Omnis homo est homo; omnis
homo est homo: ergo, omnis homo est homo.” A mere sport and
trifling with sounds.

We have no ideas of vertues & vices, no ideas of moral Mo.
actions^^^. Wherefore it may be question'd whether we are
capable of arriving at demonstration about them^^*, the morality
consisting in the volition chiefly.

Strange it is that men should be at a loss to find their idea of e.
Existence; since that (if such there be distinct from perception)
it is brought into the mind by all the ways of sensation and
reflection^^^, methinks it should be most familiar to us, and we
best acquainted with it. [037]

This 1 am sure, 1 have no idea of Existence^^*^, or annext to the e.
Word Existence. And if others have that's nothing to me; they can

the mental images represent original data of sense-perception.

™ Does he not allow that we have meaning, if not ideas, when we use the
terms virtue and vice and moral action?

As Locke says we are.

“Existence and unity are ideas that are suggested to the understanding by
every object without and every idea within. When ideas are in our minds, we
consider that they exist.” Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. 7.

i.e. of Existence in the abstract—unperceived and unperceiving—realised
neither in percipient life ñor in moral action.

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S. E.

N. Mo.
Mo.

[038]

never make me sensible of it; simple ideas being incommunicable
by language.

Say yon, the unknown substtatum of volitions & ideas is
something whereof 1 have no idea. 1 ask, Is there any other being
which has or can have an idea of it? If there be, then it must be
itself an idea; which yon will think absurd.

There is somewhat active in most perceptions, i.e. such as
ensue upon our volitions, such as we can prevent and stop: e.g. 1
turn my eyes toward the sun: 1 open them. All this is active.

Things are twofold—active or inactive. The existence of
active things is to act; of inactive to be perceiv'd.

Distinct from or without perception there is no volition;
therefore neither is there existence without perception.

God may comprehend all ideas, even the ideas w are painfull
& unpleasant, without being in any degree pained thereby'^^
Thus we ourselves can imagine the pain of a burn, &c. without
any misery or uneasiness at all.

Truth, three sorts thereof—natural, mathematical, & moral.

Agreement of relation onely where numbers do obtain: of co-
existence, in nature: of signification, by including, in morality.

Gyant who shakes the mountain that's on him must be
acknowledged. Or rather thus: 1 am no more to be reckon'd
stronger than Locke than a pigmy should be reckon'd stronger
than a gyant, because he could throw off the molehill w lay
upon him, and the gyant could onely shake or shove the mountain
that oppressed him. This in the Preface.

Promise to extend our knowledge & olear it of those shamefull
contradictions which embarrass it. Something like this to begin
the Introduction in a modest way^^^.

Whoever shall pretend to censure any part, 1 desire he would

This suggests that God knows sensible things without being sentient of any.

Cf. Principies, Introd., sect. 1-5.

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115

read out the whole, else he may perhaps not understand me. In
the Prefaee or Introduetion^^^.

Doetrine of identity best explain'd by taking the Will for
volitions, the Understanding for ideas. The difficulty of
consciousness of are never aeted surely solv'd thereby.

1 must aeknowledge myself beholding to the philosophers
who have gone before me. They have given good rules,
though eertainly they do not always observe them. Similitude of
adventurers, who, tho' they attained not the desired port, they by
their wreeks have made known the roeks and sands, whereby the
passage of aftercomers is made more seeure & easy. Preface or
Introduction.

The opinión that men had ideas of moral actions^^^ has render'd
the demonstrating ethiques very difficult to them.

An idea being itself unactive cannot be the resemblance or
image of an active thing.

Excuse to be made in the Introduction for using the word idea,
viz. because it has obtain'd. But a caution must be added.

Scripture and possibility are the onely proofs^^^ with
Malbranch. Add to these what he calis a great propensión
to think so: this perhaps may be questioned. Perhaps men, if
they think before they speak, will not be found so thoroughly
persuaded of the existence of Matter.

On second thoughts 1 am on t'other extream. 1 am certain
of that w Malbranch seems to doubt of, viz. the existence of
bodies^^^.

Mem. To bring the killing blow at the last, e.g. in the matter
of abstraction to bring Locke's general triangle in the last^^^.

They give good rules, tho' perhaps they themselves do not

Cf. Preface to Principies', also to Dialogues.

i.e. that ethics was a Science of phenomena or ideas.

i.e. of the independen! existence of Matter.

’bodies'—i.e. sensible things—not unrealised Matter.

Cf. Principies, Introduction, sect. 13.

Mo.

I. &c.

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always observe them. They speak much of olear and distinct
ideas, though at the same time they talk of general abstrae! ideas,
&c. ni [instance] in Locke's opinión of abstraction, he being as

[039] olear a writer as 1 have met with.

Such was the candour of this great man that 1 perswade myself,
were he alive^^^, he would not be offended that 1 differ from
him: seeing that even in so doing 1 follow his advice, viz. to use
my own judgement, see with my own eyes, & not with another's.
Introduction.

s. The Word thing, as comprising or standing for idea & volition,

usefull; as standing for idea and archetype without the mind^^^,
mischievous and useless.

Mo. To demónstrate morality it seems one need only make a

dictionary of words, and see which included which. At least, this
is the greatest part and bulk of the work.

Mo. Locke's instances of demonstration in morality are, according

to his own rule, trifling propositions.

p. s. Qu. How comes it that some ideas are confessedly allow'd by

all to be onely in the mind^^*’, and others as generally taken to
be without the mind'^^, if, according to you, all are equally and
only in the mind? Ans. Because that in proportion to pleasure or
pain ideas are attended with desire, exertion, and other actions
which inelude volition. Now volition is by all granted to be in
spirit.

I. If men would lay aside words in thinking, 'tis impossible they

should ever mistake, save only in matters of fact. 1 mean it seems
impossible they should be positive & secure that anything was
true w in truth is not so. Certainly 1 cannot err in matter of
simple perception. So far as we can in reasoning go without the

Locke died in October, 1704.

“without the mind,” i.e. abstracted from all active percipient life.

e.g. secondary qualities of sensible things, in which pleasure and pain are
prominent.

e.g. primary qualities, in which pleasure and pain are latent.

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117

help of signs, there we have certain knowledge. Indeed, in long
deductions made by signs there may be slips of memory.

From my doetrine there follows a eure for pride. We are only Mo.
to be praised for those things whieh are our own, or of our own
doing; natural abilitys are not eonsequenees of our volitions.

Mem. Candidly to take notiee that Loeke holds some m.
dangerous opinions; sueh as the infinity and eternity of Spaee
and the possibility of Matter's thinking^^^. [ 040 ]

Onee more 1 desire my reader may be upon bis guard against i.
the fallaey of words. Let him beware that 1 do not impose on
him by plausible empty talk, that eommon dangerous way of
eheating men into absurditys. Let him not regard my words any
otherwise than as oeeasions of bringing into bis mind determin'd
signifieations. So far as they fail of this they are gibberish,
jargon, & deserve not the ñame of language. 1 desire & warn him
not to expeet to find truth in my book, or anywhere but in bis
own mind. w'^ever 1 see myself 'tis impossible 1 ean paint it out
in words.

N. B. To eonsider well w is meant by that w Loeke saith Mo.
eoneerning algebra—that it supplys intermediate ideas. Also to
think of a method affording the same use in moráis &e. that this
doth in mathematiques.

Homo is not proved to be vivens by means of any intermediate Mo.
idea. 1 don't fully agree w* Loeke in w^ he says eoneerning
sagaeity in finding out intermediate ideas in matter eapable of
demonstration & the use thereof; as if that were the onely means
of improving and enlarging demonstrative knowledge.

There is a differenee betwixt power & volition. There s.
may be volition without power. But there ean be no power

See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13. § 21, ch. 17. § 4; also Bk. IV. ch. 3.

§ 6; also his controversy with Bishop Stillingfleet regarding the possibility of
Matter thinking. With Berkeley real space is a finite creature, dependen! for
realisation on living percipient Spirit.

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M. S.

[041]

Mo.

without volition. Power implyeth volition, & at the same time a
connotation of the effects following the volition^^^.

We have assuredly an idea of substance. 'Twas absurd of
Locke^^^ to think we had a ñame without a meaning. This might
prove acceptable to the Stillingfleetians.

The substance of Body we know^^^. The substance of Spirit
we do not know—it not being knowable, it being a puras actas.

Words have ruin'd and overrun all the Sciences—law,
physique, chymistry, astrology, &c.

Abstract ideas only to be had amongst the learned. The vulgar
never think they have any such, ñor truly do they find any want
of them. Genera & species & abstract ideas are terms unknown
to them.

Locke's out^^^—the case is different. We can have an idea of
body without motion, but not of soul without thought.

God ought to be worship'd. This easily demonstrated when
once we ascertain the signification of the words God, worship,
ought.

No perception, according to Locke, is active. Therefore no
perception (i.e. no idea) can be the image of, or like unto, that
which is altogether active & not at all passive, i.e. the Will.

I can will the calling to mind something that is past, tho' at
the same time that w I cali to mind was not in my thoughts
before that volition of mine, & consequently I could have had no
uneasiness for the want of it.

The Will & the Understanding may very well be thought two
distinct beings.

Sed quia voluntas raro agit nisi ducente desiderio. V. Locke,

But what of the origination of the volition itself?

Essay, Bk. I. ch. iv. § 18. See also Locke's Letters to Stillingfleet.

It is, according to Berkeley, the steady unión or co-existence of a group of
sense-phenomena.

Essay, Bk. II. ch. i. § 10—where he argües for interruptions of
consciousness. “Men think not always.”

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Epistles, p. 479, ad Limburgum.

You cannot say the m. t. [minimum tangibile] is like or one
with the m. v. [minimum visibile], because they be both minima,
just pereeiv'd, and next door to nothing. You may as well say
the m. t. is the same with or like unto a sound, so small that it is
searee pereeiv'd.

Extensión seems to be a mode of some tangible or sensible
quality aeeording as it is seen or felt.

The spirit—the aetive thing—that w is soul, & God—is the s.
Will alone. The ideas are effeets—impotent things.

The eonerete of the will & understanding 1 might eall mind; s.
not person, lest offenee be given. Mem. Carefully to omit
defining of person, or making mueh mention of it.

You ask, do these volitions make one Will? you ask is s.
meerly about a word—unity being no more^^^.

N. B. To use utmost eaution not to give the least handle of
offenee to the Chureh or Churehmen. [ 042 ]

Even to speak somewhat favourably of the Sehoolmen, and i.
shew that they who blame them for j argón are not free of it
themselves. Introd.

Eoeke's great oversight seems to be that he did not begin with
his third book; at least that he had not some thought of it at first.
Certainly the & 4* books don't agree w* w*^ he says in y®

If Matter^^^ is onee allow'd to exist, elippings of weeds and m.

In other words, the material world is wholly impotent: all activity in the
universe is spiritual.

On the order of its four books and the structure of Locke's Essay, see the
Prolegomena in my edition of the Essay, pp. liv-lviii.

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parings of nails may think, for ought that Locke can tell; tho' he
seems positive of the contrary.

Since I say men cannot mistake in short reasoning about
things demonstrable, if they lay aside words, it will be expected
this Treatise will contain nothing but is certain & evident
demonsfration, & in truth I hope yon will find nothing in it but
what is such. Certainly I take it all for such. Introd.

I. When I say I will reject all propositions wherein I know not

fully and adequately and clearly, so far as knowable, the thing
meant thereby, this is not to be extended to propositions in the
Scripture. I speak of matters of Reason and Philosophy—not
Revelation. In this I think an humble, implicit faith becomes
US (when we cannot comprehend or understand the proposition),
such as a popish peasant gives to propositions he hears at mass in
Latin. This proud men may cali blind, popish, implicit, irrational.
For my part I think it is more irrational to pretend to dispute at,
cavil, and ridicule holy mysteries, i.e. propositions about things
that are altogether above our knowledge, out of our reach. When
I shall come to plenary knowledge of the meaning of any fact,
then I shall yield an explicit belief. Introd.

Complexation of ideas twofold. refers to colours being
complex ideas.

Considering length without breadth is considering any length,
be the breadth w^ it will.

M. I may say earth, plants, &c. were created before man—there

being other intelligences to perceive them, before man was

[043] created

M. There is a philosopher^^^ who says we can get an idea of

i.e. independent imperceptible Matter.

What of the earliest geological periods, asks Ueherweg? But is there greater
difficulty in such instances than in explaining the existence of a table or a
house, while one is merely seeing, without touching?

Locke explains “suhstance” as “an uncertain supposition of we know not
what.” Essay, Bk. I. ch. 4. § 18.

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substance by no way of sensation or reflection, & seems to
imagine that we want a sense proper for it. Truly if we had a new
sense it eould only give us a new idea. Now 1 suppose he will not
say substanee, aeeording to him, is an idea. For my part, 1 own 1
have no idea ean stand for substanee in bis and the Sehoolmen's
sense of that word. But take it in the eommon vulgar sense, &
then we see and feel substanee.

N. B. That not eommon usage, but the Sehoolmen eoined the e.
word Existenee, supposed to stand for an abstraet general idea.

Writers of Opties mistaken in their prineiples both in judging
of magnitudes and distanees.

'Tis evident y^ w" the solitary man should be taught to speak, i.
the words would give him no other new ideas (save only the
sounds, and eomplex ideas whieh, tho' unknown before, may be
signified by language) beside w*^ he had before. If he had not,
eould not have, an abstraet idea before, he eannot have it after he
is taught to speak.

“Homo est homo,” &e. eomes at last to Petrus est Petrus, Mo.
&e. Now, if these identieal propositions are sought after in the
mind, they will not be found. There are no identieal mental
propositions. 'Tis all about sounds and terms.

Henee we see the doetrine of eertainty by ideas, and proving Mo.
by intermediate ideas, eomes to nothing^^^.

We may have eertainty & knowledge without ideas, i.e. Mo.
without other ideas than the words, and their standing for one
idea, i.e. their being to be used indifferently.

It seems to me that we have no eertainty about ideas, but only Mo.

Locke makes eertainty consist in the agreement of “our ideas with the
reality of things.” See Essay, Bk. IV. ch. 4. § 18. Here the sceptical difficulty
arises, which Berkeley meets under his Principie. If we have no perception of
reality, we eannot compare our ideas with it, and so eannot have any criterion

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[044]

Mo.

N. Mo.

about words. 'Tis improper to say, I am certain I see, I feel,
&c. There are no mental propositions form'd answering to these
words, & in simple perception 'tis allowed by all there is no
affirmation or negation, and consequently no certainty^^^.

The reason why we can demónstrate so well about signs is, that
they are perfectly arbitrary & in our power—made at pleasure.

The obscure ambiguous term relation, which is said to be the
largest field of knowledge, confounds us, deceives us.

Let any man shew me a demonstration, not verbal, that does
not depend on some false principie; or at best on some principie
of nature, which is y® effect of God's will, and we know not how
soon it may be changed.

Qu. What becomes of the cetemcB veritates? Ans. They
vanish^^"*.

But, say yon, 1 find it difficult to look beneath the words and
uncover my ideas. Say 1, Use will make it easy. In the sequel of
my Book the cause of this difficulty shall be more clearly made
out.

To view the deformity of error we need onely undress it.

“Cogito ergo sum.” Tautology. No mental proposition
answering thereto.

Knowledge, or certainty, or perception of agreement of
ideas—as to identity and diversity, and real existence, vanisheth;
of relation, becometh merely nominal; of co-existence,
remaineth. Locke thought in this latter our knowledge was
little or nothing. Whereas in this only real knowledge seemeth to
be foundi55.

of reality.

[This seems wrong. Certainty, real certainty, is of sensible ideas. I may be
certain without affirmation or negation.—AUTHOR.fFNS] This needs further
explanation.

This entry and the preceding tends to resolve all judgments which are not
what Kant calis analytical into contingent.

See Locke's Essay, Bk. IV. ch. 1, §§ 3-7, and ch. 3. §§ 7-21. The stress
Berkeley lays on “co-existence” is significant.

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123

We must w* the mob place certainty in the senses^^^. p.

'Tis a man's duty, 'tis the fruit of friendship, to speak well of
bis friend. Wonder not therefore that 1 do 1 do.

A man of slow parts may overtake truth, &c. Introd. Even i.
my shortsightedness might perhaps be aiding to me in this
matter—'twill make me bring the object nearer to my thoughts.

A purblind person, &c. Introd. [045]

Locke to Limborch, &c. Talk oíjudicium intellectus preceding s.
the volition: 1 thmkjudicium ineludes volition. 1 can by no means
distinguish these— -judicium, intellectus, indijferentia, uneasiness
to many things accompanying or preceding every volition, as e.g.
the motion of my hand.

Qu. mean you by my perceptions, my volitions? Both all s.
the perceptions 1 perceive or conceive'^^, &c. are mine; all the
volitions 1 am conscious to are mine.

Homo est agens liberum. What mean they by homo and agens s.
in this place?

Will any man say that brutes have ideas of Unity & Existence? e.

1 believe not. Yet if they are suggested by all the ways of
sensation, 'tis strange they should want them^^^.

It is a strange thing and deserves our attention, that the more i.
time and pains men have consum'd in the study of philosophy,
by so much the more they look upon themselves to be ignorant &
weak creatures. They discover flaws and imperfections in their
faculties w other men never spy out. They find themselves
under a necessity of admitting many inconsistent, irreconcilable
opinions for true. There is nothing they touch with their hand,
or behold with their eyes, but has its dark sides much larger and
more numerous than is perceived, & at length turn scepticks,

i.e. we must not doubt the reality of the immediate data of sense but accept
it, as “the mob” do.

But is imagination different from actual perception only in degree of reality?

Cf. Principies, sect. 13, 120; also Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 7. sect. 7.

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at least in most things. I imagine all this proceeds from, &c.
Exord. Introd.^^^

I. These men with a supercilious pride disdain the common

single Information of sense. They grasp at knowledge by sheafs
& bundles. ('Tis well if, catching at too much at once, they
hold nothing but emptiness & air.) They in the depth of their
understanding contémplate abstract ideas.

It seems not improbable that the most comprehensive &
sublime intellects see more m.v.'s at once, i.e. that their visual
Systems are the largest.

Words (by them meaning all sorts of signs) are so necessary
that, instead of being (w" duly us'd or in their own nature)
[046] prejudicial to the advancement of knowledge, or an hindrance

to knowledge, without them there could in mathematiques
themselves be no demonstration.

Mem. To be eternally banishing Metaphisics, &c., and
recalling men to Common Sense^^*’.

s. We cannot conceive other minds besides our own but as so

many selves. We suppose ourselves affected w* such & such
thoughts & such and such sensations^^'.

s. Qu. whether composition of ideas be not that faculty which

chiefly serves to discriminate us from brutes? 1 question whether
a brute does or can imagine a blue horse or chimera.

Naturalists do not distinguish betwixt cause and occasion.
Useful to enquire after co-existing ideas or occasions.

Mo. Morality may be demonstrated as mixt mathematics.

Cf. Principies, Introduction, sect. 1.

Berkeley's aim evidently is to deliver men from empty abstractions, by a
return to more reasonably interpreted common-sense.

The sort of external world that is intelligible to us is that of which another
person is percipient, and which is objective to me, in a percipient experience
foreign to mine.

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Perception is passive, but this not distinct from idea. Therefore s.
there can be no idea of volition.

Algebraic species or letters are denominations of
denominations. Therefore Arithmetic to be treated of before
Algebra.

2 crowns are called ten shillings. Henee may appear the valué
of numbers.

Complex ideas are the creatures of the mind. Henee may
appear the nature of numbers. This to be deeply discuss'd.

1 am better informed & shall know more by telling me there
are 10,000 men, than by shewing me them all drawn up. 1 shall
better be able to judge of the bargain you'd have me make w" you
tell me how much (i.e. the ñame of y®) money lies on the table,
than by offering and shewing it without naming. 1 regard not the
idea, the looks, but the ñames. Henee may appear the nature of
numbers.

Children are unacquainted with numbers till they have made
some progress in language. This could not be if they were ideas
suggested by all the senses. [047]

Numbers are nothing but ñames—never words.

Mem. Imaginary roots—to unravel that mystery.

Ideas of utility are annexed to numbers.

In arithmetical problems men seek not any idea of number.

They only seek a denomination. This is all can be of use to them.

Take away the signs from Arithmetic and Algebra, and pray

remains?

These are Sciences purely verbal, and entirely useless but for
practice in societies of men. No speculative knowledge, no
comparing of ideas in them^^^.

Qu. whether Geometry may not properly be reckon'd amongst
the mixt mathematics—Arithmetic & Algebra being the only

Cf. Berkeley's Arithmetica and Miscellanea Mathematica, published while
he was making his entries in this Commonplace Book.

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abstracted puré, i.e. entirely nominal—Geometry being an
application of these to points^^^?

Mo. Locke of Trifling Propositions. [b. 4. c. 8] Mem. Well to

observe & con over that chapter.

E. Existence, Extensión, &c. are abstract, i.e. no ideas. They are

words, unknown and useless to the vulgar.

Mo. Sensual pleasure is the summum bonum. This the great

principie of morality. This once rightly understood, all the
doctrines, even the severest of the Gospels, may clearly be
demonstrated.

Mo. Sensual pleasure, quá pleasure, is good & desirable by a wise

man^^^. But if it be contemptible, 'tis not quá pleasure but quá
pain, or cause of pain, or (which is the same thing) of loss of
greater pleasure.

I. W“ I consider, the more objects we see at once the more

distant they are, and that eye which beholds a great many things
can see none of them near.

I. By idea I mean any sensible or imaginable thing

M. s. To be sure or certain of we do not actually perceive^®^ (I

[048] say perceive, not imagine), we must not be altogether passive;

there must be a disposition to act; there must be assent, w is
active. Nay, what do I talk; there must be actual volition.

Mínima sensibilia?

Pleasures, quá pleasures, are natural causes of correlative desires, as pains
or uneasinesses are of correlative aversions. This is implied in the very nature
of pleasure and pain.

Here we have his explanation of idea.

Absent things.

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What do we demónstrate in Geometry but that Unes are equal
or unequal? i.e. may not be ealled by the same name^^^.

I approve of this axiom of the Sehoolmen, “Nihil est in
intelleetu quod non prius fuit in sensu.”^^^ I wish they had stuek
to it. It had never taught them the doetrine of abstraet ideas.

“Nihil dat quod non habet,” or, the effeet is eontained in the
eause, is an axiom 1 do not understand or believe to be true.

Whoever shall east his eyes on the writings of oíd or new
philosophers, and see the noise is made about formal and
objeetive Being, Will, &e.

Absurd to argüe the existenee of God from his idea. We have
no idea of God. 'Tis impossible^®.

Cause of mueh errour & eonfusion that men knew not what
was meant by Reality^™.

Des Cartes, in Med. 2, says the notion of this partieular wax
is less elear than that of wax in general; and in the same Med., a
little before, he forbears to eonsider bodies in general, beeause
(says he) these general eoneeptions are usually eonfused.

Des Cartes, in Med. 3, ealls himself a thinking substanee, and
a stone an extended substanee; and adds that they both agree in
this, that they are substanees. And in the next paragraph he ealls
extensión a mode of substanee.

'Tis eommonly said by the philosophers, that if the soul of

Here, as elsewhere, he resolves geometry, as strictly demonstrable, into a
reasoned system of analytical or verbal propositions.

Compare this with note 3, p. 34; also with the contrast between Sense and
Reason, in Siris. Is the statement consistent with implied assumptions even in
the Principies, apart from which they could not cohere?

To have an idea of God—as Berkeley uses idea—would imply that God is
an immediately perceptible, or at least an imaginable object.

Cf. Principies, sect. 89.

I. M.

S. G.

M. E.

M. S.

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man were self-existent it would have given itself all possible

[049] perfection. This I do not understand.

Mo. Mem. To excite men to the pleasures of the eye & the ear,

which surfeit not, ñor bring those evils after them, as others.

s. We see no variety or difference betwixt volitions, only between

their effects. 'Tis one Will, one Act—distinguished by the effects.
This Will, this Act, is the Spirit, i.e. operative principie, soul,
&c. No mention of fears and jealousies, nothing like a party.

M. Locke in his 4* Book^’^, and Des Caries in Med. 6, use the

same argument for the existence of objects, viz. that sometimes
we see, feel, &c. against our will.

s. While I exist or have any idea, I am eternally, constantly

willing; my acquiescing in the presen! State is willing.

E. The existence of any thing imaginable is nothing different

from imagination or perception^^^. Volition or Will, W^^^ is not
imaginable, regard must not be had to its existence(?) ... First
Book.

Mo. There are four sorts of propositions:—“Gold is a metal;” “Gold

is yellow;” “Gold is fixt;” “Gold is not a stone”—of which the
first, second, and third are only nominal, and have no mental
propositions answering them.

M. Mem. In vindication of the senses effectually to confute what

Des Cartes saith in the last par. of the last Med., viz. that the
senses oftener inform him falsely than truely—that sense of pain
tells me not my foot is bruised or broken, but I, having frequently
observed these two ideas, viz. of that peculiar pain and bruised
foot go together, do erroneously take them to be inseparable
by a necessity of Nature—as if Nature were anything but the
ordinance of the free will of God^’^.

M. s. Des Cartes owns we know not a substance immediately by

Ch. ll.§5.

Why add—“or perception”?

Here we have Berkeley's favourite thought of the divine arhitrariness of the
constitution of Nature, and of its laws of change.

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itself, but by this alone, that it is the subject of several acts. Ans.
to 2^ objection of Hobbs.

Hobbs in some degree falls in with Locke, saying thought is
to the mind or himself as dancing to the dancer. Object.

Hobbs in bis Object. 3 ridicules those expressions of the
scholastiques—“the will wills,” &c. So does Locke. 1 am of
another mind^’^.

Des Cartes, in answer to Object. 3 of Hobbs, owns he is
distinct from thought as a thing from its modus or manner.

Opinión that existence was distinct from perception of horrible
consequence. It is the foundation of Hobbs's doctrine, &c.

Malbranch in bis illustration^^^ differs widely from me. He
doubts of the existence of bodies. 1 doubt not in the least of this.

1 differ from Cartesians in that 1 make extensión, colour, &c.
to exist really in bodies independent of our mind^^^. All y®
carefully and lucidly to be set forth.

Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to say the
things—the effects themselves—do really exist, even w" not
actually perceived; but still with relation to perception

The great use of the Indian figures above the Román shews
arithmetic to be about signs, not ideas—or at least not ideas
different from the characters themselves'’^.

Reasoning there may be about things or ideas, or about actions;
but demonstration can be only verbal. 1 question, no matter &c.

This suggests the puzzle, that the cause of every volition must be a preceding
volition, and so on ad infinitum.

Recherche, I. 19.

i.e. of his own individual mind.

i.e. to a percipient mind, but not necessarily to mine\ for natural laws
are independent of individual will, although the individual participates in
perception of the ordered changes.

Cf. the Arithmetica.

[050]

E. S.

M. P. E.

M. P.

M. N.

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G. Quoth Des Caries, The idea of God is not made by me, for I

can neither add lo ñor subtract from it. No more can he add lo or
take from any other idea, even of his own making.

s. The not distinguishing 'twixt Will and ideas is a grand mistake

with Hobbs. He takes those things for nothing which are not
ideas

M. Say yon, At this rate all's nothing but idea—mere phantasm.

I answer, Everything as real as ever. I hope to cali a thing idea
makes it not the less real. Truly I should perhaps have stuck to

[051] the Word thing, and not mentioned the word idea, were it not for

a reason, and I think a good one too, which I shall give in the
Second Book^^°.

I. s. Idea is the object of thought. I think on, whatever it be, I

cali idea. Thought itself, or thinking, is no idea. 'Tis an act—i.e.
volition, i.e. as contradistinguished to effects—the Will.

I. Mo. Locke, in B. 4. c. 5, assigns not the right cause why mental

propositions are so difficult. It is not because of complex but
because of abstrae! ideas. Y® idea of a horse is as complex as that
of fortitude. Yet in saying the “horse is white” I form a mental
proposition with case. But when I say “fortitude is a virtue” I
shall find a mental proposition hard, or not at all to be come at.

s. Puré intellect I understand not^^^.

Locke is in y® right in those things wherein he differs from y®
Cartesians, and they cannot but allow of his opinions, if they stick
to their own principies or causes of Existence & other abstrae!
ideas.

G. s. The properties of all things are in God, i.e. there is in the Deity

i.e. which are not phenomena. This recognition of originative Will even
then distinguished Berkeley.

Is this Part II of the Principies, which was lost in Italy?

*** The thought of articúlate relations to which real existence must conform,
was not then at least in Berkeley's mind. Henee the empiricism and
sensationalism into which he occasionally seems to rush in the Commonplace
Book, in his repulsión from empty abstractions.

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131

Understanding as well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth
a blind agent is a eontradiction^^^.

1 am certain there is a God, tho' 1 do not perceive Him—have
no intuition of Him. This not diffieult if we rightly understand

is meant by certainty.

It seems that the Soul, taken for the Will, is immortal,
ineorruptible.

Qu. whether pereeption must of necessity precede volition?

Error is not in the Understanding, but in the Will. What 1
understand or perceive, that 1 understand. There can be no errour
in this.

Mem. To take notice of Locke's woman afraid of a wetting, in
the Introd., to shew there may be reasoning about ideas or things.

Say Des Caries & Malbranch, God hath given us strong
inclinations to think our ideas proceed from bodies, or that
bodies do exist. Fray mean they by this? Would they have it
that the ideas of imagination are images of, and proceed from,
the ideas of sense? This is true, but cannot be their meaning;
for they speak of ideas of sense as themselves proceeding from,
being like unto—1 know not

Cartesius per ideam vult omne id quod habet esse objectivum
in intellectu. V. Tract. de Methodo.

Qu. May there not be an Understanding without a Will?

Understanding is in some sort an action.

Silly of Hobbs, &c. to speak of the Will as if it were motion,
with which it has no likeness.

Ideas of Sense are the real things or archetypes. Ideas of
imagination, dreams, &c. are copies, images, of these.

This is the essence of Berkeley's philosophy—“a blind agent is a
contradiction.”

This is thebasis of Berkeley's reasoning for the necessarily unrepresentative
character of the ideas or phenomena that are presented to our senses. They are
the origináis.

S. Mo.

Mo. N.

1052]

M. S.

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M. My doctrines rightly understood, all that philosophy of

Epicurus, Hobbs, Spinosa, &c., which has been a declared
enemy of religión, comes to the ground.

G. Hobbs & Spinosa make God extended. Locke also seems to

do the same^*^.

I. E. Ens, res, aliquid dicuntur termini transcendentales. Spinosa,

p. 76, prop. 40, Eth. part 2, gives an odd account of their original.
Also of the original of all universals—Homo, Canis, &c.

G. Spinosa (vid. Prsef. Opera Posthum.) will have God to

be “omnium rerum causa immanens,” and to countenance this
produces that of St. Paul, “in Him we live,” &c. Now this of St.
Paul may be explained by my doctrine as well as Spinosa's, or
Eocke's, or Hobbs's, or Raphson's^^^, &c.

The Will is purus actus, or rather puré spirit not imaginable,
not sensible, not intelligible, in no wise the object of the
understanding, no wise perceivable.

Substance of a spirit is that it acts, causes, wills, operates, or
if you picase (to avoid the quibble y*^ may be made of the word
“it”) to act, cause, will, opérate. Its substance is not knowable,
not being an idea.

G. Why may we not conceive it possible for God to create things

out of nothing? Certainly we ourselves create in some wise
whenever we imagine.

Berkeley's horror of abstrae! or unperceived space and atoms is partly
explained by dogmas in natural philosophy that are now antiquated.

Ralph [?] Raphson, author of Demonstratio de Deo (1710), and also of De
Spatio Reali, seu ente Infinito: conamen mathematico-metaphysicum (1697),
to which Berkeley refers in one of his letters to Johnson. See also Green's
Principies of Natural Philosophy (1712). The immanence of omnipotent
goodness in the material world was unconsciously Berkeley's presupposition.
In God we have our being.

[053]

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133

“Ex nihilo nihil fit.” This (saith Spinoza, Opera Posth. p. e. n.
464) and the like are ealled veritates cetemcB, beeause “nullam
fidem habent extra mentem.” To make this axiom have a positive
signifieation, one should express it thus: Every idea has a eause,
i.e. is produeed by a Will^^^.

The philosophers talk mueh of a distinetion 'twixt absolute & p.
relative things, or 'twixt things eonsidered in their own nature &
the same things eonsidered with respeet to us. I know not they
mean by “things eonsidered in themselves.” This is nonsense,
j argón.

It seems there ean be no pereeption—no idea—without Will, s.
seeing there are no ideas so indifferent but one had rather have
them than annihilation, or annihilation than them. Or if there be
sueh an equal batanee, there must be an equal mixture of pleasure
and pain to eause it; there being no ideas perfeetly void of all
pain & uneasiness, but are preferable to annihilation.

Reeipe in animum tuum, per eogitationem vehementem, rerum
ipsarum, non literarum aut sonorum imagines. Hobbs against
Wallis.

'Tis a perfeetion we may imagine in superior spirits, that
they ean see a great deal at onee with the utmost elearness and
distinetion; whereas we ean only see a point'^’.

Mem. W" I treat of mathematiques to enquire into the
eontroversy 'twixt Hobbes and Wallis. [054]

Every sensation of mine, whieh happens in eonsequenee of the g.
general known laws of nature, & is from without, i.e. independent

Note here Berkeley's versión of the causal principie, which is really the
central presupposition of his whole philosophy—viz. every event in the
material world must be the issue of acting Will.

So Locke on an ideally perfect memory. Essay, Bk. II. ch. x. § 9.

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of my will, demónstrales the being of a God, i.e. of an unextended,
incorporeal spirit, which is omnipresent, omnipotent, &c.

M. I say not with J.S. [John Sergeant] that we see solids. I

reject his “solid philosophy”—solidity being only perceived by
touch^^^.

s. It seems to me that will and understanding—volitions and

ideas—cannot be separated, that either cannot be possibly without
the other.

E. s. Some ideas or other I must have, so long as I exist or will. But

no one idea or sort of ideas being essential^^^.

M. The distinction between idea and ideatum I cannot otherwise

conceive than by making one the effect or consequence of dream,
reverte, imagination—the other of sense and the constan! laws of
nature.

p. Dico quod extensio non concipitur in se et per se, contra quam

dicit Spinoza in Epist. 2^ ad Oldenburgium.

G. My definition of the word God I think much clearer than

those of Des Garles & Spinoza, viz. “Ens siimme perfectum &
absoluto infinitum,” or “Ens constans infinitis attributis, quorum
unumquodque est infinitum^^°.”

*** John Sergeant was the author of Solid Philosophy asserted against the
Pandes ofthe Ideists (London, 1697); also of the Method to Sríence (1696).
He was a deserter from the Church of England to the Church of Rome,
and wrote several pieces in defence of Román theology—some of them in
controversy with Tillotson.

*** Spirit and Matter are mutually dependent; but Spirit is the realising factor
and real agent in the universe.

See Descartes, Meditations, III; Spinoza, Epist. II, ad Oldenburgium.

Commonplace Book 135

'Tis chiefly the connexion betwixt tangible and visible ideas
that deeeives, and not the visible ideas themselves.

But the grand mistake is that we know not what we mean by
“we,” or “selves,” or “mind,” &e. 'Tis most sure & eertain that
our ideas are distinet from the mind, i.e. the Will, the Spirit'^^

1 must not mention the understanding as a faeulty or part
of the mind. 1 must inelude understanding & will in the word
Spirit—by whieh 1 mean all that is aetive. 1 must not say that
the understanding diners not from the partieular ideas, or the will
from partieular volitions.

The Spirit, the Mind, is neither a volition ñor an idea.

1 say there are no eauses (properly speaking) but spiritual,
nothing aetive but Spirit. Say you, This is only verbal; 'tis only
annexing a new sort of signifieation to the word eause, & why
may not others as well retain the oíd one, and eall one idea the
eause of another whieh always follows it? 1 answer, If you do so
1 shall drive you into many absurditys: you eannot avoid running
into opinions you'll be glad to disown, if you stiek firmly to that
signifieation of the word Cause.

In valuing good we reekon too mueh on the present & our
own.

There be two sorts of pleasure. The one is ordained as a
spur or ineitement to somewhat else, & has a visible relation
and subordination thereto; the other is not. Thus the pleasure of
eating is of the former sort, of musiek of the later sort. These
may be used for reereation, those not but in order to their end.

Three sorts of useful knowledge—that of Coexistenee, to
be treated of in our Prineiples of Natural Philosophy; that of
Relation, in Mathematiques; that of Definition, or inelusion,

Cf. Principies, sect. 2.

[055]

N. S,

Mo.

Mo. N.

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or words (which perhaps differs not from that of relation), in
Morality^^^.

s. Will, understanding, desire, hatred, &c., so far forth as they

are acts or active, differ not. All their difference consists in their
objects, circumstances, &c.

N. We must carefully distinguish betwixt two sorts of

causes—^physical & spiritual.

N. The physical may more properly be cabed occasions. Yet

(to comply) we may cali them causes—but then we must mean
causes y^ do nothing.

According to Locke, we must be in an eternal uneasiness so
long as we Uve, bating the time of sleep or trance, &c.; for he
will have even the continuance of an action to be in bis sense an
action, & so requires a volition, & this an uneasiness.

I. I must not pretend to promise much of demonstration. I must

cancell all passages that look like that sort of pride, that raising
of expectation in my friend.

I. If this be the case, surely a man had better not philosophize

at all: no more than a deformed person ought to cavil to behold
himself by the reflex light of a mirrour.

I. Or thus, like deformed persons who, having beheld themselves

by the reflex light of a mirrour, are displeased with their diseases.

M. What can an idea be like but another idea? We can compare it

with nothing else—a sound like a sound, a colour like a colour.

M. Is it not nonsense to say a smell is like a thing which cannot

be smelt, a colour is like a thing w^ cannot be seen?

M. s. Bodies exist without the mind, i.e. are not the mind, but

Is “inclusión” here virtually a synonym for verbal definition?

[056]

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137

distinct from it. This I allow, the mind being altogether different
therefrom^^^.

Certainly we should not see motion if there was no diversity p.
of colours.

Motion is an abstract idea, i.e. there is no sueh idea that ean p.
be eoneeived by itself.

Contradietions eannot be both true. Men are obliged to answer i.
objeetions drawn from eonsequenees. Introd.

The Will and Volition are words not used by the vulgar. The s.
learned are bantered by their meaning abstrae! ideas.

Speeulative Math, as if a man was all day making hard knots
on purpose to unty them again.

Tho' it might have been otherwise, yet it is eonvenient the
same thing w is M.V. should be also M.T., or very near it.

1 must not give the soul or mind the scholastique ñame “puré s.
aet,” but rather puré spirit, or aetive being. [057]

1 must not say the Will or Understanding are all one, but that s.
they are both abstrae! ideas, i.e. none at all—they not being even
ratione different from the Spirit, quá faeulties, or aetive.

Dangerous to make idea & thing terms eonvertible^^^. That s.
were the way to prove spirits are nothing.

Qu. whether ventas stands not for an abstrae! idea? Mo.

'Tis plain the moderns must by their own prineiples own there m.
are no bodies, i.e. no sort of bodies without the mind, i.e.
unpereeived.

See Principies, sect. 2. The universe of Berkeley consists of Active Spirits
that perceive and produce motion in impotent ideas or phenomena, realised
in the percipient experience of persons. All supposed powers in Matter are
refunded into Spirit.

When self-conscious agents are included among “things.” We can have no
sensuous image, i.e. idea, of spirit, although he maintains we can use the word
intelligently.

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s.G.

M. P.

Mo. N.

[058]

Qu. whether the Will can be the object of prescience or any
knowledge?

If there were only one ball in the world, it could not be moved.
There could be no variety of appearance.

According to the doctrine of infinite divisibility, there must
be some smell of a rose, v. g. at an infinite distance from it.

Extensión, tho' it exist only in the mind, yet is no property of
the mind. The mind can exist without it, tho' it cannot without
the mind. But in Book II. I shall at large shew the difference
there is betwixt the Soul and Body or extended being.

'Tis an absurd question w Locke puts, whether man be free
to will?

Mem. To enquire into the reason of the rule for determining
questions in Algebra.

It has already been observed by others that ñames are nowhere
of more necessary use than in numbering.

I will grant you that extensión, colour, &c. may be said to be
without the mind in a double respect, i.e. as independent of our
will, and as distinct from the mind.

Certainly it is not impossible but a man may arrive at the
knowledge of all real truth as well without as with signs, had he a
memory and imagination most strong and capacious. Therefore
reasoning & Science doth not altogether depend upon words or
ñames

I think not that things fall out of necessity. The connexion of

Berkeley insists that we should individualise our thinking—“ipsis
consuescere rebus,” as Bacon says,—to escape the dangers of artificial signs.
This is the drift of his assault on abstract ideas, and his repulsión from what is
not concrete. He would even dispense with words in his meditations in case of
being sophisticated by abstractions.

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139

no two ideas is necessary; 'tis all the result of freedom, i.e. 'tis all
voluntary^^^.

If a man with his eyes shut imagines to himself the sun & m. s.
firmament, yon will not say he or his mind is the sun, or is
extended, tho' neither sun or firmament be without mind.

'Tis strange to find philosophers doubting & disputing whether s.
they have ideas of spiritual things or no. Surely 'tis easy to know.

Vid. De Vries^^^, De Ideis Innatis, p. 64.

De Vries will have it that we know the mind agrees with things s.
not by idea but sense or eonseientia. So will Malbraneh. This a
vain distinetion.

August 28th, 1708. The Adventure of the [Shirt?].

It were to be wished that persons of the greatest birth, honour,

& fortune, would take that eare of themselves, by edueation,
industry, literature, & a love of virtue, to surpass all other men in
knowledge & all other qualifieations neeessary for great aetions,
as far as they do in quality & titles; that prinees out of them
might always ehose men fit for all employments and high trusts.

Clov. B. 7.

One eternity greater than another of the same kind.

In what sense eternity may be limited.

Whether sueeession of ideas in the Divine intelleet?

Time is the train of ideas sueeeeding eaeh other.

Duration not distinguish'd from existenee.

Sueeession explain'd by before, between, after, & numbering.
Why time in pain longer than time in pleasure?

Duration infinitely divisible, time not so.

The same tó vüv not eommon to all intelligenees.

Time thought infinitely divisible on aeeount of its mensure.

Nature or the phenomenal world in shoit is the revelation of perfectly
reasonable Will.

Gerard De Vries, the Cartesian.

G. T.
T.

[059]

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Extensión not infinitely divisible in one sense.

Revolutions immediately mensure train of ideas, mediately
duration.

T. Time a sensation; therefore onely in y® mind.

Eternity is onely a train of innumerable ideas. Henee the
immortality of y® soul easily conceiv'd, or rather the immortality
of the person, that of y® soul not being necessary for ought we
can see.

Swiftness of ideas compar'd with y^ of motions shews the
wisdom of God.

if succession of ideas were swifter, if slower?

M. Eall of Adam, use of idolatry, use of Epicurism & Hobbism,

dispute about divisibility of matter, &c. expounded by material
substances.

Extensión a sensation, therefore not without the mind.

M. In the immaterial hypothesis, the wall is white, fire hot, &c.

Primary ideas prov'd not to exist in matter; after the same
manner y^ secondary ones are prov'd not to exist therein.

Demonstrations of the infinite divisibility of extensión suppose
length without breadth, or invisible length, w is absurd.

M. World w*out thought is nec quid, nec quantum, nec quale,

&c.

M. 'Tis wondrous to contémplate y® World empty'd of all

intelligences.

Nothing properly but Persons, i.e. conscious things, do exist.
All other things are not so much existences as manners of y®
existence of persons^^^.

Qu. about the soul, or rather person, whether it be not
compleatly known?

198

Are the things of sense only modes in which percipient persons exist?

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Infinite divisibility of extensión does suppose the external

existenee of extensión; but the later is false, ergo y® former also.

Qu. Blind man made to see, would he know motion at 1
sight?

Motion, figure, and extensión pereeivable by sight are [ 060 ]
different from those ideas pereeived by toueh w goe by the
same ñame.

Diagonal ineommensurable w* y® side. Qusere how this ean
be in my doetrine?

Qu. how to reeoneile Newton's 2 sorts of motion with my n.
doetrine?

Terminations of surfaees & Unes not imaginable per se.

Molyneux's blind man would not know the sphere or eube to
be bodies or extended at first sight^^^.

Extensión so far from being ineompatible w*, y* 'tis impossible
it should exist without thought.

Extensión itself or anything extended eannot think—these m. s.
being meer ideas or sensations, whose essenee we thoroughly
know.

No extensión but surfaee pereeivable by sight.

W" we imagine 2 bowls v. g. moving in vaeuo, 'tis only m.
eoneeiving a person affeeted with these sensations.

Extensión to exist in a thoughtless thing [or rather in a thing m.
void of pereeption—thought seeming to imply aetion], is a
eontradietion.

Qu. if visible motion be proportional to tangible motion?

In some dreams sueeession of ideas swifter than at other times, t.

If a pieee of matter have extensión, that must be determined m.
to a partieular bigness & figure, but &e.

Nothing w*out eorresponds to our primary ideas but powers.

Henee a direet & brief demonstration of an aetive powerfull
Being, distinet from us, on whom we depend.

See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8.

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The ñame of colours actually given to tangible qualities, by
the relation of y® story of the Germán Count.

Qu. How carne visible & tangible qualities by the same ñame
in all languages?

Qu. Whether Being might not be the substance of the soul, or
(otherwise thus) whether Being, added to y® faculties, compleat
the real essence and adequate definition of the soul?

N. Qu. Whether, on the supposition of external bodies, it be

[ 061 ] possible for us to know that any body is absolutely at rest, since

that supposing ideas much slower than at present, bodies now
apparently moving then be apparently at rest?

M. Qu. What can be like a sensation but a sensation?

Qu. Did ever any man see any other things besides bis own
ideas, that he should compare them to these, and make these like
unto them?

T. The age of a fly, for ought that we know, may be as long as y*^

of a man^*’®.

Visible distance heterogeneous from tangible distance
demonstrated 3 several ways:—

1 . If a tangible inch be equal or in any other reason to a
visible inch, thence it will follow y^ unequals are equals, w^^^ is
absurd: for at what distance would the visible inch be placed to
make it equal to the tangible inch?

2^^. One made to see that had not yet seen bis own limbs, or
any thing he touched, upon sight of a foot length would know it
to be a foot length, if tangible foot & visible foot were the same
idea—sed falsum id, ergo et hoc.

Time being relative to the capacity of the percipient.

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From Molyneux's problem, otherwise is falsely
solv'd by Locke and .

Nothing but ideas perceivable^*’^.

A man cannot compare 2 things together without perceiving
them each. Ergo, he cannot say anything w is not an idea is
like or unlike an idea.

Bodies &c. do exist even w" not perceived—they being
powers in the active being^*^^.

Succession a simple idea, [succession is an abstrae!, i.e. an
inconceivable idea,] Locke says^*^^.

Visible extensión is [proportional to tangible extensión, also
is] encreated & diminish'd by parts. Henee taken for the same.

If extensión be without the mind in bodies. Qu. whether
tangible or visible, or both?

Mathematical propositions about extensión & motion true in
a double sense.

Extensión thought peculiarly inert, because not accompany'd
w* pleasure & pain: henee thought to exist in matter; as also for
that it was conceiv'd common to 2 senses, [as also the constan!
perception of ’em].

Blind at 1 sight could not tell how near what he saw was to
him, ñor even whether it be w*out him or in bis eye^*’^. Qu.
Would he not think the later?

™ See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 9. § 8.

To perceive what is not an idea (as Berkeley uses idea) is to perceive what
is not realised, and therefore not real.

So things have a potential objective existence in the Divine Will.

With Berkeley, change is time, and time, abstracted from all changes, is
meaningless.

Could he know, by seeing only, even that he had a body?

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st t t

Blind at 1 sight could not know y w he saw was extended,
until he had seen and touched some one self-same thing—not
knowing how minimum tangibile would look in visión.

M. Mem. That homogeneous partióles be brought in to answer

the objection of God's creating sun, plants, &c. before animáis.

In every bodie two infinite series of extensión—the one of
tangible, the other of visible.

All things to a blind [man] at first seen in a point.

Ignorance of glasses made men think extensión to be in bodies.

M. Homogeneous portions of matter—useful to contémplate

them.

Extensión if in matter changos its relation w* minimum
visibile, w seems to be fixt.

Qu. whether m.v. be fix'd?

M. Each partióle of matter if extended must be infinitely extended,

or have an infinite series of extensión.

M. If the World be granted to consist of Matter, 'tis the mind gives

it beauty and proportion.

1 have said onely proves there is no proportion at all times
and in all men between a visible & tangible inch.

Tangible and visible extensión heterogeneous, because they
have no common measure; also because their simplest constituent
parts or elements are specifically different, viz. punctum visibile

[063] & tangibile. N. B. The former seems to be no good reason.

M. N. By immateriality is solv'd the cohesión of bodies, or rather the

dispute ceases.

Our idea we cali extensión neither way capable of infinity, i.e.
neither infinitely small or great.

Greatest possible extensión seen under an angle w will be

less than 180 degrees, the legs of w angle proceed from the
ends of the extensión.

N. Allowing there be extended, solid, &c. substances without the
mind, 'tis impossible the mind should know or perceive them;
the mind, even according to the materialists, perceiving onely

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145

the impressions made upon its brain, or rather the ideas attending
these impressions^*’^.

Unity in abstracto not at all divisible, it being as it were a
point, or with Barrow nothing at all; in concreto not divisible ad
infmitum, there being no one idea demonstrable ad infinitum.

Any subjeet can have of each sort of primary qualities but one m.
particular at once. Locke, b. 4. c. 3. s. 15.

Qu. whether we have olear ideas of large numbers themselves,
or onely of their relations?

Of solidity see L. b. 2. c. 4. s. 1, 5, 6. If any one ask m.
w* solidity is, let him put a flint between bis hands and he will
know. Extensión of body is continuity of solid, &c.; extensión
of space is continuity of unsolid, &c.

Why may not 1 say visible extensión is a continuity of visible
points, tangible extensión is a continuity of tangible points?

Mem. That 1 take notice that 1 do not fall in w* sceptics, m.
Fardella^*’^, &c., in that 1 make bodies to exist certainly, they
doubt of.

1 am more certain of y® existence & reality of bodies than m.
Mr. Locke; since he pretends onely to w* he calis sensitive
knowledge^°^, whereas 1 think 1 have demonstrative knowledge [064]
of their existence—by them meaning combinations of powers in
an unknown substratum^°^.

“the ideas attending these impressions,” i.e. the ideas that are correlatives
of the (by us unperceived) organic impressions.

™ The Italian physical and metaphysical philosopher Fardella (1650-1718)
maintained, by reasonings akin to those of Malebranche, that the existence
of the material world could not be scientifically proved, and could only be
maintained by faith in authoritative revelation. See his Universíe Philosophice
Systema (1690), and especially his Lógica (1696).

™ Locke's Essay, Bk. IV. ch. 11.

What does he mean by “unknown substratum”?

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The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

M. Our ideas we cali figure & extensión, not images of the figure

and extensión of matter; these (if such there be) being infinitely
divisible, those not so.

'Tis impossible a material cube should exist, because the edges
of a cube will appear broad to an acute sense.

Men die, or are in [a] State of annihilation, oft in a day.

s. Powers. Qu. whether more or one onely?

Lengths abstract from breadths are the work of the mind. Such
do intersect in a point at all angles. After the same way colour is
abstract from extensión.

Every position alters the line.

Qu. whether ideas of extensión are made up of other ideas,
v.g. idea of a foot made up of general ideas of an inch?

The idea of an inch length not one determin'd idea. Henee
enquire the reason why we are out in judging of extensión by the
sight; for which purpose 'tis meet also to consider the frequent &
sudden changes of extensión by position.

No stated ideas of length without a mínimum.

M. Material substance banter'd by Locke, b. 2. c. 13. s. 19.

M. In my doctrine all absurdities from infinite space &c. cease^^*’.

Qu. whether if (speaking grossly) the things we see were all of
them at all times too small to be felt, we should have confounded
tangible & visible extensión and figure?

T. Qu. whether if succession of ideas in the Eternal Mind, a day

He gets rid of the infinite in quantity, because it is incapable of concrete
manifestation to the senses. When a phenomenon given in sense reaches the
minimum sensibile, it reaches what is for us the margin of realisable existence:
it cannot be infinitely little and still a phenomenon: insensible phenomena of
sense involve a contradiction. And so too of the infinitely large.

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147

does not seem to God a 1000 years, rather than a 1000 years a
day?

But one only colour & its degrees. [ 065 ]

Enquiry about a grand mistake in writers of dioptricks in
assigning the cause of microscopes magnifying objects.

Qu. whether a born-blind [man] made to see would at 1^^
give the ñame of distance to any idea intromitted by sight; since
he would take distance y*^ that he had perceived by touch to
be something existing without bis mind, but he would certainly
think that nothing seen was without bis mind^^^?

Space without any bodies existing in rerum natura would not s.
be extended, as not having parts—in that parts are assigned to
it w* respect to body; from whence also the notion of distance
is taken. Now without either parts or distance or mind, how can
there be Space, or anything beside one uniform Nothing?

Two demonstrations that blind made to see would not take all
things he saw to be without his mind, or not in a point—the one
from microscopic eyes, the other from not perceiving distance,
i.e. radius of the visual sphere.

The trees are in the park, i.e. whether 1 will or no, whether 1 m.
imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither and
open my eyes by day, & 1 shall not avoid seeing them.

By extensión blind [man] would mean either the perception
caused in his touch by something he calis extended, or else the
power of raising that perception; w power is without, in the
thing termed extended. Now he could not know either of these
to be in things visible till he had try'd.

In short he would idealise the visible world but not the tangible world. In
the Principies, Berkeley idealises both.

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Geometry seems to have for its object tangible extensión,
figures, & motion—and not visible^^^.

A man will say a body will seem as big as before, tho' the
visible idea it yields be less than it was; therefore the bigness
or tangible extensión of the body is different from the visible
extensión.

Extensión or space no simple idea—length, breadth, & solidity
[ 066 ] being three several ideas.

Depth or solidity now perceived by sight^^^.

Strange impotence of men. Man without God wretcheder than
a stone or tree; he having onely the power to be miserable by bis
unperformed wills, these having no power at all^^^.

Length perceivable by hearing—length & breadth by
sight—length, breadth, & depth by touch.

G. affects US must be a thinking thing, for thinks not cannot

subsist.

Number not in bodies, it being the creature of the mind,
depending entirely on its consideration, & being more or less as
the mind pleases^^^.

Mem. Quiere whether extensión be equally a sensation with
colour? The mob use not the word extensión. 'Tis an abstract
term of the Schools.

p. Round figure a perception or sensation in the mind, but in the

body is a power. L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8.

Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 149-59, where he concludes that “neither abstract
ñor visible extensión makes the object of geometry.”

By the adult, who has leamed to interpret its visual signs.

Inasmuch as no physical consequences/o/Zow the volition; which however
is still self-originated.

“A succession of ideas I take to constitute time, and not to be only the
sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think.” (Berkeley's letter to
Johnson.)

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149

Mem. Mark well the later part of the last cited section.

Solids, or any other tangible things, are no otherwise seen than
eolours felt by the Germán Count.

“Of ’ and “thing” eauses of mistake. m.

The visible point of he who has mieroseopieal eyes will not
be greater or less than mine.

Qu. Whether the propositions & even axioms of geometry do
not divers of them suppose the existenee of lines &e. without the
mind?

Whether motion be the measure of duration? Loeke, b. 2. e. t.
14. s. 19.

Lines & points eoneeiv'd as terminations different ideas from
those eoneeiv'd absolutely.

Every position alters a Une.
st

Blind man at 1 would not take eolours to be without his mind; s.
but eolours would seem to be in the same plaee with the eoloured
extensión: therefore extensión w^^ not seem to be without the
mind. [ 067 ]

All visible eoneentrie eireles whereof the eye is the eentre are
absolutely equal.

Infinite number—why absurd—notrightly solv'dby Loeke^^^.

Qu. how 'tis possible we should see fíats or right lines?

Qu. why the moon appears greatest in the horizon^^^?

Qu. why we see things ereet when painted inverted^^^?

Question put by Mr. Deering touehing the thief and paradise. t.

Matter tho' allowed to exist may be no greater than a pin's m.
head.

Motion is proportionable to spaee deseribed in given time.

Cf. Essay, Bk. II. ch. 16, sect. 8.

™ Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 61-11.

Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 88-120.

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Velocity not proportionable to space describ'd in given time.

M. No active power but the Will: therefore Matter, if it exists,

affects US not^^^.

Magnitude when barely taken for the ratio partium extra
partes, or rather for co-existence & succession, without
considering the parts co-existing & succeeding, is infinitely,
or rather indefinitely, or not at all perhaps, divisible, because it is
itself infinite or indefinite. But definite, determined magnitudes,
i.e. Unes or surfaces consisting of points whereby (together w*
distance & position) they are determin'd, are resoluble into those
points.

Again. Magnitude taken for co-existence and succession is
not all divisible, but is one simple idea.

Simple ideas inelude no parts ñor relations—^hardly separated
and considered in themselves—ñor yet rightly singled by any
author. Instance in power, red, extensión, &c.

M. Space not imaginable by any idea received from sight—not

imaginable without body moving. Not even then necessarily
existing (I speak of infinite space)—for w^ the body has past may

[ 068 ] be conceiv'd annihilated.

M. Qu. What can we see beside colours? what can we feel beside

hard, soft, coid, warm, pleasure, pain?

Qu. Why not taste & smell extensión?

Qu. Why not tangible & visible extensions thought
heterogeneous extensions, so well as gustable & olefactible
perceptions thought heterogeneous perceptions? or at least why
not as heterogeneous as blue & red?

Moon w“ horizontal does not appear bigger as to visible
extensión than at other times; henee difficulties and disputes
about things seen under equal angles &c. cease.

This is of the essence of Berkeley's philosophy.

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All patentice alike indifferent.

A. B. W* does he mean by his potential Is it the will, desire,
person, or all or neither, or sometimes one, sometimes t'other?

No agent ean be eoneeiv'd indifferent as to pain or pleasure.

We do not, properly speaking, in a sttiet philosophieal sense,
make objeets more or less pleasant; but the laws of nature do
that.

A finite intelligenee might have foreseen 4 thousand years
agoe the plaee and eireumstanees, even the most minute &
trivial, of my presen! existenee. This true on supposition that
uneasiness determines the will.

Doetrines of liberty, preseienee, &e. explained by billiard
balls.

judgement would he make of uppermost and lowermost
who had always seen through an inverting glass?

All lines subtending the same optie angle eongruent (as is
evident by an easy experiment); therefore they are equal.

We have not puré simple ideas of blue, red, or any other eolour
(exeept perhaps blaek) beeause all bodies refleet heterogeneal
light.

Qu. Whether this be true as to sounds (& other sensations),
there being, perhaps, rays of air w will onely exhibit one
partieular sound, as rays of light one partieular eolour.

Colours not definable, not beeause they are puré iinmixt
thoughts, but beeause we eannot easily distinguish & sepárate
the thoughts they inelude, or beeause we want ñames for their
eomponent ideas.

By Soul is meant onely a eomplex idea, made up of existenee,
willing, & pereeption in a large sense. Therefore it is known and
it may be defined.

We eannot possibly eoneeive any aetive power but the Will.

Mo. S.

[ 069 ]

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s. In moral matters men think ('tis true) that they are free; but

this freedom is only the freedom of doing as they please; w
freedom is consecutive to the Will, respecting only the operative
faculties^^*^.

Men impute their actions to themselves because they will'd
them, and that not out of ignorance, but whereas they have the
consequences of them, whether good or bad.

This does not prove men to be indifferent in respect of desiring.

If anything is meant by the potentia of A. B. it must be desire;
but 1 appeal to any man if his desire be indifferent, or (to speak
more to the purpose) whether he himself be indifferent in respect
of he desires till after he has desired it; for as for desire itself,
or the faculty of desiring, that is indifferent, as all other faculties
are.

Actions leading to heaven are in my power if 1 will them:
therefore 1 will will them.

Qu. concerning the procession of Wills in infmitum.

Herein mathematiques have the advantage over metaphysiques
and morality. Their definitions, being of words not yet known
to y® learner, are not disputed; but words in metaphysiques &
morality, being mostly known to all, the definitions of them may
chance to be contraverted.

M. The short jejune way in mathematiques will not do

in metaphysiques & ethiques: for y^ about mathematical
propositions men have no prejudices, no anticipated opinions
to be encounter'd; they not having yet thought on such matters.
'Tis not so in the other 2 mentioned Sciences. A man must [there]
not onely demónstrate the truth, he must also vindicate it against
surupíes and established opinions which contradict it. In short,
the dry, strigose^^^, rigid way will not suffice. He must be more

But in moral freedom originales in the agent, instead of being “consecutive”
to his voluntary acts or found only in their consequences.

“Strigose” (strigosus)—meagre.

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ampie & copious, else his demonstration, tho' never so exact,
will not go down with most. [ 070 ]

Extensión seems to eonsist in variety of homogeneal thoughts
eo-existing without mixture.

Or rather visible extensión seems to be the eo-existenee of
eolour in the mind.

Enquiring and judging are aetions which depend on the s. Mo.
operative faculties, depend on the Will, is determin'd
by some uneasiness; ergo &c. Suppose an agent w is finite
perfectly indifferent, and as to desiring not determin'd by any
prospeet or eonsideration of good, 1 say, this agent cannot do an
aetion morally good. Henee 'tis evident the suppositions of A. B.
are insignificant.

Extensión, motion, time, number are no simple ideas, but
inelude succession to them, which seems to be a simple idea.

Mem. To enquire into the angle of contact, & into fluxions,

&c.

The sphere of visión is equal whether 1 look onely in my hand

or on the open firmament, for 1 , in both cases the retina is full;

the radius's of both spheres are equall or rather nothing at all
to the sight; equal numbers of points in one & t'other.

In the Barrovian case purblind would judge aright.

Why the horizontal moon greater?

Why objeets seen erect?

To what purpose certain figure and texture connected w* n.
other perceptions?

Men estimate magnitudes both by angles and distance. Blind
at 1 could not know distance; or by puré sight, abstracting from
experience of connexion of sight and tangible ideas, we can't
perceive distance. Therefore by puré sight we cannot perceive or
judge of extensión.

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Qu. Whether it be possible to enlarge our sight or make us
see at once more, or more points, than we do, by diminishing the
punctum visibile below 30 minutes?

I. s. Speech metaphorical more than we imagine; insensible things,

& their modes, circumstances, &c. being exprest for the most
part by words borrow'd from things sensible. Henee manyfold
mistakes.

s. The grand mistake is that we think we have ideas of the

operations of our minds^^^. Certainly this metaphorical dress is
an argument we have not.

Qu. How can our idea of God be complex & compounded,
when bis essence is simple & uncompounded? V. Locke, b. 2. c.
23. s. 35223 .

G. The impossibility of defining or discoursing clearly of such

things proceeds from the fault & scantiness of language, as much
perhaps as from obscurity & confusión of thought. Henee 1 may
clearly and fully understand my own soul, extensión, &c., and
not be able to define them22^.

M. The substance wood a collection of simple ideas. See Locke,

b. 2. c. 26. s. 1.

Mem. concerning strait lines seen to look at them through an
orbicular lattice.

Qu. Whether possible that those visible ideas w are now
connected with greater tangible extensions could have been
connected with lesser tangible extensions,—there seeming to be
no necessary connexion between those thoughts?

As he afterwards expresses it, we have intelligible notions, but not
ideas —sensuous pictures—of the States or acts of our minds.

[“Omnes reales rerum proprietates continentur in Deo.” What means Le
Clerc &c. by this? Log. I. ch. 8.]—AUTHORfFNS, on margin.

“Si non rogas intelligo.”

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Speculums seem to diminish or enlarge objects not by altering
the optique angle, but by altering the apparent distance.

Henee Qu. if blind would think things diminish'd by eonvexes,
or enlarg'd by eoneaves?

Motion not one idea. It eannot be pereeived at onee. p.n.

Mem. To allow existenee to eolours in the dark, persons not m. p.
thinking, &e.—but not an aetual existenee. 'Tis prudent to eorreet
men's mistakes without altering their language. This makes truth
glide into their souls insensibly^^^.

Colours in y® dark do exist really, i.e. were there light; or as m. p.
soon as light eomes, we shall see them, provided we open our
eyes; and that whether we will or no.

How the retina is fill'd by a looking-glass?

Convex speeulums have the same effeet w* eoneave glasses. [ 072 ]

Qu. Whether eoneave speeulums have the same effeet w*
eonvex glasses?

The reason why eonvex speeulums diminish & eoneave
magnify not yet fully assign'd by any writer 1 know.

Qu. Why not objeets seen eonfus'd when that they seem
inverted through a eonvex lens?

Qu. How to make a glass or speeulum whieh shall magnify or
diminish by altering the distanee without altering the angle?

No identity (other than perfeet likeness) in any individuáis
besides persons^^^.

As well make tastes, smells, fear, shame, wit, virtue, viee, & n.
all thoughts move w* loeal motion as immaterial spirit.

On aeeount of my doetrine, the identity of finite substanees
must eonsist in something else than eontinued existenee, or
relation to determined time & plaee of beginning to exist—the

This way of winning others to his own opinions is very characteristic of
Berkeley. See p. 92 and note.

See Third Dialogue, on sameness in things and sameness in persons, which
it puzzles him to reconcile with his New Principies.

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existence of our thoughts (which being combined make all
substances) being frequently interrupted, & they having divers
beginnings & endings.

Qu. Whether identity of person consists not in the Will?

No necessary connexion between great or little optique angles
and great or little extensión.

Distance is not perceived: optique angles are not perceived.
How then is extensión perceiv'd by sight?

Apparent magnitude of a Une is not simply as the optique
angle, but directly as the optique angle, & reciprocally as the
confusión, &c. (i.e. the other sensations, or want of sensation,
that attend near visión). Henee great mistakes in assigning the
magnifying power of glasses. Vid. Moly[neux], p. 182.

Glasses or speculums may perhaps magnify or lessen without
altering the optique angle, but to no purpose.

Qu. Whether purblind would think objects so much diminished
by a convex speculum as another?

Qu. Wherein consists identity of person? Not in actual
consciousness; for then Tm not the same person I was this day
twelvemonth but while I think of I then did. Not in potential;
for then all persons may be the same, for ought we know.

Mem. Story of Mr. Deering's aunt.

Two sorts of potential consciousness—natural &

prEeternatural. In the last § but one, I mean the latter.

If by magnitude be meant the proportion anything bears to
a determined tangible extensión, as inch, foot, &c., this, 'tis
plain, cannot be properly & per se perceived by sight; & as for
determin'd visible inches, feet, &c., there can be no such thing
obtain'd by the meer act of seeing—abstracted from experience,
&c.

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The greatness per se perceivable by the sight is onely the
proportion any visible appearanee bears to the others seen at the
same time; or (which is the same thing) the proportion of any
partieular part of the visual orb to the whole. But mark that we
pereeive not it is an orb, any more than a plain, but by reasoning.

This is all the greatness the pietures have per se.

Hereby meere seeing cannot at all judge of the extensión of
any object, it not availing to know the objeet makes sueh a part
of a sphserieal surfaee exeept we also know the greatness of the
sphserical surfaee; for a point may subtend the same angle w* a
mile, & so create as great an image in the retina, i.e. take up as
much of the orb.

Men judge of magnitude by faintness and vigorousness, by
distinctness and eonfusion, with some other cireumstances, by
great & little angles.

Henee 'tis plain the ideas of sight which are now connected
with greatness might have been connected w* smallness, and
vice versa: there being no necessary reason why great angles,
faintness, and distinctness without straining, should stand for
great extensión, any more than a great angle, vigorousness, and
confusion^^^.

My end is not to deliver metaphysiques altogether in a general
scholastic way, but in some measure to accommodate them to
the Sciences, and shew how they may be useful in optiques,
geometry,

Qu. Whether per se proportion of visible magnitudes be
perceivable by sight? This is put on account of distinctness and
confusedness, the act of perception seeming to be as great in [074]
viewing any point of the visual orb distinctly, as in viewing the
whole confusedly.

Mem. To correct my language & make it as philosophically
nice as possible—to avoid giving handle.

™ Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 52-61.

Cf. Principies, sect. 101-134.

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If men could without straining alter the convexity of their
crystallines, they might magnify or diminish the apparent
diameters of objects, the same optic angle remaining.

The bigness in one sense of the pictures in the fund is not
determin'd; for the nearer a man views them, the images of them
(as well as other objects) will take up the greater room in the
fund of his eye.

Mem. Introduction to contain the design of the whole, the
nature and manner of demonstrating, &c.

Two sorts of bigness accurately to be distinguished, they being
perfectly and toto ccelo different—the one the proportion that any
one appearance has to the sum of appearances perceived at the
same time w* it, is proportional to angles, or, if a surface, to
segments of sphserical surfaces;—the other is tangible bigness.

Qu. would happen if the sphseríe of the retina were enlarged
or diminish'd?

We think by the meer act of visión we perceive distance from
US, yet we do not; also that we perceive solids, yet we do not;
also the inequality of things seen under the same angle, yet we
do not.

Why may I not add, We think we see extensión by meer
visión? Yet we do not.

Extensión seems to be perceived by the eye, as thought by the
ear.

As long as the same angle determines the minimum visibile
to two persons, no different conformation of the eye can make
a different appearance of magnitude in the same thing. But, it
being possible to try the angle, we may certainly know whether
the same thing appears differently big to two persons on account
of their eyes.

If a man could see ... objects would appear larger to him than
to another; henee there is another sort of purely visible magnitude
beside the proportion any appearance bears to the visual sphere,
viz. its proportion to the M. V.

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Were there but one and the same language in the world, and
did children speak it naturally as soon as born, and were it not
in the power of men to eoneeal their thoughts or deceive others,
but that there were an inseparable eonnexion between words &
thoughts, so posito uno, ponitur alterum by the laws of nature;
Qu. would not men think they heard thoughts as much as that
they see extension^^^?

All our ideas are adsequate: our knowledge of the laws of
nature is not perfeet & adsequate^^*’.

Men are in the right in judging their simple ideas to be in the
things themselves. Certainly heat & colour is as mueh without
the mind as figure, motion, time, &e.

We know many things w we want words to express. Great
things diseoverable upon this principie. For want of considering
w divers men have run into sundry mistakes, endeavouring to
set forth their knowledge by sounds; w foundering them, they
thought the defect was in their knowledge, while in truth it was
in their language.

Qu. Whether the sensations of sight arising from a man's head
be liker the sensations of touch proceeding from thence or from
his legs?

Or, Is it onely the constant & long association of ideas entirely
different that makes me judge them the same?

1 see is onely variety of colours & light. 1 feel is hard
or Soft, hot or coid, rough or smooth, &c. resemblance have
these thoughts with those?

“distance”—on opposite page in the MS. Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 140.

Direct perception of phenomena is adequate to the perceived phenomena;
indirect or scientific perception is inadequate, leaving room for faith and trust.

[ 075 ]

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A picture painted w* great variety of colours affects the touch
in one uniform manner. I cannot therefore conclude that because
I see 2, I shall feel 2; because I see angles or inequalities, I
shall feel angles or inequalities. How therefore can I—^before
experience teaches me—^know that the visible leggs are (because
2 ) connected w* the tangible ones, or the visible head (because
[ 076 ] one) connected w* the tangible head^^^ ?

M. All things by us conceivable are—

Ist, thoughts;

2 ndly, powers to receive thoughts;

3rdly, powers to cause thoughts; neither of all w can possibly
exist in an inert, senseless thing.

An object w*out a glass may be seen under as great an angle
as w* a glass. A glass therefore does not magnify the appearance
by the angle.

s. Absurd that men should know the soul by idea—ideas being

inert, thoughtless. Henee Malbranch confuted^^^.

I saw gladness in his looks. I saw shame in his face. So I see
figure or distance.

Qu. Why things seen confusedly thro' a convex glass are not
magnify'd?

Tho' we should judge the horizontal moon to be more distant,
why should we therefore judge her to be greater? What connexion
betwixt the same angle, further distant, and greaterness?

N. My doctrine affects the essences of the Corpuscularians.

Perfect circles, &c. exist not without (for none can so exist,
whether perfect or no), but in the mind.

Lines thought divisible ad infinitum, because they are suppos'd
to exist without. Also because they are thought the same when
view'd by the naked eye, & w“ view'd thro' magnifying glasses.

Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 107-8.

The Divine Ideas of Malebranche and the sensuous ideas of Berkeley differ.

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They who knew not glasses had not so fair a pretence for the
divisibility ad infinitum.

No idea of circle, &c. in abstrae!.

Metaphysiques as eapable of eertainty as ethiques, but not so
eapable to be demonstrated in a geometrieal way; beeause men
see elearer & have not so many prejudiees in ethiques.

Visible ideas eome into the mind very distinet. So do tangible
ideas. Henee extensión seen & felt. Sounds, tastes, &e. are more
blended.

Qu. Why not extensión intromitted by the tas te in eonjunetion
with the smell—seeing tastes & smells are very distinet ideas?

Blew and yellow partieles mixt, while they exhibit an uniform
green, their extensión is not pereeiv'd; but as soon as they exhibit
distinet sensations of blew and yellow, then their extensión is
pereeiv'd.

Distinet pereeption of visible ideas not so perfeet as of
tangible—tangible ideas being many at onee equally vivid. Henee
heterogeneous extensión.

Objeet. Why a mist inereases not the apparent magnitude of
an objeet, in proportion to the faintness^^^?

Mem. To enquire touehing the squaring of the eirele, &e.

That w seems smooth & round to the toueh may to sight
seem quite otherwise. Henee no necessary eonnexion betwixt
visible ideas and tangible ones.

In geometry it is not prov'd that an ineh is divisible ad
infinitum.

Geometry not eonversant about our eompleat determined ideas
of figures, for these are not divisible ad infinitum.

Partieular eireles may be squar'd, for the eireumferenee being
given a diameter may be found betwixt w & the true there
is not any pereeivable differenee. Therefore there is no
differenee—extensión being a pereeption; & a pereeption not

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Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 71.

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[ 078 ]

perceivd is contradiction, nonsense, nothing. In vain to alledge
the difference may be seen by magnifying-glasses, for in y*^ case
there is ('tis ttue) a difference perceiv'd, but not between the same
ideas, but others much greater, entirely different therefrom^^^.

Any visible circle possibly perceivable of any man may
be squar'd, by the common way, most accurately; or even
perceivable by any other being, see he never so acute, i.e. never
so small an arch of a circle; this being makes the distinction
between acute & dull sight, and not the m.v., as men are perhaps
apt to think.

The same is true of any tangible circle. Therefore further
enquiry of accuracy in squaring or other curves is perfectly
needless, & time thrown away.

Mem. To press last precedes more homely, & so think on't
again.

A meer Une or distance is not made up of points, does not
exist, cannot be imagin'd, or have an idea framed thereof,—no
more than meer colour without extension^^^.

Mem. A great difference between considering length w*out
breadth, & having an idea of, or imagining, length without
breadth^^^.

Malbranch out touching the crystallines diminishing, L. 1. c.

6 .

'Tis possible (& perhaps not very improbable, that is, is
sometimes so) we may have the greatest pictures from the least
objects. Therefore no necessary connexion betwixt visible &
tangible ideas. These ideas, viz. great relation to sphcera visualis,
or to the m. v. (w is all that I would have meant by having

Cf. Malebranche, Recherche, Bk. I. c. 6. That and the following chapters
seem to have been in Berkeley's mind.

He here assumes that extensión (visible) is implied in the visible idea we
cali colour.

This strikingly illustrates Berkeley's use of “idea,” and what he intends
when he argües against “abstrae!” ideas.

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a greater picture) & faintness, might possibly have stood for or
signify'd small tangible extensions. Certainly the greater relation
to s. V. and m. v. does frequently, in that men view little objects
near the eye.

Malbranch out in asserting we cannot possibly know whether
there are 2 men in the world that see a thing of the same bigness.

V. L. 1. c. 6.

Diagonal of particular square commensurable w* its side, they
both containing a certain number of m. v.

1 do not think that surfaces consist of Unes, i.e. meer distances.

Henee perhaps may be solid that sophism w would prove the
oblique Une equal to the perpendicular between 2 parallels.

Suppose an inch represen! a mile. 1/1000 of an inch is nothing,
but 1/1000 of y® mile represented is something: therefore 1/1000
an inch, tho' nothing, is not to be neglected, because it represents
something, i.e. 1/1000 of a mile.

Particular determin'd Unes are not divisible ad infinitum, but
Unes as us'd by geometers are so, they not being determin'd to
any particular finite number of points. Yet a geometer (he knows
not why) will very readily say he can demónstrate an inch Une is
divisible ad infinitum.

A body moving in the optique axis not perceiv'd to move
by sight merely, and without experience. There is ('tis true) a [079]
successive change of ideas,—it seems less and less. But, besides
this, there is no visible change of place.

Mem. To enquire most diligently concerning the
incommensurability of diagonale & side—whether it does not go
on the supposition of units being divisible ad infinitum, i.e. of
the extended thing spoken of being divisible ad infinitum (unit
being nothing; also v. Barrow, Lect. Geom.), & so the infinite
indivisibility deduced therefrom is a petitio principii?

The diagonal is commensurable with the side.

From Malbranch, Locke, & my first arguings it can't be prov'd m. p.

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[ 080 ]

that extensión is not in matter. From Locke's arguings it can't be
proved that colours are not in bodies.

Mem. That I was distrustful at 8 years oíd; and consequently
by nature disposed for these new doctrines^^^.

Qu. How can a line consisting of an unequal number of points
be divisible {ad infinitum] in two equals?

Mem. To discuss copiously how & why we do not see the
pictures.

Allowing extensions to exist in matter, we cannot know even
their proportions—contrary to Malbranch.

I wonder how men cannot see a truth so obvious, as that
extensión cannot exist without a thinking substance.

Species of all sensible things made by the mind. This prov'd
either by turning men's eyes into magnifyers or diminishers.

m. V. is, suppose, less than mine. Let a 3^^^ person have
perfect ideas of both our m. v®. His idea of my m. v. contains
bis idea of yours, & somewhat more. Therefore 'tis made up of
parts: therefore his idea of my m. v. is not perfect or just, which
diverts the hypothesis.

Qu. Whether a m. v. or t. be extended?

Mem. The strange errours men run into about the pictures. We
think them small because should a man be suppos'd to see them
their pictures would take up but little room in the fund of his eye.

It seems all Unes can't be bisected in 2 equall parts. Mem. To
examine how the geometers pro ve the contrary.

An interesting autobiographical fact. From childhood he was indisposed to
take things on trust.

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'Tis impossible there should be a m. v. less than mine. If there
be, mine may beeome equal to it (beeause they are homogeneous)
by detraetion of some part or parts. But it eonsists not of parts,
ergo &e.

Suppose inverting perspeetives bound to y® eyes of a ehild, &
eontinu'd to the years of manhood—when he looks up, or turns
up bis head, he shall behold we eall under. Qu. What would
he think of up and dowrP'^^l

I wonder not at my sagaeity in diseovering the obvious tho' m.
amazing truth. I rather wonder at my stupid inadverteney in not
finding it out before—'tis no witeheraft to see.

Our simple ideas are so many simple thoughts or pereeptions; m.
a pereeption eannot exist without a thing to pereeive it, or any
longer than it is pereeiv'd; a thought eannot be in an unthinking
thing; one uniform simple thought ean be like to nothing but
another uniform simple thought. Complex thoughts or ideas are
onely an assemblage of simple ideas, and ean be the image of
nothing, or like unto nothing, but another assemblage of simple
ideas, &e.

The Cartesian opinión of light & eolours &e. is orthodox m.
enough even in their eyes who think the Seripture expression
may favour the eommon opinión. Why may not mine also? But
there is nothing in Seripture that ean possibly be wrested to make
against me, but, perhaps, many things for me.

Bodies &e. do exist whether we think of 'em or no, they being m.
taken in a twofold sense—

1. Collections of thoughts.

2. Collections of powers to cause those thoughts.

Essay on Vision, sect. 88-119.

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M. P.

These later exist; tho' perhaps a parte rei it may be one simple
perfect power.

Qu. whether the extensión of a plain, look'd at straight and
slantingly, survey'd minutely & distinctly, or in the bulk and
confusedly at once, be the same? N. B. The plain is suppos'd to
keep the same distance.

The ideas we have by a successive, curious inspection of y®
minute parts of a plain do not seem to make up the extensión of
that plain view'd & consider'd all together.

Ignorance in some sort requisito in y® person that should
disown the Principie.

Thoughts do most properly signify, or are mostly taken for
the interior operations of the mind, wherein the mind is active.
Those y^ obey not the acts of volition, and in the mind is
passive, are more properly call'd sensations or perceptions. But
y^ is all a case of words.

Extensión being the collection or distinct co-existence of
minimums, i.e. of perceptions intromitted by sight or touch, it
cannot be conceiv'd without a perceiving substance.

Malbranch does not prove that the figures & extensions exist
not when they are not perceiv'd. Consequently he does not prove,
ñor can it be prov'd on his principies, that the sorts are the work
of the mind, and onely in the mind.

The great argument to prove that extensión cannot be in an
unthinking substance is, that it cannot be conceiv'd distinct from
or without all tangible or visible quality.

Tho' matter be extended w* an indefinite extensión, yet the
mind makes the sorts. They were not before the mind perceiving
them, & even now they are not without the mind. Houses, trees.

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&c., tho' indefinitely extended matter do exist, are not without
the mind.

The great danger of making extensión exist without the mind m.
is, that if it does it must be aeknowledg'd infinite, immutable,
eternal, &c.;—will be to make either God extended
I think dangerous), or an eternal, immutable, infinite, increate
Being beside God.

Finiteness of our minds no excuse for the geometers. i.

The Principie easily proved by plenty of arguments ad m.
absurdum.

The twofold signification of Bodies, viz.

1. Combinations of thoughts^^^;

2. Combinations of powers to raise thoughts.

[ 082 ]

These, 1 say, in conjunction with homogeneous partióles, may
solve much better the objections from the creation than the
supposition that Matter does exist. Upon w supposition 1 think
they cannot be solv'd.

Bodies taken for powers do exist w“ not perceiv'd; but this
existence is not actual^^*’. W" 1 say a power exists, no more is
meant than that if in the light 1 open my eyes, and look that way,

1 shall see it, i.e. the body, &c.

“thoughts,” i.e. ideas of sense?

This, in a crude way, is the distinction of 5úvapt<; and évépyeta. It helps
to explain Berkeley's meaning, when he occasionally speaks of the ideas or
phenomena that appear in the sense experience of different persons as if they
were absolutely independent entities.

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Qu. whether blind before sight may not have an idea of light
and colours & visible extensión, after the same manner as we
perceive them w* eyes shut, or in the dark—not imagining, but
seeing after a sort?

Visible extensión cannot be conceiv'd added to tangible
extensión. Visible and tangible points can't make one sum.
Therefore these extensions are heterogeneous.

A probable method propos'd whereby one may judge whether
in near visión there is a greater distance between the crystalline
& fund than usual, or whether the crystalline be onely render'd
more convex. If the former, then the v. s. is enlarg'd, & the
m. V. corresponds to less than 30 minutes, or w'^ever it us'd to
correspond to.

Stated measures, inches, feet, &c., are tangible not visible
extensions.

M. Locke, More, Raphson, &c. seem to make God extended. 'Tis

nevertheless of great use to religión to take extensión out of our

idea of God, & put a power in its place. It seems dangerous to
ch

suppose extensión, w is manifestly inert, in God.

M. But, say you, The thought or perception I cali extensión is not

itself in an unthinking thing or Matter—but it is like something
w is in Matter. Well, say I, Do you apprehend or conceive
w*^ you say extensión is like unto, or do you not? If the later,
how know you they are alike? How can you compare any things
besides your own ideas? If the former, it must be an idea, i.e.
[ 083 ] perception, thought, or sensation—w to be in an unperceiving

thing is a contradiction^^^

I. I abstain from all flourish & powers of words & figures, using

To be “in an unperceiving thing,” i.e. to be real, yet unperceived. Whatever
is perceived is, because realised only through a percipient act, an idea —in
Berkeley's use of the word.

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a great plainness & simplicity of simile, having oft found it
difficult to understand those that use the lofty & Platonic, or
subtil & scholastique strain^^^.

Whatsoever has any of our ideas in it must perceive; it m.
being that very having, that passive recognition of ideas, that
denominates the mind perceiving—that being the very essence
of perception, or that wherein perception consists.

The faintness w alters the appearance of the horizontal moon,
rather proceeds from the quantity or grossness of the intermedíate
atmosphere, than from any change of distance, w is perhaps
not considerable enough to be a total cause, but may be a pardal
of the phenomenon. N. B. The visual angle is less in cause the
horizon.

We judge of the distance of bodies, as by other things, so also

by the situation of their pictures in the eye, or (w is the same
thing) according as they appear higher or lower. Those w seem
higher are farther off.

Qu. why we see objects greater in y® dark? whether this can
be solv'd by any but my Principies?

The reverse of y® Principie introduced scepticism. m.

N. B. On my Principies there is a reality: there are things: m.
there is a rerum natura.

Mem. The surds, doubling the cube, &c.

We think that if just made to see we should judge of the
distance & magnitude of things as we do now; but this is false.

So also w*^ we think so positively of the situation of objects.

Hays's, Keill's^^^, &c. method of proving the infinitesimals of
the 3^^ order absurd, & perfectly contradictions. [ 084 ]

This as to the “Platonic strain” is not in the tone of Siris.

John Keill (1671-1721), an eminent mathematician, educated at the

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Angles of contad, & verily all angles comprehended by a
right line & a curve, cannot be measur'd, the arches intercepted
not being similar.

The danger of expounding the H. Trinity by extensión.

M. p. Qu. Why should the magnitude seen at a near distance be

deem'd the true one rather than that seen at a farther distance?
Why should the sun be thought many 1000 miles rather than
one foot in diameter—^both being equally apparent diameters?
Certainly men judg'd of the sun not in himself, but w* relation
to themselves.

M. 4 Principies whereby to answer objections, viz.

1. Bodies do really exist, tho' not perceiv'd by us.

2. There is a law or course of nature.

3. Language & knowledge are all about ideas; words stand
for nothing else.

4. Nothing can be a proof against one side of a
contradiction that bears equally hard upon the olber^”*^.

What shall 1 say? Daré 1 pronounce the admired áKpí(36ia
mathematica, that darling of the age, a trifle?

Most certainly no finite extensión divisible ad infinitum.

M. Difficulties about concentric circles.

N. Mem. To examine & accurately discuss the scholium of the

University of Edinburgh; in 1710 Savilian Professor of Astronomy at Oxford,
and the first to teach the Newtonian philosophy in that University. In 1708 he
was engaged in a controversy in support of Newton's claims to the discovery
of the method of fluxions.

This suggests a negativo argument for Kanf s antinomies, and for Hamilton's
law of the conditioned.

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8 * definition of Mr. Newton's^^^ Principia.

Ridiculous in the mathematicians to despise Sense.

Qu. Is it not impossible there should be abstract general ideas?

All ideas come from without. They are all particular. The
mind, 'tis true, can consider one thing w*out another; but then,
considered asunder, they make not 2 ideas. Both together can
make but one, as for instance colour & visible extension^^^. [ 085 ]

The end of a mathematical Une is nothing. Locke's argument
that the end of bis pen is black or white concludes nothing here.

Mem. Take care how you pretend to define extensión, for fear
of the geometers.

Qu. Why difficult to imagine a minimum? Ans. Because we
are not used to take no tice of 'em singly; they not being able
singly to pleasure or hurt us, thereby to deserve our regard.

Mem. To prove against Keill y^ the infinite divisibility of
matter makes the half have an equal number of equal parts with
the whole.

Mem. To examine how far the not comprehending infinites
may be admitted as a plea.

Qu. Why may not the mathematicians reject all the extensions
below the M. as well as the dd, &c., w are allowed to be
something, & consequently may be magnify'd by glasses into
inches, feet, &c., as well as the quantities next below the M.?

Big, little, and number are the works of the mind. How
therefore can y® extensión you suppose in Matter be big or little?

How can it consist of any number of points?

Mem. Strictly to remark L[ocke], b. 2. c. 8. s. 8. p.

Schoolmen compar'd with the mathematicians.

Extensión is blended w* tangible or visible ideas, & by the
mind prsescinded therefrom.

Newton became Sir Isaac on April 16, 1705. Was this written before that
date?

These may be considered separately, but not pictured as such.

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Mathematiques made easy—the scale does almost all. The
scale can tell us the subtangent in y® parabola is double the
abscisse.

need of the utmost accuracy w" the mathematicians own in
rerum natura they cannot find anything corresponding w* their
nice ideas.

One should endeavour to find a progression by trying the
scale.

Newton's fluxions needless. Anything below an M might
serve for Leibnitz's Differential Calculus.

How can they hang together so well, since there are in them
(1 mean the mathematiques) so many contradictorice argutice. V.
Barrow, Lect.

A man may read a book of Conics with case, knowing how to
[ 086 ] try if they are right. He may take 'em on the credit of the author.

Where's the need of certainty in such trifles? The thing that
makes it so much esteem'd in them is that we are thought not
capable of getting it elsewhere. But we may in ethiques and
metaphysiques.

The not leading men into mistakes no argument for the truth of
the infinitesimals. They being nothings may perhaps do neither
good ñor harm, except w" they are taken for something, & then
the contradiction begets a contradiction.

a + 500 nothings = a + 50 nothings—an innocent silly truth.

My doctrine excellently corresponds w* the creation. 1
suppose no matter, no stars, sun, &c. to have existed before^^’.

It seems all circles are not similar figures, there not being the
same proportion betwixt all circumferences & their diameters.

When a small line upon paper represents a mile, the
mathematicians do not calcúlate the 1/10000 of the paper line,

In as far as they have not been sensibly realised in finite percipient mind.

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they calcúlate the 1/10000 of the mile. 'Tis to this they have
regard, 'tis of this they think; if they think or have any idea at all.

The inch perhaps might represent to their imaginations the mile,
but y® 1/10000 of the inch cannot be made to represent anything,
it not being imaginable.

But the 1/10000 of a mile being somewhat, they think the
1/10000 inch is somewhat: w” they think of y^ they imagine they
think on this.

3 faults occur in the arguments of the mathematicians for
divisibility ad infinitum —

1. They suppose extensión to exist without the mind, or not
perceived.

2. They suppose that we have an idea of length without
breadth^^®, or that length without breadth does exist.

3. That unity is divisible ad infinitum.

To suppose a M. S. divisible is to say there are distinguishable
ideas where there are no distinguishable ideas. [087]

The M. S. is not near so inconceivable as the signum in
magnitudine individuum.

Mem. To examine the math, about their point —what it
is—something or nothing; and how it differs from the M. S.

All might be demonstrated by a new method of indivisibles,
easier perhaps and juster than that of Cavalierius^"*^.

Unperceivable perception a contradiction. m.

Proprietates reales rerum omnium in Deo, tam corporum quum p. g.
spirituum continentur. Clerici, Log. cap. 8.

Let my adversarios answer any one of mine, l'll yield. If 1
don't answer every one of theirs, l'll yield.

[Or rather that invisible length does exist.]—AUTH0R{FNS, on margin.
Bonaventura Cavalieri (1598-1647), the Italian mathematician. His
Geometry of Indivisibles (1635) prepared the way for the Calculus.

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M. P.

[ 088 ]

The loss of the excuse^^*^ may hurt Transubstantiation, but not
the Trinity.

We need not strain our imaginations to conceive such little
things. Bigger may do as well for infinitesimals, since the integer
must be an infinite.

Evident y^ has an infinite number of parts must be infinite.

Qu. Whether extensión be resoluble into points it does not
consist of?

Ñor can it be objected that we reason about numbers, w are
only words & not ideas^^^; for these infinitesimals are words of
no use, if not supposed to stand for ideas.

Axiom. No reasoning about things whereof we have no idea.
Therefore no reasoning about infinitesimals.

Much less infinitesimals of infinitesimals, &c.

Axiom. No Word to be used without an idea.

Our eyes and senses inform us not of the existence of matter
or ideas existing without the mind^^^. They are not to be blam'd
for the mistake.

1 defy any man to assign a right Une equal to a paraboloid, but
w" look'd at thro' a microscope they may appear unequall.

Newton's harangue amounts to no more than that gravity is
proportional to gravity.

One can't imagine an extended thing without colour. V.
Barrow, L. G.

Men allow colours, sounds, not to exist without the

[By “the excuse” is meant the finiteness of our mind—making it possible
for contradictions to appear true to us.]—AUTHORfFNS, on margin.

He allows elsewhere that words with meanings not realisable in imagination,
i.e. in the form of idea, may discharge a useful office. See Principies,
Introduction, sect. 20.

We do not perceive unperceived matter, but only matter realised in living
perception—the percipient act being the factor of its reality.

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mind, tho' they have no demonstration they do not. Why may
they not allow my Principie with a demonstration?

Qu. Whether 1 had not better allow colours to exist without m. p.
the mind; taking the mind for the active thing w 1 cali “1,”
“myself ’—y^ seems to be distinct from the understanding^^^?

The taking extensión to be distinct from all other tangible & p.
visible qualities, & to make an idea by itself, has made men take
it to be without the mind.

1 see no wit in any of them but Newton. The rest are meer
triflers, mere Nihilarians.

The folly of the mathematicians in not judging of sensations
by their senses. Reason was given us for nobler uses.

Keill's filling the world with a mite^^^. This follows from the m.
divisibility of extensión ad infmitum.

Extensión, or length without breadth, seems to be nothing save
the number of points that lie betwixt any 2 points^^^. It seems to
consist in meer proportion—meer reference of the mind.

To what purpose is it to determine the forms of glasses
geometrically?

Sir Isaac^^^ owns his book could have been demonstrated on
the supposition of indivisibles.

Innumerable vessels of matter. V. Cheyne. m.

ni not admire the mathematicians. 'Tis w^ any one of common [089]
sense might attain to by repeated acts. 1 prove it by experience. 1
am but one of human sense, and 1 &c.

The secondary qualities of things.

Because, while dependent on percipient sense, they are independent of my
personal will, being determined to appear under natural law, by Divine agency.

Keill's Introductio ad veram Physicam (Oxon. 1702)—Lectio 5—a curious
Work, dedicated to the Earl of Pembroke.

[Extensión without breadth—i. e. insensible, intangible length—is
not conceivable. ’Tis a mistake we are led into by the doctrine of
abstraction.]—AUTHORfFNS, on margin of MS.

Here “Sir Isaac.” Henee written after April, 1705.

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Mathematicians have some of them good parts—the more is
the pity. Had they not been mathematicians they had been good
for nothing. They were such fools they knew not how to employ
their parts.

The mathematicians could not so much as tell wherein truth
& certainty consisted, till Locke told 'em^^^. I see the best of 'em
talk of light and colours as if w*out the mind.

By ihing I either mean ideas or that has ideas^^^.

Nullum prEeclarum ingenium unquam fuit magnus
mathematicus. Scaliger^^*^.

A great genius cannot stoop to such trifles & minutenesses as
they consider.

1 . significant words stand for ideas^^^.

2. All knowledge about our ideas.

3. All ideas come from without or from within.

4. If from without it must be by the senses, & they are call'd
sensations^^^.

5. If from within they are the operations of the mind, & are
cabed thoughts.

6 . No sensation can be in a senseless thing.

7. No thought can be in a thoughtless thing.

8 . All our ideas are either sensations or thoughts^^^, by 3, 4, 5.

Essay, Bk. IV. ch. iv. sect. 18; ch. v. sect. 3, &c.

He applies thing to self-conscious persons as well as to passive objects of
sense.

Scaligerana Secunda, p. 270.

[These arguments must be proposed shorter and more sepárate in the
Treatise.]—AUTH0R{FNS, on margin.

“Idea” here used in its wider meaning—for “operations of mind,” as well
as for sense presented phenomena that are independent of individual will. Cf.
Principies, sect. 1.

“sensations,” i.e. objective phenomena presented in sense.

See Principies, sect. 1.

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9. None of our ideas can be in a thing w is both thoughtless
& senseless^^^, by 6, 7, 8.

10. The bare passive recognition or having of ideas is called
perception.

11. Whatever has in it an idea, tho' it be never so passive, tho'
it exert no manner of act about it, yet it must perceive. 10.

12. All ideas either are simple ideas, or made up of simple
ideas.

13. That thing is like unto another thing must agree w* it
in one or more simple ideas.

14. Whatever is like a simple idea must either be another
simple idea of the same sort, or contain a simple idea of the same
sort. 13.

15. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11,
14. Another demonstration of the same thing.

16. Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they
have been compar'd.

17. Comparing is the viewing two ideas together, & marking

they agree in and they disagree in.

18. The mind can compare nothing but its own ideas. 17.

19. Nothing like an idea can be in an unperceiving thing. 11,
16, 18.

N. B. Other arguments innumerable, both a priori & a
posteriori, drawn from all the Sciences, from the clearest, plainest,
most obvious truths, whereby to demónstrate the Principie, i.e.
that neither our ideas, ñor anything like our ideas, can possibly
be in an unperceiving thing^^^.

N. B. Not one argument of any kind w’^soever, certain or
probable, a priori or a posteriori, from any art or Science, from
either sense or reason, against it.

See Principies, sect. 2.

An “unperceiving thing” cannot be the factor of material reality.

[090]

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Mathematicians have no right idea of angles. Henee angles of
contact wrongly apply'd to prove extensión divisible ad infinitum.

We have got the Algebra of puré intelligences.

We can prove Newton's propositions more accurately, more
easily, & upon truer principies than himself^^’.

Barrow owns the downfall of geometry. However l'll
endeavour to reseñe it—so far as it is useful, or real, or
imaginable, or intelligible. But for the nothings, l'll leave
[091] them to their admirers.

ni teach any one the whole course of mathematiques in 1/100
part the time that another will.

Much banter got from the prefaces of the mathematicians.
p. Newton says colour is in the subtil matter. Henee Malbranch

proves nothing, or is mistaken, in asserting there is onely figure
& motion.

1 can square the circle, &c.; they cannot. W goes on the best
principies?

The Billys^^^ use a finite visible line for an 1/m.

T. Marsilius Ficinus—bis appearing the moment he died solv'd

by my idea of time^^^.

M. The philosophers lose their abstract or unperceived Matter.

The mathematicians lose their insensible sensations. The profane

[To the utmost accuracy, wanting nothing of perfection. Their
Solutions of problems, themselves must own to fall infinitely short of
perfection.]—AUTHORfFNS, on margin.

lean de Billy and René de Billy, French mathematicians—the former author
of Nova Geometrice Clavis and other mathematical works.

According to Baronius, in the fifth volume of his “Annals,” Ficinus appeared
after death to Michael Mercatus—agreeably to a promise he made when he
was alive—to assure him of the life of the human spirit after the death of the
body.

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[lose] their extended Deity. Fray do the rest of mankind lose?

As for bodies, &e., we have them still^^*’.

N. B. The future nat. philosoph. & mathem. get vastly by the
bargain^^^.

There are men who say there are insensible extensions. There p.
are others who say the wall is not white, the fire is not hot, &e.

We Irishmen eannot attain to these truths.

The mathematieians think there are insensible Unes. About
these they harangue: these eut in a point at all angles: these are
divisible ad infmitum. We Irishmen ean eoneeive no sueh Unes.

The mathematieians talk of they eall a point. This, they say,
is not altogether nothing, ñor is it downright something. Now
we Irishmen are apt to think something^’^ & nothing are next
neighbours.

Engagements to on aeeount of y® Treatise that grew up
under his eye; on aeeount also of his approving my harangue. [092]
Glorious for P. to be the proteetor of usefull tho' newly diseover'd
truths.

How eould 1 venturo thoughts into the world before 1 knew
they would be of use to the world? and how eould 1 know that
till 1 had try'd how they suited other men's ideas?

1 publish not this so mueh for anything else as to know whether
other men have the same ideas as we Irishmen. This is my end,

& not to be inform'd as to my own partieular.

My speeulations have the same effeet as visiting foreign
eountries: in the end 1 return where 1 was before, but my heart at
case, and enjoying Ufe with new satisfaetion.

So far as we are factors of their reality, in sense and in Science, or can be
any practical way concerned with them.

Cf. Principies, sect. 101-34.

“something,” i.e. abstract something.

Lord Pemhroke (?)—to whom the Principies were dedicated, and to whom
Locke dedicated his Essay.

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Passing through all the Sciences, though false for the most
part, yet it gives us the better insight and greater knowledge of
the truth.

He that would bring another over to bis opinión, must seem to
harmonize with him at first, and humour him in his own way of
talking™.

From my childhood I had an unaccountable turn of thought
that way.

It doth not argüe a dwarf to have greater strength than a giant,
because he can throw off the molehill which is upon him, while
the other struggles beneath a mountain.

The whole directed to practise and morality—as appears 1 ,
from making manifest the nearness and omnipresence of God;
from cutting off the useless labour of Sciences, and so forth.

[095]

This is an interesting example of a feature that is conspicuous in
Berkeley—the art of “humoring an opponent in his own way of thinking,”
which it seems was an early habit. It is thus that he insinuates his New Principies
in the Essay on Vision, and so prepares to unfold and defend them in the book
of Principies and the three Dialogues —straining language to reconcile them
with ordinary modes of speech.

An Essay Towards A New Theory
Of Vision

First published in 1709

Editor's Preface To The Essay Towards A
New Theory Of Vision

Berkeley's Essay towards a New Theory of Vision was meant
to prepare the way for the exposition and defenee of the new
theory of the material world, its natural order, and its relation
to Spirit, that is eontained in his book of Principies and in the
relative Dialogues, whieh speedily followed. The Essay was the
firstfruits of his early philosophieal studies at Dublin. It was also
the first attempt to show that our apparently immediate Vision
of Spaee and of bodies extended in three-dimensioned spaee,
is either taeit or eonseious inferenee, oeeasioned by eonstant
assoeiation of the phenomena of whieh alone we are visually
percipient with assumed realities of our taetual and loeomotive
experienee.

The first edition of the Essay appeared early in 1709, when
its author was about twenty-four years of age. A seeond edition,
with a few verbal ehanges and an Appendix, followed before the
end of that year. Both were issued in Dublin, “printed by Aaron
Rhames, at the baek of Diek's Coffeehouse, for Jeremy Pepyat, [ 096 ]
bookseller in Skinner Row.” In Mareh, 1732, a third edition,
without the Appendix, was annexed to Alciphron, on aeeount of

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[ 097 ]

its relation to the Fourth Dialogue in that book. This was the
author's last revisión.

In the present edition the text of this last edition is adopted,
after collation with those preceding. The Appendix has been
restored, and also the Dedication to Sir John Percival, which
appeared only in the first edition.

A due appreciation of Berkeley's theory of seeing, and his
conception of the visible world, involves a study, not merely of
this tentativo juvenile Essay, but also of its fuller development
and application in his more matured works. This has been
commonly forgotten by his critics.

Various circumstances contribute to perplex and even repel
the reader of the Essay, making it less fit to be an easy avenue of
approach to Berkeley's Principies.

Its occasion and design, and its connexion with his spiritual
conception of the material world, are suggested in Sections 43
and 44 of the Principies. Those sections are a key to the Essay.
They inform us that in the Essay the author intentionally uses
language which seems to attribute a reality independent of all
percipient spirit to the ideas or phenomena presented in Touch;
it being beside his purpose, he says, to “examine and refute” that
“vulgar error” in “a work on Vision.” This studied reticence of
a verbally paradoxical conception of Matter, in reasonings about
visión which are fully intelligible only under that conception, is
one cause of a want of philosophical lucidity in the Essay.

Another circumstance adds to the embarrassment of those
who approach the Principies and the three Dialogues through
the Essay on Vision. The Essay offers no exception to the lax
employment of equivocal words familiar in the early literature
of English philosophy, but which is particularly inconvenient in
the subtle discussions to which we are here introduced. At the
present day we are perhaps accustomed to more precisión and
uniformity in the philosophical use of language; at any rate we

183

connect other meanings than those here intended with some of
the leading words. It is enough to refer to sueh terms as idea,
notion, sensation, perception, touch, externality, distance, and
their eonjugates. It is diffieult for the modern reader to revive
and remember the meanings whieh Berkeley intends by idea and
notion —so signifieant in his voeabulary; and touch with him
eonnotes museular and loeomotive experienee as well as the puré
sense of eontaet. Interehange of the terms outward, outness,
externality, without the mind, and without the eye is eonfusing, if
we forget that Berkeley implies that pereipient mind is virtually
eoextensive with our bodily organism, so that being “without”
or “at a distanee from” our bodies is being at a distanee from the
pereipient mind. I have tried in the annotations to relieve some
of these ambiguities, of whieh Berkeley himself warns us (ef.
seet. 120).

The Essay moreover abounds in repetitions, and interpolations
of antiquated opties and physiology, so that its logieal strueture
and even its supremo generalisation are not easily apprehended.
I will try to disentangle them.

The reader must remember that this Essay on Vision is
professedly an introspeetive appeal to human eonseiousness.

It is an analysis of what human beings are eonseious of when
they see, the results being here and there applied, partly by way
of verifieation, to solve some famous optieal or physiologieal
puzzle. The aim is to present the faets, the whole faets, and
nothing but the faets of our internal visual experienee, as
distinguished from supposed faets and empty abstraetions, whieh
an irregular exereise of imagination, or abuse of words, had put
in their plaee. The investigation, moreover, is not eoneerned [ 098 ]
with Spaee in its metaphysieal infinity, but with finito seetions of
Spaee and their relations, whieh eoneern the seienees, physieal
and mathematieal, and with real or tangible Distanee, Magnitude,
and Plaee, in their relation to seeing.

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[ 099 ]

From the second section onwards the Essay naturally falls into
six Parts, devoted successively to the proof of the six following
theses regarding the relation of Sight to finite spaces and to things
extended:—

I. (Sect. 2-51.) Distance, or outness from the eye in the
line of visión, is not seen: it is only suggested to the mind by
visible phenomena and by sensations felt in the eye, all which are
somehow its arbitrarily constituted and non-resembling Signs.

II. (Sect. 52-87.) Magnitude, or the amount of space that
objects of sense occupy, is really invisible: we only see a greater
or less quantity of colour, and colour depends upon percipient
mind: our supposed visual perceptions of real magnitude are only
our own interpretations of the tactual meaning of the colours we
see, and of sensations felt in the eye, which are its Signs.

III. (Sect. 88-120.) Situation of objects of sense, or their real
relation to one another in ambient space, is invisible: what we see
is variety in the relations of colours to one another: our supposed
visión of real tangible locality is only our interpretation of its
visual non-resembling Signs.

IV. (Sect. 121-46.) There is no object that is presented in
common to Sight and Touch: space or extensión, which has the
best claim to be their common object, is specifically as well as
numerically different in Sight and in Touch.

V. (Sect. 147-48.) The explanation of the tactual significance
of the visible and visual Signs, upon which human experience
proceeds, is offered in the Theory that all visible phenomena
are arbitrary signs in what is virtually the Language of Nature,
addressed by God to the senses and intelligence of Man.

VI. (Sect. 149-60.) The true object studied in Geometry
is the kind of Extensión given in Touch, not that given in
Sight: real Extensión in all its phases is tangible, not visible:
colour is the only immediate object of Sight, and colour being
mind-dependent sensation, cannot be realised without percipient

185

mind. These concluding sections are supplementary to the main
argument.

The faet that distanee or outness is invisible is sometimes
regarded as Berkeley's eontribution to the theory of seeing. It is
rather the assumption on whieh the Essay proeeeds (seet. 2). The
Essay does not prove this invisibility, but seeks to shew how,
notwithstanding, we learn to find outness through seeing. That
the relation between the visual signs of outness, on the one hand,
and the real distanee whieh they signify, on the other, is in all
eases arbitrary, and diseovered through experienee, is the burden
of seet. 2-40. The previously reeognised signs of “eonsiderably
remóte” distanees, are mentioned (seet. 3). But near distanee
was supposed to be inferred by a visual geometry—and to be
“suggested,” not signified by arbitrary signs. The determination
of the visual signs whieh suggest outness, near and remóte, is
Berkeley's professed diseovery regarding visión.

An induetion of the visual signs whieh “suggest” distanee, is
followed (seet. 43) by an assertion of the wholly sensuous reality
of colour, whieh is aeknowledged to be the only immediate
objeet of sight. Henee visible extensión, eonsisting in eolour,
must be dependent for its realisation upon sentient or pereipient
mind. It is then argued (seet. 44) that this mind-dependent visible
outness has no resemblanee to the tangible reality (seet. 45). This
is the first passage in the Essay in whieh Toueh and its data are
formally brought into view. Taetual or loeomotive experienee, [loo]
it is implied, is needed to infuse true reality into our eoneeptions
of distanee or outness. This eannot be got from seeing any more
than from hearing, or tasting, or smelling. It is as impossible to
see and toueh the same objeet as it is to hear and toueh the same
objeet. Visible objeets and oeular sensations ean only be ideal
signs of real things.

The seetions in whieh Toueh is thus introdueed are among the
most important in the Essay. They represent the outness given

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[ 101 ]

in hearing as wholly sensuous, ideal, or mind-dependent: they
recognise as more truly real that got by contact and locomotion.
But if this is all that man can see, it follows that his visible
World, at any rate, becomes real only in and through percipient
mind. The problem of an Essay on Vision is thus, to explain how
the visible world of extended colour can inform us of tangible
realities, which it does not in the least resemble, and with which
it has no necessary connexion. That visible phenomena, or else
certain organic sensations involved in seeing (sect. 3, 16, 21,
27), gradually suggest the real or tangible outness with which
they are connected in the divinely constituted system of nature,
is the explanation which now begins to dawn upon us.

Here an ambiguity in the Essay appears. It concludes that the
visible world cannot be real without percipient realising mind,
i.e. not otherwise than ideally: yet the argument seems to take
for granted that we are percipient of a tangible world that is
independent of percipient realising mind. The reader is apt to say
that the tangible world must be as dependen! on percipient mind
for its reality as the visible world is concluded to be, and for the
same reason. This difficulty was soon afterwards encountered in
the book of Principies, where the worlds of sight and touch are
put on the same level; and the possibility of unperceived reality in
both cases is denied; on the ground that a material world cannot
be realised in the total absence of Spirit—human and divine. The
term “external” may still be applied to tactual and locomotive
phenomena alone, if men choose; but this not because of the
ideal character of what is seen, and the unideal reality of what
is touched, but only because tactual perceptions are found to be
more firm and steady than visual. Berkeley preferred in this way
to insinúate his new conception of the material world by degrees,
at the risk of exposing this juvenile and tentativo Essay on Vision
to a charge of incoherence.

The way in which visual ideas or phenomena “suggest” the

187

outness or distance of things from the organ of sight having been
thus explained, in what I cali the First Part of the Essay, the
Second and Third Parts (sect. 52-120) argüe for the invisibility of
real extensión in two other relations, viz. magnitude and locality
or situation. An induction of the visual signs of tangible size
and situation is given in those sections. The result is applied to
solve two problems then notable in optics, viz. (1) the reason for
the greater visible size of the horizontal moon than of the moon
in its meridian (sect. 67-87); and (2) the fact that objects are
placed erect in visión only on condition that their images on the
retina are inverted (sect. 88-120). Here the antithesis between
the ideal world of coloured extensión, and the real world of
resistan! extensión is pressed with vigour. The “high” and “low”
of the visible world is not the “high” and “low” of the tangible
world (sect. 91-106). There is no resemblance and no necessary
relation, between those two so-called extensions; not even when
the number of visible objects happen to coincide with the number
of tangible objects of which they are the visual signs, e.g. the
visible and tangible fingers on the hand: for the born-blind, on
first receiving sight, could not parcel out the visible phenomena
in correspondence with the tangible.

The next Part of the Essay (sect. 121-45) argües for a specific
as well as a numerical difference between the original data of sight
and the data of touch and locomotion. Sight and touch perceive
nothing in common. Extensión in its various relations differs
in sight from extensión in touch. Coloured extensión, which
alone is visible, is found to be different in kind from resistan!
extensión, which alone is tangible. And if actually perceived or
concrete extensions differ thus, the question is determined. For
all extensión with which man can be concerned must be concrete
(sect. 23). Extensión in the abstrae! is meaningless (sect. 124-25).
What remains is to marshal the scattered evidence, and to guard
the foregoing conclusions against objections. This is attempted
in sections 128-46.

[ 102 ]

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[103]

The enunciation of the summary generalisation, which forms
the “New Theory of Vision” (sect. 147-8), may be taken as the
Fifth and culminating Part of the Essay.

The closing sections (149-60), as I have said, are
supplementary, and profess to determine the sort of
extensión—visible or tangible—with which Geometry is
concerned. In concluding that it is tangible, he tries to picture
the mental State of Idominians, or unbodied spirits, endowed
with visual perceptions only, and asks what their conception of
outness and solid extensión must be. Here further refinements in
the interpretation of visual perception, and its organic conditions,
which have not escaped the attention of latter psychologists and
biologists, are hinted at.

Whether the data of sight consist of non-resembling
arbitrary Signs of the tactual distances, sizes, and situations
of things, is a question which some might prefer to deal
with experimentally—by trial of the experience of persons in
circumstances fitted to supply an answer. Of this sort would
be the experience of the born-blind, immediately after their sight
has been restored; the conception of extensión and its relations
found in persons who continué from birth unable to see; the
experience (if it could be got) of persons always destitute of all
tactual and locomotive perceptions, but familiar with visión; and
the facts of seeing observed in infants of the human species, and
in the lower animáis.

Berkeley did not try to verify his conclusions in this way. Here
and there (sect. 41, 42, 79, 92-99, 103, 106, 110, 128, 132-37),
he conjectures what the first visual experience of those rescued
from born-blindness is likely to be; he also speculates, as we
have seen, about the experience of unbodied spirits supposed to

189

be able to see, but unable to touch or move (sect. 153-59); and
in the Appendix he refers, in confirmation of bis New Theory,
to a reported case of one born blind who had obtained sight. But
he forms bis Theory independently of those delicate and difficult
investigations. His testing facts were sought introspectively.
Indeed those physiologists and mental philosophers who have
since tried to determine what visión in its purity is, by cases either
of communicated sight or of continued born-blindness, have
illustrated the truth of Diderot's remark—“préparer et interroger
un aveugle-né n'eüt point été une occupation indigne des talens
réunis de Newton, Des Cartes, Locke, et Leibniz^^^.”

Berkeley's New Theory has been quoted as a signal example
of discovery in metaphysics. The subtle analysis which
distinguishes seeing strictly so called, from judgments about
extended things, suggested by what we see, appears to have [104]
been imperfectly known to the ancient philosophers. Aristotle,
indeed, speaks of colour as the only proper object of sight; but, in
passages of the De Anima^^^ where he ñames properties peculiar
to particular senses, he enumerates others, such as motion, figure,
and magnitude, which belong to all the senses in common. His
distinction of Proper and Common Sensibles appears at first to
contradict Berkeley's doctrine of the heterogeneity of the ideal
visible and the real tangible worlds. Aristotle, however, seems to
question the immediate perceptibility of Common Sensibles, and
to regard them as realised through the activity of intelligence^’^.

In Diderot's Lettre sur les aveugles, á l'usage de ceux qui voient, where
Berkeley, Molyneux, Condillac, and others are mentioned. Cf. also Appendix,
pp. 111, 112; and Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 71, with the note, in which
some recorded experiments are alluded to.

De Anima, II. 6, III. 1, &c. Aristotle assigns a pre-eminent intellectual valué
to the sense of sight. See, for instance, his Metaphysics, I. 1.

Sir A. Grant, [Ethics of Aristotle, vol. II. p. 172) remarks, as to the doctrine
that the Common Sensibles are apprehended concomitantly by the senses, that:

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[105]

Some writers in Optics, in mediaeval times, and in early
modern philosophy, advanced beyond Aristotle, in explaining
the relation of our matured notion of distance to what we
originally perceive in seeing, and in the fifteenth century it was
discovered by Maurolyco that the rays of light from the object
converge to a focus in the eye; but I have not been able to trace
even the germ of the New Theory in these speculations.

Excepting some hints by Descartes, Malebranche was among
the first dimly to anticipate Berkeley, in resolving our supposed
power of seeing outness into an interpretation of visual signs
which we learn by experience to understand. The most important
part of Malebranche's account of seeing is contained in the
Recherche de la Vérité (Liv. I. ch. 9), in one of those chapters in
which he discusses the frequent fallaciousness of the senses, and
in particular of our visual perceptions of extensión. He accounts
for their inevitable uncertainty by assigning them not to sense but
to misinterpretation of what is seen. He also enumerates various
visual signs of distance.

That the Recherche of Malebranche, published more than
thirty years before the Essay, was familiar to Berkeley before the
publication of his New Theory, is proved by internal evidence,
and by his juvenile Commonplace Book. I am not able to
discover signs of a similar connexion between the New Theory

“this is surely the true view; we see in the apprehension of number, figure,
and the like, not an operation of sense, but the mind putting its own forms
and categories, i.e. itself, on the external object. It would follow then that
the senses cannot really be separated from the mind; the senses and the mind
each contribute an element to every knowledge. Aristotle's doctrine of KOtvf]
ata0r|at<; would go far, if carried out, to modify his doctrine of the simple and
innate character of the senses, e.g. sight (cf. Eth. II. 1, 4), and would preven!
its collision with Berkeley's Theory of Vision .”—See also Sir W. Hamilton,
Reid's Works, pp. 828-830.

Dugald Stewart (Collected Works, vol. I. p. 341, note) quotes Aristotle's
Ethics, II. 1, as evidence that Berkeley's doctrine, “with respect to the
acquired perceptions of sight, was quite unknown to the best metaphysicians
of antiquity.”

191

and the chapter on the mystery of sensation in Glanvill's Scepsis
Scientifica (ch. 5), published some years before the Recherche
of Malebranche, where Glanvill refers to “a secret deduction,”
through which—from motions, &c., of which we are immediately
percipient—we “spell out” figures, distances, magnitudes, and
colours, which have no resemblance to them.

An approach to the New Theory is found in a passage which
first appeared in the second edition of Locke's Essay, published
in 1694, to which Berkeley refers in his own Essay (sect. 132-35),
and which, on account of its relativo importance, I shall here
transcribe at length:—

“We are further to consider concerning Perception that the
ideas we receive by sensation are often, in grown people, altered
by the judgment, without our taking notice of it. When we set
before our eyes a round globe of any uniform colour, e.g. gold,
alabaster, or jet, it is certain that the idea thereby imprinted in our
mind is of a flat circle, variously shadowed, with several degrees
of light and brightness coming to our eyes. But, we having by use
been accustomed to perceive what kind of appearance convex
bodies are wont to make in us, what alterations are made in [ 106 ]
the reflection of light by the difference in the sensible figures
of bodies—the judgment presently, by an habitual custom, alters
the appearances into their causes; so that, from that which is
truly variety of shadow or colour, collecting the figure, it makes
it pass for a mark of figure, and frames to itself the perception of
a convex figure and an uniform colour, when the idea we receive
from them is only a plañe variously coloured, as is evident in
painting.

“To which purpose I shall here insert a problem of that very
ingenious and studious promotor of real knowledge, the learned
and worthy Mr. Molyneux, which he was pleased to send me
in a letter some months since, and it is this:—Suppose a man
born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish
between a cube and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the

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[107]

same bigness, so as to tell, when he felt the one and the other,
which is the cube and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube
and the sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to
see: quere, whether, by his sight, before he touched them, he
could not distinguish and tell, which is the globe and which the
cube? To which the acute and judicious proposer answers: ‘Not.’
For, though he has obtained the experience of how a globe, how
a cube affects his touch; yet he has not obtained the experience
that what affects his touch so and so, must affect his sight so
and so; so that a protuberant angle in the cube, that pressed his
hand unequally, shall appear to his eye as it does in the cube.—I
agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to cali
my friend, in his answer to this his problem, and am of opinión
that the blind man, at first sight, would not be able to say with
certainty which was the globe and which the cube, whilst he only
saw them; though he would unerringly ñame them by his touch,
and certainly distinguish them by the difference in their figures
felt.

“This I have set down, and leave with my reader, as an
occasion for him to consider how much he may be beholden to
experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks
he had not the least use of, or help from them: and the rather
because this observing gentleman further adds that, having, upon
the occasion of my book, proposed this problem to divers very
ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one that at first gave the
answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reasons they
were convinced.

“But this is not I think usual in any of our ideas but those
received by sight: because sight, the most comprehensive of the
senses, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours,
which are peculiar only to that sense; and also the far different
ideas of space, figure, and motion, the several varieties of which
change the appearance of its proper object, i.e. light and colours;
we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This,

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in many cases, by a settled habit, in things whereof we have
frequent experience, is performed so constantly and so quick,
that we take that for the perception of our sensation, which is an
idea formed by our judgment; so that one, i.e. that of sensation,
serves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself;
as a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding
takes little notice of the character or sounds, but of the ideas that
are excited in him by them.

“Ñor need we wonder that this is done with so little notice,
if we consider how very quick the actions of the mind are
performed; for, as itself is thought to take up no space, to have
no extensión, so its actions seem to require no time, but many
of them seem to be crowded into an instant. I speak this in
comparison of the actions of the body.... Secondly, we shall not
be much surprised that this is done with us in so little notice, if
we consider how the facility we get of doing things, by a custom
of doing, makes them often pass in us without notice. Habits,
especially such as are begun very early, come at last to produce
actions in us which often escape our observation.... And therefore
it is not so strange that our mind should often change the idea of
its sensation into that of its judgment, and make the one serve
only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.” {Essay
concerning Human Understanding, Book II. ch. 9. § 8.)

This remarkable passage anticipates by implication the view
of an interpretation of materials originally given in the visual
sense, which, under the ñame of “suggestion,” is the ruling factor
in the New Theory of Vision.

The following sentences relative to the invisibility of distances,
contained in the Treatise of Dioptrics (published in 1690) of
Locke's friend and corresponden! William Molyneux, whose son
was Berkeley's pupil, illustrate Locke's statements, and may be
compared with the opening sections of the Essay on Vision :—

“In plain visión the estimate we make of the distance of objects
(especially when so far removed that the interval between our two

[ 108 ]

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[109]

eyes bears no sensible proportion thereto, or when looked upon
with one eye only) is rather the act of our judgment than of sense;
and acquired by exercise, and a faculty of comparing, rather than
natural. For, distance of itself is not to be perceived; for, 'tis a Une
(or a length) presented to our eye with its end toward us, which
must therefore be only a point, and that is invisible. Wherefore
distance is chiefly perceived by means of interj acent bodies, as
by the earth, mountains, hills, fields, trees, houses, &c. Or by
the estimate we make of the comparative magnitude of bodies,
or of their faint colours, &c. These I say are the chief means
of apprehending the distance of objects that are considerably
remóte. But as to nigh objects—to whose distance the interval of
the eyes bears a sensible proportion—their distance is perceived
by the turn of the eyes, or by the angle of the optic axes {Gregorii
Opt. Promot. prop. 28). This was the opinión of the ancients,
Alhazen, Vitellio, &c. And though the ingenious Jesuit Tacquet
(Opt. Lib. I. prop. 2) disapprove thereof, and objects against it a
new notion of Gassendus (of a man's seeing only with one eye
at a time one and the same object), yet this notion of Gassendus
being absolutely false (as I could demónstrate were it not beside
my present purpose), it makes nothing against this opinión.

“Wherefore, distance being only a line and not of itself
perceivable, if an object were conveyed to the eye by one single
ray only, there were no other means of judging of its distance
but by some of those hinted before. Therefore when we estimate
the distance of nigh objects, either we take the help of both
eyes; or else we consider the pupil of one eye as having breadth,
and receiving a parcel of rays from each radiating point. And,
according to the various inclinations of the rays from one point on
the various parts of the pupil, we make our estimate of the distance
of the object. And therefore (as is said before), by one single
eye we can only judge of the distance of such objects to whose
distance the breadth of the pupil has a sensible proportion.... For,
it is observed before (prop. 29, sec. 2, see also Gregorii Opt.

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Promot. prop. 29) that for viewing objects remóte and nigh, there
are requisite various eonformations of the eye—the rays from
nigh objeets that fall on the eye diverging more than those from
more remóte objeets.” {Treatise of Dioptrics, Part I. prop. 31.)

All this helps to shew the State of seienee regarding visión
about the time Berkeley's Essay appeared, espeeially among
those with whose works he was familiar^^*. I shall next refer to
illustrations of the ehange whieh the Essay produeed.

The New Theory has oeeasioned some interesting eritieism
sinee its appearanee in 1709. At first it drew little attention. For
twenty years after its publieation the allusions to it were few.
The aeeount of Cheselden's experiment upon one born blind,
published in 1728, in the Philosophical Transactions, whieh
seemed to bring the Theory to the test of seientifie experiment,
reealled attention to Berkeley's reasonings. The State of religious
thought about the same time eonfirmed the tendeney to diseuss
a doetrine whieh represented human visión as interpretation of a
natural yet divine language, thus suggesting Omnipresent Mind.

Occasional diseussions of the New Theory may be found in the
Gentleman's Magazine, from 1732 till Berkeley's death in 1753.
Some eritieisms may also be found in Smith's Optics, published
in 1738.

Essentialparts of Berkeley's analysis are explainedby Voltaire,
in his Elémens de la Philosophie de Newton. The following from
that Work is here given on its own aeeount, and also as a prominent
reeognition of the new doetrine in Franee, within thirty years
from its first promulgation:—

“11 faut absolument conclure de tout ceci, que les distances,
les grandeurs, les situations, ne sont pas, á proprement parler,

A Work resembling Berkeley's in its title, but in little else, appeared more
than twenty years before the Essay —the Nova Visionis Theoria of Dr. Briggs,
published in 1685.

[ 110 ]

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[ 111 ]

des choses visibles, c'est-á-dire, ne sont pas les objets propres
et immédiats de la vue. L'objet propre et immédiat de la vue
n'est autre chose que la lumiére colorée; tout le reste, nous ne
le sentons qu'á la longue et par expérience. Nous apprenons á
voir précisément comme nous apprenons á parler et á lire. La
différence est, que l'art de voir est plus facile, et que la nature
est également á tous notre maitre.

“Les jugements soudains, presque uniformes, que toutes
nos ames, á un certain age, portent des distances, des
grandeurs, des situations, nous font penser qu'il n'y a qu'á
ouvrir les yeux pour voir la maniere dont nous voyons. On se
trompe; il y faut le secours des autres sens. Si les hommes
n'avaient que le sens de la vue, ils n'auraient aucun moyen
pour connaitre l'étendue en longueur, largeur et profondeur;
et un pur esprit ne la connaitrait pas peutétre, á moins que
Dieu ne la lui révélát. 11 est tres difficile de séparer dans
notre entendement ¡'extensión d'un objet d'avec les couleurs
de cet objet. Nous ne voyons jamais rien que d'étendu, et de
la nous sommes tous portés á croire que nous voyons en effet
l'étendue.” (Élémens de la Philos. de Newton, Seconde Partie,
ch. 7.)

Condillac, in his Essais sur VOrigine des Connaissances
Humaines (Part I. sect. 6), published in 1746, combats Berkeley's
New Theory, and maintains that an extensión exterior to the eye
is immediately diseernible by sight; the eye being naturally
eapable of judging at onee of figures, magnitudes, situations,
and distanees. His reasonings in support of this “prejudiee,”
as he afterwards allowed it to be, may be found in the seetion
entitled “De quelques jugemens qu'on a attribués á l'áme sans
fondement, ou solution d'un probléme de métaphysique.” Here
Loeke, Molyneux, Berkeley, and Voltaire are eritieised, and
Cheselden's experiment is referred to. Condillae's subsequent
reeantation is eontained in his Traité des Sensations, published
in 1754, and in his L'Art de Penser. In the Traité des Sensations

197

(Troisiéme Partie, ch. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, &c.) the whole question
is discussed at length, and Condillac vindicates what he allows
must appear a marvellous paradox to the uninitiated—that we
only gradually learn to see, hear, smell, taste, and toueh. He
argües in partieular that the eye eannot originally pereeive an
extensión that is beyond itself, and that pereeption of trinal spaee
is due to what we experienee in toueh.

Voltaire and Condillae gave eurreney to the New Theory in
Franee, and it soon beeame a eommonplaee with D'Alembert,
Diderot, Buffon, and other Freneh philosophers. In Germany
we have allusions to it in the Berlin Memoirs and elsewhere;
but, although known by ñame, if not in its distinetive prineiple
and latent idealism, it has not obtained the eonsideration whieh [ii 2 ]
its author's developed theory of the material as well as the
visible World has reeeived. The Kantian a priori eritieism
of our eognition of Spaee, and of our mathematieal notions,
subsequently indisposed the Germán mind to the a posteriori
reasoning of Berkeley's Essay.

Its influenee is apparent in British philosophy. The following
passages in Hartley's Observations on Man, published in 1749,
illustrate the extent to whieh some of the distinetive parts of the
new doetrine were at that time reeeived by an eminent English
psyehologist:—

“Distanee is judged of by the quantity of motion, and figure
by the relative quantity of distanee.... And, as the sense of
sight is mueh more extensive and expedite than feeling, we
judge of tangible qualities ehiefly by sight, whieh therefore
may be eonsidered, agreeably to Bishop Berkeley's remark, as
a philosophieal language for the ideas of feeling; being, for the
most part, an adequate representative of them, and a language
eommon to all mankind, and in whieh they all agree very nearly,
after a modérate degree of experienee.

“However, if the informations from toueh and sight disagree
at any time, we are always to depend upon toueh, as that whieh.

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[ 113 ]

according to the usual ways of speaking upon these subjects,
is the true representation of the essential properties, i.e. as
the earnest and presage of what other tangible impressions the
body under consideration will make upon our feeling in other
circumstances; also what changes it will produce in other bodies;
of which again we are to determine by our feeling, if the visual
language should not happen to correspond to it exactly. And it
is from this difference that we cali the touch the reality, light
the representative—also that a person born blind may foretell
with certainty, from his present tangible impressions, what others
would follow upon varying the circumstances; whereas, if we
could suppose a person to be born without feeling, and to
arrive at man's estáte, he could not, from his present visible
impressions, judge what others would follow upon varying the
circumstances. Thus the picture of a knife, drawn so well as
to deceive his eye, would not, when applied to another body,
produce the same change of visible impressions as a real knife
does, when it separates the parts of the body through which it
passes. But the touch is not hable to these deceptions. As it is
therefore the fundamental source of Information in respect of the
essential properties of matter, it may be considered as our first
and principal key to the knowledge of the external world.” (Prop.
30.)

In other parts of Hartley's book (e.g. Prop. 58) the relation
of our visual judgments of magnitude, figure, motion, distance,
and position to the laws of association is explained, and the
associating circumstances by which these judgments are formed
are enumerated in detail.

Dr. Porterfield of Edinburgh, in his Treatise on the Eye,
or the Manner and Phenomena of Vision (Edinburgh, 1759),
is an exception to the consent which the doctrine had then
widely secured. He maintains, in opposition to Berkeley, that
“the judgments we form of the situation and distance of visible
objects, depend not on custom and experience, but on original

199

instinct, to which mind is subject in our embodied state^’^.”

Berkeley's Theory of Vision, in so far as it resolves our visual
perceptions of distance into interpretation of arbitrary signs,
received the qualified approbation of Reid, in bis Inquiry into
the Human Mind on the Principies of Common Sense (1764).

He eritieises it in the Inquiry, where the doetrine of visual
signs, of whieh Berkeley's whole philosophy is a development,
is aeeepted, and to some extent applied. With Reid it is divoreed,
however, from the Berkeleian eoneeption of the material world,
although the Theory of Vision was the seminal prineiple of [ii4]
Berkeley's Theory of Matter^^*’.

This Theory of Matter was imperfeetly eoneeived and
then rejeeted by Reid and his followers, while the New
Theory of Vision obtained the general eonsent of the Seottish
metaphysieians. Adam Smith refers to it in his Essays (published
in 1795) as “one of the finest examples of philosophieal analysis
that is to be found either in our own or in any other language.”
Dugald Stewart eharaeterises it in his Elements as “one of the most
beautiful, and at the same time one of the most important theories
of modern philosophy.” “The solid additions,” he afterwards
remarks in his Dissertation, “made by Berkeley to the stoek of
human knowledge, were important and brilliant. Among these
the first plaee is unquestionably due to his New Theory of Vision,
a Work abounding with ideas so different from those eommonly
reeeived, and at the same time so profound and refined, that it
was regarded by all but a few aeeustomed to deep metaphysieal
refleetion, rather in the light of a philosophieal romanee than
of a sober inquiry after truth. Sueh, however, has sinee been
the progress and diffusion of this sort of knowledge, that the
leading and most abstraeted doetrines eontained in it form now
an essential part of every elementary treatise on opties, and

See Treatise on the Eye, vol. II. pp. 299, &c.

See Reid's Inquiry, ch. v. §§ 3, 5, 6, 7; ch. vi. § 24, and Essays on the
Intellectual Powers, II. ch. 10 and 19.

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[115]

are adopted by the most superficial smatterers in Science as
fundamental articles of their faith.” The New Theory is accepted
by Thomas Brown, who proposes {Lectures, 29) to extend the
scope of its reasonings. With regard to perceptions of sight,
Young, in his Lectures on Intellectual Philosophy (p. 102), says
that “it has been universally admitted, at least since the days
of Berkeley, that many of those which appear to us at present
to be instantaneous and primitive, can yet be shewn to be
acquired; that most of the adult perceptions of sight are founded
on the previous information of touch; that colour can give us no
conception originally of those qualities of bodies which produce
it in us; and that primary visión gives us no notion of distance,
and, as I believe, no notion of magnitude.” Sir James Mackintosh,
in his Dissertation, characterises the New Theory of Vision as “a
great discovery in Mental Philosophy.” “Nothing in the compass
of inductivo reasoning,” remarks Sir William Hamilton (Reid's
Works, p. 182, note), “appears more satisfactory than Berkeley's
demonstration of the necessity and manner of our learning, by a
slow process of observation and comparison alone, the connexion
between the perceptions of visión and touch, and, in general, all
that relates to the distance and magnitude of external things^^'.”

The New Theory of Vision has in short been generally
accepted, so far as it was understood, alike by the followers
of Hartley and by the associates and successors of Reid. Among
British psychologists, it has recommended itself to rationalists
and sensationalists, to the advocates of innate principies, and to
those who would explain by accidental association what their

While Sir W. Hamilton {Lectures on Metaphysics, Ixxviii) acknowledges
the scientific validity of Berkeley's conclusions, as to the way we judge of
distances, he complains, in the same lecture, that “the whole question is
thrown into doubt hy the analogy of the lower animáis,” i.e. by their probable
visual instinct of distances; and elsewhere (Reid's Works, p. 137, note) he
seems to hesitate about Locke's Solution of Molyneux's Problem, at least in its
application to Cheselden's case. Cf. Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, Liv. II. ch. 9,
in connexion with this last.

201

opponents attribute to reason originally latent in man. But
this wide conscious assent is I think chiefly confined to the
proposition that distance is invisible, and hardly reaches the
deeper implieates of the theory, on its extensión to all the senses,
leading to a pereeption of the final unity of the natural and the [ii6]
supernatural, and the ultímate spirituality of the universe^^^.

[117]

An almost solitary exception in Britain to this unusual uniformity on a subtle
question in psychology is found in Samuel Bailey's Review ofBerkeley's Theory
of Vision, designed to show the unsoundness of that celebrated Speculation,
which appeared in 1842. It was the subject of two interesting rejoinders—a well-
weighed criticism, in the Westminster Review, by J.S. Mili, since republished in
his Discussions; and an ingenious Essay by Professor Ferrier, in Blackwood’s
Magazine, republished in his Philosophical Remains. The controversy ended
on that occasion with Bailey's Letter to a Philosopher in reply to some recent
attenipts to vindicóte Berkeley's Theory of Vision, and infurther elucidation of
its unsoundness, and a reply to it by each of his critics. It was revived in 1864
by Mr. Abbott of Trinity College, Dublin, whose essay on Sight and Touch is
“an attempt to disprove the received (or Berkeleian) Theory of Vision.”

Dedication

[ 118 ]

TO THE RT. HON. SIR JOHN PERCIVALE, BART.283,

ONE OE HER MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABEE PRIVY
COUNCIE

IN THE KINGDOM OE IREEAND.

Sir,

I could not, without doing violence to myself, forbear upon
this occasion to give some public testimony of the great and
well-grounded esteem I have conceived for yon, ever since I had
the honour and happiness of your acquaintance. The outward
advantages of fortune, and the early honours with which you
are adorned, together with the reputation you are known to have
amongst the best and most considerable men, may well imprint
veneration and esteem on the minds of those who behold you
from a distance. But these are not the chief motives that inspire
me with the respect I bear you. A nearer approach has given
me the view of something in your person infinitely beyond the
external ornaments of honour and estáte. I mean, an intrinsic
stock of virtue and good sense, a true concern for religión, and
disinterested love of your country. Add to these an uncommon
proficiency in the best and most useful parts of knowledge;
together with (what in my mind is a perfection of the first rank)
a surpassing goodness of nature. All which I have collected, not
from the uncertain reports of fame, but from my own experience.
Within these few months that I have the honour to be known unto
you, the many delightful hours I have passed in your agreeable

Afterwards (in 1733) Earl of Egmont. Born about 1683, he succeeded to
the baronetcy in 1691, and, after sitting for a few years in the Irish House of
Commons, was in 1715 created Barón Percival, in the Irish peerage. In 1732
he obtained a charter to colonise the province of Georgia in North America.
His ñame appears in the list of subscribers to Berkeley's Bermuda Scheme in
1726. He died in 1748. He corresponded frequently with Berkeley from 1709
onwards.

Dedication

203

and improving conversation have afforded me the opportunity of
discovering in yon many excellent qualities, which at once fill
me with admiration and esteem. That one at those years, and
in those circumstances of wealth and greatness, should continué
proof against the charms of luxury and those criminal pleasures
so fashionable and predominant in the age we live in; that he
should preserve a sweet and modest behaviour, free from that
insolent and assuming air so familiar to those who are placed
above the ordinary rank of men; that he should manage a great
fortune with that prudence and inspection, and at the same time
expend it with that generosity and nobleness of mind, as to
shew himself equally remóte from a sordid parsimony and a
lavish inconsiderate profusión of the good things he is intrusted
with—this, surely, were admirable and praiseworthy. But, that
he should, moreover, by an impartial exercise of bis reason, and
constan! perusal of the sacred Scriptures, endeavour to attain a
right notion of the principies of natural and revealed religión;
that he should with the concern of a true patrio! have the interest
of the public at heart, and omit no means of informing himself
what may be prejudicial or advantageous to bis country, in order
to preven! the one and promote the other; in fine, that, by a
constan! application to the most severe and useful studies, by a
strict observation of the rules of honour and virtue, by frequent
and serious reflections on the mistaken mensures of the world,
and the true end and happiness of mankind, he should in all
respects qualify himself bravely to run the race that is set before
him, to deserve the character of great and good in this life, and be
ever happy hereafter—this were amazing and almos! incredible.

Yet all this, and more than this, SiR, might I justly say of you,
did either your modesty permit, or your character stand in need
of it. I know it might deservedly be thought a vanity in me to
imagine that anything coming from so obscure a hand as mine
could add a lustre to your reputation. But, I am withal sensible
how far I advance the interest of my own, by laying hold on [ii9]

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this opportunity to make it known that I am admitted into some
degree of intimacy with a person of your exquisite judgment.
And, with that view, I have ventured to make yon an address
of this nature, which the goodness I have ever experienced in
yon inclines me to hope will meet with a favourable reception at
your hands. Though I must own I have your pardon to ask, for
touching on what may possibly be offensive to a virtue you are
possessed of in a very distinguishing degree. Excuse me, SiR, if it
was out of my power to mention the ñame of SiR John Percivale
without paying some tribute to that extraordinary and surprising
merit whereof I have so olear and affecting an idea, and which, I
am sure, cannot be exposed in too full a light for the imitation of
others,

Of late I have been agreeably employed in considering the
most noble, pleasant, and comprehensive of all the senses^^^.
The fruit of that (labour shall I cali it or) diversión is what I now
present you with, in hopes it may give some entertainment to one
who, in the midst of business and vulgar enjoyments, preserves
a relish for the more refined pleasures of thought and reflexión.
My thoughts concerning Vision have led me into some notions
so far out of the common road^^^ that it had been improper to
address them to one of a narrow and contracted genius. But, you,
SiR, being master of a large and free understanding, raised above
the power of those prejudices that enslave the far greater part

Similar terms are applied to the sense of seeing by writers with whom
Berkeley was familiar. Thus Locke (Essay, II. ix. 9) refers to sight as “the
most comprehensive of all our senses.” Descartes opens his Dioptrique by
designating it as “le plus universal et le plus noble de nos sens;” and he
alludes to it elsewhere (Princip. TV. 195) as “le plus subtil de tous les sens.”
Malebranche begins his analysis of sight (Recherche, I. 6) by describing it as
“le premier, le plus noble, et le plus étendu de tous les sens.” The high place
assigned to this sense by Aristotle has been already alluded to. Its office, as the
chief organ through which a conception of the material universe as placed in
ambient space is given to us, is recognised by a multitude of psychologists and
metaphysicians.

On Berkeley's originality in his Theory of Vision see the Editor's Preface.

Dedication

205

of mankind, may deservedly be thought a proper patrón for an
attempt of this kind. Add to this, that yon are no less disposed to
forgive than qualified to diseern whatever faults may oeeur in it.

Ñor do I think yon defeetive in any one point neeessary to form [ 120 ]
an exaet judgment on the most abstraet and diffieult things, so
mueh as in a just eonfidenee of your own abilities. And, in this
one instanee, give me leave to say, yon shew a manifest weakness
of judgment. With relation to the following Essay, I shall only
add that I beg your pardon for laying a trifle of that nature in your
way, at a time when you are engaged in the important affairs of
the nation, and desire you to think that I am, with all sineerity
and respeet,

SiR,

Your most faithful and most humble servant,

GEORGE BERKEEEY.

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An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision

[ 128 ]

1. My design is to shew the manner wherein we perceive by
Sight the Distance, Magnitude, and Situation of objects: also to
consider the differenee there is betwixt the ideas of Sight and
Toueh, and whether there be any idea eommon to both senses^^^.

2. It is, I think, agreed by all that Distance, of itself and
immediately, cannot be seen^*^. For, distance^^* being a Une
directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point in the fund
of the eye, which point remains invariably the same, whether the
distance be longer or shorter^^^.

3. I find it also acknowledged that the estimate we make of
the distance of objects considerably remóte is rather an act of
judgment grounded on experience than of sense. For example,
when I perceive a great number of intermediate objects, such

In the first edition alone this sentence followed:—“In treating of all which,
it seems to me, the writers of Optics have proceeded on wrong principies.”

Sect. 2-51 explain the way in which we leam in seeing to judge of Distance
or Outness, and of objects as existing remóte from our organism, viz. by their
association with what we see, and with certain muscular and other sensations in
the eye which accompany visión. Sect. 2 assumes, as granted, the invisibility
of distance in the line of sight. Cf. sect. 11 and 88 —First Dialogue between
Hylas and Philonous — Alciphron, TV. 8 —Theory of Vision Vindicated and
Explained, sect. 62-69.

i.e. outness, or distance outward from the point of visión—distance in the
line of sight—the third dimensión of space. Visible distance is visible space or
interval between two points (see sect. 112). We can be sensibly percipient of it
only when both points are seen.

This section is adduced by some of Berkeley's critics as if it were the
evidence discovered by him for his Theory, instead of being, as it is, a passing
reference to the scientific ground of the already acknowledged invisibility of
outness, or distance in the line of sight. See, for example, Bailey's Review of
Berkeley's Theory of Vision, pp. 38-43, also his Theory of Reasoning, p. 179
and pp. 200-7—Mill's Discussions, vol. II. p. 95—Abbott's Sight and Toueh,
p. 10, where this sentence is presented as “the solé positive argument advanced
by Berkeley.” The invisibility of outness is not Berkeley's discovery, but the

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as houses, fields, rivers, and the like, which I have experienced
to take up a considerable space, I thence form a judgment or
conclusión, that the object I see beyond them is at a great
distance. Again, when an object appears faint and small which
at a near distance I have experienced to make a vigorous and
large appearance, I instantly conclude it to be far off^^°. And
this, it is evident, is the result of experience; without which, from
the faintness and littleness, I should not have inferred anything
concerning the distance of objects.

4. But, when an object is placed at so near a distance as that
the interval between the eyes bears any sensible proportion to
it^^\ the opinión of speculative men is, that the two optic axes
(the fancy that we see only with one eye at once being exploded),
concurring at the object, do there make an angle, by means of
which, according as it is greater or lesser, the object is perceived
to be nearer or farther off^^^.

5. Betwixt which and the foregoing manner of estimating
distance there is this remarkable difference:—that, whereas there
was no apparent necessary connexion between small distance
and a large and strong appearance, or between great distance
and a little and faint appearance, there appears a very necessary
connexion between an obtuse angle and near distance, and an
acute angle and farther distance. It does not in the least depend
upon experience, but may be evidently known by any one before
he had experienced it, that the nearer the concurrence of the optic

way we learn to interpret its visual signs, and what these are.

i.e. aerial and linear perspective are acknowledged signs of remóte distances.
But the question, in this and the thirty-six following sections, concems the
visibility of near distances only—a few yards in front of us. It was “agreed by
all” that beyond this limit distances are suggested by our experience of their
signs.

Cf. this and the four following sections with the quotations in the Editor's
Preface, from Molyneux's Treatise of Dioptrics.

In the author's last edition we have this annotation: “See what Des Cartes
and others have written upon the subject.”

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axes the greater the angle, and the remeter their concurrence is,
the lesser will be the angle comprehended by them.

6. There is another way, mentioned by optic writers, whereby
they will have us judge of those distances in respect of which
the breadth of the pupil hath any sensible bigness. And that is
the greater or lesser divergeney of the rays which, issuing from
the visible point, do fall on the pupil—that point being judged
nearest which is seen by most diverging rays, and that remeter
which is seen by less diverging rays, and so on; the apparent
distance still increasing, as the divergeney of the rays decreases,
till at length it becomes infinite, when the rays that fall on the
pupil are to sense parallel. And after this manner it is said we
perceive distance when we look only with ene eye.

7. In this case also it is plain we are not beholden to experience:
it being a certain necessary truth that, the nearer the direct rays
falling on the eye approach to a parallelism, the farther off is the
point of their intersection, or the visible point from whence they
flow.

8. ^^^Now, though the accounts here given of perceiving near
distance by sight are received for true, and accordingly made
use of in determining the apparent places of objeets, they do
nevertheless seem to me very unsatisfactory, and that for these
foliowing reasons:—

9. It is evident that, when the mind perceives any
idea not immediately and of itself, it must be by the means of
some other idea. Thus, for instance, the passions which are in
the mind of another are of themselves to me invisible. I may

In the first edition this section opens thus: “I have here set down the common
current accounts that are given of our perceiving near distances by sight,
which, though they are unquestionably received for true by mathematicians,
and accordingly made use of by them in determining the apparent places of
objeets, do nevertheless,” &c.

Omitted in the author's last edition.

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209

nevertheless perceive them by sight; though not immediately, [ 130 ]
yet by means of the colours they produce in the countenance. We
often see shame or fear in the looks of a man, by perceiving the
changes of bis countenance to red or palé.

10. Moreover, it is evident that no idea which is not itself
perceived can be to me the means of perceiving any other
idea. If I do not perceive the redness or paleness of a man's
face themselves, it is impossible I should perceive by them the
passions which are in his mind.

11. Now, from sect. ii., it is plain that distance is in its
own nature imperceptible, and yet it is perceived by sight^^^.

It remains, therefore, that it be brought into view by means of
some other idea, that is itself immediately perceived in the act of
visión.

12. But those lines and angles, by means whereof some men^^^
pretend to explain the perception^^^ of distance, are themselves
not at all perceived; ñor are they in truth ever thought of by those
unskilful in optics. I appeal to any one's experience, whether,
upon sight of an object, he computes its distance by the bigness
of the angle made by the meeting of the two optic axes? or
whether he ever thinks of the greater or lesser divergency of the
rays which arrive from any point to his pupil? nay, whether
it be not perfectly impossible for him to perceive by sense the
various angles wherewith the rays, according to their greater or
lesser divergence, do fall on the eye? Every one is himself the
best judge of what he perceives, and what not. In vain shall any

i.e. although immediately invisible, it is mediately seen. Mark, here and
elsewhere, the ambiguity of the term perception, which now signifies the act
of being conscious of sensuous phenomena, and again the act of inferring
phenomena of which we are at the time insentient; while it is also applied to the
object perceived instead of to the percipient act; and sometimes to imagination,
and the higher acts of intelligence.

“Some men”—“mathematicians,” in first edition.

i.e. the medíate perception.

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tell me, that I perceive certain Unes and angles, which
introduce into my mind the various ideas of distance, so long as
I myself am conscious of no such thing.

13. Since therefore those angles and Unes are not themselves
perceived by sight, it follows, from sect. x., that the mind does
not by them judge of the distance of objects.

14. [Secondly^'^^,] The truth of this assertion will be yet farther
evident to any one that considers those Unes and angles have no
real existence in nature, being only an hypothesis framed by the
mathematicians, and by them introduced into optics, that they
might treat of that Science in a geometrical way.

15. The [third and^*’*’] last reason 1 shall give for rejecting
that doctrine is, that though we should grant the real existence of
those optic angles, &c., and that it was possible for the mind to
perceive them, yet these principies would not be found sufficient
to explain the phenomena of distance, as shall be shewn hereafter.

16. Now it being already shewn^°^ that distance is suggested^^^
to the mind, by the mediation of some other idea which is itself
perceived in the act of seeing, it remains that we inquire, what
ideas or sensations there be that attend visión, unto which we

“any man”—“all the mathematicians in the world,” in first edition.

Omitted in the author's last edition.

Sect. 3, 9.

Observe the first introduction by Berkeley of the term suggestion, used
by him to express a leading factor in his account of the visible world, and
again in his more comprehensive account of our knowledge of the material
universe in the Principies. It had been employed occasionally, among others,
by Hobbes and Locke. There are three ways in which the objects we have
an immediate perception of in sight may be supposed to conduct us to what
we do not immediately perceive: (1) Instinct, or what Reid calis “original
suggestion” {Inquiry, ch. VI. sect. 20-24); (2) Custom; (3) Reasoning from
accepted premisses. Berkeley's “suggestion” corresponds to the second. (Cf.
Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 42.)

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211

may suppose the ideas of distanee are eonneeted, and by whieh
they are introdueed into the mind.

And, first, it is eertain by experienee, that when we look at a
near objeet with both eyes, aeeording as it approaehes or reeedes
from US, we alter the disposition of our eyes, by lessening or
widening the interval between the pupils. This disposition or turn
of the eyes is attended with a sensation^*^^, whieh seems to me
to be that whieh in this ease brings the idea of greater or lesser
distanee into the mind.

17. Not that there is any natural or neeessary^*^^ eonnexion
between the sensation we pereeive by the turn of the eyes and
greater or lesser distanee. But—^beeause the mind has, by eonstant
experienee, found the different sensations eorresponding to the
different dispositions of the eyes to be attended eaeh with a
different degree of distanee in the objeet—there has grown an
habitual or eustomary eonnexion between those two sorts of
ideas: so that the mind no sooner pereeives the sensation arising
from the different turn it gives the eyes, in order to bring the
pupils nearer or farther asunder, but it withal pereeives the
different idea of distanee whieh was wont to be eonneeted with
that sensation. Just as, upon hearing a eertain sound, the idea is
immediately suggested to the understanding whieh eustom had
United with it^*^^.

18. Ñor do 1 see how 1 ean easily be mistaken in this matter. 1
know evidently that distanee is not pereeived of itself^°^; that, by
eonsequenee, it must be pereeived by means of some other idea,
whieh is immediately pereeived, and varies with the different

In the Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 66, it is added that this “sensation”
belongs properly to the sense of touch. Cf. also sect. 145 of this Essay.

Here “natural”=“necessary”: elsewhere=divinely arhitrary eonnexion.

That our medióte visión of outness and of objeets as thus external, is due to
media whieh have a contingent or arhitrary, instead of a necessary, eonnexion
with the distances whieh they enable us to see, or of whieh they are the signs,
is a cardinal part of his argument.

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degrees of distance. I know also that the sensation arising from
the turn of the eyes is of itself immediately perceived; and
various degrees thereof are connected with different distances,
which never fail to accompany them into my mind, when I view
an object distinctly with both eyes whose distance is so small that
in respect of it the interval between the eyes has any considerable
magnitude.

19. 1 know it is a received opinión that, by altering the
disposition of the eyes, the mind perceives whether the angle of
the optic axes, or the lateral angles comprehended between the
interval of the eyes or the optic axes, are made greater or lesser;
and that, accordingly, by a kind of natural geometry, it judges the
point of their intersection to be nearer or farther off. But that this
is not true 1 am convinced by my own experience; since 1 am
not conscious that 1 make any such use of the perception 1 have
by the turn of my eyes. And for me to make those judgments,
and draw those conclusions from it, without knowing that 1 do
so, seems altogether incomprehensible^*’^.

20. From all which it follows, that the judgment we make
of the distance of an object viewed with both eyes is entirely
the result of experience. If we had not constantly found certain
sensations, arising from the various disposition of the eyes,
attended with certain degrees of distance, we should never make
those sudden judgments from them concerning the distance of
objects; no more than we would pretend to judge of a man's
thoughts by his pronouncing words we had never heard before.

21. Secondly, an object placed at a certain distance from
the eye, to which the breadth of the pupil bears a considerable
proportion, being made to approach, is seen more confusedly^*’^.
And the nearer it is brought the more confused appearance it

Here, as generally in the Essay, the appeal is to our inward experience, not
to phenomena observed by our senses in the organism.

See sect. 35 for the difference between confused and faint visión. Cf. sect.
32-38 with this section. Also Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 68.

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213

makes. And this being found constanüy to be so, there arises in
the mind an habitual eonnexion between the several degrees of
eonfusion and distanee; the greater eonfusion still implying the
lesser distanee, and the lesser eonfusion the greater distanee of
the objeet.

22. This eonfused appearanee of the objeet doth therefore
seem to be the médium whereby the mind judges of distanee, in
those eases wherein the most approved writers of opties will have
it judge by the different divergeney with whieh the rays flowing
from the radiating point fall on the pupil^*^^. No man, 1 believe,
will pretend to see or feel those imaginary angles that the rays
are supposed to form, aeeording to their various inelinations on
his eye. But he eannot ehoose seeing whether the objeet appear
more or less eonfused. It is therefore a manifest eonsequenee
from what has been demonstrated that, instead of the greater or
lesser divergeney of the rays, the mind makes use of the greater [ 134 ]
or lesser eonfusedness of the appearanee, thereby to determine

the apparent plaee of an objeet.

23. Ñor doth it avail to say there is not any neeessary
eonnexion between eonfused visión and distanee great or small.

For 1 ask any man what neeessary eonnexion he sees between
the redness of a blush and shame? And yet no sooner shall he
behold that eolour to arise in the faee of another but it brings into
his mind the idea of that passion whieh hath been observed to
aeeompany it.

24. What seems to have misled the writers of opties in this
matter is, that they imagine men judge of distanee as they do
of a eonelusion in mathematies; betwixt whieh and the premises
it is indeed absolutely requisite there be an apparent neeessary
eonnexion. But it is far otherwise in the sudden judgments men
make of distanee. We are not to think that brutes and ehildren, or
even grown reasonable men, whenever they pereeive an objeet

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See sect. 6.

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[135]

to approach or depart from them, do it by virtue of geometry and
demonstration.

25. That one idea may suggest another to the mind, it will
suffice that they have been observed to go together, without any
demonstration of the necessity of their coexistence, or without
so much as knowing what it is that makes them so to coexist.
Of this there are innumerable instances, of which no one can be
ignoran!^'*’.

26. Thus, greater confusión having been constantly attended
with nearer distance, no sooner is the former idea perceived but
it suggests the latter to our thoughts. And, if it had been the
ordinary course of nature that the farther off an object were placed
the more confused it should appear, it is certain the very same
perception that now makes us think an object approaches would
then have made us to imagine it went farther off; that perception,
abstracting from custom and experience, being equally fitted
to produce the idea of great distance, or small distance, or no
distance at all.

27. Thirdly, an object being placed at the distance above
specified, and brought nearer to the eye, we may nevertheless
prevent, at least for some time, the appearance's growing more
confused, by straining the eye^'^ In which case that sensation
supplies the place of confused visión, in aiding the mind to judge
of the distance of the object; it being esteemed so much the
nearer by how much the effort or straining of the eye in order to
distinct visión is greater.

28. 1 have here^^^ set down those sensations or ideas^^^ that

These sections presuppose previous contiguity as an associative law of
mental phenomena.

See Reid's Inquiry, ch. vi. sect. 22.

Sect. 16-27.—For the signs of remóte distances, see sect. 3.

These are muscular sensations felt in the organ, and degrees of confusión
in a visible idea. Berkeley's “arbitrary” signs of distance, near and remóte, are

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215

seem to be the eonstant and general oeeasions of introdueing
into the mind the different ideas of near distanee. It is true, in
most eases, that divers other eireumstanees eontribute to frame
our idea of distanee, viz. the partieular number, size, kind,
&e. of the things seen. Coneerning whieh, as well as all other
the forementioned oeeasions whieh suggest distanee, 1 shall only
observe, they have none of them, in their own nature, any relation
or eonnexion with it: ñor is it possible they should ever signify
the various degrees thereof, otherwise than as by experienee they
have been found to be eonneeted with them.

29. 1 shall proeeed upon these prineiples to aeeount for a
phenomenon whieh has hitherto strangely puzzled the writers of
opties, and is so far from being aeeounted for by any of their
theories of visión, that it is, by their own eonfession, plainly
repugnant to them; and of eonsequenee, if nothing else eould be
objeeted, were alone suffieient to bring their eredit in question.
The whole diffieulty 1 shall lay before yon in the words of
the learned Doetor Barrow, with whieh he eoneludes his Optic
Lectures^^^: —

either (a) invisible States of the visual organ, or (b) visible appearances.

In Molyneux's Treatise of Dioptrics, Pt. I. prop. 31, sect. 9, Barrow's
diffieulty is stated. Cf. sect. 40 below.

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217

qjuaiKWTepai sunt, adeoque saepiuscule pro certis principiis
plausibiles conjecturas venditare necessum habent) nihil fere
quicquam admodum verisimile succuirit, a pervulgatis (ab
iis, inquam, quae Keplems, Scheinems^*^, Cartesius, et post
dios alii tradiderunt) alienum aut diversum. Atqui lacere
malo, quam toties oblatam cramben reponere. Proinde
receptui cano; nee ita lamen ul prorsus discedam, anleaquam
improbam quandam difficullalem (pro sincerilale quam el
vobis el verilali debeo minime dissimulandam) in médium
prolulero, quae doclrinae noslrae, haclenus incúlcate, se objicil
adversam, ab ea sallem nullam admillil solulionem. Illa,
breviler, lalis esl. Lenli vel speculo cavo EBF exponalur
punclum visibile A, ila dislans, ul radii ex A manantes ex
infleclione versus axem AB coganlur. Silque radialionis
limes (seu puncli A imago, qualem supra passim slaluimus)
punclum Z. Inter hoc aulem el infleclenlis verticem B uspiam
posilus concipialur oculus. Quaeri jam polesl, ubi loci debeal
punclum A apparere? Relrorsum ad punclum Z videri non
ferl nalura (cum omnis impressio sensum afficiens provenial
a parlibus A) ac experienlia reclamal. Noslris aulem e
placilis consequi videlur, ipsum ad partes anlicas apparens,
ab intervallo longissime dissilo (quod el máximum sensibile
quodvis inlervallum quodammodo exsuperel), apparere. Cum
enim quo radiis minus divergenlibus allingilur objeclum,
eo (seclusis ulique praenolionibus el praejudiciis) longius
abesse senlialur; el quod parallelos ad oculum radios projicil,
remolissime posilum aeslimelur; exigere rallo videlur, ul
quod convergenlibus radiis apprehendilur, adhuc magis, si
fien possel, quoad apparenliam elongelur. Quin el circa
casum hunc generalim inquirí possil, quidnam omnino sil,
quod apparenlem puncli A locum delerminel, facialque quod
conslanli ralione nunc propius, nunc remolius appareal?
Cui ilidem dubio nihil quicquam ex haclenus diclomm

Chrislopher Scheiner, a Germán aslronomer, and opponenl of Ihe
Copernican syslem, bom 1575, died 1650.

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[ 137 ]

analogía responden posse videtur, nisi debere punctum A
perpetuo longissime semotum videri. Verum experientia secus
attestatur, illud pro diversa oculi ínter puncta B, Z, positione
varíe distans, nunquam fere (si unquam) longinquius ipso
A libere spectato, subinde vero multo propinquius adparere;
quinimo, quo oculum appellentes radii magis convergunt,
eo speciem objecti propius accedere. Nempe, si puncto
B admoveatur oculus, suo (ad lentem) fere nativo in loco
conspicitur punctum A (vel aeque distans, ad speculum); ad
O reductus oculus ejusce speciem appropinquantem cernit;
ad P adhuc vicinius ipsum existimat; ac ita sensim, doñee
alicubi tándem, velut ad Q, constituto oculo, objectum
summe propinquum apparens in meram confusionem incipiat
evanescere. Quae sane cuneta rationibus atque decretis
nostris repugnare videntur, aut cum iis saltem parum amice
conspirant. Ñeque nostram tantum sententiam pulsat hoc
experimentum, at ex sequo eseteras quas norim omnes;
veterem imprimís ac vulgatam, nostrse prse reliquis affinem, ita
conveliere videtur, ut ejus vi coactus doctissimus A. Tacquetus
isti principio (cui pene soli totam insedificaverat Catoptricam
suam) ceu infido ac inconstanti renunciarit, adeoque suam ipse
doctrinam labefactarit? id tamen, opinor, minime facturas,
si rem totam inspexissit penitius, atque difficultatis fundum
attigissit. Apud me vero non ita pollet haec, nec eousque
prsepollebit ulla difficultas, ut ab iis quse manifesté rationi
consentanea video, discedam; prsesertim quum, ut bis accidit,
ejusmodi difficultas in singularis cujuspiam casus disparitate
fundetur. Nimirum in prsesente casu peculiare quiddam,
naturas subtilitati involutum, delitescit, aegre fortassis, nisi
perfectius explórate videndi modo, detegendum. Circa quod
nil, fateor, hactenus excogitare potui, quod adblandiretur
animo meo, nedum plañe satisfaceret. Vobis itaque nodum
hunc, utinam feliciore conatu, resolvendum committo.”

In English asfollows:

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219

“I have here delivered what my thoughts have suggested to
me concerning that part of optics which is more properly
mathematical. As for the other parís of that Science (which,
being rather physical, do consequently abound with plausible
conjectures instead of certain principies), there has in them
scarce anything occurred to my observation different from
what has been already said by Kepler, Scheinerus, Des Caries,
ífec. And methinks I had better say nothing at all than repeat
that which has been so often said by others. I think it therefore
high time to take my leave of this subject. But, before I quit
it for good and all, the fair and ingenuous dealing that I owe
both to you and to truth obliges me to acquaint you with a
certain untoward difficulty, which seems directly opposite to
the doctrine I have been hitherto inculcating, at least admits
of no solution from it. In short it is this. Before the double
convex glass or concave speculum EBF, let the point A be
placed at such a distance that the rays proceeding from A, after
refraction or reflection, be brought to unite somewhere in the
axis AB. And suppose the point of unión (i.e. the image of the
point A, as hath been already set forth) to be Z; between which
and B, the vertex of the glass or speculum, conceive the eye
to be anywhere placed. The question now is, where the point
A ought to appear. Experience shews that it doth not appear
behind at the point Z; and it were contrary to nature that it
should; since all the impression which affects the sense comes
from towards A. But, from our tenets it should seem to follow
that it would appear before the eye at a vast distance off, so
great as should in some sort surpass all sensible distance. For
since, if we exelude all anticipations and prejudices, every
object appears by so much the farther off by how much the
rays it sends to the eye are less diverging; and that object is
thought to be most remóte from which parallel rays proceed
unto the eye; reason would make one think that object should
appear at yet a greater distance which is seen by converging
rays. Moreover, it may in general be asked concerning this
case, what it is that determines the apparent place of the point

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[139]

A, and maketh it to appear after a constan! manner, sometimes
nearer, at other times farther off? To which doubt I see
nothing that can be answered agreeable to the principies we
have laid down, except only that the point A ought always to
appear extremely remóte. But, on the contrary, we are assured
by experience, that the point A appears variously distan!,
according to the difieren! situations of the eye between the
points B and Z. And that it doth almos! never (if at all) seem
farther off than it would if it were beheld by the naked eye;
but, on the contrary, it doth sometimes appear much nearer.
Nay, it is even certain that by how much the rays falling on the
eye do more converge, by so much the nearer does the object
seem to approach. Por, the eye being placed cióse to the point

B, the object A appears nearly in its own natural place, if the
point B is taken in the glass, or at the same distance, if in the
speculum. The eye being brought back to O, the object seems
to draw near; and, being come to P, it beholds it still nearer;
and so on by little and little, till at length the eye being placed
somewhere, suppose at Q, the object appearing extremely near
begins to vanish into mere confusión. All which doth seem
repugnan! to our principies; at leas!, not rightly to agree with
them. Ñor is our tenet alone stmck at by this experiment, but
likewise all others that ever carne to my knowledge are every
whit as much endangered by it. The ancient one especially
(which is most commonly received, and comes nearest to
mine) seems to be so effectually overthrown thereby that the
most learned Tacquet has been forced to reject that principie,
as false and uncertain, on which alone he had built almos!
his whole Catoptrics, and consequently, by taking away the
foundation, hath himself pulled down the superstructure he
had raised on it. Which, nevertheless, I do not believe he
would have done, had he but considered the whole matter
more thoroughly, and examined the difficulty to the bottom.
But as for me, neither this ñor any other difficulty shall have so
great an influence on me, as to make me renounce that which
I know to be manifestly agreeable to reason. Especially when.

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as it here falls out, the difficulty is founded in the peculiar
nature of a certain odd and particular case. Por, in the present
case something peculiar lies hid, which, being involved in the
subtilty of nature, will perhaps hardly be discovered till such
time as the manner of visión is more perfectly made known.
Concerning which, I must own I have hitherto been able to
find out nothing that has the least show of probability, not
to mention certainty. I shall therefore leave this knot to be
untied by you, wishing you may have better success in it than
I have had.”

30. The aneient and reeeived prineiple, whieh Dr. Barrow
here mentions as the main foundation of Taequet's^'^ Catoptrics,
is, that every “visible point seen by refleetion from a speeulum
shall appear plaeed at the interseetion of the refleeted ray and the
perpendieular of ineidenee.” Whieh interseetion in the present
ease happening to be behind the eye, it greatly shakes the
authority of that prineiple whereon the aforementioned author
proeeeds throughout bis whole Catoptrics, in determining the
apparent plaee of objeets seen by refleetion from any kind of
speeulum.

31. Let US now see how this phenomenon agrees with our
tenets^^^. The eye, the nearer it is plaeed to the point B in the
above figures, the more distinet is the appearanee of the objeet:
but, as it reeedes to O, the appearanee grows more eonfused;
and at P it sees the objeet yet more eonfused; and so on, till
the eye, being brought baek to Z, sees the objeet in the greatest
eonfusion of all. Wherefore, by seet. 21, the objeet should seem

Andrea Tacquet, a mathematician, bom at Antwerp in 1611, and referred
to by Molyneux as “the ingenious Jesuit.” He published a number of scientific
treatises, most of which appeared after his death, in a collected form, at
Antwerp in 1669.

™ In what follows Berkeley tries to explain by his visual theory seeming
contradictions which puzzled the mathematicians.

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to approach the eye gradually, as it recedes from the point fi;
that is, at O it should (in consequence of the principie I have laid
down in the aforesaid section) seem nearer than it did at B, and
at P nearer than at O, and at Q nearer than at P, and so on, till it
quite vanishes at Z. Which is the very matter of fact, as any one
that picases may easily satisfy himself by experiment.

32. This case is much the same as if we should suppose
an Englishman to meet a foreigner who used the same words
with the English, but in a direct contrary signification. The
Englishman would not fail to make a wrong judgment of the
ideas annexed to those sounds, in the mind of him that used
them. Just so in the present case, the object speaks (if I may
so say) with words that the eye is well acquainted with, that is,
confusions of appearance; but, whereas heretofore the greatest
confusions were always wont to signify nearer distances, they
have in this case a direct contrary signification, being connected
with the greater distances. Whence it follows that the eye must
unavoidably be mistaken, since it will take the confusions in the
sense it has been used to, which is directly opposed to the true.

33. This phenomenon, as it entirely subverts the opinión of
those who will have us judge of distance by lines and angles, on
which supposition it is altogether inexplicable, so it seems to me
no small confirmation of the truth of that principie whereby it
is explained^^^. But, in order to a more full explication of this
point, and to shew how far the hypothesis of the mind's judging
by the various divergency of rays may be of use in determining
the apparent place of an object, it will be necessary to premise
some few things, which are already well known to those who
have any skill in Dioptries.

34. First, Any radiating point is then distinctly seen when
the rays proceeding from it are, by the refractive power of the

This is offered as a verification of the theory that near distances are
suggested, according to the order of nature, by non-resembling visual signs,
contingently connected with real distance.

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crystalline, accurately reunited in the retina or fund of the eye.
But if they are reunited either before they arrive at the retina, or
after they have passed it, then there is eonfused visión.

Figure 1

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Figure 2

Ti C

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Figure 3

35. Secondly, Suppose, in the adjacent figures, NP represent
an eye duly framed, and retaining its natural figure. In fig. 1 the
rays falling nearly parallel on the eye, are, by the crystalline AB,
refracted, so as their focus, or point of unión F, falls exactly on
the retina. But, if the rays fall sensibly diverging on the eye, as
in fig. 2, then their focus falls beyond the retina; or, if the rays
are made to converge by the lens QS, before they come at the
eye, as in fig. 3, their focus F will fall before the retina. In which

[ 142 ] two last cases it is evident, from the foregoing section, that the
appearance of the point Z is confused. And, by how much the
greater is the convergency or divergency of the rays falling on
the pupil, by so much the farther will the point of their reunión
be from the retina, either before or behind it, and consequently
the point Z will appear by so much the more confused. And this,
by the bye, may shew us the difference between confused and
faint visión. Confused visión is, when the rays proceeding from
each distinct point of the object are not accurately re-collected
in one corresponding point on the retina, but take up some space
thereon—so that rays from different points become mixed and
confused together. This is opposed to a distinct visión, and
attends near objects. Faint visión is when, by reason of the
distance of the object, or grossness of the interj acent médium,

[ 143 ] few rays arrive from the object to the eye. This is opposed
to vigorous or olear visión, and attends remóte objects. But to
return.

36. The eye, or (to speak truly) the mind, perceiving only the
confusión itself, without ever considering the cause from which
it proceeds, doth constantly annex the same degree of distance
to the same degree of confusión. Whether that confusión be
occasioned by converging or by diverging rays it matters not.
Whence it follows that the eye, viewing the object Z through
the glass QS (which by refraction causeth the rays ZQ, ZS,
&c. to converge), should judge it to be at such a nearness, at

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which, if it were placed, it would radiate on the eye, with rays
diverging to that degree as would produce the same confusión
which is now produced by converging rays, i.e. would cover a
portion of the retina equal to DC. (Vid. fig. 3, sup.) But then
this must be understood (to use Dr. Barrow's phrase) “seclusis
prsenotionibus et príejudiciis,” in case we abstract from all other
circumstances of visión, such as the figure, size, faintness, &c.
of the visible objects—all which do ordinarily concur to form
our idea of distance, the mind having, by frequent experience,
observed their several sorts or degrees to be connected with
various distances.

37. It plainly follows from what has been said, that a person
perfectly purblind (i.e. that could not see an object distinctly but
when placed cióse to his eye) would not make the same wrong
judgment that others do in the forementioned case. For, to him,
greater confusions constantly suggesting greater distances, he
must, as he recedes from the glass, and the object grows more
confused, judge it to be at a farther distance; contrary to what
they do who have had the perception of the objects growing more
confused connected with the idea of approach.

38. Henee also it doth appear, there may be good use of
computation, by lines and angles, in optics^^^; not that the mind
judges of distance immediately by them, but because it judges by
somewhat which is connected with them, and to the determination
whereof they may be subservient. Thus, the mind judging of

the distance of an object by the confusedness of its appearance, [ 144 ]
and this confusedness being greater or lesser to the naked eye,
according as the object is seen by rays more or less diverging, it
follows that a man may make use of the divergency of the rays, in
computing the apparent distance, though not for its own sake, yet
on account of the confusión with which it is connected. But so it
is, the confusión itself is entirely neglected by mathematicians,

Cf. sect. 78; also New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 31.

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as having no necessary relation with distance, such as the greater
or lesser angles of divergency are conceived to have. And these
(especially for that they fall under mathemaücal computation) are
alone regarded, in determining the apparent places of objects, as
though they were the solé and immediate cause of the judgments
the mind makes of distance. Whereas, in truth, they should not at
all be regarded in themselves, or any otherwise than as they are
supposed to be the cause of confused visión.

39. The not considering of this has been a fundamental and
perplexing oversight. For proof whereof, we need go no farther
than the case before us. It having been observed that the most
diverging rays brought into the mind the idea of nearest distance,
and that still as the divergency decreased the distance increased,
and it being thought the connexion between the various degrees
of divergency and distance was immediate—this naturally leads
one to conclude, from an ill-grounded analogy, that converging
rays shall make an object appear at an immense distance, and
that, as the convergency increases, the distance (if it were
possible) should do so likewise. That this was the cause of
Dr. Barrow's mistake is evident from his own words which we
have quoted. Whereas had the learned Doctor observed that
diverging and converging rays, how opposite soever they may
seem, do nevertheless agree in producing the same effect, to wit,
confusedness of visión, greater degrees whereof are produced
indifferently, either as the divergency or convergency of the rays
increaseth; and that it is by this effect, which is the same in both,
that either the divergency or convergency is perceived by the
eye—I say, had he but considered this, it is certain he would have
made a quite contrary judgment, and rightly concluded that those
rays which fall on the eye with greater degrees of convergency
should make the object from whence they proceed appear by so
much the nearer. But it is plain it was impossible for any man
to attain to a right notion of this matter so long as he had regard
only to lines and angles, and did not apprehend the true nature of

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visión, and how far it was of mathematical consideration.

40. Before we dismiss this subject, it is fit we take notice of a
query relating thereto, proposed by the ingenious Mr. Molyneux,
in bis Treatise of Dioptrics (par. i. prop. 31. sect. 9), where,
speaking of the diffieulty we have been explaining, he has these
words: “And so he (i.e. Dr. Barrow) leaves this diffieulty to the
solution of others, whieh 1 (after so great an example) shall do
likewise; but with the resolution of the same admirable author,
of not quitting the evident doetrine whieh we have before laid
down, for determining the locus objecti, on aeeount of being
pressed by one diffieulty, whieh seems inexplieable till a more
intímate knowledge of the visive faeulty be obtained by mortals.

In the meantime 1 propose it to the eonsideration of the ingenious,
whether the locus apparens of an objeet plaeed as in this ninth
seetion be not as mueh before the eye as the distinet base is
behind the eye?” To whieh query we may venture to answer in
the negative. For, in the present ease, the rule for determining
the distanee of the distinet base, or respeetive foeus from the
glass is this: Aí the difference between the distanee of the objeet
and foeus is to the foeus or focal length, so the distanee of the
objeet from the glass is to the distanee of the respective foeus or
distinet base from the glass. (Molyneux, Dioptr., par. i. prop.

5.) Let US now suppose the objeet to be plaeed at the distanee of
the foeal length, and one-half of the foeal length from the glass,
and the eye elose to the glass. Henee it will follow, by the rule,
that the distanee of the distinet base behind the eye is double
the true distanee of the objeet before the eye. If, therefore, Mr.
Molyneux's eonjeeture held good, it would follow that the eye
should see the objeet twiee as far off as it really is; and in other
eases at three or four times its due distanee, or more. But this
manifestly eontradiets experienee, the objeet never appearing, at
farthest, beyond its due distanee. Whatever, therefore, is built on
this supposition (vid. eorol. i. prop. 57. ibid.) eomes to the [ 146 ]
ground along with it.

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41. From what hath been premised, it is a manifest
consequence, that a man born blind, being made to see, would
at first have no idea of distance by sight: the sun and stars, the
remo test objects as well as the nearer, would all seem to be in
bis eye, or rather in bis mind. The objects intromitted by sight
would seem to him (as in truth they are) no other than a new set
of thoughts or sensations, each whereof is as near to him as the
perceptions of pain or pleasure, or the most inward passions of
his soul. For, our judging objects perceived by sight to be at any
distance, or without the mind, is (vid. sect, xxviii.) entirely the
effect of experience; which one in those circumstances could not
yet have attained to^^°.

42. It is indeed otherwise upon the common supposition—that
men judge of distance by the angle of the optic axes, just as one
in the dark, or a blind man by the angle comprehended by two
sticks, one whereof he held in each hand^^^ For, if this were
true, it would follow that one blind from his birth, being made
to see, should stand in need of no new experience, in order to
perceive distance by sight. But that this is false has, 1 think, been
sufficiently demonstrated.

43. And perhaps, upon a strict inquiry, we shall not find that
even those who from their birth have grown up in a continued
habit of seeing are irrecoverably prejudiced on the other side, to
wit, in thinking what they see to be at a distance from them. For,
at this time it seems agreed on all hands, by those who have had
any thoughts of that matter, that colours, which are the proper

Berkeley here passes from his proof of visual “suggestion” of all outward
distances—i.e. intervals between extremes in the line of sight—by means of
arbitrary signs, and considers the nature of visible extemality. See note in
Hamilton's Reid, p. 177, on the distinction between perception of the external
World and perception of distance through the eye.

See Descartes, Dioptrique, VI—Malebranche, Recherche, Liv. I. ch. 9,
3—Reid's Inquiry, VI. II.

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and immediate object of sight, are not without the mind.—But
then, it will be said, by sight we have also the ideas of extensión,
and figure, and motion; all whieh may well be thought without
and at some distanee from the mind, though eolour should not.
In answer to this, I appeal to any man's experienee, whether the
visible extensión of any objeet do not appear as near to him as
the eolour of that objeet; nay, whether they do not both seem to
be in the very same plaee. Is not the extensión we see eoloured,
and is it possible for us, so mueh as in thought, to sepárate and
abstraet eolour from extensión? Now, where the extensión is,
there surely is the figure, and there the motion too. 1 speak of
those whieh are pereeived by sight^^^.

44. But for a fuller explieation of this point, and to shew that
the immediate objeets of sight are not so mueh as the ideas or
resemblanees of things plaeed at a distanee, it is requisite that
we look nearer into the matter, and earefully observe what is
meant in common diseourse when one says, that whieh he sees
is at a distanee from him. Suppose, for example, that looking
at the moon 1 should say it were fifty or sixty semidiameters of
the earth distant from me. Let us see what moon this is spoken
of. It is plain it eannot be the visible moon, or anything like
the visible moon, or that whieh 1 see—whieh is only a round
luminous plain, of about thirty visible points in diameter. For, in
ease 1 am earried from the plaee where 1 stand direetly towards
the moon, it is manifest the objeet varíes still as 1 go on; and, by
the time that 1 am advaneed fifty or sixty semidiameters of the
earth, 1 shall be so far from being near a small, round, luminous
flat that 1 shall pereeive nothing like it—this objeet having long

Berkeley here begins to found, on the experienced connexion between
extensión and eolour, and between visible and tangible extensión, a proof that
outness is invisible. From Aristotle onwards it has been assumed that eolour
is the only phenomenon of whieh we are immediately pereipient in seeing.
Visible extensión, visible figure, and visible motion are aecordingly taken to
be dependent on the sensation of eolour.

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since disappeared, and, if I would recover it, it must be by going
back to the earth from whence I set out^^^. Again, suppose I
perceive by sight the faint and obscure idea of something, which
I doubt whether it be a man, or a tree, or a tower, but judge it
to be at the distance of about a mile. It is plain I cannot mean
that what I see is a mile off, or that it is the image or likeness of
anything which is a mile off; since that every step I take towards
it the appearance alters, and from being obscure, small, and faint,
grows olear, large, and vigorous. And when I come to the mile's
end, that which I saw first is quite lost, neither do I find anything
in the likeness of it^^^.

45. In these and the like instances, the truth of the matter,
I find, stands thus:—Having of a long time experienced certain
ideas perceivable by touch^^^—as distance, tangible figure, and
solidity—to have been connected with certain ideas of sight,
I do, upon perceiving these ideas of sight, forthwith conclude
what tangible ideas are, by the wonted ordinary course of nature,
like to follow. Looking at an object, I perceive a certain visible

In connexion with this and the next illustration, Berkeley seems to argüe
that we are not only unable to see distance in the line of sight, but also that
we do not see a distant object in its real visible magnitude. But elsewhere he
affirms that only tangible magnitude is entitled to be called real. Cf. sect. 55,
59,61.

The sceptical objections to the trustworthiness of the senses, proposed by
the Eleatics and others, referred to by Descartes in his Meditations, and by
Malebranche in the First Book of his Recherche, may have suggested the
illustrations in this section. Cf. also Hume's Essay On the Academical or
Sceptical Philosophy. The sceptical difficulty is founded on the assumption
that the object seen at different distances is the same visible object. it is really
different, and so the difficulty vanishes.

Here Berkeley expressly introduces “touch”—a term which with him
ineludes, not merely organic sense of contact, but also muscular and locomotive
sense-experience. After this he begins to unfold the antithesis of visual and
tactual phenomena, whose subsequent synthesis it is the aim of the New Theory
to explain. Cf. Principies of Human Knowledge, sect. 43— Theory of Vision
Vindicated, sect. 22 and 25. Note here Berkeley's reticence of his idealization
of Matter—tangible as well as visible. Cf. Principies, sect. 44.

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figure and eolour, with some degree of faintness and other
eireumstanees, whieh, from what I have formerly observed,
determine me to think that if I advanee forward so many paees,
miles, &e., I shall be affeeted with sueh and sueh ideas of toueh.

So that, in truth and strietness of speeeh, I neither see distanee
itself, ñor anything that I take to be at a distanee. I say, neither
distanee ñor things plaeed at a distanee are themselves, or their
ideas, truly pereeived by sight. This I am persuaded of, as to what
eoneerns myself. And I believe whoever will look narrowly into
his own thoughts, and examine what he means by saying he sees
this or that thing at a distanee, will agree with me, that what he
sees only suggests to his understanding that, after having passed [ 149 ]
a eertain distanee, to be measured by the motion of his body,
whieh is pereeivable by toueh^^^, he shall eome to pereeive sueh
and sueh tangible ideas, whieh have been usually eonneeted with
sueh and sueh visible ideas. But, that one might be deeeived
by these suggestions of sense, and that there is no neeessary
eonnexion between visible and tangible ideas suggested by them,
we need go no farther than the next looking-glass or pieture
to be eonvineed. Note that, when I speak of tangible ideas, I
take the word idea for any the immediate objeet of sense, or
understanding—in whieh large signifieation it is eommonly used
by the moderns^^^.

46. From what we have shewn, it is a manifest eonsequenee
that the ideas of spaee, outness^^^, and things plaeed at a distanee

This eonnexion of our knowledge of distanee with our loeomotive
experienee points to a theory whieh ultimately resolves spaee into experienee
of unimpeded loeomotion.

™ Loeke (Essay, Introduetion, § 8) takes idea vaguely as “the term whieh
serves best to stand whatsoever is the objeet of the understanding when a man
thinks.” Oversight of what Berkeley intends the term idea has made his whole
eoneeption of nature and the material universe a riddle to many, of whieh
afterwards.

The expressive term “outness,” favoured by Berkeley, is here first used.

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[ 150 ]

are not, strictly speaking, the object of sight^^^; they are not
otherwise perceived by the eye than by the ear. Sitting in my
study I hear a coach drive along the Street; I look through the
casement and see it; I walk out and enter into it. Thus, common
speech would incline one to think I heard, saw, and touched the
same thing, to wit, the coach. It is nevertheless certain the ideas
intromitted by each sense are widely different, and distinct from
each other; but, having been observed constantly to go together,
they are spoken of as one and the same thing. By the variation
of the noise, I perceive the different distances of the coach, and
know that it approaches before I look out. Thus, by the ear I
perceive distance just after the same manner as I do by the eye.

47. I do not nevertheless say I hear distance, in like manner
as I say that I see it—the ideas perceived by hearing not being so
apt to be confounded with the ideas of touch as those of sight are.
So likewise a man is easily convinced that bodies and external
things are not properly the object of hearing, but only sounds, by
the mediation whereof the idea of this or that body, or distance,
is suggested to his thoughts. But then one is with more difficulty
brought to discern the difference there is betwixt the ideas of
sight and touch^^°: though it be certain, a man no more sees and
feels the same thing, than he hears and feels the same thing.

48. One reason of which seems to be this. It is thought a great
absurdity to imagine that one and the same thing should have
any more than one extensión and one figure. But, the extensión
and figure of a body being let into the mind two ways, and that
indifferently, either by sight or touch, it seems to follow that we
see the same extensión and the same figure which we feel.

49. But, if we take a cióse and accurate view of the matter,

“We get the idea of Space,” says Locke, “both by our sight and touch”
(Essay, II. 13. § 2). Locke did not contémplate Berkeley's antithesis of visible
and tangible extensión, and the consequent ambiguity of the term extensión;
which sometimes signifies coloured, and at others resistant experience in sense.

For an explanation of this difficulty, see sect. 144.

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it must be aeknowledged that we never see and feel one and
the same objeet^^^ That whieh is seen is one thing, and that
whieh is felt is another. If the visible figure and extensión be
not the same with the tangible figure and extensión, we are not
to infer that one and the same thing has divers extensions. The
true eonsequenee is that the objeets of sight and toueh are two
distinet things^^^. It may perhaps require some thought rightly
to eoneeive this distinetion. And the diffieulty seems not a
little inereased, beeause the eombination of visible ideas hath
eonstantly the same ñame as the eombination of tangible ideas
wherewith it is eonneeted—whieh doth of neeessity arise from
the use and end of language^^^.

50. In order, therefore, to treat aeeurately and uneonfusedly of
visión, we must bear in mind that there are two sorts of objeets
apprehended by the eye—the one primarily and immediately, the
other seeondarily and by intervention of the former. Those of
the first sort neither are ñor appear to be without the mind, or at
any distanee off^^^. They may, indeed, grow greater or smaller, [i5i]
more eonfused, or more elear, or more faint. But they do not,
eannot approaeh, [or even seem to approaeh or reeede from
US. Whenever we say an objeet is at a distanee, whenever we
say it draws near, or goes farther off, we must always mean it
of the latter sort, whieh properly belong to the toueh^^^, and are
not so truly pereeived as suggested by the eye, in like manner as

“objeet”—“thing,” in the earlier editions.

This is the issue of the analytical portion of the Essay.

Cf. sect. 139-40.

Here the question of externality, signifying independence of all percipient
life, is again mixed up with that of the invisibility of distanee outwards in the
line of sight.

Omitted in author's last edition.

i.e. ineluding muscular and locomotive experience as well as sense of
contact. But what are the tangibilia themselves? Are they also significant, like
visibilia, of a still ulterior reality? This is the problem of the Principies of
Human Knowledge.

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[ 152 ]

thoughts by the ear.

51. No sooner do we hear the words of a familiar language
pronounced in our ears but the ideas corresponding thereto
present themselves to our minds: in the very same instant the
sound and the meaning enter the understanding: so closely are
they United that it is not in our power to keep out the one
except we exelude the other also. We even act in all respeets
as if we heard the very thoughts themselves. So likewise the
secondary objeets, or those which are only suggested by sight,
do often more strongly affect us, and are more regarded, than the
proper objeets of that sense; along with which they enter into the
mind, and with which they have a far more strict connexion than
ideas have with words^^’. Henee it is we find it so difficult to
discriminate between the immediate and mediate objeets of sight,
and are so prone to attribute to the former what belongs only to
the latter. They are, as it were, most closely twisted, blended,
and incorporated together. And the prejudice is confirmed and
riveted in our thoughts by a long tract of time, by the use of
language, and want of reflection. However, I doubt not but
anyone that shall attentively consider what we have already said,
and shall say upon this subject before we have done (especially if
he pursue it in his own thoughts), may be able to deliver himself
from that prejudice. Sure I am, it is worth some attention to
whoever would understand the true nature of visión.

52. I have now done with Distance, and proceed to shew
how it is that we perceive by sight the Magnitude of objeets^^^.
It is the opinión of some that we do it by angles, or by angles

In this section the conception of a natural Visual Language, makes its
appearance, with its implication that Nature is (for us) virtually Spirit.
Cf. sect. 140, 147— Principies, sect. 44— Dialogues of Hylas and
Philonous — Alciphron, IV. 8, 11—and Theory of Vision Vindicated, passim.

Sect. 52-87 treat of the invisibility of real, i.e. tactual, Magnitude. Cf.
Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 54-61.

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in conjunction with distance. But, neither angles ñor distance
being perceivable by sight^^^, and the things we see being in
truth at no distance from it follows that, as we have shewn
Unes and angles not to be the médium the mind makes use of in
apprehending the apparent place, so neither are they the médium
whereby it apprehends the apparent magnitude of objects.

53. It is weh known that the same extensión at a near distance
shah subtend a greater angle, and at a farther distance a lesser
angle. And by this principie (we are told) the mind estimates the
magnitude of an object^^', comparing the angle under which it is
seen with its distance, and thence inferring the magnitude thereof.

What inclines men to this mistake (beside the humour of making
one see by geometry) is, that the same perceptions or ideas which
suggest distance do also suggest magnitude. But, if we examine
it, we shah find they suggest the latter as immediately as the
former. I say, they do not first suggest distance and then leave it
to the judgment to use that as a médium whereby to cohect the
magnitude; but they have as cióse and immediate a connexion
with the magnitude as with the distance; and suggest magnitude
as independently of distance, as they do distance independently
of magnitude. All which will be evident to whoever considers
what has been already said and what follows.

54. It has been shewn there are two sorts of objects
apprehended by sight, each whereof has its distinct magnitude,
or extensión—the one, properly tangible, i.e. to be perceived
and measured by touch, and not immediately falling under the
sense of seeing; the other, properly and immediately visible,
by mediation of which the former is brought in view. Each of
these magnitudes are greater or lesser, according as they contain [ 153 ]
in them more or fewer points, they being made up of points or

339

340

341

Sect. 8-15.

Sect. 41, &c.

See Molyneux's Treatise on Dioptrics, B. I. prop. 28.

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minimums. For, whatever may be said of extensión in abstract^'*^,
it is certain sensible extensión is not infinitely divisible^^^. There
is a minimum tangibile, and a minimum visibile, beyond which
sense cannot perceive. This every one's experience will inform
him.

55. The magnitude of the object which exists without the mind,
and is at a distance, continúes always invariably the same: but,
the visible object still changing as yon approach to or recede from
the tangible object, it hath no fixed and determinate greatness.
Whenever therefore we speak of the magnitude of any thing, for
instance a tree or a house, we must mean the tangible magnitude;
otherwise there can be nothing steady and free from ambiguity
spoken of it^^^. Now, though the tangible and visible magnitude
do in truth belong to two distinct objects^^^, I shall nevertheless
(especially since those objects are called by the same ñame, and
are observed to coexist^^^), to avoid tediousness and singularity
of speech, sometimos speak of them as belonging to one and the
same thing.

56. Now, in order to discover by what means the magnitude of
tangible objects is perceived by sight, I need only reflect on what
passes in my own mind, and observe what those things be which
introduce the ideas of greater or lesser into my thoughts when I

See sect. 122-126.

In short there is a point at which, with our limited sense, we cease to
he percipient of colour, in seeing; and of resistance, in locomotion. Though
Berkeley regards all visible extensions as sensible, and therefore dependent for
their reality on being realised by sentient mind, he does not mean that mind
or consciousness is extended. With him, extensión, though it exists only in
mind,—i.e. as an idea seen, in the case of visible extensión, and as an idea
touched, in the case of tangible extensión,—is yet no property of mind. Mind
can exist without being percipient of extensión, although extensión cannot be
realised without mind.

But this is true, though less obviously, of tangible as well as of visible
objects.

Sect. 49.

Cf. sect. 139, 140, &c.

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look on any object. And these I find to be, first, the magnitude
or extensión of the visible objeet, whieh, being immediately
pereeived by sight, is eonneeted with that other whieh is tangible
and plaeed at a distanee: secondly, the eonfusion or distinetness:
and thirdly, the vigorousness or faintness of the aforesaid visible [ 154 ]
appearanee. Cceteris paribus, by how mueh the greater or lesser
the visible objeet is, by so mueh the greater or lesser do I eonelude
the tangible objeet to be. But, be the idea immediately pereeived
by sight never so large, yet, if it be withal eonfused, I judge the
magnitude of the thing to be but small. If it be distinet and elear,

I judge it greater. And, if it be faint, I apprehend it to be yet
greater. What is here meant by eonfusion and faintness has been
explained in seet. 35.

57. Moreover, the judgments we make of greatness do, in like
manner as those of distanee, depend on the disposition of the
eye; also on the figure, number, and situation^^^ of intermediate
objeets, and other eireumstanees that have been observed to
attend great or small tangible magnitudes. Thus, for instanee, the
very same quantity of visible extensión whieh in the figure of a
tower doth suggest the idea of great magnitude shall in the figure
of a man suggest the idea of mueh smaller magnitude. That this
is owing to the experienee we have had of the usual bigness of a
tower and a man, no one, I suppose, need be told.

58. It is also evident that eonfusion or faintness have no more a
neeessary eonnexion with little or great magnitude than they have
with little or great distanee. As they suggest the latter, so they
suggest the former to our minds. And, by eonsequenee, if it were
not for experienee, we should no more judge a faint or eonfused
appearanee to be eonneeted with great or little magnitude than
we should that it was eonneeted with great or little distanee.

59. Ñor will it be found that great or small visible
magnitude hath any neeessary relation to great or small tangible

“situation”—not in the earlier editions.

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[ 155 ]

magnitude—so that the one may certainly and infallibly be
inferred from the other. But, before we come to the proof of
this, it is fit we consider the difference there is betwixt the
extensión and figure which is the proper object of touch, and that
other which is termed visible; and how the former is principally,
though not immediately, taken notice of when we look at any
object. This has been before mentioned^^^, but we shall here
inquire into the cause thereof. We regard the objects that environ
US in proportion as they are adapted to benefit or injure our
own bodies, and thereby produce in our minds the sensations
of pleasure or pain. Now, bodies operating on our organs by
an immediate application, and the hurt and advantage arising
therefrom depending altogether on the tangible, and not at all on
the visible, qualities of any object—this is a plain reason why
those should be regarded by us much more than these. And for
this end [chiefly^^^] the visive sense seems to have been bestowed
on animáis, to wit, that, by the perception of visible ideas (which
in themselves are not capable of affecting or anywise altering
the frame of their bodies), they may be able to foresee^^*^ (from
the experience they have had what tangible ideas are connected
with such and such visible ideas) the damage or benefit which is
like to ensue upon the application of their own bodies to this or
that body which is at a distance. Which foresight, how necessary
it is to the preservation of an animal, every one's experience
can inform him. Henee it is that, when we look at an object,
the tangible figure and extensión thereof are principally attended
to; whilst there is small heed taken of the visible figure and
magnitude, which, though more immediately perceived, do less

Omitted in the author's last edition.

Ordinary sight is virtually foresight. Cf. sect. 85.—See also Malebranche
on the external senses, as given primarily for the urgent needs of embodied
life, not to immediately convey scientific knowledge, Recherche, Liv. I. ch. 5,
6, 9, &c.

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sensibly affect us, and are not fitted to produee any alteration in
our bodies.

60. That the matter of faet is true will be evident to any one
who eonsiders that a man plaeed at ten foot distanee is thought as
great as if he were plaeed at the distanee only of five foot; whieh
is true, not with relation to the visible, but tangible greatness of
the objeet: the visible magnitude being far greater at one station
than it is at the other.

61. Inehes, feet, &e. are settled, stated lengths, whereby
we measure objeets and estímate their magnitude. We say, for
example, an objeet appears to be six inehes, or six foot long. Now,
that this eannot be meant of visible inehes, &e. is evident, beeause
a visible ineh is itself no eonstant determínate magnitude^^^ and
eannot therefore serve to mark out and determine the magnitude
of any other thing. Take an ineh marked upon a ruler; view it
sueeessively, at the distanee of half a foot, a foot, a foot and a half,
&e. from the eye: at eaeh of whieh, and at all the intermedíate
distanees, the ineh shall have a different visible extensión, i.e.
there shall be more or fewer points diseerned in it. Now, 1 ask
whieh of all these various extensions is that stated determínate
one that is agreed on for a common measure of other magnitudes?
No reason ean be assigned why we should piteh on one more
than another. And, exeept there be some invariable determínate
extensión fixed on to be marked by the word ineh, it is plain it ean
be used to little purpose; and to say a thing eontains this or that
number of inehes shall imply no more than that it is extended,
without bringing any partieular idea of that extensión into the
mind. Farther, an ineh and a foot, from different distanees, shall
both exhibit the same visible magnitude, and yet at the same time
you shall say that one seems several times greater than the other.
From all whieh it is manifest, that the judgments we make of
the magnitude of objeets by sight are altogether in referenee to

Sect. 44.—See also sect. 55, and note.

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[ 157 ]

their tangible extensión. Whenever we say an object is great or
small, of this or that determinate measure, I say, it must be meant
of the tangible and not the visible extension^^^, which, though
immediately perceived, is nevertheless little taken notice of.

62. Now, that there is no necessary connexion between these
two distinct extensions is evident from henee—because our eyes
might have been framed in such a manner as to be able to see
nothing but what were less than the minimum tangibile. In
which case it is not impossible we might have perceived all the
immediate objects of sight the very same that we do now; but
unto those visible appearances there would not be connected
those different tangible magnitudes that are now. Which shews
the judgments we make of the magnitude of things placed at a
distance, from the various greatness of the immediate objects of
sight, do not arise from any essential or necessary, but only a
customary, tie which has been observed betwixt them.

63. Morco ver, it is not only certain that any idea of sight
might not have been connected with this or that idea of touch
we now observe to accompany it, but also that the greater visible
magnitudes might have been connected with and introduced into
our minds lesser tangible magnitudes, and the lesser visible
magnitudes greater tangible magnitudes. Nay, that it actually is
so, we have daily experience—that object which makes a strong
and large appearance not seeming near so great as another the
visible magnitude whereof is much less, but more faint,^^^ and
the appearance upper, or which is the same thing, painted lower
on the retina, which faintness and situation suggest both greater
magnitude and greater distance.

64. From which, and from sect. 57 and 58, it is manifest

This supposes “settled” tangibilia, but not “settled” visibilia. Yet the
sensible extensión given in touch and locomotive experience is also relativo—an
object being/e/í as larger or smaller according to the State of the organism, and
the other conditions of our embodied perception.

What follows, to end of sect. 63, added in the author's last edition.

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that, as we do not perceive the magnitude of objects immediately
by sight, so neither do we pereeive them by the mediation of
anything whieh has a neeessary eonnexion with them. Those
ideas that now suggest unto us the various magnitudes of external
objeets before we toueh them might possibly have suggested no
sueh thing; or they might have signified them in a direet eontrary
manner, so that the very same ideas on the pereeption whereof
we judge an objeet to be small might as well have served to
make us eonelude it great;—those ideas being in their own nature
equally fitted to bring into our minds the idea of small or great,
or no size at all, of outward objeets^^^, just as the words of any
language are in their own nature indifferent to signify this or that
thing, or nothing at all.

65. As we see distanee so we see magnitude. And we see both
in the same way that we see shame or anger in the looks of a man.

Those passions are themselves invisible; they are nevertheless let
in by the eye along with eolours and alterations of eountenanee
whieh are the immediate objeet of visión, and whieh signify them
for no other reason than barely beeause they have been observed

to aeeompany them. Without whieh experienee we should no [158]
more have taken blushing for a sign of shame than of gladness.

66. We are nevertheless exeeedingly prone to imagine those
things whieh are pereeived only by the mediation of others to be
themselves the immediate objeets of sight, or at least to have in
their own nature a fitness to be suggested by them before ever
they had been experieneed to eoexist with them. From whieh
prejudiee every one perhaps will not find it easy to emaneipate
himself, by any the elearest eonvietions of reason. And there
are some grounds to think that, if there was one only invariable
and universal language in the world, and that men were born
with the faeulty of speaking it, it would be the opinión of some,

“outward objeets,” i.e. objeets of whieh we are pereipient in taetual
experienee, taken in this Essay provisionally as the real external objeets. See
Principies, sect. 44.

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[159]

that the ideas in other men's minds were properly perceived by
the ear, or had at least a necessary and inseparable tie with the
sounds that were affixed to them. All which seems to arise from
want of a due application of our discerning faculty, thereby to
discriminate between the ideas that are in our understandings,
and consider them apart from each other; which would preserve
US from confounding those that are different, and make us see
what ideas do, and what do not, inelude or imply this or that
other idea^^^.

67. There is a celebrated phenomenon^^^ the solution whereof
I shall attempt to give, by the principies that have been laid down,
in reference to the manner wherein we apprehend by sight the
magnitude of objeets.—The apparent magnitude of the moon,
when placed in the horizon, is much greater than when it is in
the meridian, though the angle under which the diameter of the
moon is seen be not observed greater in the former case than in
the latter; and the horizontal moon doth not constantly appear of
the same bigness, but at some times seemeth far greater than at
others.

68. Now, in order to explain the reason of the moon's appearing
greater than ordinary in the horizon, it must be observed that the
partióles which compose our atmosphere do intercept the rays of
light proceeding from any object to the eye; and, by how much
the greater is the portion of atmosphere interj acent between the

Cf. sect. 144. Note, in this and the three preceding sections, the stress
laid on the arbitrariness of the connexion between the signs which suggest
magnitudes, or other modes of extensión, and their significates. This is the
foundation of the New Theory, which thus resolves physical causality into a
relation of signs to what they signify and predict—analogous to the relation
between words and their accepted meanings.

In sect. 67-78, Berkeley attempts to verify the foregoing account of the
natural signs of Size, by applying it to solve a phenomenon, the cause of
which had been long debated among men of Science—the visible magnitude of
heavenly bodies when seen in the horizon.

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object and the eye, by so much the more are the rays intereepted,
and, by eonsequenee, the appearanee of the objeet rendered more
faint—every objeet appearing more vigorous or more faint in
proportion as it sendeth more or fewer rays into the eye. Now,
between the eye and the moon when situated in the horizon there
lies a far greater quantity of atmosphere than there does when
the moon is in the meridian. Whenee it eomes to pass, that the
appearanee of the horizontal moon is fainter, and therefore, by
seet. 56, it should be thought bigger in that situation than in the
meridian, or in any other elevation above the horizon.

69. Farther, the air being variously impregnated, sometimes
more and sometimes less, with vapours and exhalations fitted
to retund and intereept the rays of light, it follows that the
appearanee of the horizontal moon hath not always an equal
faintness, and, by eonsequenee, that luminary, though in the very
same situation, is at one time judged greater than at another.

70. That we have here given the true aeeount of the phenomena
of the horizontal moon, will, I suppose, be farther evident to
any one from the following eonsiderations:— First, it is plain,
that whieh in this ease suggests the idea of greater magnitude,
must be something whieh is itself pereeived; for, that whieh is
unpereeived eannot suggest to our pereeption any other thing^^^.
Secondly, it must be something that does not eonstantly remain
the same, but is subjeet to some ehange or variation; sinee
the appearanee of the horizontal moon varíes, being at one
time greater than at another. [Thirdly, it must not lie in the
eireumjaeent or intermedíate objeets, sueh as mountains, houses,
fields, &e.; beeause that when all those objeets are exeluded [ 160 ]
from sight the appearanee is as great as ever^^^.] And yet.

Cf. sect. 10.

Omitted in the author's last edition. Cf sect. 76, 77.—The explanation
in question is attributed to Alhazen, and by Bacon to Ptolemy, while it is
sanctioned by eminent scientific ñames before and since Berkeley.

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thirdly^^'^, it cannot be the visible figure or magnitude; since that
remains the same, or is rather lesser, by how much the moon is
nearer to the horizon. It remains therefore, that the true cause
is that affection or alteration of the visible appearance, which
proceeds from the greater paucity of rays arriving at the eye, and
which I term faintness: since this answers all the forementioned
conditions, and I am not conscious of any other perception that
does.

71. Add to this that in misty weather it is a common
observation, that the appearance of the horizontal moon is far
larger than usual, which greatly conspires with and strengthens
our opinión. Neither would it prove in the least irreconcilable
with what we have said, if the horizontal moon should chance
sometimes to seem enlarged beyond its usual extent, even in
more serene weather. For, we must not only have regard to the
mist which happens to be in the place where we stand; we ought
also to take into our thoughts the whole sum of vapours and
exhalations which lie betwixt the eye and the moon: all which
co-operating to render the appearance of the moon more faint,
and thereby increase its magnitude, it may chance to appear
greater than it usually does even in the horizontal position, at a
time when, though there be no extraordinary fog or haziness just
in the place where we stand, yet the air between the eye and the
moon, taken altogether, may be loaded with a greater quantity of
interspersed vapours and exhalations than at other times^^°.

72. It may be objected that, in consequence of our principies,
the interposition of a body in some degree opaque, which may
intercept a great part of the rays of light, should render the

“Fourthly” in the second edition. Cf. what follows with sect. 74. Why
“lesser”?

When Berkeley, some years afterwards, visited Italy, he remarked that
distant objects appeared to him much nearer than they really were—a
phenomenon which he attributed to the comparative purity of the Southern
air.

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appearance of the moon in the meridian as large as when it is
viewed in the horizon. To whieh I answer, it is not faintness
anyhow applied that suggests greater magnitude; there being [i6i]
no neeessary, but only an experimental, eonnexion between
those two things. It follows that the faintness whieh enlarges
the appearanee must be applied in sueh sort, and with sueh
eireumstanees, as have been observed to attend the visión of
great magnitudes. When from a distanee we behold great
objeets, the partieles of the intermediate air and vapours, whieh
are themselves unpereeivable, do interrupt the rays of light,
and thereby render the appearanee less strong and vivid. Now,
faintness of appearanee, eaused in this sort, hath been experieneed
to eo-exist with great magnitude. But when it is eaused by the
interposition of an opaque sensible body, this eireumstanee alters
the ease; so that a faint appearanee this way eaused does not
suggest greater magnitude, beeause it hath not been experieneed
to eo-exist with it.

73. Faintness, as well as all other ideas or pereeptions whieh
suggest magnitude or distanee, does it in the same way that
words suggest the notions to whieh they are annexed. Now, it
is known a word pronouneed with eertain eireumstanees, or in
a eertain eontext with other words, hath not always the same
import and signifieation that it hath when pronouneed in some
other eireumstanees, or different eontext of words. The very
same visible appearanee, as to faintness and all other respeets,
if plaeed on high, shall not suggest the same magnitude that it
would if it were seen at an equal distanee on a level with the eye.

The reason whereof is, that we are rarely aeeustomed to view
objeets at a great height; our eoneerns lie among things situated
rather before than above us; and aeeordingly our eyes are not
plaeed on the top of our heads, but in sueh a position as is most
eonvenient for us to see distant objeets standing in our way. And,
this situation of them being a eireumstanee whieh usually attends
the visión of distant objeets, we may from henee aeeount for

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[ 162 ]

(what is commonly observed) an object's appearing of different
magnitude, even with respect to its horizontal extensión, on the
top of a steeple, e.g. a hundred feet high, to one standing below,
from what it would if placed at a hundred feet distance, on a level
with his eye. For, it hath been shewn that the judgment we make
on the magnitude of a thing depends not on the visible appearance
only, but also on divers other circumstances, any one of which
being omitted or varied may suffice to make some alteration
in our judgment. Henee, the circumstance of viewing a distant
object in such a situation as is usual and suits with the ordinary
posture of the head and eyes, being omitted, and instead thereof
a different situation of the object, which requires a different
posture of the head, taking place—it is not to be wondered at if
the magnitude be judged different. But it will be demanded, why
a high object should constantly appear less than an equidistant
low object of the same dimensions; for so it is observed to be. It
may indeed be granted that the variation of some circumstances
may vary the judgment made on the magnitude of high objects,
which we are less used to look at; but it does not henee appear
why they should be judged less rather than greater? I answer,
that in case the magnitude of distant objects was suggested by the
extent of their visible appearance alone, and thought proportional
thereto, it is certain they would then be judged much less than
now they seem to be. (Vid. sect. 79.) But, several circumstances
concurring to form the judgment we make on the magnitude of
distant objects, by means of which they appear far larger than
others whose visible appearance hath an equal or even greater
extensión, it follows that upon the change or omission of any of
those circumstances which are wont to attend the visión of distant
objects, and so come to influence the judgments made on their
magnitude, they shall proportionally appear less than otherwise
they would. For, any of those things that caused an object to be
thought greater than in proportion to its visible extensión being
either omitted, or applied without the usual circumstances, the

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judgment depends more entirely on the visible extensión; and
eonsequently the objeet must be judged less. Thus, in the present
ease the situation of the thing seen being different from what it
usually is in those objeets we have oeeasion to view, and whose
magnitude we observe, it follows that the very same objeet being
a hundred feet high, should seem less than if it was a hundred
feet off, on (or nearly on) a level with the eye. What has been
here set forth seems to me to have no small share in eontributing
to magnify the appearanee of the horizontal moon, and deserves
not to be passed over in the explieation of it.

74. If we attentively eonsider the phenomenon before us, we
shall find the not diseerning between the medíate and immediate
objeets of sight to be the ehief eause of the diffieulty that oeeurs
in the explieation of it. The magnitude of the visible moon, or
that whieh is the proper and immediate objeet of vision^^\ is
no greater when the moon is in the horizon than when it is in
the meridian. How eomes it, therefore, to seem greater in one
situation than the other? What is it ean put this eheat on the
understanding? It has no other pereeption of the moon than what
it gets by sight. And that whieh is seen is of the same extent—I
say, the visible appearanee hath the very same, or rather a less,
magnitude, when the moon is viewed in the horizontal than when
in the meridional position. And yet it is esteemed greater in the
former than in the latter. Herein eonsists the diffieulty; whieh
doth vanish and admit of the most easy solution, if we eonsider
that as the visible moon is not greater in the horizon than in the
meridian, so neither is it thought to be so. It hath been already
shewn that, in any aet of visión, the visible objeet absolutely, or
in itself, is little taken notiee of—the mind still earrying its view
from that to some tangible ideas, whieh have been observed to be
eonneeted with it, and by that means eome to be suggested by it.
So that when a thing is said to appear great or small, or whatever

i.e. the original pereeption, apart from any synthetic operation of suggestion
and inferential thought, founded on visual signs.

1163]

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estímate be made of the magnitude of any thing, this is meant not
of the visible but of the tangible object. This duly considered,
it will be no hard matter to reconcile the seeming contradiction
there is, that the moon should appear of a different bigness, the
visible magnitude thereof remaining still the same. For, by sect.
56, the very same visible extensión, with a different faintness,
shall suggest a different tangible extensión. When therefore the
horizontal moon is said to appear greater than the meridional
moon, this must be understood, not of a greater visible extensión,
but of a greater tangible extensión, which, by reason of the more
than ordinary faintness of the visible appearance, is suggested to
the mind along with it.

75. Many attempts have been made by learned men to account
for this appearance^^^. Gassendus^^^, Des Cartes^^^, Hobbes^^^,
and several others have employed their thoughts on that subject;
but how fruitless and unsatisfactory their endeavours have been is
sufficiently shewn in the Philosophical Transactions^^^ (Numb.
187, p. 314), where you may see their several opinions at
large set forth and confuted, not without some surprise at the
gross blunders that ingenious men have been forced into by
endeavouring to reconcile this appearance with the ordinary
principies of optics^^’. Since the writing of which there hath

In Riccioli's Almagest, II. lib. X. sect. 6. quest. 14, we have an account of
many hypotheses then current, in explanation of the apparent magnitude of the
horizontal moon.

Gassendi's “Epistolte quatuor de apparente magnitudine solis humilis et
sublimis.”— Opera, tom. III pp. 420-477. Cf. Appendix to this Essay, p. 110.

See Dioptrique, VI.

Opera Latina, vol. I, p. 376, vol. II, pp. 26-62; English Works, vol. I. p.
462. (Molesworth's Edition.)

The paper in the Transactions is by Molyneux.

See Smith's Optics, pp. 64-67, aLnáRemarks, pp. 48, &c. Atp. 55 Berkeley's
New Theory is referred to, and pronounced to be at variance with experience.
Smith concludes by saying, that in “the second edition of Berkeley's Essay,
and also in a Vindication and Explanation of it (called the Visual Language),
very lately published, the author has made some additions to his solution of the

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been published in the Transactions (Numb. 187, p. 323) another
paper relating to the same affair, by the eelebrated Dr. Wallis,
wherein he attempts to aeeount for that phenomenon; whieh,
though it seems not to eontain anything new, or different from
what had been said before by others, 1 shall nevertheless eonsider
in this plaee.

76. His opinión, in short, is this:—We judge not of the
magnitude of an objeet by the optie angle alone, but by the optie
angle in eonjunetion with the distanee. Henee, though the angle
remain the same, or even beeome less, yet, if withal the distanee
seem to have been inereased, the objeet shall appear greater.

Now, one way whereby we estímate the distanee of anything
is by the number and extent of the intermediate objeets. When
therefore the moon is seen in the horizon, the variety of fields, [ 165 ]
houses, &e. together with the large prospeet of the wide extended
land or sea that lies between the eye and the utmost limb of the
horizon, suggest unto the mind the idea of greater distanee, and
eonsequently magnify the appearanee. And this, aeeording to

Dr. Wallis, is the true aeeount of the extraordinary largeness
attributed by the mind to the horizontal moon, at a time when the
angle subtended by its diameter is not one jot greater than it used
to be.

77. With referenee to this opinión, not to repeat what has
been already said eoneerning distanee^^^, 1 shall only observe,
first, that if the prospeet of interjaeent objeets be that whieh
suggests the idea of farther distanee, and this idea of farther
distanee be the eause that brings into the mind the idea of greater
magnitude, it should henee follow that if one looked at the
horizontal moon from behind a wall, it would appear no bigger

said phenomenon; but seeing it still involves and depends on the principie of
faintness, I may leave the rest of it to the reader's consideration.” This, whieh
appeared in 1738, is one of the very few early references to Berkeley's New
Theory of Vision Vindicated.

Sect. 2-51.

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than ordinary. For, in that case, the wall interposing cuts off all
that prospect of sea and land, &c. which might otherwise increase
the apparent distance, and thereby the apparent magnitude of the
moon. Ñor will it suffice to say, the memory doth even then
suggest all that extent of land, &c. which lies within the horizon,
which suggestion occasions a sudden judgment of sense, that
the moon is farther off and larger than usual. For, ask any man
who from such a station beholding the horizontal moon shall
think her greater than usual, whether he hath at that time in his
mind any idea of the intermediate objects, or long tract of land
that lies between his eye and the extreme edge of the horizon?
and whether it be that idea which is the cause of his making
the aforementioned judgment? He will, without doubt, reply
in the negative, and declare the horizontal moon shall appear
greater than the meridional, though he never thinks of all or
any of those things that lie between him and it. [And as for
the absurdity of any idea's introducing into the mind another,
whilst itself is not perceived, this has already fallen under our
observation, and is too evident to need any farther enlargement
on it^^^.] Secondly, it seems impossible, by this hypothesis, to
account for the moon's appearing, in the very same situation,
at one time greater than at another; which, nevertheless, has
been shewn to be very agreeable to the principies we have laid
down, and receives a most easy and natural explication from
them. [^^‘^For the further clearing up of this point, it is to be
observed, that what we immediately and properly see are only
lights and colours in sundry situations and shades, and degrees
of faintness and clearness, confusión and distinctness. All which
visible objects are only in the mind; ñor do they suggest aught
external^^^, whether distance or magnitude, otherwise than by
habitual connexion, as words do things. We are also to remark,

This sentence is omitted in the author's last edition.

What follows to the end of this section is not contained in the first edition.

i.e. tangible.

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that beside the straining of the eyes, and beside the vivid and
faint, the distinet and eonfused appearanees (whieh, bearing some
proportion to Unes and angles, have been substituted instead of
them in the foregoing part of this Treatise), there are other means
whieh suggest both distanee and magnitude—partieularly the
situation of visible points or objeets, as upper or lower; the
former suggesting a farther distanee and greater magnitude, the
latter a nearer distanee and lesser magnitude—all whieh is an
effeet only of eustom and experienee, there being really nothing
intermediate in the line of distanee between the uppermost and
the lowermost, whieh are both equidistant, or rather at no distanee
from the eye; as there is also nothing in upper or lower whieh by
neeessary eonnexion should suggest greater or lesser magnitude.

Now, as these eustomary experimental means of suggesting
distanee do likewise suggest magnitude, so they suggest the one
as immediately as the other. I say, they do not (vide seet. 53) first
suggest distanee, and then leave the mind from thenee to infer or
eompute magnitude, but suggest magnitude as immediately and
directly as they suggest distanee.]

78. This phenomenon of the horizontal moon is a elear
instanee of the insuffieieney of lines and angles for explaining
the way wherein the mind pereeives and estimates the magnitude
of outward objeets. There is, nevertheless, a use of eomputation
by them^^^—in order to determine the apparent magnitude of [ 167 ]
things, so far as they have a eonnexion with and are proportional
to those other ideas or pereeptions whieh are the true and
immediate oeeasions that suggest to the mind the apparent
magnitude of things. But this in general may, I think, be
observed eoneerning mathematieal eomputation in opties—that
it ean never^^^ be very preeise and exaet^^^, sinee the judgments

Cf. sect. 38; and Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 31.

“Never”—“hardly,” in first edition.

Cf. Appendix, p. 208.—See Smith's Opties, B. I. ch. v, and Remarks, p.

56, in whieh he “leaves it to be considered, whether the said phenomenon is

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we make of the magnitude of external things do often depend on
several circumstances which are not proportional to or capable
of being defined by Unes and angles.

79. From what has been said, we may safely deduce this
consequence, to wit, that a man born blind, and made to see,
would, at first opening of his eyes, make a very different judgment
of the magnitude of objects intromitted by them from what others
do. He would not consider the ideas of sight with reference to,
or as having any connexion with, the ideas of touch. His view
of them being entirely terminated within themselves, he can no
otherwise judge them great or small than as they contain a greater
or lesser number of visible points. Now, it being certain that
any visible point can cover or exelude from view only one other
visible point, it follows that whatever object intercepts the view
of another hath an equal number of visible points with it; and,
consequently, they shall both be thought by him to have the same
magnitude. Henee, it is evident one in those circumstances would
judge his thumb, with which he might hide a tower, or hinder
its being seen, equal to that tower; or his hand, the interposition
whereof might conceal the firmament from his view, equal to
the firmament: how great an inequality soever there may, in our
apprehensions, seem to be betwixt those two things, because of
the customary and cióse connexion that has grown up in our
minds between the objects of sight and touch, whereby the very
different and distinct ideas of those two senses are so blended
and confounded together as to be mistaken for one and the
same thing—out of which prejudice we cannot easily extricate
ourselves.

80. For the better explaining the nature of visión, and setting
the manner wherein we perceive magnitudes in a due light, I shall
proceed to make some observations concerning matters relating
thereto, whereof the want of reflection, and duly separating

not as clear an instance of the insufficieney of faintness” as of mathematical
computation.

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between tangible and visible ideas, is apt to ereate in us mistaken
and eonfused notions. And, first, I shall observe, that the
minimum visibile is exaetly equal in all beings whatsoever that
are endowed with the visive faeulty^^^. No exquisito formation
of the eye, no peeuliar sharpness of sight, ean make it less in
one ereature than in another; for, it not being distinguishable into
parts, ñor in anywise eonsisting of them, it must neeessarily be
the same to all. For, suppose it otherwise, and that the minimum
visibile of a mite, for instanee, be less than the minimum visibile
of a man; the latter therefore may, by detraetion of some part,
be made equal to the former. It doth therefore eonsist of parts,
whieh is ineonsistent with the notion of a minimum visibile or
point.

81. It will, perhaps, be objeeted, that the minimum visibile of
a man doth really and in itself eontain parts whereby it surpasses
that of a mite, though they are not pereeivable by the man. To
whieh I answer, the minimum visibile having (in like manner as
all other the proper and immediate objeets of sight) been shewn
not to have any existenee without the mind of him who sees
it, it follows there eannot be any part of it that is not aetually
pereeived and therefore visible. Now, for any objeet to eontain

A favourite doctrine with Berkeley, according to whose theory of visibles
there can be no absoluto visible magnitude, the minimum being the least that is
pereeivable by each seeing subject, and thus relative to his visual capacity. This
section is thus criticised, in January, 1752, in a letter signed “Anti-Berkeley,”
in the Gent. Mag. (vol. XXII, p. 12): “Upon what his lordship asserts with
respect to the minimum visibile, I would observe that it is certain that there
are infinite numbers of animáis whieh are imperceptible to the naked eye, and
eannot be pereeived but by the help of a microscope; consequently there are
animáis whose whole bodies are far less than the minimum visibile of a man.
Doubtless these animáis have eyes, and, if their minimum visibile were equal
to that of a man, it would follow that they eannot perceive anything but what
is much larger than their whole body; and therefore their own bodies must be
invisible to them, because we know they are so to men, whose minimum visibile
is asserted by his lordship to be equal to theirs.” There is some misconception
in this. Cf. Appendix to Essay, p. 209.

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several distinct visible parts, and at the same time to be a
minimum visibile, is a manifest contradiction.

82. Of these visible points we see at all times an equal number.
It is every whit as great when our view is contracted and bounded
by near objects as when it is extended to larger and remoter ones.
For, it being impossible that one minimum visibile should obscure
or keep out of sight more than one other, it is a plain consequence
that, when my view is on all sides bounded by the walls of my
study, I see just as many visible points as I could in case that,
by the removal of the study-walls and all other obstructions, I
had a full prospect of the circumjacent fields, mountains, sea,
and open firmament. For, so long as I am shut up within the
walls, by their interposition every point of the external objects
is covered from my view. But, each point that is seen being
able to cover or exelude from sight one only other corresponding
point, it follows that, whilst my sight is confined to those narrow
walls, I see as many points, or minima visibilia, as I should were
those walls away, by looking on all the external objects whose
prospect is intercepted by them. Whenever, therefore, we are
said to have a greater prospect at one time than another, this must
be understood with relation, not to the proper and immediate,
but the secondary and mediate objects of visión—which, as hath
been shewn, do properly belong to the touch.

83. The visive faculty, considered with reference to its
immediate objects, may be found to labour of two defeets. First,
in respect of the extent or number of visible points that are at
once perceivable by it, which is narrow and limited to a certain
degree. It can take in at one view but a certain determinate
number of minima visibilia, beyond which it cannot extend its
prospect. Secondly, our sight is defectivo in that its view is not
only narrow, but also for the most part confused. Of those things
that we take in at one prospect, we can see but a few at once
clearly and unconfusedly; and the more we fix our sight on any
one object, by so much the darker and more indistinct shall the

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rest appear.

84. Corresponding to these two defects of sight, we may
imagine as many perfeetions, to wit, Ist. That of eomprehending

in one view a greater number of visible points; 2dly, of being [ 170 ]
able to view them all equally and at onee, with the utmost
elearness and distinetion. That those perfeetions are not aetually
in some intelligenees of a different order and eapaeity from ours,
it is impossible for us to know^^^.

85. In neither of those two ways do mieroseopes eontribute
to the improvement of sight. For, when we look through a
mieroseope, we neither see more visible points, ñor are the
eollateral points more distinet, than when we look with the naked
eye at objeets plaeed at a due distanee. A mieroseope brings
US, as it were, into a new world. It presents us with a new
seene of visible objeets, quite different from what we behold
with the naked eye. But herein eonsists the most remarkable
differenee, to wit, that whereas the objeets pereeived by the eye
alone have a eertain eonnexion with tangible objeets, whereby
we are taught to foresee what will ensue upon the approaeh or
applieation of distant objeets to the parts of our own body—whieh
mueh eondueeth to its preservation^^^—there is not the like
eonnexion between things tangible and those visible objeets that
are pereeived by help of a fine mieroseope.

86. Henee, it is evident that, were our eyes turned into the
nature of mieroseopes, we should not be mueh benefitted by the
ehange. We should be deprived of the forementioned advantage
we at present reeeive by the visive faeulty, and have left us only
the empty amusement of seeing, without any other benefit arising
from it. But, in that ease, it will perhaps be said, our sight would

Those two defects belong to human consciousness. See Locke's Essay, II.

10, on the defects of human memory. It is this imperfection which makes
reasoning needful—to assist finite intuition. Reasoning is the sign at once of
our dignity and our weakness.

Sect. 59.

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be endued with a far greater sharpness and penetration than it
now hath. But I would fain know wherein consists that sharpness
which is esteemed so great an excellency of sight. It is certain,
from what we have already shewn^^*, that the minimum visibile
is never greater or lesser, but in all cases constantly the same.
And in the case of microscopical eyes, I see only this difference,
to wit, that upon the ceasing of a certain observable connexion
betwixt the divers perceptions of sight and touch, which before
enabled us to regúlate our actions by the eye, it would now be
rendered utterly unserviceable to that purpose.

87. Upon the whole, it seems that if we consider the use and
end of sight, together with the present State and circumstances of
our being, we shall not find any great cause to complain of any
defect or imperfection in it, or easily conceive how it could be
mended. With such admirable wisdom is that faculty contrived,
both for the pleasure and convenience of life.

88. Having finished what I intended to say concerning the
Distance and Magnitude of objects, I come now to treat of the
manner wherein the mind perceives by sight their Situation^^^.
Among the discoveries of the last age, it is reputed none of the
least, that the manner of visión has been more clearly explained
than ever it had been before. There is, at this day, no one ignorant
that the pictures of external objects are painted on the retina or
fund of the eye; that we can see nothing which is not so painted;
and that, according as the picture is more distinct or confused, so
also is the perception we have of the object^^*^. But then, in this
explication of visión, there occurs one mighty difficulty, viz. the
objects are painted in an inverted order on the bottom of the eye:

Sect. 80-82.

Sect. 88-119 relate to the nature, invisibility, and arbitrary visual signs
of Situation, or of the localities of tangible things. Cf. Theory of Vision
Vindicated, sect. 44-53.

Cf. sect. 2, 114, 116, 118.

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the upper part of any object being painted on the lower part of
the eye, and the lower part of the objeet on the upper part of the
eye; and so also as to right and left. Sinee therefore the pietures
are thus inverted, it is demanded, how it eomes to pass that we
see the objeets ereet and in their natural posture?

Figure 4

89. In answer to this diffieulty, we are told that the mind,
pereeiving an impulse of a ray of light on the upper part of the
eye, eonsiders this ray as eoming in a direet line from the lower
part of the objeet; and, in like manner, traeing the ray that strikes
on the lower part of the eye, it is direeted to the upper part of
the objeet. Thus, in the adjaeent figure, C, the lower point of
the objeet ABC, is projeeted on c the upper part of the eye. So
likewise, the highest point A is projeeted on a the lowest part
of the eye; whieh makes the representation cba inverted. But
the mind—eonsidering the stroke that is made on c as eoming
in the straight line Ce from the lower end of the objeet; and
the stroke or impulse on a, as eoming in the line Aa from the
upper end of the objeet—is direeted to make a right judgment
of the situation of the objeet ABC, notwithstanding the pieture
of it be inverted. Moreover, this is illustrated by eoneeiving a
blind man, who, holding in his hands two stieks that eross eaeh
other, doth with them toueh the extremities of an objeet, plaeed
in a perpendieular situation^^^. It is eertain this man will judge
that to be the upper part of the objeet whieh he touehes with the

This illustration is taken from Descartes. See Appendix.

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stick held in the undermost hand, and that to be the lower part
of the object which he touches with the stick in his uppermost
hand. This is the common explication of the erect appearance of
objects, which is generally received and acquiesced in, being (as
Mr. Molyneux tells us, Diopt. part ii. ch. vii. p. 289) “allowed
by all men as satisfactory.”

90. But this account to me does not seem in any degree true.
Did I perceive those impulses, decussations, and directions of the
rays of light, in like manner as hath been set forth, then, indeed,
it would not at first view be altogether void of probability. And
there might be some pretence for the comparison of the blind
man and his cross sticks. But the case is far otherwise. I know
very well that I perceive no such thing. And, of consequence,
I cannot thereby make an estimate of the situation of objects.
Moreover, I appeal to any one's experience, whether he be
conscious to himself that he thinks on the intersection made by
the radius pencils, or pursues the impulses they give in right
lines, whenever he perceives by sight the position of any object?
To me it seems evident that Crossing and tracing of the rays,
&c. is never thought on by children, idiots, or, in truth, by
any other, save only those who have applied themselves to the
study of optics. And for the mind to judge of the situation of
objects by those things without perceiving them, or to perceive
them without knowing it^*^, take which you picase, it is perfectly
beyond my comprehension. Add to this, that the explaining the
manner of visión by the example of cross sticks, and hunting
for the object along the axes of the radius pencils, doth suppose
the proper objects of sight to be perceived at a distance from us,
contrary to what hath been demonstrated^*^. [We may therefore
venture to pronounce this opinión, concerning the way wherein
the mind perceives the erect appearance of objects, to be of a
piece with those other tenets of writers in optics, which in the

Sect. 10 and 19.

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foregoing parts of this treatise we have had occasion to examine
and refute^^^.]

91. It remains, therefore, that we look for some other
explieation of this diffieulty. And 1 believe it not impossible
to find one, provided we examine it to the bottom, and earefully
distinguish between the ideas of sight and toueh; whieh eannot be
too oft ineuleated in treating of vision^^^. But, more espeeially
throughout the eonsideration of this affair, we ought to earry
that distinetion in our thoughts; for that from want of a right
understanding thereof, the diffieulty of explaining ereet visión
seems ehiefly to arise.

92. In order to disentangle our minds from whatever prejudiees
we may entertain with relation to the subjeet in hand, nothing
seems more apposite than the taking into our thoughts the ease
of one born blind, and afterwards, when grown up, made to see.
And—though perhaps it may not be a task altogether easy and
familiar to us, to divest ourselves entirely of the experienees
reeeived from sight, so as to be able to put our thoughts exaetly
in the posture of sueh a one's—we must, nevertheless, as far
as possible, endeavour to frame true eoneeptions of what might
reasonably be supposed to pass in bis mind^^^.

93. It is eertain that a man aetually blind, and who had
eontinued so from his birth, would, by the sense of feeling,
attain to have ideas of upper and lower. By the motion of his
hand, he might diseern the situation of any tangible objeet plaeed
within his reaeh. That part on whieh he felt himself supported,
or towards whieh he pereeived his body to gravitate, he would

Omitted in author's last edition.

This is Berkeley's universal solvent of the psychological difficulties
involved in visual-perception.

Cf. sect. 103, 106, 110, 128, &c. Berkeley treats this case hypothetically
in the Essay, in defect of actual experiments upon the born-blind, since
accumulated from Cheselden downwards. See however the Appendix, and
Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 71.

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term lower, and the contrary to this upper, and accordingly
denomínate whatsoever objects he touched.

94. But then, whatever judgments he makes concerning the
situation of objects are confined to those only that are perceivable
by touch. All those things that are intangible, and of a spiritual
nature—^his thoughts and desires, his passions, and in general all
the modifications of his soul—to these he would never apply the
terms upper and lower, except only in a metaphorical sense. He
may perhaps, by way of abusión, speak of high or low thoughts:
but those terms, in their proper signification, would never be
applied to anything that was not conceived to exist without the
mind. For, a man born blind, and remaining in the same State,
could mean nothing else by the words higher and lower than a
greater or lesser distance from the earth; which distance he would
measure by the motion or application of his hand, or some other
part of his body. It is, therefore, evident that all those things
which, in respect of each other, would by him be thought higher
or lower, must be such as were conceived to exist without his
mind, in the ambient space^^’.

95. Whence it plainly follows, that such a one, if we suppose
him made to see, would not at first sight think that anything he
saw was high or low, erect or inverted. For, it hath been already
demonstrated, in sect. 41, that he would not think the things he
perceived by sight to be at any distance from him, or without his
mind. The objects to which he had hitherto been used to apply
the terms up and down, high and low, were such only as affected,
or were some way perceived by his touch. But the proper
objects of visión make a new set of ideas, perfectly distinct
and different from the former, and which can in no sort make
themselves perceived by touch. There is, therefore, nothing at all
that could induce him to think those terms applicable to them.
Ñor would he ever think it, till such time as he had observed

i.e. tangible things. Cf. Principies, sect. 44.

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their connexion with tangible objeets, and the same prejudiee^*^
began to insinúate itself into bis understanding, whieh, from their
infaney, had grown up in the understandings of other men.

96. To set this matter in a elearer light, I shall make use of
an example. Suppose the above-mentioned blind person, by bis
toueh, pereeives a man to stand ereet. Let us inquire into the
manner of this. By the applieation of bis hand to the several
parts of a human body, he had pereeived different tangible ideas;
whieh being eolleeted into sundry eomplex ones^^^ have distinet
ñames annexed to them. Thus, one eombination of a eertain
tangible figure, bulk, and eonsisteney of parts is ealled the head;
another the hand; a third the foot, and so of the rest—all whieh
eomplex ideas eould, in his understanding, be made up only of
ideas pereeivable by toueh. He had also, by his toueh, obtained
an idea of earth or ground, towards whieh he pereeives the parts
of his body to have a natural tendeney. Now—^by ereet nothing
more being meant than that perpendieular position of a man
wherein his feet are nearest to the earth—if the blind person, by
moving his hand over the parts of the man who stands before
him, do pereeive the tangible ideas that eompose the head to be
farthest from, and those that eompose the feet to be nearest to,
that other eombination of tangible ideas whieh he ealls earth, he
will denominate that man ereet. But, if we suppose him on a
sudden to reeeive his sight, and that he behold a man standing
before him, it is evident, in that ease, he would neither judge the
man he sees to be ereet ñor inverted; for he, never having known
those terms applied to any other save tangible things, or whieh
existed in the spaee without him, and what he sees neither being
tangible, ñor pereeived as existing without, he eould not know
that, in propriety of language, they were applieable to it.

The “prejudice,” to wit, whieh Berkeley would dissolve by his introspective
analysis of visión. Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 35.

Thus forming individual concrete things out of what is pereeived separately
through different senses.

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97. Afterwards, when, upon turning his head or eyes up and
down to the right and left, he shall observe the visible objects to
change, and shall also attain to know that they are called by the
same ñames, and connected with the objects perceived by touch;
then, indeed, he will come to speak of them and their situation in
the same terms that he has been used to apply to tangible things:
and those that he perceives by turning up his eyes he will cali
upper, and those that by turning down his eyes he will cali lower.

98. And this seems to me the true reason why he should
think those objects uppermost that are painted on the lower part
of his eye. For, by turning the eye up they shall be distinctly
seen; as likewise they that are painted on the highest part of
the eye shall be distinctly seen by turning the eye down, and
are for that reason esteemed lowest. For we have shewn that
to the immediate objects of sight, considered in themselves, he
would not attribute the terms high and low. It must therefore be
on account of some circumstances which are observed to attend
them. And these, it is plain, are the actions of turning the eye
up and down, which suggest a very obvious reason why the
mind should denomínate the objects of sight accordingly high
or low. And, without this motion of the eye—this turning it
up and down in order to discern different objects—doubtless
erect, inverse, and other the like terms relating to the position
of tangible objects, would never have been transferred, or in any
degree apprehended to belong to the ideas of sight, the mere act
of seeing including nothing in it to that purpose; whereas the
different situations of the eye naturally direct the mind to make a
suitable judgment of the situation of objects intromitted by it^^°.

99. Farther, when he has by experience learned the connexion
there is between the several ideas of sight and touch, he will be
able, by the perception he has of the situation of visible things in
respect of one another, to make a sudden and true estímate of the

This briefly is Berkeley's solution of “the knot about inverted images,”
which long puzzled men of Science.

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situation of outward, tangible things eorresponding to them. And
thus it is he shall pereeive^^' by sight the situation of externaP^^
objeets, whieh do not properly fall under that sense.

100. I know we are very prone to think that, if just made to
see, we should judge of the situation of visible things as we do
now. But, we are also as prone to think that, at first sight, we
should in the same way apprehend the distanee and magnitude
of objeets, as we do now; whieh hath been shewn to be a false
and groundless persuasión. And, for the like reasons, the same
eensure may be passed on the positive assuranee that most men,
before they have thought suffieiently of the matter, might have
of their being able to determine by the eye, at first view, whether
objeets were ereet or inverse.

101. It will perhaps be objeeted to our opinión, that a man,
for instanee, being thought ereet when his feet are next the earth,
and inverted when his head is next the earth, it doth henee follow
that, by the mere aet of visión, without any experienee or altering
the situation of the eye, we should have determined whether he
were ereet or inverted. For both the earth itself, and the limbs of
the man who stands thereon, being equally pereeived by sight,
one eannot ehoose seeing what part of the man is nearest the
earth, and what part farthest from it, i.e. whether he be ereet or
inverted.

102. To whieh I answer, the ideas whieh eonstitute the tangible
earth and man are entirely different from those whieh eonstitute
the visible earth and man. Ñor was it possible, by virtue of
the visive faeulty alone, without superadding any experienee of
toueh, or altering the position of the eye, ever to have known, or
so mueh as suspeeted, there had been any relation or eonnexion
between them. Henee, a man at first view would not denominate

i.e. perceive mediately —visible objeets, per se, having no tactual situation.
Puré visión, he would say, has nothing to do with “high” and “low,” “great”
and “inverted,” in the real or tactual meaning of those terms.

i.e. tangible.

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anything he saw, earth, or head, or foof, and consequently, he
could not tell, by the mere act of visión, whether the head or
feet were nearest the earth. Ñor, indeed, would we have thereby
any thought of earth or man, erect or inverse, at all—which will
be made yet more evident, if we nicely observe, and make a
particular comparison between, the ideas of both senses.

103. That which I see is only variety of light and colours. That
which I feel is hard or soft, hot or coid, rough or smooth. What
similitude, what connexion, have those ideas with these? Or, how
is it possible that any one should see reason to give one and the
same name^^^ to combinations of ideas so very different, before
he had experienced their co-existence? We do not find there is
any necessary connexion betwixt this or that tangible quality,
and any colour whatsoever. And we may sometimes perceive
colours, where there is nothing to be felt. All which doth make
it manifest that no man, at first receiving of his sight^^^, would
know there was any agreement between this or that particular
object of his sight and any object of touch he had been already
acquainted with. The colours therefore of the head would to him
no more suggest the idea of head^^^ than they would the idea of
feet.

104. Farther, we have at large shewn (vid. sect. 63 and 64)
there is no discoverable necessary connexion between any given
visible magnitude and any one particular tangible magnitude;
but that it is entirely the result of custom and experience, and
depends on foreign and accidental circumstances, that we can, by
the perception of visible extensión, inform ourselves what may
be the extensión of any tangible object connected with it. Henee,
it is certain, that neither the visible magnitude of head or foot

e.g. “extensión,” which, according to Berkeley, is an equivocal term,
common (in its different meanings) to visibilia and tangibilia. Cf. sect. 139,
140.

Cf. sect. 93, 106, 110, 128.

i.e. real or tangible head.

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would bring along with them into the mind, at first opening of
the eyes, the respeetive tangible magnitudes of those parts.

105. By the foregoing seetion, it is plain the visible figure
of any part of the body hath no neeessary eonnexion with the
tangible figure thereof, so as at first sight to suggest it to the
mind. For, figure is the termination of magnitude. Whenee
it follows that no visible magnitude having in its own nature
an aptness to suggest any one partieular tangible magnitude, so
neither ean any visible figure be inseparably eonneeted with its
eorresponding tangible figure, so as of itself, and in a way prior

to experienee, it might suggest it to the understanding. This will [ 179 ]
be farther evident, if we eonsider that what seems smooth and
round to the toueh may to sight, if viewed through a mieroseope,
seem quite otherwise.

106. From all whieh, laid together and duly eonsidered, we
may elearly deduee this inferenee:—In the first aet of visión, no
idea entering by the eye would have a pereeivable eonnexion
with the ideas to whieh the ñames earth, man, head, foot, &e.
were annexed in the understanding of a person blind from his
birth; so as in any sort to introduee them into his mind, or make
themselves be ealled by the same ñames, and reputed the same
things with them, as afterwards they eome to be.

107. There doth, nevertheless, remain one diffieulty, whieh to
some may seem to press hard on our opinión, and deserve not to
be passed over. For, though it be granted that neither the eolour,
size, ñor figure of the visible feet have any neeessary eonnexion
with the ideas that eompose the tangible feet, so as to bring them
at first sight into my mind, or make me in danger of eonfounding
them, before I had been used to and for some time experieneed
their eonnexion; yet thus mueh seems undeniable, namely, that
the number of the visible feet being the same with that of the
tangible feet, I may from henee, without any experienee of sight,
reasonably eonelude that they represent or are eonneeted with the
feet rather than the head. I say, it seems the idea of two visible

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feet will sooner suggest to the mind the idea of two tangible feet
than of one head—so that the blind man, upon first reception of
the visive faculty, might know which were the feet or two, and
which the head or one.

108. In order to get olear of this seeming difficulty, we need
only observe that diversity of visible objects does not necessarily
infer diversity of tangible objects corresponding to them. A
picture painted with great variety of colours affects the touch
in one uniform manner; it is therefore evident that I do not, by
any necessary consecution, independent of experience, judge of
the number of things tangible from the number of things visible.
I should not therefore at first opening my eyes conclude that
because I see two I shall feel two. How, therefore, can I, before
experience teaches me, know that the visible legs, because two,
are connected with the tangible legs; or the visible head, because
one, is connected with the tangible head? The truth is, the things I
see are so very different and heterogeneous from the things I feel
that the perception of the one would never have suggested the
other to my thoughts, or enabled me to pass the least judgment
thereon, until I had experienced their connexion^^^.

Cf. sect. 140, 143. In the Gent. Mag. (vol. XXII. p. 12), “Anti-Berkeley”
thus argües the case of one bom blind. “This man,” he adds, “would, by being
accustomed to feel one hand with the other, have perceived that the extremity
of the hand was divided into fingers—that the extremities of these fingers were
distinguished by certain hard, smooth surfaces, of a different texture from the
rest of the fingers—and that each finger had certain joints or fiexures. Now,
if this man was restored to sight, and immediately viewed his hand before he
touched it again, it is manifest that the divisions of the extremity of the hand
into fingers would be visibly perceived. He would note too the small spaces at
the extremity of each finger, which affected his sight differently from the rest of
the fingers; upon moving his fingers he would see the joints. Though therefore,
by means of this lately acquired sense of seeing, the object affected his mind
in a new and different manner from what it did before, yet, as by touch he had
acquired the knowledge of these several divisions, marks, and distinctions of
the hand, and, as the new object of sight appeared to be divided, marked, and
distinguished in a similar manner, I think he would certainly conclude, before

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109. But, for a fuller illustration of this matter, it ought
to be eonsidered, that number (however some may reekon it
amongst the primary qualities^^^) is nothing fixed and settled,
really existing in things themselves. It is entirely the ereature
of the mind, eonsidering either a simple idea by itself, or any
eombination of simple ideas to whieh it gives one ñame, and
so makes it pass for a unit. Aeeording as the mind variously
eombines its ideas, the unit varies; and as the unit, so the number,
whieh is only a eolleetion of units, doth also vary. We eall a
window one, a ehimney one; and yet a house, in whieh there
are many Windows and many ehimneys, has an equal right to
be ealled one; and many houses go to the making of one eity.

In these and the like instanees, it is evident the unit eonstantly
relates to the partieular draughts the mind makes of its ideas, to
whieh it affixes ñames, and wherein it ineludes more or less, [i8i]
as best suits its own ends and purposes. Whatever therefore the
mind eonsiders as one, that is an unit. Every eombination of ideas

is eonsidered as one thing by the mind, and in token thereof is
marked by one ñame. Now, this naming and eombining together
of ideas is perfeetly arbitrary, and done by the mind in sueh sort
as experienee shews it to be most eonvenient—without whieh
our ideas had never been eolleeted into sueh sundry distinet
eombinations as they now are.

110. Henee, it follows that a man born blind, and afterwards,
when grown up, made to see, would not, in the first aet of visión,
pareel out the ideas of sight into the same distinet eolleetions
that others do who have experieneed whieh do regularly eo-exist
and are proper to be bundled up together under one ñame. He
would not, for example, make into one eomplex idea, and thereby
esteem and unite all those partieular ideas whieh eonstitute the

he touched his hand, that the thing whieh he now saw was the same whieh he
had felt before and ealled his hand.”

Loeke, Essay, II. 8, 16. Aristotle regards number as a Common
Sensible .—De Anima, II. 6, III. 1.

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visible head or foot. For, there can be no reason assigned why he
should do so, barely upon his seeing a man stand upright before
him. There crowd into his mind the ideas which compose the
visible man, in company with all the other ideas of sight perceived
at the same time. But, all these ideas offered at once to his view
he would not distribute into sundry distinct combinations, till
such time as, by observing the motion of the parts of the man and
other experiences, he comes to know which are to be separated
and which to be collected together^^^.

111. From what hath been premised, it is plain the objects
of sight and touch make, if I may so say, two sets of ideas,
which are widely different from each other. To objects of either
kind we indifferently attribute the terms high and low, right and
left, and such like, denoting the position or situation of things;
but then we must well observe that the position of any object is
determined with respect only to objects of the same sense. We
say any object of touch is high or low, according as it is more
or less distant from the tangible earth: and in like manner we

denominate any object of sight high or low, in proportion as
it is more or less distant from the visible earth. But, to define
the situation of visible things with relation to the distance they
bear from any tangible thing, or vice versa, this were absurd and
perfectly unintelligible. For all visible things are equally in the
mind, and take up no part of the external space; and consequently
are equidistant from any tangible thing which exists without the
mind^^^.

112. Or rather, to speak truly, the proper objects of sight

“If the visible appearance of two shillings had been found connected from
the beginning with the tangible idea of one shilling, that appearance would as
naturally and readily have signified the unity of the (tangible) object as it now
signifies its duplicity.” Reid, Inquiry, VI. 11.

Here again note Berkeley's inconvenient reticence of his full theory of
matter, as dependent on percipient life for its reality. Tangible things are
meantime granted to be real “without mind.” Cf. Principies, sect. 43, 44.
“Without the mind”—in contrast to sensuous phenomenon only.

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are at no distanee, neither near ñor far from any tangible thing.

For, if we inquire narrowly into the matter, we shall find that
those things only are eompared together in respeet of distanee
whieh exist after the same manner, or appertain unto the same
sense. For, by the distanee between any two points, nothing more
is meant than the number of intermediate points. If the given
points are visible, the distanee between them is marked out by
the number of the interjaeent visible points; if they are tangible,
the distanee between them is a line eonsisting of tangible points;
but, if they are one tangible and the other visible, the distanee
between them doth neither eonsist of points pereeivable by sight
ñor by toueh, i.e. it is utterly ineoneeivable^®**. This, perhaps,
will not find an easy admission into all men's understanding.
However, 1 should gladly be informed whether it be not true, by
any one who will be at the pains to refleet a little, and apply it
borne to bis thoughts.

113. The not observing what has been delivered in the two last
seetions, seems to have oeeasioned no small part of the diffieulty
that oeeurs in the business of direet appearanees. The head,
whieh is painted nearest the earth, seems to be farthest from it;
and on the other hand, the feet, whieh are painted farthest from
the earth, are thought nearest to it. Herein lies the diffieulty,
whieh vanishes if we express the thing more elearly and free
from ambiguity, thus:—How eomes it that, to the eye, the visible
head, whieh is nearest the tangible earth, seems farthest from the
earth; and the visible feet, whieh are farthest from the tangible [183]
earth, seem nearest the earth? The question being thus proposed,
who sees not the diffieulty is founded on a supposition that the
eye or visive faeulty, or rather the soul by means thereof, should
judge of the situation of visible objeets with referenee to their
distanee from the tangible earth? Whereas, it is evident the
tangible earth is not pereeived by sight. And it hath been shewn.

^“Cf. sect. 131.

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in the two last preceding sections, that the location of visible
objects is determined only by the distance they bear from one
another, and that it is nonsense to talk of distance, far or near,
between a visible and tangible thing.

114. If we confine our thoughts to the proper objects of sight,
the whole is plain and easy. The head is painted farthest from,
and the feet nearest to, the visible earth; and so they appear to be.
What is there strange or unaccountable in this? Let us suppose
the pictures in the fund of the eye to be the immediate objects
of sight^°^ The consequence is that things should appear in the
same posture they are painted in; and is it not so? The head
which is seen seems farthest from the earth which is seen; and
the feet which are seen seem nearest to the earth which is seen.
And just so they are painted.

115. But, say yon, the picture of the man is inverted, and yet
the appearance is erect. I ask, what mean you by the picture of
the man, or, which is the same thing, the visible man's being
inverted? You tell me it is inverted, because the heels are
uppermost and the head undermost? Explain me this. You say
that by the head's being undermost, you mean that it is nearest
to the earth; and, by the heels being uppermost, that they are
farthest from the earth. I ask again, what earth you mean? You
cannot mean the earth that is painted on the eye or the visible
earth—for the picture of the head is farthest from the picture of
the earth, and the picture of the feet nearest to the picture of the
earth; and accordingly the visible head is farthest from the visible
earth, and the visible feet nearest to it. It remains, therefore, that
you mean the tangible earth; and so determine the situation of
visible things with respect to tangible things—contrary to what
hath been demonstrated in sect. 111 and 112. The two distinct
provinces of sight and touch should be considered apart, and as
though their objects had no intercourse, no manner of relation to

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one another, in point of distance or position^*’^.

116. Farther, what greatly contributes to make us mistake in
this matter is that, when we think of the pictures in the fund of the
eye, we imagine ourselves looking on the fund of another's eye,
or another looking on the fund of our own eye, and beholding
the pictures painted thereon. Suppose two eyes, A and B. A from
some distance looking on the pictures in B sees them inverted,
and for that reason concludes they are inverted in B. But this is
wrong. There are projected in little on the bottom of A the images
of the pictures of, suppose, man, earth, &c., which are painted
on B. And, besides these, the eye B itself, and the objects which
environ it, together with another earth, are projected in a larger
size on A. Now, by the eye A these larger images are deemed
the true objects, and the lesser only pictures in miniature. And
it is with respect to those greater images that it determines the
situation of the smaller images; so that, comparing the little man
with the great earth, A judges him inverted, or that the feet are
farthest from and the head nearest to the great earth. Whereas, if
A compare the little man with the little earth, then he will appear
erect, i.e. his head shall seem farthest from and his feet nearest
to the little earth. But we must consider that B does not see two
earths as A does. It sees only what is represented by the little
pictures in A, and consequently shall judge the man erect. For, in
truth, the man in B is not inverted, for there the feet are next the
earth; but it is the representation of it in A which is inverted, for
there the head of the representation of the picture of the man in
B is next the earth, and the feet farthest from the earth—meaning
the earth which is without the representation of the pictures in B.
For, if you take the little linages of the pictures in B, and consider
them by themselves, and with respect only to one another, they
are all erect and in their natural posture.

In short, we see only quantities ofcolour —the real or tactual distance, size,
shape, locality, up and down, right and left, &c., being gradually associated
with the various visible modifications of colour.

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117. Farther, there lies a mistake in our imagining that the
pictures of external^*^^ objects are painted on the bottom of
the eye. It has been shewn there is no resemblance between
the ideas of sight and things tangible. It hath likewise been
demonstrated^*’^, that the proper objects of sight do not exist
without the mind. Whence it clearly follows that the pictures
painted on the bottom of the eye are not the pictures of external
objects. Let any one consult his own thoughts, and then tell me,
what affinity, what likeness, there is between that certain variety
and disposition of colours which constitute the visible man, or
picture of a man, and that other combination of far different ideas,
sensible by touch, which compose the tangible man. But, if this
be the case, how come they to be accounted pictures or images,
since that supposes them to copy or represent some origináis or
other?

118. To which I answer—In the forementioned instance, the
eye A takes the little images, included within the representation of
the other eye B, to be pictures or copies, whereof the archetypes
are not things existing without^**^, but the larger pictures^°^
projected on its own fund; and which by A are not thought
pictures, but the origináis or true things themselves. Though if
we suppose a third eye C, from a due distance, to behold the fund
of A, then indeed the things projected thereon shall, to C, seem
pictures or images, in the same sense that those projected on B
do to A.

119. Rightly to conceive the business in hand, we must
carefully distinguish between the ideas of sight and touch,
between the visible and tangible eye; for certainly on the tangible
eye nothing either is or seems to be painted. Again, the visible
eye, as well as all other visible objects, hath been shewn to

i.e. tangible.

Sect. 41-44.

i.e. tangible things.

i.e. visible.

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exist only in the mind^*’^; which, perceiving its own ideas, and
eomparing them together, does eall some pietures in respeet to
others. What hath been said, being rightly eomprehended and
laid together, does, I think, afford a full and genuine explieation
of the ereet appearanee of objeets—whieh phenomenon, I must [ 186 ]
eonfess, I do not see how it ean be explained by any theories of
visión hitherto made publie.

120. In treating of these things, the use of language is apt to
oeeasion some obseurity and eonfusion, and ereate in us wrong
ideas. For, language being aeeommodated to the eommon notions
and prejudiees of men, it is searee possible to deliver the naked
and preeise truth, without great eireumloeution, impropriety, and
(to an unwary reader) seeming eontradietions. I do, therefore,
onee for all, desire whoever shall think it worth bis while to
understand what I have written eoneerning visión, that he would
not stiek in this or that phrase or manner of expression, but
eandidly eolleet my meaning from the whole sum and tenor of
my diseourse, and, laying aside the words^®^ as mueh as possible,
eonsider the bare notions themselves, and then judge whether
they are agreeable to truth and his own experienee or no.

121. We have shewn the way wherein the mind, by mediation
of visible ideas^*’^, doth pereeive or apprehend the distanee,
magnitude, and situation of tangible objeets^^**. I eome now to
inquire more partieularly eoneerning the differenee between the
ideas of sight and toueh whieh are ealled by the same ñames,

Cf. sect. 41-44. The “eyes”—visible and tangible—are themselves objeets
of sense.

Cf. Principies, Introduction, sect. 21-25.

409 ideas”—including sensations muscular and locomotive,/e/t in the

organ of visión. Sect. 16, 27, 57.

i.e. objeets which, in this tentative Essay, are granted, for argument's sake,
to be extemal, or independent of percipient mind.

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and see whether there be any idea common to both senses^^^
From what we have at large set forth and demonstrated in the
foregoing parts of this treatise, it is plain there is no one self-same
numerical extensión, perceived both by sight and touch; but that
the particular figures and extensions perceived by sight, however
they may be called by the same ñames, and reputed the same
things with those perceived by touch, are nevertheless different,
and have an existence very distinct and sepárate from them.
So that the question is not now concerning the same numerical
ideas, but whether there be any one and the same sort or species
of ideas equally perceivable to both senses? or, in other words,
whether extensión, figure, and motion perceived by sight, are not
specifically distinct from extensión, figure, and motion perceived
by touch?

122. But, before I come more particularly to discuss this
matter, I find it proper to take into my thoughts extensión in
abstract^^^. For of this there is much talk; and I am apt to think
that when men speak of extensión as being an idea common to
two senses, it is with a secret supposition that we can single
out extensión from all other tangible and visible qualities, and
form thereof an abstrae! idea, which idea they will have common
both to sight and touch. We are therefore to understand by

i.e. to inquire whether there are, in this instance, Common Sensibles; and,
in particular, whether an extensión of the same kind at least, if not numerically
the same, is presented in each. The Kantian theory of an a priori intuition of
space, the common condition of tactual and visual experience, because implied
in sense-experience as such, is not conceived by Berkeley. Cf. Theory of Vision
Vindicated, sect. 15.

In the following reasoning against abstract, as distinguished from concrete
or sense presented (visible or tangible) extensión, Berkeley urges some of
his favourite objections to “abstract ideas,” fully unfolded in his Principies,
Introduction, sect. 6-20.—See also Alciphron, VII. 5-8.— Defence of Free
Thinking in Mathematics, sect. 45-48.

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extensión in abstraet, an idea^^^ of extensión—for instanee, a
Une or surfaee entirely stripped of all other sensible qualities and
eireumstanees that might determine it to any partieular existenee;
it is neither blaek, ñor white, ñor red, ñor hath it any eolour
at all, or any tangible quality whatsoever, and eonsequently it
is of no finite determinate magnitude^^^; for that whieh bounds
or distinguishes one extensión from another is some quality or
eireumstanee wherein they disagree.

123. Now, I do not find that I ean pereeive, imagine, or anywise
frame in my mind sueh an abstraet idea as is here spoken of. A
Une or surfaee whieh is neither blaek, ñor white, ñor blue, ñor
yellow, &e.; ñor long, ñor short, ñor rough, ñor smooth, ñor
square, ñor round, &e. is perfeetly ineomprehensible. This I am
sure of as to myself; how far the faeulties of other men may reaeh
they best ean tell.

124. It is eommonly said that the objeet of geometry is abstraet [ 188 ]
extensión. But geometry eontemplates figures: now, figure is the
termination of magnitude^^^; but we have shewn that extensión

in abstraet hath no finite determinate magnitude; whenee it
elearly follows that it ean have no figure, and eonsequently is
not the objeet of geometry. It is indeed a tenet, as well of
the modern as the aneient philosophers, that all general truths
are eoneerning universal abstraet ideas; without whieh, we are
told, there eould be no seienee, no demonstration of any general
proposition in geometry. But it were no hard matter, did I think
it neeessary to my present purpose, to shew that propositions and
demonstrations in geometry might be universal, though they who
make them never think of abstraet general ideas of triangles or
eireles.

Berkeley's ideas are concrete or particular—immediate data of sense or
imagination.

i.e. it cannot be individualized, either as a perceived or an imagined objeet.
Sect. 105.

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125. After reiterated efforts and pangs of thought^^^ to
apprehend the general idea of a triangle^^^, I have found it
altogether incomprehensible. And surely, if any one were able
to let that idea into my mind, it must be the author^^* of the
Essay conceming Human Understanding: he, who has so far
distinguished himself from the generality of writers, by the
clearness and significancy of what he says. Let us therefore see
how this celebrated author^'^ describes the general or [which
is the same thing, the^^*’] abstract idea of a triangle. “It must
be,” says he, “neither oblique ñor rectangle, neither equilateral,
equicrural, ñor scalenum; but all and none of these at once.
In effect it is somewhat imperfect that cannot exist; an idea,
wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent ideas are
put together.” {Essay on Human Understanding, B. iv. ch. 7. s.
9.) This is the idea which he thinks needful for the enlargement of
knowledge, which is the subject of mathematical demonstration,
and without which we could never come to know any general
proposition conceming triangles. [Sure I am, if this be the case,
it is impossible for me to attain to know even the first elements
of geometry: since I have not the faculty to frame in my mind
such an idea as is here described^^^] That author acknowledges
it doth “require some pains and skill to form this general idea of
a triangle.” (Ibid.) But, had he called to mind what he says in
another place, to wit, “that ideas of mixed modes wherein any
inconsistent ideas are put together, cannot so much as exist in the
mind, i.e. be conceived,” (vid. B. iii. ch. 10. s. 33, ibid.) —I say,

“Endeavours” in first edition.

i.e. a mental image of an abstraction, an impossible image, in which the
extensión and comprehension of the notion must be adequately pictured.

“deservedly admired author,” in the first edition.

“this celebrated author,”—“that great man” in second edition. In assailing
Locke's “abstract idea,” he discharges the meaning which Locke intended by
the term, and then demolishes his own figment.

Omitted in the author's last edition.

Omitted in last edition.

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had this occurred to his thoughts, it is not improbable he would
have owned it above all the pains and skill he was master of, to
form the above-mentioned idea of a triangle, whieh is made up
of manifest staring eontradietions. That a man [of sueh a elear
understanding^^^], who thought so mueh and so well, and laid so
great a stress on elear and determínate ideas, should nevertheless
talk at this rate, seems very surprising. But the wonder will
lessen, if it be eonsidered that the souree whenee this opinión
[of abstrae! figures and extensión flows is the prolifie womb
whieh has brought forth innumerable errors and diffieulties, in
all parts of philosophy, and in all the seienees. But this matter,
taken in its full extent, were a subjeet too vast and eomprehensive
to be insisted on in this plaee^^^. [I shall only observe that your
metaphysieians and men of speeulation seem to have faeulties
distinet from those of ordinary men, when they talk of general or
abstraeted triangles and eireles, &e., and so peremptorily deelare
them to be the subjeet of all the eternal, immutable, universal
truths in geometry^^^.] And so mueh for extensión in abstrae!.

126. Some, perhaps, may think puré spaee, vaeuum, or trine
dimensión, to be equally the objeet of sight and toueh^^^. But,
though we have a very great propensión to think the ideas of
outness and spaee to be the immediate objeet of sight, yet, if I
mistake not, in the foregoing parts of this Essay, that hath been
elearly demonstrated to be a mere delusion, arising from the [ 190 ]
quiek and sudden suggestion of faney, whieh so elosely eonneets
the idea of distanee with those of sight, that we are apt to think
it is itself a proper and immediate objeet of that sense, till reason

Omitted in last edition.

See Principies, passim.

Omitted in author's last edition.
He probably has Locke in his eye.

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corrects the mistake^^’.

127. It having been shewn that there are no abstrae! ideas
of figure, and that it is impossible for us, by any precisión of
thought, to frame an idea of extensión sepárate from all other
visible and tangible qualities, which shall be common both to
sight and touch—the question now remaining is^^^, whether the
particular extensions, figures, and motions perceived by sight,
be of the same kind with the particular extensions, figures, and
motions perceived by touch? In answer to which I shall venture
to lay down the following proposition :—The extensión, figures,
and motions perceived by sight are specifically distinctfrom the
ideas of touch, called by the same ñames; ñor is there any such
thing as one idea, or kind of idea, common^^'^ to both senses.
This proposition may, without much difficulty, be collected from
what hath been said in several places of this Essay. But, because
it seems so remóte from, and contrary to the received notions
and settled opinión of mankind, I shall attempt to demónstrate it
more particularly and at large by the following arguments:—

128. [Firsf^^^,] When, upon perception of an idea, I range
it under this or that sort, it is because it is perceived after the
same manner, or because it has a likeness or conformity with,
or affects me in the same way as the ideas of the sort I rank it
under. In short, it must not be entirely new, but have something
in it oíd and already perceived by me. It must, I say, have so

On Berkeley's theory, space without relation to boches (i.e. insensible or
abstract space) would not be extended, as not having parts; inasmuch as parts
can be assigned to it only with relation to bodies. Berkeley does not distinguish
space from sensible extensión. Cf. Reid's Works, p. 126, note—in which Sir
W. Hamilton suggests that one may have an a priori conception of puré space,
and also an a posteriori perception of finite, concrete space.

Sect. 121. Cf. New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 15.

i.e. there are no Common Sensibles: from which it follows that we
can reason from the one sense to the other only by founding on the constant
connexion of their respective phenomena, under a natural yet (for us) contingent
law. Cf. New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 27, 28.

Omitted in last edition.

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much, at least, in common with the ideas I have before known [i9i]
and named, as to make me give it the same ñame with them. But,
it has been, if I mistake not, elearly made out^^^ that a man born
blind would not, at first reeeption of his sight, think the things
he saw were of the same nature with the objeets of toueh, or
had anything in common with them; but that they were a new
set of ideas, perceived in a new manner, and entirely different
from all he had ever perceived before. So that he would not cali
them by the same ñame, ñor repute them to be of the same sort,
with anything he had hitherto known. [And surely the judgment
of such an unprejudiced person is more to be relied on in this
case than the sentiments of the generality of men; who, in this
as in almost everything else, suffer themselves to be guided by
custom, and the erroneous suggestions of prejudice, rather than
reason and sedate reflection^^^.]

129. Secondly, Light and colours are allowed by all to
constitute a sort or species entirely different from the ideas of
toueh; ñor will any man, 1 presume, say they can make themselves
perceived by that sense. But there is no other immediate object
of sight besides light and colours^^^. It is therefore a direct
consequence, that there is no idea common to both senses.

130. It is a prevailing opinión, even amongst those who have
thought and writ most accurately concerning our ideas, and the
ways whereby they enter into the understanding, that something
more is perceived by sight than barely light and colours with
their variations. [The excellent^^^] Mr. Locke termeth sight
“the most comprehensive of all our senses, conveying to our

Cf. sect. 93, 103, 106, 110.

Omitted in last edition.

Cf. sect. 43, 103, &c. A plurality of co-existent minima of coloured points
constitutes Berkeley's visible extensión; while a plurality of successively
experienced minima of resistant points constitutes his tactual extensión.
Whether we can perceive visible extensión without experience of muscular
movement at least in the eye, he does not here say.

Omitted in last edition.

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minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only
to that sense; and also the far different ideas of space, figure,
and motion.” {Essay on Human Understanding, B. iii. ch. 9.
s. 9.) Space or distance^^^, we have shewn, is no otherwise
the object of sight than of hearing. (Vid. sect. 46.) And, as
for figure and extensión, I leave it to any one that shall calmly
attend to his own olear and distinct ideas to decide whether he
has any idea intromitted immediately and properly by sight save
only light and colours: or, whether it be possible for him to
frame in his mind a distinct abstract idea of visible extensión, or
figure, exclusive of all colour; and, on the other hand, whether
he can conceive colour without visible extensión? For my own
part, I must confess, I am not able to attain so great a nicety of
abstraction. I know very well that, in a strict sense, I see nothing
but light and colours, with their several shades and variations. He
who beside these doth also perceive by sight ideas far different
and distinct from them, hath that faculty in a degree more perfect
and comprehensive than I can pretend to. It must be owned,
indeed, that, by the mediation of light and colours, other far
different ideas are suggested to my mind. But so they are by
hearing^^^. But then, upon this score, I see no reason why the
sight should be thought more comprehensive than the hearing,
which, beside sounds which are peculiar to that sense, doth, by
their mediation, suggest not only space, figure, and motion, but
also all other ideas whatsoever that can be signified by words.

131. Thirdly, It is, I think, an axiom universally received, that
“quantities of the same kind may be added together and make
one entire sum.” Mathematicians add lines together; but they do
not add a line to a solid, or conceive it as making one sum with a
surface. These three kinds of quantity being thought incapable of

Real distance belongs originally, according to the Essay, to our tactual
experience only—in the wide meaning of touch, which ineludes muscular and
locomotive perceptions, as well as the simple perception of contad.

Added in second edition.

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any such mutual addition, and consequently of being compared
together in the several ways of proportion, are by them for that
reason esteemed entirely disparate and heterogeneous. Now let
any one try in bis thoughts to add a visible line or surface to
a tangible line or surface, so as to conceive them making one
continued sum or whole. He that can do this may think them
homogeneous; but he that cannot must, by the foregoing axiom,
think them heterogeneous. [I acknowledge myself to be of the
latter sort^^’.] A blue and a red line I can conceive added together
into one sum and making one continued line; but, to make, in [193]
my thoughts, one continued line of a visible and tangible line
added together, is, I find, a task far more difficult, and even
insurmountable—and I leave it to the reflection and experience
of every particular person to determine for himself.

132. A farther confirmation of our tenet may be drawn from
the solution of Mr. Molyneux's problem, published by Mr. Locke
in his Essay^^^'. which I shall set down as it there lies, together
with Mr. Locke's opinión of it:—“Suppose a man born blind, and
now adult, and taught by his touch to distinguish between a cube
and a sphere of the same metal, and nighly of the same bigness,
so as to tell when he felt one and the other, which is the cube,
and which the sphere. Suppose then the cube and sphere placed
on a table, and the blind man made to see: Qusere, Whether by
his sight, before he touched them, he could now distinguish, and
tell, which is the globe, which the cube. To which the acute and
judicious proposer answers: Not. For, though he has obtained the
experience of how a globe, how a cube affects his touch; yet he
has not yet attained the experience, that what affects his touch so
or so must affect his sight so or so: or that a protuberant angle in

Omitted in last edition.

See also Locke's “Correspondence” with Molyneux, in Locke's Works,
vol. IX. p. 34.—Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, Liv. 11. ch. 9, who, so far
granting the fact, disputes the heterogeneity.—Smith's Optics. — Remarks, §§
161-170.—Hamilton's Reid, p. 137, note, and Lect. Metaph. 11. p. 176.

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[194]

the cube, that pressed bis hand unequally, shall appear to bis eye
as it doth in the cube. I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom
I am proud to cali my friend, in bis answer to this bis problem;
and am of opinión that the blind man, at first sight, would not be
able with certainty to say, which was the globe, which the cube,
whilst he only saw them.” (Essay on Human Understanding, B.
ii. ch. 9. s. 8.)

133. Now, if a square surface perceived by touch be of the
same sort with a square surface perceived by sight, it is certain
the blind man here mentioned might know a square surface as
soon as he saw it. It is no more but introducing into bis mind,
by a new inlet, an idea he has been already well acquainted with.
Since therefore he is supposed to have known by bis touch that a
cube is a body terminated by square surfaces; and that a sphere
is not terminated by square surfaces—upon the supposition that
a visible and tangible square differ only in numero, it follows
that he might know, by the unerring mark of the square surfaces,
which was the cube, and which not, while he only saw them. We
must therefore allow, either that visible extensión and figures are
specifically distinct from tangible extensión and figures, or else,
that the solution of this problem, given by those two [very^^^]
thoughtful and ingenious men, is wrong.

134. Much more might be laid together in proof of the
proposition I have advanced. But, what has been said is, if I
mistake not, sufficient to convince any one that shall yield a
reasonable attention. And, as for those that will not be at the
pains of a little thought, no multiplication of words will ever

suffice to make them understand the truth, or rightly conceive
440

my meanmg .

135. I cannot let go the above-mentioned problem without
some reflection on it. It hath been made evident that a man blind
from his birth would not, at first sight, denominate anything he

Omitted in last edition.

Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 70.

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saw, by the ñames he had been used to appropriate to ideas of
toueh. (Vid. seet. 106.) Cube, sphere, table are words he
has known applied to things pereeivable by toueh, but to things
perfeetly intangible he never knew them applied. Those words, in
their wonted applieation, always marked out to bis mind bodies
or solid things whieh were pereeived by the resistanee they gave.
But there is no solidity, no resistanee or protrusion, pereeived
by sight. In short, the ideas of sight are all new pereeptions, to
whieh there be no ñames annexed in bis mind; he eannot therefore
understand what is said to him eoneerning them. And, to ask of
the two bodies he saw plaeed on the table, whieh was the sphere,
whieh the eube, were to him a question downright bantering
and unintelligible; nothing he sees being able to suggest to his
thoughts the idea of body, distanee, or, in general, of anything
he had already known.

136. It is a mistake to think the same^^' thing affeets both
sight and toueh. If the same angle or square whieh is the
objeet of toueh be also the objeet of visión, what should hinder
the blind man, at first sight, from knowing it? For, though the
manner wherein it affeets the sight be different from that wherein
it affeeted his toueh, yet, there being, beside this manner or
eireumstanee, whieh is new and unknown, the angle or figure,
whieh is oíd and known, he eannot ehoose but discern it.

137. Visible figure and extensión having been demonstrated to
be of a nature entirely different and heterogeneous from tangible
figure and extensión, it remains that we inquire eoneerning
motion. Now, that visible motion is not of the same sort with
tangible motion seems to need no farther proof; it being an
evident eorollary from what we have shewn eoneerning the
differenee there is betwixt visible and tangible extensión. But,
for a more full and express proof hereof, we need only observe
that one who had not yet experieneed visión would not at first

Cf. sect. 49, 146, &c. Here “same” ineludes “similar.”

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[196]

sight know motion^^^. Whence it clearly follows that motion
perceivable by sight is of a sort distinct from motion perceivable
by touch. The antecedent I prove thus—By touch he could not
perceive any motion but what was up or down, to the right or
left, nearer or farther from him; besides these, and their several
varieties or complications, it is impossible he should have any
idea of motion. He would not therefore think anything to be
motion, or give the ñame motion to any idea, which he could
not range under some or other of those particular kinds thereof.
But, from sect. 95, it is plain that, by the mere act of visión, he
could not know motion upwards or downwards, to the right or
left, or in any other possible direction. From which I conclude,
he would not know motion at all at first sight. As for the idea of
motion in abstract, I shall not waste paper about it, but leave it
to my reader to make the best he can of it. To me it is perfectly
unintelligible^^^.

138. The consideration of motion may furnish a new field
for inquiry^^^. But, since the manner wherein the mind
apprehends by sight the motion of tangible objects, with the
various degrees thereof, may be easily collected from what
has been said concerning the manner wherein that sense doth
suggest their various distances, magnitudes, and situations, I
shall not enlarge any farther on this subject, but proceed to
inquire what may be alleged, with greatest appearance of reason,
against the proposition we have demonstrated to be true; for,
where there is so much prejudice to be encountered, a haré and
naked demonstration of the truth will scarce suffice. We must
also satisfy the surupíes that men may start in favour of their

^ i.e. visible and tangible motions being absolutely heterogeneous, and the
former, at man ’s point of view, only contingent signs of the latter, we should
not, at first sight, be able to interpret the visual signs of tactual phenomena.

Cf. sect. 122-125.

Cf. Principies, sect. 111-116; also Analyst, query 12. On Berkeley's system
space in its three dimensions is unrealisahle without experience of motion.

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preconceived notions, shew whence the mistake arises, how it
carne to spread, and carefully disclose and root out those false
persuasions that an early prejudice might ha ve implanted in the
mind.

139. First, therefore, it will be demanded how visible
extensión and figures come to be called by the same ñame
with tangible extensión and figures, if they are not of the same
kind with them? It must be something more than humour or
accident that could occasion a custom so constant and universal
as this, which has obtained in all ages and nations of the world,
and amongst all ranks of men, the learned as well as the illiterate.

140. To which 1 answer, we can no more argüe a visible and
tangible square to be of the same species, from their being called
by the same ñame, than we can that a tangible square, and the
monosyllable consisting of six letters whereby it is marked, are
of the same species, because they are both called by the same
ñame. It is customary to cali written words, and the things they
signify, by the same ñame: for, words not being regarded in their
own nature, or otherwise than as they are marks of things, it
had been superfluous, and beside the design of language, to have
given them ñames distinct from those of the things marked by
them. The same reason holds here also. Visible figures are the
marks of tangible figures; and, from sect. 59, it is plain that in
themselves they are little regarded, or upon any other score than
for their connexion with tangible figures, which by nature they
are ordained to signify. And, because this language of nature^^^
does not vary in different ages or nations, henee it is that in all [197]
times and places visible figures are called by the same ñames

as the respective tangible figures suggested by them; and not
because they are alike, or of the same sort with them.

141. But, say you, surely a tangible square is liker to a visible
square than to a visible circle: it has four angles, and as many

Here the term “language of nature” makes its appearance, as applicable to
the ideas or visual signs of tactual realities.

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[ 198 ]

sides; so also has the visible square—^but the visible circle has no
such thing, being bounded by one uniform curve, without right
Unes or angles, which makes it unfit to represen! the tangible
square, but very fit to represen! the tangible circle. Whence it
clearly follows, that visible figures are patterns of, or of the same
species with, the respective tangible figures represented by them;
that they are like unto them, and of their own nature fitted to
represen! them, as being of the same sort; and that they are in no
respect arbitrary signs, as words.

142. I answer, it must be acknowledged the visible square is
fitter than the visible circle to represen! the tangible square, but
then it is not because it is liker, or more of a species with it; but,
because the visible square contains in it several distinct parts,
whereby to mark the several distinct corresponding parts of a
tangible square, whereas the visible circle doth not. The square
perceived by touch hath four distinct equal sides, so also hath it
four distinct equal angles. It is therefore necessary that the visible
figure which shall be most proper to mark it contain four distinct
equal parts, corresponding to the four sides of the tangible square;
as likewise four other distinct and equal parts, whereby to denote
the four equal angles of the tangible square. And accordingly
we see the visible figures contain in them distinct visible parts,
answering to the distinct tangible parts of the figures signified or
suggested by them.

143. But, it will not henee follow that any visible figure is
like unto or of the same species with its corresponding tangible
figure—unless it be also shewn that not only the number, but
also the kind of the parts be the same in both. To illustrate this,
I observe that visible figures represen! tangible figures much
after the same manner that written words do sounds. Now, in
this respect, words are not arbitrary; it not being indifferent
what written word stands for any sound. But, it is requisite
that each word contain in it as many distinct characters as there
are variations in the sound it stands for. Thus, the single letter

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a is proper to mark one simple uniform sound; and the word
adultery is aeeommodated to represent the sound annexed to
it—in the formation whereof there being eight different eollisions
or modifieations of the air by the organs of speeeh, eaeh of whieh
produees a differenee of sound, it was fit the word representing
it should eonsist of as many distinet eharaeters, thereby to mark
eaeh partieular differenee or part of the whole sound. And yet
nobody, I presume, will say the single letter a, or the word
adultery, are alike unto or of the same speeies with the respeetive
sounds by them represented. It is indeed arbitrary that, in general,
letters of any language represent sounds at all; but, when that is
onee agreed, it is not arbitrary what eombination of letters shall
represent this or that partieular sound. I leave this with the reader
to pursue, and apply it in bis own thoughts.

144. It must be eonfessed that we are not so apt to eonfound
other signs with the things signified, or to think them of the
same speeies, as we are visible and tangible ideas. But, a little
eonsideration will shew us how this may well be, without our
supposing them of a like nature. These signs are eonstant and
universal; their eonnexion with tangible ideas has been learnt at
our first entranee into the world; and ever sinee, almost every
moment of our lives, it has been oeeurring to our thoughts,
and fastening and striking deeper on our minds. When we
observe that signs are variable, and of human institution; when
we remember there was a time they were not eonneeted in our
minds with those things they now so readily suggest, but that
their signifieation was learned by the slow steps of experienee:
this preserves us from eonfounding them. But, when we find the
same signs suggest the same things all over the world; when we
know they are not of human institution, and eannot remember
that we ever learned their signifieation, but think that at first
sight they would have suggested to us the same things they do
now: all this persuades us they are of the same speeies as the
things respeetively represented by them, and that it is by a natural

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[199]

resemblance they suggest them to our minds.

145. Add to this that whenever we make a nice survey of any
object, successively directing the optic axis to each point thereof,
there are certain Unes and figures, described by the motion of
the head or eye, which, being in truth perceived by feeling^^^,
do nevertheless so mix themselves, as it were, with the ideas of
sight that we can scarce think but they appertain to that sense.
Again, the ideas of sight enter into the mind several at once, more
distinct and unmingled than is usual in the other senses beside
the touch. Sounds, for example, perceived at the same instant,
are apt to coalesce, if 1 may so say, into one sound: but we
can perceive, at the same time, great variety of visible objects,
very sepárate and distinct from each other. Now, tangible^^^
extensión being made up of several distinct coexistent parts, we
may henee gather another reason that may dispose us to imagine
a likeness or analogy between the immediate objects of sight and
touch. But nothing, certainly, does more contribute to blend and
confound them together, than the strict and cióse connexion^^^
they have with each other. We cannot open our eyes but the
ideas of distance, bodies, and tangible figures are suggested by
them. So swift, and sudden, and unperceived is the transit from
visible to tangible ideas that we can scarce forbear thinking them
equally the immediate object of visión.

146. The prejudice'^'^^ which is grounded on these, and
whatever other causes may be assigned thereof, sticks so fast
on our understandings, that it is impossible, without obstínate
striving and labour of the mind, to get entirely olear of it. But
then the reluctancy we find in rejecting any opinión can be no
argument of its truth, to whoever considers what has been already

^ Cf. sect. 16, 27, 97.

Is “tangible” here used in its narrow meaning—excluding muscular and
locomotive experience?

i.e. as natural signs, divinely associated with their thus implied meanings.

Cf. New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 35.

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shewn with regard to the prejudices we entertain concerning the
distance, magnitude, and situation of objects; prejudices so
familiar to our minds, so confirmed and invetérate, as they will
hardly give way to the clearest demonstration.

147. Upon the whole, 1 think we may fairly conclude^^° that
the proper ohjects of Vision constitute the Universal Language of
Nature; wherehy we are instructed how to regúlate our actions, in
order to attain those things that are necessary to the preservation
and well-heing of our hodies, as also to avoid whatever may he
hurtful and destructive of them. It is by their Information that
we are principally guided in all the transactions and concerns of
Ufe. And the manner wherein they signify and mark out unto
US the objects which are at a distance is the same with that of
languages and signs of human appointment; which do not suggest
the things signified by any likeness or identity of nature, but only
by an habitual connexion that experience has made us to observe
between them"*^^

Berkeley, in this section, enuncíales the principal conclusión in the Essay,
which conclusión indeed forms his new theory of Vision.

A suggestion thus due to natural laws of association. The explanation of
the fact that we apprehend, by those ideas or phenomena which are objects of
sight, certain other ideas, which neither resemble them, ñor efficiently cause
them, ñor are so caused by them, ñor have any necessary connexion with
them, comprehends, according to Berkeley, the whole Theory of Vision. “The
imagination of every thinking person,” remarks Adam Smith, “will supply him
with instances to prove that the ideas received by any one of the senses do
readily excite such other ideas, either of the same sense or of any other, as have
habitually been associated with them. So that if, on this account, we are to
suppose, with a late ingenious writer, that the ideas of sight constitute a Visual
Language, because they readily suggest the corresponding ideas of touch—as
the terms of a language excite the ideas answering to them—I see not but
we may, for the same reason, allow of a tangible, audible, gustatory, and
olefactory language; though doubtless the Visual Language will be abundantly
more copious than the rest.” Smith's Optics. — Remarks, p. 29.—And into
this conception of a universal sense symbolism, Berkeley's theory of Visión
ultimately rises.

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[ 201 ]

148. Suppose one who had always continued blind be told
by his guide that after he has advanced so many steps he shall
come to the brink of a precipice, or be stopped by a wall; must
not this to him seem very admirable and surprising? He cannot
conceive how it is possible for mortals to frame such predictions
as these, which to him would seem as strange and unaccountable
as prophecy does to others. Even they who are blessed with the
visive faculty may (though familiarity make it less observed) find
therein sufficient cause of admiration. The wonderful art and
contrivance wherewith it is adj usted to those ends and purposes
for which it was apparently designed; the vast extent, number,
and variety of objects that are at once, with so much case, and
quickness, and pleasure, suggested by it—all these afford subject
for much and pleasing speculation, and may, if anything, give us
some glimmering analogous prsenotion of things, that are placed
beyond the certain discovery and comprehension of our present
state^^^.

149. I do not design to trouble myself much with drawing
corollaries from the doctrine I have hitherto laid down. If it
bears the test, others may, so far as they shall think convenient,
employ their thoughts in extending it farther, and applying it
to whatever purposes it may be subservient to. Only, I cannot
forbear making some inquiry concerning the object of geometry,
which the subject we have been upon does naturally lead one
to. We have shewn there is no such idea as that of extensión
in abstract"*^^; and that there are two kinds of sensible extensión
and figures, which are entirely distinct and heterogeneous from
each other^^^. Now, it is natural to inquire which of these is the
object of geometry"^^^.

Cf. Alciphron, Dialogue IV. sect. 11-15.

Sect. 122-125.

Sect. 127-138.

Some modern metaphysicians would say, that neither tangible ñor visible

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150. Some things there are whieh, at first sight, ineline one to
think geometry eonversant about visible extensión. The eonstant
use of the eyes, both in the praetieal and speeulative parts of that
seienee, doth very mueh induee us thereto. It would, without
doubt, seem odd to a mathematieian to go about to eonvinee
him the diagrams he saw upon paper were not the figures, or
even the likeness of the figures, whieh make the subjeet of
the demonstration—the eontrary being held an unquestionable
truth, not only by mathematieians, but also by those who apply
themselves more partieularly to the study of logie; 1 mean who
eonsider the nature of seienee, eertainty, and demonstration;

it being by them assigned as one reason of the extraordinary [ 202 ]
elearness and evidenee of geometry, that in that seienee the
reasonings are free from those ineonvenienees whieh attend the
use of arbitrary signs, the very ideas themselves being eopied
out, and exposed to view upon paper. But, by the bye, how well
this agrees with what they likewise assert of abstraet ideas being
the objeet of geometrieal demonstration 1 leave to be eonsidered.

151. To eome to a resolution in this point, we need only
observe what has been said in seet. 59, 60, 61, where it is
shewn that visible extensions in themselves are little regarded,
and have no settled determínate greatness, and that men measure
altogether by the applieation of tangible extensión to tangible
extensión. All whieh makes it evident that visible extensión and
figures are not the objeet of geometry.

152. It is therefore plain that visible figures are of the same
use in geometry that words are. And the one may as well
be aeeounted the objeet of that seienee as the other; neither
of them being any otherwise eoneerned therein than as they

extensión is the objeet geometry, but abstraet extensión; and others that space
is a neeessary implicate of sense-experienee, rather than, per se, an objeet of
any single sense. Cf. Kant's explanation of the origin of our mathematieal
knowledge, Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Elementarlehre, I.

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[203]

represent or suggest to the mind the particular tangible figures
connected with them. There is, indeed, this difference betwixt
the signification of tangible figures by visible figures, and of
ideas by words—that whereas the latter is variable and uncertain,
depending altogether on the arbitrary appointment of men, the
former is fixed, and immutably the same in all times and places.
A visible square, for instance, suggests to the mind the same
tangible figure in Europe that it doth in America. Henee it is,
that the voice of nature, which speaks to our eyes, is not hable
to that misinterpretation and ambiguity that languages of human
contrivance are unavoidably subject to^^^. From which may, in
some measure, be derived that peculiar evidence and clearness
of geometrical demonstrations.

153. Though what has been said may suffice to shew what
ought to be determined with relation to the object of geometry,
I shall, nevertheless, for the fuller illustration thereof, take into
my thoughts the case of an intelligence or unbodied spirit, which
is supposed to see perfectly well, i.e. to have a olear perception
of the proper and immediate objects of sight, but to have no
sense of touch^^^. Whether there be any such being in nature
or no, is beside my purpose to inquire; it suffices, that the
supposition contains no contradiction in it. Let us now examine
what proficiency such a one may be able to make in geometry.
Which speculation will lead us more clearly to see whether the
ideas of sight can possibly be the object of that Science.

154. First, then, it is certain the aforesaid intelligence could
have no idea of a solid or quantity of three dimensions, which
follows from its not having any idea of distance. We, indeed, are

Cf. sect. 51-66, 144.

This is a conjecture, not as to the probable ideas of one bom blind, but as to
the ideas of an “unbodied” intelligence, whose only sense was that of seeing.
See Reid's speculation (Inquiry, VI. 9) on the “Geometry of Visibles,” and the
mental experience of Idomenians, or imaginary beings supposed to have no
ideas of the material world except those got by seeing.

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prone to think that we have by sight the ideas of spaee and solids;
whieh arises from our imagining that we do, strietly speaking,
see distanee, and some parts of an objeet at a greater distanee
than others; whieh has been demonstrated to be the effeet of
the experienee we have had what ideas of toueh are eonneeted
with sueh and sueh ideas attending visión. But the intelligenee
here spoken of is supposed to have no experienee of toueh. He
would not, therefore, judge as we do, ñor have any idea of
distanee, outness, or profundity, ñor eonsequently of spaee or
body, either immediately or by suggestion. Whenee it is plain he
ean have no notion of those parts of geometry whieh relate to the
mensuration of solids, and their eonvex or eoneave surfaees, and
eontemplate the properties of Unes generated by the seetion of a
solid. The eoneeiving of any part whereof is beyond the reaeh of
his faeulties.

155. Farther, he eannot eomprehend the manner wherein
geometers describe a right Une or circle; the rule and compass,
with their use, being things of whieh it is impossible he should
have any notion. Ñor is it an easier matter for him to conceive
the placing of one plañe or angle on another, in order to prove
their equality; since that supposes some idea of distanee, or
external spaee. All whieh makes it evident our puré intelligenee [204]
could never attain to know so much as the first elements of plain
geometry. And perhaps, upon a nice inquiry, it will be found

he eannot even have an idea of plain figures any more than he
can of solids; since some idea of distanee is necessary to form
the idea of a geometrical plañe, as will appear to whoever shall
reflect a little on it.

156. All that is properly perceived by the visive faculty
amounts to no more than colours with their variations, and
different proportions of light and shade—^but the perpetual
mutability and fleetingness of those immediate objects of sight
render them incapable of being managed after the manner of
geometrical figures; ñor is it in any degree useful that they

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[ 205 ]

should. It is true there be divers of them perceived at once; and
more of some, and less of others: but accurately to compute their
magnitude, and assign precise determínate proportions between
things so variable and inconstant, if we suppose it possible to be
done, must yet be a very trifling and insignificant labour.

157. I must confess, it seems to be the opinión of some very
ingenious men that flat or plañe figures are immediate objects of
sight, though they acknowledge solids are not. And this opinión
of theirs is grounded on what is observed in painting, wherein
(say they) the ideas immediately imprinted in the mind are only
of planes variously coloured, which, by a sudden act of the
judgment, are changed into solids: but, with a little attention, we
shall find the planes here mentioned as the immediate objects of
sight are not visible but tangible planes. For, when we say that
pictures are planes, we mean thereby that they appear to the touch
smooth and uniform. But then this smoothness and uniformity,
or, in other words, this planeness of the picture is not perceived
immediately by visión; for it appeareth to the eye various and
multiform.

158. From all which we may conclude that planes are no
more the immediate object of sight than solids. What we strictly
see are not solids, ñor yet planes variously coloured—they are
only diversity of colours. And some of these suggest to the
mind solids, and others plañe figures; just as they have been
experienced to be connected with the one or the other: so that
we see planes in the same way that we see solids—^both being
equally suggested by the immediate objects of sight, which
accordingly are themselves denominated planes and solids. But,
though they are called by the same ñames with the things marked
by them, they are, nevertheless, of a nature entirely different, as
hath been demonstrated^^*.

Cf. sect. 130, and New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 57. Does
Berkeley, in this and the two preceding sections, mean to hint that the only
proper object of sight is unextended colour; and that, apart from muscular

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159. What has been said is, if I mistake not, sufficient to decide
the question we proposed to examine, concerning the ability of
a puré spirit, such as we have described, to know geometty.

It is, indeed, no easy matter for us to enter precisely into the
thoughts of such an intelligence; because we cannot, without
great pains, cleverly sepárate and disentangle in our thoughts the
proper objects of sight from those of touch which are connected
with them. This, indeed, in a complete degree seems scarce
possible to be performed; which will not seem strange to us, if
we consider how hard it is for any one to hear the words of his
native language, which is familiar to him, pronounced in his ears
without understanding them. Though he endeavour to disunite
the meaning from the sound, it will nevertheless intrude into his
thoughts, and he shall find it extreme difficult, if not impossible,
to put himself exactly in the posture of a foreigner that never
learnt the language, so as to be affected barely with the sounds
themselves, and not perceive the signification annexed to them.

160. By this time, I suppose, it is clear that neither abstract
ñor visible extensión makes the object of geometry; the not
discerning of which may, perhaps, have created some difficulty
and useless labour in mathematics. [^^^Sure I am that somewhat
relating thereto has occurred to my thoughts; which, though after
the most anxious and repeated examination I am forced to think
it true, doth, nevertheless, seem so far out of the common road
of geometry, that I know not whether it may not be thought
presumption if I should make it public, in an age wherein [206]
that Science hath received such mighty improvements by new
methods; great part whereof, as well as of the ancient discoveries,

movement in the eye or other locomotion, visibilia resolve into unextended
mathematical points? This question has not escaped more recent British
psychologists, including Stewart, Brown, Mili, and Bain, who seem to hold
that unextended colour is perceivable and imaginable.

The bracketed sentence is not retained in the author's last edition, in which
the first sentence of sect. 160 is the concluding one of sect. 159, and of the
Essay.

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may perhaps lose their reputation, and much of that ardour with
which men study the abstruse and fine geometry be abated, if
what to me, and those few to whom I have imparted it, seems
evidently ttue, should really prove to be so.]

[ 207 ]

An Appendix To The Essay On Vision

[This Appendix is contained only in the second edition.]

The censures which, I am informed, have been made on
the foregoing Essay inclined me to think I had not been clear
and express enough in some points; and, to prevent being
misunderstood for the future, I was willing to make any necessary
alterations or additions in what I had written. But that was
impracticable, the present edition having been almost finished
before I received this information. Wherefore, I think it proper
to consider in this place the principal objections that are come to
my notice.

In the first place, it is objected, that in the beginning of the
Essay I argüe either against all use of lines and angles in optics,
and then what I say is false; or against those writers only who
will have it that we can perceive by sense the optic axes, angles,
&c., and then it is insignificant, this being an absurdity which no
one ever held. To which I answer that I argüe only against those
who are of opinión that we perceive the distance of objects by
lines and angles, or, as they term it, by a kind of innate geometry.
And, to shew that this is not fighting with my own shadow, I shall
here set down a passage from the celebrated Des Cartes^^*^:—

This passage is contained in the Dioptrices of Descartes, VI. 13; see also

VI. 11.

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[ 208 ]

“Distantiam prseterea discimus, per mutuam quandam
conspirationem oculorum. Ut enim csecus noster dúo bacilla
tenens, A E e.t C E, áe. quorum longitudine incertus, solumque
intervallum manuum A et C, cum magnitudine angulorum A C
E, ti C A E exploratum habens, inde, ut ex Geometría quadam
ómnibus innata, scire potest ubi sit punctum E. Sic quum nostri
oculi R S T e.t r s t ambo, vertuntur ad X, magnitudo Unese
S s, et angulorum X S s X s S, certos nos reddunt ubi sit
punctum X. Et ídem opera alterutrius possumus indagare, loco
illum movendo, ut si versus X illum semper dirigentes, prime
sistamus in puncto S, et statim post in puncto s, hoc sufficiet
ut magnitudo Unese S s, et duorum angulorum X S s et X s S
nostrse imaginationi simul occurrant, et distantiam puncti X nos
edoceant: idque per actionem mentís, quse licet simplex judicium
esse videatur, ratiocinationem tamen quandam involutam habet,
similem illi, qua Geometrse per duas stationes diversas, loca
inaccessa dimetiuntur.”

An Appendix To The Essay On Vision

301

I might amass together citations from several authors to the
same purpose, but, this being so elear in the point, and from an
author of so great note, I shall not trouble the reader with any
more. What I have said on this head was not for the sake of
rinding fault with other men; but, beeause I judged it neeessary
to demónstrate in the first plaee that we neither see distanee
immediately, ñor yet pereeive it by the mediation of anything
that hath (as lines and angles) a neeessary eonnexion with it. For
on the demonstration of this point the whole theory depends^^^

Secondly, it is objeeted, that the explieation I give of the
appearanee of the horizontal moon (whieh may also be applied [209]
to the sun) is the same that Gassendus had given before. 1 answer,
there is indeed mention made of the grossness of the atmosphere
in both; but then the methods wherein it is applied to solve the
phenomenon are widely different, as will be evident to whoever
shall eompare what 1 have said on this subjeet with the following
words of Gassendus:—

“Reine diei posse videtur: solem humilem oeulo speetatum
ideo apparere majorem, quam dum altius egreditur, quia dum
vieinus est horizonti prolixa est series vaporum, atque adeo

The arbitrariness or contingeney—as far as our knowledge carries us—of
the eonnexion between the visual phenomena, as signs, on the one hand, and
actual distanee, as perceived through this means, on the other.

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[ 210 ]

corpusculorum quse solis radios ita retundunt, ut oculus miniis
conniveat, et pupilla quasi umbrefacta longe magis amplificetur,
quam dum solé multum elato rari vapores intercipiuntur, solque
ipse ita splendescit, ut pupilla in ipsum spectans contractissima
efficiatur. Nempe ex hoc esse videtur, cur visibilis species
ex solé procedens, et per pupillam amplificatam intromissa in
retinam, ampliorem in illa sedem occupet, majoremque proinde
creet solis apparentiam, quam dum per contractam pupillam
eodem intromissa contendit.” Vid. Epist. 1. De Apparente
Magnitudine Solis Humilis et Sublimis, p. 6. This solution of
Gassendus proceeds on a false principie, to wit, that the pupil's
being enlarged augments the species or image on the fund of the
eye.

Thirdly, against what is said in Sect. 80, it is objected, that the
same thing which is so small as scarce to be discerned by a man,
may appear like a mountain to some small insect; from which it
follows that the minimum visibile is not equal in respect of all
creatures^^^. I answer, if this objection be sounded to the bottom,
it will be found to mean no more than that the same partióle
of matter which is marked to a man by one minimum visibile,
exhibits to an insect a great number of mínima visibilia. But
this does not prove that one minimum visibile of the insect is not
equal to one minimum visibile of the man. The not distinguishing
between the medíate and immediate objects of sight is, I suspect,
a cause of misapprehension in this matter.

Some other misinterpretations and difficulties have been
made, but, in the points they refer to, I have endeavoured to be so
very plain that I know not how to express myself more clearly.
All I shall add is, that if they who are pleased to criticise on
my Essay would but read the whole over with some attention,
they might be the better able to comprehend my meaning, and

Cf. sect. 80-83.

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303

consequently to judge of my mistakes.

I am informed that, soon after the first edition of this treatise,
a man somewhere near London was made to see, who had been
born blind, and continued so for about twenty years^^^. Such
a one may be supposed a proper judge to deeide how far some
tenets laid down in several plaees of the foregoing Essay are
agreeable to truth; and if any eurious person hath the opportunity
of making proper interrogatories to him thereon, I should gladly
see my notions either amended or eonfirmed by experienee^^^.

[ 211 ]

The reference here seems to be to the case described in the Tañer (No. 55)
of August 16, 1709, in which William Jones, born blind, had received sight
after a surgical operation, at the age of twenty, on the 29th of June preceding.
A medical narrative of this case appeared, entitled A/mH and trae account ofa
miraculous cure ofa Young Man in Newington, who was born blind, and was
infive minutes brought to perfect sight, by Mr. Roger Grant, oculist. London,
1709.

Cf. New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 71, with the relative note.

A Treatise Concerning The
Principies Of Human Knowledge

[213]

[465pART I]

WHEREIN THE CHIEE CAUSES OE ERROR AND
DIEEICUETY IN THE SCIENCES, WITH THE GROUNDS
OE SCEPTICISM, ATHEISM, AND IRREEIGION, ARE
INQUIRED INTO

First Published in 1710

Omitted on the title-page in the second edition, but retained in the body of
the Work.

Editor's Preface To The Treatise Concerning
The Principies Of Human Knowledge

This book of Principies contains the most systematic and
reasoned exposition of Berkeley's philosophy, in its early stage,
which we possess. Like the Essay on Vision, its tentative pioneer,
it was prepared at Trinity College, Dublin. Its author had hardly
eompleted bis twenty-fifth year when it was published. The first
edition of this “First Part” of the projeeted Treatise, “printed
by Aaron Rhames, for Jeremy Pepyat, bookseller in Skinner
Row, Dublin,” appeared early in 1710. A seeond edition, with
minor ehanges, and in whieh “Part I” was withdrawn from the
title-page, was published in London in 1734, “printed for Jaeob
Tonson”—on the eve of Berkeley's settlement at Cloyne. It was
the last in the author's lifetime. The projeeted “Seeond Part”
of the Principies was never given to the world, and we ean
hardly eonjeeture its design. In a letter in 1729 to his Ameriean
friend, Samuel Johnson, Berkeley mentions that he had “made
eonsiderable progress on the Seeond Part,” but “the manuseript,”
he adds, “was lost about fourteen years ago, during my travels in
Italy; and I never had leisure sinee to do so disagreeable a thing [2i4]
as writing twiee on the same subjeed^^.”

An edition of the Principies appeared in London in 1776,
twenty-three years after Berkeley's death, with a running
eommentary of Remarks by the anonymous editor, on the pages
opposite the text, in whieh, aeeording to the editor, Berkeley's
doetrines are “earefuhy examined, and shewn to be repugnant to
faet, and his prineiples to be ineompatible with the eonstitution of
human nature and the reason and fitness of things.” In this volume
the Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous are appended to the
Principies, and a “Philosophieal Diseourse eoneerning the nature

Beardsley's Life and Correspondence of Samuel Johnson, D.D., First
President of King's College, New York, p. 72 (1874).

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[215]

of Human Being” is prefixed to the whole, “being a defence of
Mr. Locke's principies, and some remarks on Dr. Beattie's Essay
on Truth” by the author of the Remarks on Berkeley's Principies.
The acuteness of the Remarks is not in proportion to their bulk
and diffuseness: many popular misconceptions of Berkeley are
served up, without appreciation of the impotence of matter, and
of natural causation as only passive sense-symbolism, which is
at the root of the theory of the material world against which the
Remarks are directed.

The Kantian and post-Kantian Idealism that is characteristic
of the nineteenth century has recalled attention to Berkeley,
who had produced his spiritual philosophy under the prevailing
conditions of English thought in the preceding age, when Idealism
in any form was uncongenial. In 1869 the book of Principies
was translated into Germán, with annotations, by Ueberweg,
professor of philosophy at Konigsberg, the university of Kant.
The Clarendon Press edition of the Collected Works of Berkeley
followed in 1871. In 1874 an edition of the Principies, by
Dr. Kranth, Professor of Philosophy in the university of
Pennsylvania, appeared in America, with annotations drawn
largely from the Clarendon Press edition and Ueberweg. In 1878
Dr. Collyns Simón republished the Principies, with discussions
based upon the text, followed by an appendix of remarks on Kant
and Hume in their relation to Berkeley.

The book of Principies, as we have it, must be taken as a
systematic fragment of an incompletely developed philosophy.
Many years after its appearance, the author thus describes the
conditions:—“It was published when I was very young, and
without doubt hath many defects. For though the notions should
be true (as I verily think they are), yet it is difficult to express them
clearly and consistently, language being framed for common use
and received prejudices. I do not therefore pretend that my books
can teach truth. All I hope for is that they may be an occasion

307

to inquisitive men of discovering truth^^^.” Again:—“I had no
inclination to trouble the world with large volumes. What I have
done was rather with the view of giving hints to thinking men,
who have leisure and euriosity to go to the bottom of things, and
pursue them in their own minds. Two or three times reading
these small traets {Essay on Vision, Principies, Dialogues, De
Mota), and making what is read the oeeasion of thinking, would, I
believe, render the whole familiar and easy to the mind, and take
off that shoeking appearanee whieh hath often been observed
to attend speeulative truths^^^.” The ineitements to further and
deeper thought thus proposed have met with a more sympathetie
response in this generation than in the lifetime of Berkeley.

There is internal evidenee in the book of Principies that its
author had been a diligent and eritieal student of Loeke's Essay.

Like the Essay, it is dedieated to the Earl of Pembroke. The word
idea is not less eharaeteristie of the Principies than of the Essay, [2i6]
although Berkeley generally uses it with a narrower applieation
than Loeke, eonfining it to phenomena presented objeetively to
our senses, and their subjeetive reproduetions in imagination.

With both Berkeley and Loeke objeetive phenomena (under the
ñame of ideas) are the materials supplied to man for eonversion
into natural seienee. Loeke's reduetion of ideas into simple and
eomplex, as well as some of his subdivisions, reappear with
modifieations in the Principies. Berkeley's aeeount of Substanee
and Power, Spaee and Time, while different from Loeke's,
still bears marks of the Essay. Conerete Substanee, whieh in
its ultimate meaning mueh perplexes Loeke, is identified with
the personal pronouns “I” and “yon” by Berkeley, and is thus
spiritualised. Cause proper, or Power, he finds only in the
voluntary aetivity of persons. Spaee is presented to us in our

Beardsley's Life of Johnson, pp. 71, 72.

Chandler's Life of Johnson, Appendix, p. 161.

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[217]

sensuous experience of resistance to organic movements; while
it is symbolised in terms of phenomena presented to sight, as
already explained in the Essay on Vision. Time is revealed in
our actual experience of change in the ideas or phenomena of
which we are percipient in sense; length of time being calculated
by the changes in the adopted measure of duration. Infinite
space and infinite time, being necessarily incapable of finite
ideation, are dismissed as abstractions that for man must always
be empty of realisable meaning. Indeed, the Commonplace Book
shews that Locke influenced Berkeley as much by antagonism
as otherwise. “Such was the candour of that great man that
I persuade myself, were he alive, he would not be offended
that I differed from him, seeing that in so doing I follow his
advice to use my own judgment, see with my own eyes and
not with another's.” So he argües against Locke's opinions about
the infinity and eternity of space, and the possibility of matter
endowed with power to think, and urges his inconsistency in
treating some qualities of matter as wholly material, while he
insists that others, under the ñame of “secondary,” are necessarily
dependen! on sentient intelligence. Above all he assails Locke's
“abstrae! ideas” as germs of scepticism—interpreting Locke's
meaning paradoxically.

Next to Locke, Descartes and Malebranche are prominent
in the Principies. Recognition of the ultimate supremacy of
Spirit, or the spiritual character of active power and the constan!
agency of God in nature, suggested by Descartes, was congenial
to Berkeley, but he was opposed to the mechanical conception
of the universe found in the Cartesian physical treatises. That
thought is synonymous with existence is a formula with which
the French philosopher might make him familiar, as well as with
the assumption that ideas only are immediate objects of human
perception; an assumption in which Descartes was followed
by Locke, and philosophical thinkers in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries, but under differing interpretations of the

309

term idea.

Malebranche appears less in the Principies than Locke and
Descartes. In early Ufe, at any rate, Berkeley would be less
at borne in the “divine visión” of Malebranche than among the
“ideas” of Locke. The mysticism of the Recherche de la Vérité
is unlike the transparent lucidity of Berkeley's juvenile thought.
But the subordinate place and office of the material world in
Malebranche's system, and his conception of power as wholly
spiritual, approached the New Principies of Berkeley.

Plato and Aristotle hardly appear, either by ñame or as
characteristic influence, in the book of Principies, which in
this respect contrasts with the abundant references to ancient and
mediaeval thinkers in Siris, and to a less extent in the De Motu
and Alciphron.

The Introduction to the Principies is a proclamation of war
against “abstract ideas,” which is renewed in the body of the [ 2 i 8 ]
Work, and again more than once in the writings of Berkeley's early
and middle Ufe, but is significantly withdrawn in his oíd age. In
the ardour of youth, his prime remedy for anarchy in philosophy,
and for the sceptical disposition which philosophy had been
apt to generate, was suppression of abstract ideas as impossible
ideas—empty ñames heedlessly accepted as ideas—an evil to
be counteracted by steady adherence to the concrete experience
found in our senses and inner consciousness. Never to lose
our hold of positivo facts, and always to individualise general
conceptions, are regulativo maxims by which Berkeley would
make us govern our investigation of ultímate problems. He takes
up his position in the actual universo of applied reason; not
in the empty void of abstract reason, remóte from particulars
and succession of change, in which no real existence is found.

All realisable ideas must be either concrete data of sense, or
concrete data of inward consciousness. It is relations embodied
in particular facts, not pretended abstract ideas, that give fruitful

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meaning to common terms. Abstrae! matter, abstract substance,
abstract power, abstract space, abstract time—unindividualisable
in sense or in imagination—must all be void of meaning; the
issue of unlawful analysis, which pretends to find what is real
without the concrete ideas that make the real, because percipient
spirit is the indispensable factor of all reality. The only lawful
abstraction is nominal —the application, that is to say, of a ñame
in common to an indefinito number of things which resemble one
another. This is Berkeley's “Nominalism.”

Berkeley takes Locke as the representative advócate of the
“abstract ideas” against which he wages war in the Introduction
to the Principies. Under cover of an ambiguity in the term
idea, he is unconsciously fighting against a man of straw. He
supposes that Locke means by idea only a concrete datum of
sense, or of imagination; and he argües that we cannot without
contradiction abstract from all such data, and yet retain idea.
But Locke ineludes among his ideas intellectual relations—what
Berkeley himself afterwards distinguished as notions, in contras!
with ideas. This polemic against Locke is therefore one of
verbal confusión. In later life he probably saw this, as he saw
deeper into the whole question involved. This is suggested
by the omission of the argument against abstract ideas, given
in earlier editions of Alciphron, from the edition published a
year before he died. In his juvenile attack on abstractions, his
characteristic impetuosity seems to carry him to the extreme of
rejecting rational relations that are involved in the objectivity of
sensible things and natural order, thus resting experience at last
only on phenomena—particular and contingent.

A preparatory draft of the Introduction to the Principies, which
1 found in the manuscript department of the library of Trinity
College, Dublin, is printed in the appendix to this edition of
Berkeley's Philosophical Works. The variations are of some
Ínteres!, biographical and philosophical. It seems to have been
written in the autumn of 1708, and it may with advantage be

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compared with the text of the finished Introduction, as well as
with numerous relative entries in the Commonplace Book.

After this Introduction, the New Principies themselves
are evolved, in a corresponding spirit of hostility to empty
abstractions. The sections may be thus divided:—

i. Rationale of the Principies (sect. 1-33).

ii. Supposed Objections to the Principies answered (sect.
34-84).

iii. Consequences and Applications of the Principies (sect.
85-156).

i. Rationale of the Principies.

The reader may remember that one of the entries in the
Commonplace Book runs as follows:—“To begin the First Book,
not with mention of sensation and reflexión, but, instead of
sensation, to use perception, or thought in general.” Berkeley
seems there to be oscillating between Locke and Descartes.
He now adopts Locke's account of the materials of which our
concrete experience consists (sect. 1). The data of human
knowledge of existence are accordingly found in the ideas,
phenomena, or appearances (a) of which we are percipient in the
senses, and {b) of which we are conscious when we attend to our
inward passions and operations—all which make up the original
contents of human experience, to be reproduced in new forms
and arrangements, (c) in memory and {d) imagination and (e)
expectation. Those materials are called ideas because living mind
or spirit is the indispensable realising factor: they all presuppose
living mind, spirit, self, or ego to realise and elabórate them
(sect. 2). This is implied in our use of personal pronouns, which
signify, not ideas of any of the preceding kinds, but that which is
“entirely distinct from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the

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same thing, by which they are perceived.” In this fundamental
presupposition Descartes is more apparent than Locke, and there
is even an unconscious forecast of Kant and Hegel.

Berkeley next faces a New Question which his New Principies
are intended to answer. How is the concrete world that is
presented to our senses related to Mind or Spirit? Is all or any of
its reality independent of percipient experience? Is it true that the
phenomena of which we are percipient in sense are ultimately
independent of all percipient and conscious life, and are even
the ultímate basis of all that is real? Must we recognise in the
phenomena of Matter the substance of what we cali Mind?
For do we not find, when we examine Body and Spirit mutually
related in our personality, that the latter is more dependent on
the former, and on the physical cosmos of which the former is a
part, than our body and its bodily surroundings are dependent on
Spirit? In short, is not the universe of existence, in its final form,
only lifeless Matter?

The claim of Matter to be supreme is what Berkeley produces
his Principies in order to reduce. Concrete reality is self-
evidently unreal, he argües, in the total absence of percipient
Spirit, for Spirit is the one realising factor. Try to imagine
the material world unperceived and you are trying to picture
empty abstraction. Wholly material matter is self-evidently an
inconceivable absurdity; a universe emptied of all percipient life
is an impossible universe. The material world becomes real
in being perceived: it depends for its reality upon the spiritual
realisation. As colours in a dark room become real with the
introduction of light, so the material world becomes real in the
life and agency of Spirit. It must exist in terms of sentient life
and percipient intelligence, in order to rise into any degree of
reality that human beings at least can be at all concerned with,
either speculatively or practically. Matter totally abstracted from
percipient spirit must go the way of all abstrae! ideas. It is an
illusion, concealed by confused thought and abuse of words; yet

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from obvious causes strong enough to stifle faith in this latent
but self-evident Principie—that the universe of sense-presented
phenomena can have concrete existence only in and by sentient
intelligence. It is the reverse of this Principie that Berkeley takes
to have been “the chief source of all that scepticism and folly,
all those contradictions and inexplicable puzzling absurdities,
that have in all ages been a reproach to human reason^^^.” And
indeed, when it is fully understood, it is seen in its own light to [ 222 ]
be the chief of “those truths which are so near and obvious to the
mind, that a man need only open his eyes to see them. For such
1 take this important one to be—that all the choir of heaven and
furniture of the Earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose
the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without
a Mind” (sect. 6). Living Mind or Spirit is the indispensable
factor of all realities that are presented to our senses, including,
of course, our own bodies.

Yet this Principie, notwithstanding its intuitive certainty, needs
to be evoked by reflection from the latency in which it lies
concealed, in the confused thought of the unreflecting. It is
only gradually, and with the help of reasoning, that the world
presented to the senses is distinctly recognised in this its deepest
and truest reality. And even when we see that the phenomena
immediately presented to our senses need to be realised in
percipient experience, in order to be concretely real, we are
ready to ask whether there may not be substances like the things
so presented, which can exist “without mind,” or in a wholly
material way (sect. 8). Nay, are there not some of the phenomena
immediately presented to our senses which do not need living
mind to make them real? It is allowed by Locke and others that
all those qualities of matter which are called secondary cannot be
wholly material, and that living mind is indispensable for their
realisation in nature; but Locke and the rest argüe, that this is

Commonplace Book.

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not so with the qualities which they cali primary, and which they
regard as of the essence of matter. Colours, sounds, tastes, smells
are all allowed to be not wholly material; but are not the size,
shape, situation, solidity, and motion of bodies qualities that are
real without need for the realising agency of any Mind or Spirit
in the universe, and which would continué to be what they are
now if all Spirit, divine or human, ceased to exist?

The supposition that some of the phenomena of what is called
Matter can be real, and yet wholly material, is discussed in
sections 9-15, in which it is argued that the things of sense
cannot exist really, in any of their manifestations, unless they are
brought into reality in some percipient life and experience. It is
held impossible that any quality of matter can have the reality
which we all attribute to it, unless it is spiritually realised (sect.
15).

But may Matter not be real apart from all its so-called qualities,
these being allowed to be not wholly material, because real only
within percipient spirit? May not this wholly material Matter be
Something that, as it were, exists behind the ideas, phenomena,
or qualities that make their appearance to human beings? This
question, Berkeley would say, is a meaningless and wholly
unpractical one. Material substance that makes and can make no
real appearance—unphenomenal or unideal—stripped of all its
qualities—is only “another ñame for abstrae! Being,” and “the
abstrae! idea of Being appeareth to me the most incomprehensible
of all other. When 1 consider the two parts or branches which
make up the words material substance, 1 am convinced there is
no distinct meaning annexed to them” (sect. 17). Neither Sense
ñor Reason inform us of the existence of real material substances
that exist abstractly, or out of all relation to the secondary and
primary qualities of which we are percipient when we exercise
our senses. By our senses we cannot perceive more than ideas or
phenomena, aggregated as individual things that are presented to
us: we cannot perceive substances that make no appearance in

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sense. Then as for reason, unrealised substances, abstracted from
living Spirit, human or divine, being altogether meaningless, can
in no way explain the concrete realisations of human experience.

In short, if there are wholly unphenomenal material substances,
it is impossible that we should ever discover them, or have any [224]
concern with them, speculative or practical; and if there are not,
we should have the same reason to assert that there are which
we have now (sect. 20). It is impossible to put any meaning into
wholly abstrae! reality. “To me the words mean either a direct
contradiction, or nothing at all” (sect. 24).

The Principie that the esse of matter necessarily involves
percipi, and its correlative Principie that there is not any other
substance than Spirit, which is thus the indispensable factor
of all reality, both lead on to the more obviously practical
Principie—that the material world, per se, is wholly powerless,
and that all changes in Nature are the immediate issue of the
agency of Spirit (sect. 25-27). Concrete power, like concrete
substance, is essentially spiritual. To be satisfied that the whole
natural world is only the passive instrument and expression
of Spiritual Power we are asked to analyse the sensuous data
of experience. We can find no reason for attributing inherent
power to any of the phenomena and phenomenal things that
are presented to our senses, or for supposing that they can be
active causes, either of the changes that are continuously in
progress among themselves, or of the feelings, perceptions, and
volitions of which spiritual beings are conscious. We find the
ideas or phenomena that pass in procession before our senses
related to one another as signs to their meanings, in a cosmical
order that virtually makes the material world a language and a
prophecy: but this cosmical procession is not found to originate
in the ideas or phenomena themselves, and there is reason for
supposing it to be maintained by ever-living Spirit, which thus
not only substantiates the things of sense, but explains their laws

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of motion and their movements.

Yet the universe of reality is not exclusively One Spirit.
Experience contradicts the supposition. I find on trial that my
personal power to produce changes in the ideas or phenomena
which my senses present to me is a limited power (sect. 28-
33). 1 can make and unmake my own fancies, but 1 cannot
with like freedom make and unmake presentations of sense.
When in daylight 1 open my eyes, it is not in my power to
determine whether 1 shall see or not; ñor is it in my power
to determine what objects 1 shall see. The cosmical order of
sense-phenomena is independen! of my will. When 1 employ
my senses, 1 find myself always confronted by sensible signs
of perfect Reason and omnipresent Will. But 1 also awake
in the faith that 1 am an individual person. And the sense-
symbolism of which the material world consists, while it keeps
me in constan! and immediate relation to the Universal Spirit,
whose language it is, keeps me likewise in intercourse with
other persons, akin to myself, who are signified to me by their
overt actions and articúlate words, which enter into my sensuous
experience. Sense-given phenomena thus, among their other
instrumental offices, are the médium of communication between
human beings, who by this means can find companions, and make
signs to them. So while, at our highest point of view, Nature is
Spirit, experience shews that there is room in the universe for a
plurality of persons, individual, and in a measure free or morally
responsible. If Berkeley does not say all this, his New Principies
tend thus.

At any rate, in his reasoned exposition of his Principies he
is anxious to distinguish those phenomena that are presented to
the senses of all mankind from the prívate ideas or fancies of
individual men (sect. 28-33). The former constitute the world
which sentient beings realise in common. He calis them ideas
because they are unrealisable without percipient mind; but still
on the understanding that they are not to be confounded with

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the chimeras of imagination. They are more deeply and truly
real than ehimeras. The groups in whieh they are found to [226]
eoexist are the individual things of sense, whose fixed order
of sueeession exemplifies what we eall natural law, or natural
eausation: the eorrelation of their ehanges to our pleasures and
pains, desires and aversions, makes seientifie knowledge of their
laws praetieally important to the life of man, in his embodied
State.

Moreover, the real ideas presented to our senses, unlike
those of imagination, Berkeley would imply, eannot be either
representative or misrepresentative. Our imagination may
mislead us: the original data of sense eannot: although we
may, and often do, misinterpret their relations to one another,
and to our pleasures and pains and higher faeulties. The divine
meaning with whieh they are eharged, of whieh seienee is a partial
expression, they may perhaps be said to represent. Otherwise
representative sense-pereeption is absurdity: the ideas of sense
eannot be representative in the way those of imagination are; for
faneies are faint representations of data of sense. The appearanees
that sentient intelligenee realises are the things of sense, and we
eannot go deeper. If we prefer aeeordingly to eall the material
World a dream or a ehimera, we must understand that it is the
reasonable dream in whieh all sentient intelligenee partieipates,
and by whieh the embodied life of man must be regulated.

Has Berkeley, in his juvenile ardour, and with the impetuosity
natural to him, while seeking to demónstrate the impotenee of
matter, and the omnipresent supremaey of Spirit, so spiritualised
the material world as to make it unfit for the symbolieal offiee
in the universe of reality whieh he supposes it to diseharge? Is
its potential existenee in God, and its pereipient realisation by
me, and presumably by innumerable other sentient beings, an
adequate aeeount of the real material world existing in plaee
and time? Can this universal orderly dream experieneed in

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sense involve the objectivity implied in its being the reliable
médium of social intercourse? Does such a material world
provide me with a means of escape from absolute solitude?
Nay, if Matter cannot rise into reality without percipient spirit as
realising factor, can my individual percipient spirit realise myself
without independent Matter? Without intelligent life Matter is
pronounced unreal. But is it not also true that without Matter, and
the special material organism we cali our body, percipient spirit is
unreal? Does not Nature seem as indispensable to Spirit as Spirit
is to Nature? Must we not assume at least their unbeginning and
unending coexistence, even if we recognise in Spirit the deeper
and truer reality? Do the New Principies explain the final ground
of trust and certainty about the universe of change into which 1
entered as a stranger when 1 was born? If they make all that 1
have believed in as outward to be in its reality inward, do they
not disturb the balance that is necessary to all human certainties,
and leave me without any realities at all?

That Berkeley at the age of twenty-five, and educated chiefly
by Locke, had fathomed or even entertained all these questions
was hardly to be looked for. How far he had gone may be
gathered by a study of the sequel of bis book of Principies.

ii. Objections to the New Principies answered (sect.
34 - 84 ).

The supposed Objections, with Berkeley's answers, may be thus
interpreted:—

First objection. (Sect. 34-40.) The preceding Principies banish
all substantial realities, and substitute a universe of chimeras.

Answer. This objection is a play upon the popular meaning
of the Word “idea.” That ñame is appropriate to the phenomena
presented in sense, because they become concrete realities only
in the experience of living Spirit; and so it is not confined

[ 228 ]

319

to the chimeras of individual fancy, which may misrepresent
the real ideas of sense that are presented in the natural system
independently of our will.

Second objection. (Seet. 41.) The preeeding Prineiples abolish
the distinetion between Pereeption and Imagination—^between
imagining one's self burnt and aetually being burnt.

Answer. Real fire differs from faneied fire: as real pain does
from faneied pain; yet no one supposes that real pain any more
than imaginary pain ean exist unfelt by a sentient intelligenee.

Third objection. (Seet. 42-44.) We aetually see sensible things
existing at a distanee from our bodies. Now, whatever is seen
existing at a distanee must be seen as existing external to us in
our bodies, whieh eontradiets the foregoing Prineiples.

Answer. Distanee, or outness, is not visible. It is a eoneeption
whieh is suggested gradually, by our experienee of the eonnexion
between visible eolours and eertain visual sensations that
aeeompany seeing, on the one hand, and our taetual experienee,
on the other—as was proved in the Essay on Vision, in whieh the
ideality of the visible world is demonstrated^^°.

Fourth objection. (Seet. 45-48.) It follows from the
New Prineiples, that the material world must be undergoing
eontinuous annihilation and reereation in the innumerable
sentient experienees in whieh it beeomes real.

Answer. Aeeording to the New Prineiples a thing may be
realised in the sense-experienee of other minds, during intervals
of its pereeption by my mind; for the Prineiples do not affirm
dependenee only on this or that mind, but on a living Mind. [229]
If this implies a eonstant ereation of the material world, the
eoneeption of the universe as in a State of eonstant ereation is not
new, and it signally displays Divine Providenee.

Moreover, even if the outness or distanee of things were visible, it would
not follow that either they or their distances could be real if unperceived. On
the contrary, Berkeley implies that they are perceived visually.

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Fifth objection. (Sect. 49.) If extensión and extended Matter
can exist only in mind, it follows that extensión is an attribute of
mind—that mind is extended.

Answer. Extensión and other sensible qualities exist in mind,
not as modes of mind, which is unintelligible, but as ideas of
which Mind is percipient; and this is absolutely inconsistent with
the supposition that Mind is itself extended^’^

Sixth objection. (Sect. 50.) Natural philosophy proceeds on
the assumption that Matter is independent of percipient mind,
and it thus contradicts the New Principies.

Answer. On the contrary, Matter—if it means what exists
abstractly, or in independence of all percipient Mind—is useless
in natural philosophy, which is conversan! exclusively with the
ideas or phenomena that compose concrete things, not with empty
abstractions.

Seventh objection. (Sect. 51.) To refer all change to spiritual
agents alone, and to regard the things of sense as wholly impotent,
thus discharging natural causes as the New Principies do, is at
variance with human language and with good sense.

Answer. While we may speak as the multitude do, we should
learn to think with the few who reflect. We may still speak of
“natural causes,” even when, as philosophers, we recognise that
all true efficiency must be spiritual, and that the material world
is only a system of sensible symbols, regulated by Divine Will
and revealing Omnipresent Mind.

Eighth objection. (Sect. 54, 55.) The natural belief of men
seems inconsistent with the world being mind-dependent.

It is also to be remembered that sensible things exist “in mind,” without
being exclusively mine, as creatures of my will. In one sense, that only is
mine in which my will exerts itself. But, in another view, my involuntary
States of feeling and imagination are mine, because their existence depends on
my consciousness of them; and even sensible things are so far mine, hecause,
though present in many minds in common, they are, for me, dependent on my
percipient mind.

321

Answer. Not so when we consider that men seldom
comprehend the deep meaning of their practical assumptions;
and when we reeolleet the prejudiees, onee dignified as good
sense, whieh have sueeessively surrendered to philosophy.

Ninth objection. (Seet. 56, 57.) Any Prineiple that is
ineonsistent with our common faith in the existenee of the
material world must be rejeeted.

Answer. The faet that we are eonseious of not being ourselves
the eause of ehanges perpetually going on in our sense-ideas,
some of whieh we gradually learn by experienee to foresee,
suffieiently aeeounts for the common belief in the independence
of those ideas, and is what men truly mean by this.

Tenth objection. (Seet. 58, 59.) The foregoing Principies
concerning Matter and Spirit are ineonsistent with the laws
of motion, and with other truths in mathematics and natural
philosophy.

Answer. The laws of motion, and those other truths, may be
all conceived and expressed in consistency with the absence of
independent substance and causation in Matter.

Eleventh objection. (Seet. 60-66.) If, according to the
foregoing Principies, the material world is merely phenomena
presented by a Power not-ourselves to our senses, the elabórate
contrivances whieh we find in Nature are useless; for we might
have had all experiences that are needful without them, by the
direct agency of God.

Answer. Elabórate contrivances in Nature are relatively
necessary as signs: they express to us the occasional presence
and some of the experienee of other men, also the constant
presence and power of the Universal Spirit, while the scientific
interpretation of elaborately constituted Nature is a beneficial
moral and intellectual exercise.

Twelfth objection. (Seet. 67-79.) Although the impossibility
of active Matter may be demonstrable, this does not prove the

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impossibility of inactive Matter, neither solid ñor extended,
which may be the occasion of our having sense-ideas.

Answer. This supposition is unintelligible: the words in which
it is expressed convey no meaning.

Thirteenth objection. (Sect. 80, 81.) Matter may be an
unknowable Somewhat, neither substance ñor accident, cause
ñor effect, spirit ñor idea: all the reasonings against Matter,
conceived as something positive, fail, when this wholly negative
notion is maintained.

Answer. This is to use the word “Matter” as people use the
Word “nothing”: Unknowable Somewhat cannot be distinguished
from nothing.

Fourteenth objection. (Sect. 82-84.) Although we cannot, in
opposition to the New Principies, infer scientifically the existence
of Matter, in abstraction from all realising percipient life, or form
any conception, positive or negative, of what Matter is; yet Holy
Scripture demands the faith of every Christian in the independent
reality of the material world.

Answer. The independent reality of the material world is
nowhere affirmed in Scripture.

iii. Consequences and Applications of the New
Principies (sect. 85-156).

In this portion of the Treatise, the New Principies, already
guarded against objections, are applied to enlighten and
invigorate final faith, often suffering from the paralysis of
the scepticism produced by materialism; also to improve the
Sciences, including those which relate to Mind, in man and in
God. They are applied:—

1. To the refutation of Scepticism as to the reality of the world
(sect. 85-91) and God (sect. 92-96);

323

2. To the liberation of thought from the bondage of
unmeaning abstractions (sect. 97-100);

3. To the purification of Natural Philosophy, by making it
an interpretation of ideas of sense, simply in their relations of
coexistence and sequence, according to which they constitute
the Divine Language of Nature (sect. 101-116);

4. To simplify Mathematics, by eliminating infinites and
otherempty abstractions (sect. 117-134);

5. To explain and sustain faith in the Immortality of men
(sect. 135-144);

6. To explain the belief which each man has in the
existence of other men; as signified to him in and through
sense-symbolism (sect. 145);

7. To vindícate faith in God, who is signified in and
through the sense-symbolism of universal nature (sect. 146-
156).

It was only by degrees that Berkeley's New Principies attracted
attention. A new mode of conceiving the world we live in, by
a young and unknown author, published at a distance from the
centre of English intellectual Ufe, was apt to be overlooked. In
connexion with the Essay on Vision, however, it drew enough of
regard to make Berkeley an object of interest to the literary world
on his first visit to London, three years after its publication.

[ 233 ]

Dedication

[234]

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THOMAS, EARE OE PEMBROKE^’^

KNIGHT OE THE MOST NOBEE ORDER OE THE
GARTER, AND ONE OE THE EORDS OE HER MAJESTY'S
MOST HONOURABEE PRIVY COUNCIE
My Eord,

You will perhaps wonder that an obscure person, who has
not the honour to be known to your lordship, should presume
to address you in this manner. But that a man who has written
something with a design to promote Useful Knowledge and
Religión in the world should make ehoiee of your lordship for
his patrón, will not be thought strange by any one that is not
altogether unaequainted with the present State of the ehureh and
learning, and eonsequently ignorant how great an ornament and
support you are to both. Yet, nothing eould have indueed me
to make you this present of my poor endeavours, were I not
eneouraged by that eandour and native goodness whieh is so
bright a part in your lordship's eharaeter. I might add, my lord,
that the extraordinary favour and bounty you have been pleased
to shew towards our Soeiety^^^ gave me hopes you would not
be unwilling to eountenanee the studies of one of its members.

Thomas Herbert, eighth Earl of Pembroke and fifth Earl of Montgomery,
was the correspondent and friend of Locke—who dedicated his famous Essay
to him, as a work “having some little correspondence with some parts of that
nobler and vast system of the Sciences your lordship has made so new, exact,
and instructive a draft of.” He represents a family renowned in English political
and literary history. He was born in 1656; was a nobleman of Christ Church,
Oxford, in 1672; succeeded to his titles in 1683; was sworn of the Privy
Council in 1689; and made a Knight of the Garter in 1700. He filled some
of the highest offices in the State, in the reigns of William and Mary, and of
Anne. He was Lord Lieutenant of Ireland in 1707, having previously been one
of the Commissioners by whom the unión between England and Scotland was
negotiated. He died in January 1733.

Trinity College, Dublin.

Dedication

325

These considerations determined me to lay this treatise at your
lordship's feet, and the rather because I was ambitious to have
it known that I am with the truest and most profound respeet,
on aeeount of that learning and virtue whieh the world so justly
admires in your lordship,

My Lord,

Your lordship's most humble
and most devoted servant,

GEORGE BERKEEEY.

[ 235 ]

The Preface

[ 236 ]

What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous
inquiry"^’^, seemed to me evidently trae and not unuseful to be
known; partieularly to those who are tainted with Seeptieism, or
want a demonstration of the existenee and immateriality of God,
or the natural immortality of the Soul. Whether it be so or no
I am eontent the reader should impartially examine; sinee I do
not think myself any farther eoneerned for the sueeess of what I
have written than as it is agreeable to truth. But, to the end this
may not suffer, I make it my request that the reader suspend his
judgment till he has onee at least read the whole through, with
that degree of attention and thought whieh the subjeet-matter
shall seem to deserve. For, as there are some passages that,
taken by themselves, are very hable (ñor eould it be remedied)
to gross misinterpretation, and to be eharged with most absurd
eonsequenees, whieh, nevertheless, upon an entire perusal will
appear not to follow from them; so likewise, though the whole
should be read over, yet, if this be done transiently, it is very
probable my sense may be mistaken; but to a thinking reader, I
flatter myself it will be throughout elear and obvious.

As for the eharaeters of novelty and singularity^^^ whieh
some of the following notions may seem to bear, it is, I hope,
needless to make any apology on that aeeount. He must surely
be either very weak, or very little aequainted with the seienees,

In his Commonplace Book Berkeley seems to refer his speculations to his
boyhood. The conception of the material world propounded in the following
Treatise was in his view before the publication of the New Theory of Vision,
whieh was intended to prepare the way for it.

Cf. Locke, in the “Epistle Dedicatory” of his Essay. Notwithstanding the
“novelty” of the New Principies, viz. negation of abstract or unperceived
Matter, Space, Time, Substance, and Power; and affirmation of Mind, as the
Synthesis, Substance, and Cause of all—much in best preceding philosophy,
ancient and modem, was a dim anticipation of it.

The Preface

'ill

who shall reject a truth that is capable of demonstration^^®, for
no other reason but because it is newly known, and contrary to
the prejudices of mankind.

Thus much I thought fit to premise, in order to prevent, if
possible, the hasty censures of a sort of men who are too apt to
condemn an opinión before they rightly comprehend it^^’.

[ 237 ]

Cf. sect. 6, 22, 24, &c., in illustration of the demonstrative claim of
Berkeley's initial doctrine.

Berkeley entreats his reader, here and throughout, to take pains to understand
his meaning, and especially to avoid confounding the ordered ideas or
phenomena, objectively presented to our senses, with capricious chimeras
of imagination.

Introduction

[238]

1. Philosophy being nothing else but the study of Wisdom and
Truth^^*, it may with reason be expected that those who have
spent most time and pains in it should enjoy a greater calm and
serenity of mind, a greater clearness and evidence of knowledge,
and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men.
Yet, so it is, we see the illiterate bulk of mankind, that walk
the high-road of plain common sense, and are governed by the
dictates of nature, for the most part easy and undisturbed. To
them nothing that is familiar appears unaccountable or difficult
to comprehend. They complain not of any want of evidence in
their senses, and are out of all danger of becoming Sceptics. But
no sooner do we depart from sense and instinct to follow the
light of a superior principie—to reason, medítate, and reflect on
the nature of things, but a thousand scruples spring up in our
minds, concerning those things which before we seemed fully
to comprehend. Prejudices and errors of sense do from all parts
discover themselves to our view; and, endeavouring to correct
these by reason, we are insensibly drawn into uncouth paradoxes,
difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon
US as we advance in speculation; till at length, having wandered
through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves just where we
were, or, which is worse, sit down in a forlorn Scepticism^^^.

2. The cause of this is thought to be the obscurity of things,
or the natural weakness and imperfection of our understandings.
It is said the faculties we have are few, and those designed by
nature for the support and pleasure of Ufe, and not to penétrate
into the inward essence and constitution of things: besides,

“Philosophy is nothing but the true knowledge of things.” Locke.

The purpose of those early essays of Berkeley was to reconcile philosophy
with common sense, by employing reflection to make latent common sense, or
common reason, reveal itself in its genuine integrity. Cf. the closing sentences
in the Third Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.

Introduction

329

the mind of man being finite, when it treats of things which
partake of Infinity, it is not to be wondered at if it run into
absurdities and contradictions, out of which it is impossible it
should ever extricate itself; it being of the nature of Infinite not
to be comprehended by that which is finite^^*’.

3. But, perhaps, we may be too pardal to ourselves in placing
the fault originally in our faculties, and not rather in the wrong
use we make of them. It is a hard thing to suppose that right
deductions from true principies should ever end in consequences
which cannot be maintained or made consistent. We should
believe that God has dealt more bountifully with the sons of men
than to give them a strong desire for that knowledge which he
had placed quite out of their reach. This were not agreeable to
the wonted indulgent methods of Providence, which, whatever
appetites it may have implanted in the creatures, doth usually
furnish them with such means as, if rightly made use of, will
not fail to satisfy them. Upon the whole, I am inclined to think
that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which
have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to
knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves. We have first raised
a dust, and then complain we cannot see.

4. My purpose therefore is, to try if I can discover what those
Principies are which have introduced all that doubtfulness and
uncertainty, those absurdities and contradictions, into the several
sects of philosophy; insomuch that the wisest men have thought
our ignorance incurable, conceiving it to arise from the natural
dulness and limitation of our faculties. And surely it is a work
well deserving our pains to make a strict inquiry concerning
the First Principies of Human Knowledge; to sift and examine

Cf. Locke's Essay, Introduction, sect. 4-7; Bk. II. ch. 23, § 12, &c.
Locke (who is probably here in Berkeley's eye) attributes the perplexities of
philosophy to our narrow faculties, which are meant to regúlate our lives,
not to remove all mysteries. See also Descartes, Principia, I. 26, 27, &c.;
Malebranche, Recherche, III. 2.

[ 239 ]

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them on all sides: especially since there may be some grounds to
suspect that those lets and difficulties, which stay and embarrass
the mind in its search after truth, do not spring from any darkness
and intricacy in the objects, or natural defect in the understanding,
so much as from false Principies which have been insisted on,
and might have been avoided.

5. How difficult and discouraging soever this attempt may
seem, when I consider what a number of very great and
extraordinary men have gone before me in the like designs^^\
yet I am not without some hopes; upon the consideration that
the largest views are not always the clearest, and that he who is
short-sighted will be obliged to draw the object nearer, and may,
perhaps, by a cióse and narrow survey, discern that which had
escaped far better eyes.

6. In order to prepare the mind of the reader for the easier
conceiving what follows, it is proper to premise somewhat,
by way of Introduction, concerning the nature and abuse of
Language. But the unravelling this matter leads me in some
measure to anticipate my design, by taking notice of what
seems to have had a chief part in rendering speculation intricate
and perplexed, and to have occasioned innumerable errors and
difficulties in almost all parts of knowledge. And that is the
opinión that the mind hath a power of framing abstract ideas
or notions of things^^^. He who is not a perfect stranger to the

His most significant forerunners were Descartes in his Principia, and Locke
in his Essay.

Here “idea” and “notion” seem to be used convertibly. See sect. 142.
Cf. with the argument against abstract ideas, unfolded in the remainder of
the Introduction, Principies, sect. 97-100, 118-132, 143; New Theory of
Vision, sect. 122-125; Alciphron, Dial. vii. 5-7; Defence of Free Thinking
in Mathematics, sect. 45-48. Also Siris, sect. 323, 335, &c., where he
distinguishes Idea in a higher meaning from his sensuous ideas. As mentioned
in my Preface, the third edition oí Alciphron, published in 1752, the year before
Berkeley died, omits the three sections of the Seventh Dialogue which repeat

Introduction

331

writings and disputes of philosophers must needs acknowledge [240]
that no small part of them are spent about abstraet ideas. These
are in a more espeeial manner thought to be the object of those
Sciences which go by the ñame of logic and metaphysics, and of
all that which passes under the notion of the most abstracted and
sublime learning; in all which one shall scarce find any question
handled in such a manner as does not suppose their existence in
the mind, and that it is well acquainted with them.

7. It is agreed on all hands that the qualities or modes of things
do never really exist each of them apart by itself, and separated
from all others, but are mixed, as it were, and blended together,
several in the same object. But, we are told, the mind, being able
to consider each quality singly, or abstracted from those other
qualities with which it is united, does by that means frame to
itself abstraet ideas. For example, there is conceived by sight an
object extended, coloured, and moved: this mixed or compound
idea the mind resolving into its simple, constituent parts, and
viewing each by itself, exclusive of the rest, does frame the
abstraet ideas of extensión, colour, and motion. Not that it is
possible for colour or motion to exist without extensión; but only
that the mind can frame to itself by abstraction the idea of colour
exclusive of extensión, and of motion exclusive of both colour
and extensión.

8. Again, the mind having observed that in the particular
extensions perceived by sense there is something common and
alike in all, and some other things peculiar, as this or that
figure or magnitude, which distinguish them one from another,
it considers apart, or singles out by itself, that which is common;
making thereof a most abstraet idea of extensión; which is neither
Une, surface, ñor solid, ñor has any figure or magnitude, but is
an idea entirely prescinded from all these. So likewise the

the following argument against abstraet ideas.

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[ 241 ]

mind, by leaving out of the particular colours perceived by sense
that which distinguishes them one from another, and retaining
that only which is common to all, makes an idea of colour in
abstract; which is neither red, ñor bine, ñor white, ñor any other
determinate colour. And, in like manner, by considering motion
abstractedly, not only from the body moved, but likewise from
the figure it describes, and all particular directions and velocities,
the abstract idea of motion is framed; which equally corresponds
to all particular motions whatsoever that may be perceived by
sense.

9. And as the mind frames to itself abstract ideas of qualities
or modes, so does it, by the same precisión, or mental separation,
attain abstract ideas of the more compounded beings which
inelude several coexisten! qualities. For example, the mind
having observed that Peter, James, and John resemble each other
in certain common agreements of shape and other qualities, leaves
out of the complex or compound idea it has of Peter, James, and
any other particular man, that which is peculiar to each, retaining
only what is common to all, and so makes an abstract idea,
wherein all the particulars equally partake; abstracting entirely
from and cutting off all those circumstances and differences
which might determine it to any particular existence. And after
this manner it is said we come by the abstract idea of man, or, if
you picase, humanity, or human nature; wherein it is true there
is included colour, because there is no man but has some colour,
but then it can be neither white, ñor black, ñor any particular
colour, because there is no one particular colour wherein all men
partake. So likewise there is included stature, but then it is neither
tall stature, ñor low stature, ñor yet middle stature, but something
abstracted from all these. And so of the rest. Moreover, there
being a great variety of other creatures that partake in some parts,
but not all, of the complex idea of man, the mind, leaving out
those parts which are peculiar to men, and retaining those only
which are common to all the living creatures, frames the idea

Introduction

333

of animal', which abstraéis not only from all particular men, but
also all birds, beasts, fishes, and insects. The constituent parts of
the abstract idea of animal are body, life, sense, and spontaneous
motion. By body is meant body without any particular shape
or figure, there being no one shape or figure common to all
animáis; without covering, either of hair, or feathers, or scales,

&c., ñor yet naked: hair, feathers, scales, and nakedness being
the distinguishing properties of particular animáis, and for that
reason left out of the abstract idea. Upon the same account,
the spontaneous motion must be neither walking, ñor flying, ñor
creeping; it is nevertheless a motion, but what that motion is it is
not easy to conceive. [242]

10. Whether others have this wonderful faculty of abstracting
their ideas, they best can tell^^^. For myself, daré be
confident I have it not.] I find indeed I have a faculty of
imagining or representing to myself, the ideas of those particular
things I have perceived, and of variously compounding and
dividing them. I can imagine a man with two heads; or the upper
parts of a man joined to the body of a horse. I can consider the
hand, the eye, the nose, each by itself abstracted or separated from
the rest of the body. But then whatever hand or eye I imagine^*^,
it must have some particular shape and colour. Likewise the idea
of man that I frame to myself must be either of a white, or a
black, or a tawny, a straight, or a crooked, a tall, or a low, or
a middle-sized man. I cannot by any effort of thought conceive
the abstract idea above described. And it is equally impossible
for me to form the abstract idea of motion distinct from the body

As in Derodon's Lógica, Pt. II. c. 6, 7; Philosophia Contracta, I. i. §§

7-11; and Gassendi, Leg. Instit., I. 8; also Cudwoith, Eternal and Immutable
Morality, Bk. IV.

Omitted in second edition.

We must remember that what Berkeley intends by an idea is either a percept
of sense, or a sensuous imagination; and his argument is that none of these can
be an abstraction. We can neither perceive ñor imagine what is not concrete
and part of a succession.

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[ 243 ]

moving, and which is neither swift ñor slow, curvilinear ñor
rectilinear; and the like may be said of all other abstract general
ideas whatsoever. To be plain, I own myself able to absttact in
one sense, as when I consider some particular parts or qualities
separated from others, with which, though they are united in
some object, yet it is possible they may really exist without them.
But I deny that I can abstract from one another, or conceive
separately, those qualities which it is impossible should exist so
separated; or that I can frame a general notion, by abstracting
from particulars in the manner aforesaid—which last are the two
proper acceptations of abstraction. And there is ground to think
most men will acknowledge themselves to be in my case. The
generality of men which are simple and illiterate never pretend
to abstract notions^^^. It is said they are difficult, and not to be
attained without pains and study. We may therefore reasonably
conclude that, if such there be, they are confined only to the
learned.

11. I proceed to examine what can be alleged in defence of
the doctrine of abstraction^^^, and try if I can discover what it
is that inclines the men of speculation to embrace an opinión so
remóte from common sense as that seems to be. There has been a
late [^^^excellent and] deservedly esteemed philosopher^*^ who,
no doubt, has given it very much countenance, by seeming to
think the having abstract general ideas is what puts the widest
difference in point of understanding betwixt man and beast. “The

“abstract notions”—here used convertibly with “abstract ideas.” Cf.
Principies, sect. 89 and 142, on the special meaning of notion.

Supposed by Berkeley to mean, that we can imagine, in abstraction from
all phenomena presented in concrete experience, e.g. imagine existence, in
abstraction from all phenomena in which it manifests itself to us; or matter,
stripped of all the phenomena in which it is realised in sense.

Omitted in second edition.

Locke.

Introduction

335

having of general ideas,” saith he, “is that whieh puts a perfeet
distinetion betwixt man and brutes, and is an exeelleney whieh
the faeulties of brutes do by no means attain unto. For it is evident
we observe no foot-steps in them of making use of general signs
for universal ideas; from whieh we have reason to imagine that
they have not the faeulty of abstraeting, or making general ideas,
sinee they have no use of words, or any other general signs.” And
a little after:—“Therefore, I think, we may suppose, that it is in
this that the speeies of brutes are diseriminated from man: and
it is that proper differenee wherein they are wholly separated,
and whieh at last widens to so wide a distanee. For if they have
any ideas at all, and are not haré maehines (as some would have
them^^*^), we eannot deny them to have some reason. It seems as
evident to me that they do, some of them, in eertain instanees,
reason, as that they have sense; but it is only in partieular ideas,
just as they reeeive them from their senses. They are the best of
them tied up within those narrow bounds, and have not (as I think)
the faeulty to enlarge them by any kind of abstraetion .”—Essay
on Human Understanding, B. II. eh. 11. § 10 and 11. I readily
agree with this learned author, that the faeulties of brutes ean
by no means attain to abstraetion. But then if this be made the
distinguishing property of that sort of animáis, I fear a great many [244]
of those that pass for men must be reekoned into their number.

The reason that is here assigned, why we have no grounds to
think brutes have abstraet general ideas, is, that we observe in
them no use of words, or any other general signs; whieh is built
on this supposition, to wit, that the making use of words implies
having general ideas. From whieh it follows that men who use
language are able to abstraet or generalizo their ideas. That this
is the sense and arguing of the author will further appear by bis
answering the question he in another plaee puts: “Sinee all things
that exist are only partieulars, how eome we by general terms?”

Descartes, who regarded brutes as (sentient?) machines.

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[ 245 ]

His answer is: “Words become general by being made the signs
of general ideas.”— Essay on Human Understanding, B. III. ch.
3. § 6. But it seems that a word"*^^ becomes general by being
made the sign, not of an abstract general idea, but of several
particular ideas, any one of which it indifferently suggests to
the mind. For example, when it is said “the change of motion
is proportional to the impressed forcé,” or that “whatever has
extensión is divisible,” these propositions are to be understood
of motion and extensión in general; and nevertheless it will not
follow that they suggest to my thoughts an idea^'^^ of motion
without a body moved, or any determinate direction and velocity;
or that I must conceive an abstract general idea of extensión,
which is neither line, surface, ñor solid, neither great ñor small,
black, white, ñor red, ñor of any other determinate colour. It is
only implied that whatever particular motion I consider, whether
it be swift or slow, perpendicular, horizontal, or oblique, or
in whatever object, the axiom concerning it holds equally true.
As does the other of every particular extensión; it matters not
whether line, surface, or solid, whether of this or that magnitude
or figure^^^.

12. By observing how ideas become general, we may the
better judge how words are made so. And here it is to be noted
that I do not deny absolutely there are general ideas, but only that
there are any abstract general ideas. For, in the passages we ha ve
quoted wherein there is mention of general ideas, it is always
supposed that they are formed by abstraction, after the manner

“To this I cannot assent, being of opinión that a word,” &c.—in first edition.

“an idea,” i.e. a concrete mental picture.

So that “generality” in an idea is our “consideration” of a particular idea
(e.g. a “particular motion” or a “particular extensión”) not per se, but under
general relations, which that particular idea exemplifies, and which, as he
shews, may be signified by a corresponding word. All ideas (in Berkeley's
confined meaning of “idea”) are particular. We rise above particular ideas by
an intellectual apprehension of their relations; not by forming abstractpictures,
which are contradictory absurdities.

Introduction

337

set forth in sections 8 and Now, if we will annex a meaning
to our words, and speak only of what we ean eoneeive, I believe
we shall aeknowledge that an idea, which eonsidered in itself is
partieular, beeomes general, by being made to represent or stand
for all other partieular ideas of the same sort^^^. To make this
plain by an example. Suppose a geometrieian is demonstrating
the method of eutting a line in two equal parts. He draws, for
instanee, a blaek line of an ineh in length: this, whieh in itself is
a partieular line, is nevertheless with regará to its signification
general; sinee, as it is there used, it represents all partieular lines
whatsoever; so that what is demonstrated of it is demonstrated
of all lines, or, in other words, of a line in general^^^. And, as
that particular line beeomes general by being made a sign, so the
ñame line, whieh taken absolutely is partieular, by being a sign,
is made general. And as the former owes its generality, not to its
being the sign of an abstraet or general line, but of all partieular
right lines that may possibly exist, so the latter must be thought
to derive its generality from the same eause, namely, the various
partieular lines whieh it indifferently denotes.

13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of
abstraet ideas, and the uses they are thought neeessary to, I shall
add one more passage out of the Essay on Human Understanding,
whieh is as follows:—“Abstraet ideas are not so obvious or easy
to ehildren, or the yet unexereised mind, as partieular ones. If
they seem so to grown men, it is only beeause by eonstant and
familiar use they are made so. For, when we nieely refleet [ 246 ]
upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fietions and

Locke is surely misconceived. He does not say, as Berkeley seems to
suppose, that in forming “abstraet ideas,” we are forming abstraet mental
images—pietures in the mind that are not individual pietures.

Does Loeke intend more than this, although he expresses his meaning in
ambiguous words?

It is a partieular idea, but eonsidered relatively—a significant partieular
idea, in other words. We realise our notions in examples, and these must be
concrete.

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contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and
do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For
example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the
general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract,
comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique ñor
rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, ñor scalenon; but all and
none of these at once? In effect, it is something imperfect, that
cannot exist; an idea^^^ wherein some parts of several different
and inconsistent ideas are put together. It is true the mind, in
this imperfect State, has need of such ideas, and makes all the
baste to them it can, for the conveniency of communication and
enlargement of knowledge; to both which it is naturally very
much inclined. But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are
marks of our imperfection. At least this is enough to shew that
the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind
is first and most easily acquainted with, ñor such as its earliest
knowledge is conversan! about.”—B. iv. ch. 7. § 9. If any man
has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of a triangle
as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of
it, ñor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would
fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea
or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard task for any one to
perform. What more easy than for any one to look a little into
his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to
have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is
here given of the general idea of a triangle—which is neither
oblique ñor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural ñor scalenon, but
all and none of these at once?

14. Much is here said of the difficulty that abstract ideas carry

i.e. “ideas” in Locke's meaning of idea, under which he comprehends, not
only the particular ideas of sense and imagination—Berkeley's “ideas”—but
these considered relatively, and so seen intellectually, when Locke calis them
abstract, general, or universal. Omniscience in its all-comprehensive intuition
may not require, or even admit, such general ideas.

Introduction

339

with them, and the pains and skill requisite to the forming them.

And it is on all hands agreed that there is need of great toil and [247]
labour of the mind, to emancípate our thoughts from particular
objects, and raise them to those sublime speculations that are
conversant about abstract ideas. From all which the natural
consequence should seem to be, that so difficult a thing as the
forming abstract ideas was not necessary for communication,
which is so easy and familiar to all sorts of men. But, we are told,
if they seem obvious and easy to grown men, it is only because
by constant and familiar use they are made so. Now, I would fain
know at what time it is men are employed in surmounting that
difficulty, and furnishing themselves with those necessary helps
for discourse. It cannot be when they are grown up; for then it
seems they are not conscious of any such painstaking. It remains
therefore to be the business of their childhood. And surely the
great and multiplied labour of framing abstract notions^^^ will
be found a hard task for that tender age. Is it not a hard thing to
imagine that a couple of children cannot prate together of their
sugar-plums and rattles and the rest of their little trinkets, till
they have first tacked together numberless inconsistencies, and
so framed in their minds abstract general ideas, and annexed
them to every common ñame they make use of?

15. Ñor do I think them a whit more needful for the
enlargement ofknowledge than for communication. It is, I know,
a point much insisted on, that all knowledge and demonstration
are about universal notions, to which I fully agree. But then it does
not appear to me that those notions are formed by abstraction in
the manner premised— universality, so far as I can comprehend,
not consisting in the absolute, positive nature or conception of
anything, but in the relation it bears to the particulars signified

Here and in what follows, “abstract notion,” “universal notion,” instead of
abstract idea. Notion seems to be here a synonym for idea, and not taken in the
special meaning which he afterwards attached to the term, when he contrasted
it with idea.

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[248]

or represented by it; by virtue whereof it is that things, ñames,
or notions^^^, being in their own nature particular, are rendered
universal. Thus, when I demonsttate any proposition concerning
triangles, it is supposed that I have in view the universal idea
of a triangle: which ought not to be understood as if I could
frame an idea^^ of a triangle which was neither equilateral, ñor
scalenon, ñor equicrural; but only that the particular triangle I
consider, whether of this or that sort it matters not, doth equally
stand for and represent all rectilinear triangles whatsoever, and
is in that sense universal. All which seems very plain and not to
inelude any difficulty in it^**^.

16. But here it will be demanded, how we can know any
proposition to be true of all particular triangles, except we
have first seen it demonstrated of the abstract idea of a triangle
which equally agrees to all? For, because a property may be
demonstrated to agree to some one particular triangle, it will not
thence follow that it equally belongs to any other triangle which
in all respeets is not the same with it. For example, having
demonstrated that the three angles of an isósceles rectangular
triangle are equal to two right ones, I cannot therefore conclude
this affection agrees to all other triangles which have neither a
right angle ñor two equal sides. It seems therefore that, to be
certain this proposition is universally true, we must either make
a particular demonstration for every particular triangle, which is
impossible; or once for all demónstrate it of the abstract idea of a
triangle, in which all the particulars do indifferently partake, and
by which they are all equally represented. To which I answer, that,
though the idea I have in view^*’^ whilst I make the demonstration

“notions,” again synonymous with ideas, which are all particular or concrete,
in his meaning of idea, when he uses it strictly.

idea, i.e. individual mental picture.

In all this he takes no account of the intellectual relations necessarily
embodied in concrete knowledge, and without which experience could not
cohere.

“have in view,” i.e. actually realise in imagination.

Introduction

341

be, for instance, that of an isósceles rectangular triangle whose
sides are of a determínate length, 1 may nevertheless be certain it
extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness
soever. And that because neither the right angle, ñor the equality,
ñor determínate length of the sides are at all concerned in the
demonstration. It is true the diagram 1 have in view ineludes all
these particulars; but then there is not the least mention made of
them in the proof of the proposition. It is not said the three angles
are equal to two right ones, because one of them is a right angle, [249]
or because the sides comprehending it are of the same length.
Which sufficiently shews that the right angle might have been
oblique, and the sides unequal, and for all that the demonstration
have held good. And for this reason it is that 1 conclude that to be
true of any obliquangular or scalenon which 1 had demonstrated
of a particular right-angled equicrural triangle, and not because
1 demonstrated the proposition of the abstract idea of a triangle.

[503And here it must be acknowledged that a man may consider
a figure merely as triangular; without attending to the particular
qualities of the angles, or relations of the sides. So far he may
abstract. But this will never prove that he can frame an abstract,
general, inconsistent idea of a triangle. In like manner we may
consider Peter so far forth as man, or so far forth as animal,
without framing the forementioned abstract idea, either of man
or of animal; inasmuch as all that is perceived is not considered.]

17. It were an endless as well as an useless thing to trace
the Schoolmen, those great masters of abstraction, through all
the manifold inextricable labyrinths of error and dispute which
their doctrine of abstract natures and notions seems to have
led them into. What bickerings and controversies, and what
a learned dust have been raised about those matters, and what
mighty advantage has been from thence derived to mankind,
are things at this day too clearly known to need being insisted

What follows, to the end of this section, was added in the second or 1734
edition.

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on. And it had been well if the ill effects of that doctrine were
confined to those only who make the most avowed profession
of it. When men consider the great pains, industry, and parts
that have for so many ages been laid out on the cultivation
and advancement of the Sciences, and that notwithstanding all
this the far greater part of them remain full of darkness and
uncertainty, and disputes that are like never to have an end; and
even those that are thought to be supported by the most olear
and cogent demonstrations contain in them paradoxes which are
perfectly irreconcilable to the understandings of men; and that,
taking all together, a very small portion of them does supply any
real benefit to mankind, otherwise than by being an innocent
diversión and amusement^*’^—I say, the consideration of all this
is apt to throw them into a despondency and perfect contempt of
all study. But this may perhaps cease upon a view of the false
Principies that have obtained in the world; amongst all which
there is none, methinks, hath a more wide influence^*^^ over the
thoughts of speculative men than this of abstract general ideas.

18. I come now to consider the source of this prevailing
notion, and that seems to me to be language. And surely nothing
of less extent than reason itself could have been the source of
an opinión so universally received. The truth of this appears as
from other reasons so also from the plain confession of the ablest
patrons of abstract ideas, who acknowledge that they are made in
order to naming; from which it is olear consequence that if there
had been no such thing as speech or universal signs, there never
had been any thought of abstraction. See B. iii. ch. 6. § 39, and
elsewhere of the Essay on Human Understanding.

Let US examine the manner wherein Words have contributed
to the origin of that mistake.—First then, it is thought that

So Bacon in many passages of his De Augmentis Scientiarium and Novum
Organum.

“wide influence,”—“wide and extended sway”—in first edition.

Introduction

343

every ñame has, or ought to have, one only precise and settled
signification; which inclines men to think there are certain
abstract determinate ideas that constitute the true and only
immediate signification of each general ñame; and that it is
by the mediation of these abstract ideas that a general ñame
comes to signify any particular thing. Whereas, in truth, there is
no such thing as one precise and definite signification annexed
to any general ñame, they all signifying indifferently a great
number of particular ideas. All which does evidently follow
from what has been already said, and will clearly appear to any
one by a little reflexión. To this it will be objected that every
ñame that has a definition is thereby restrained to one certain
signification. For example, a triangle is defined to be “a plain
surface comprehended by three right lines”; by which that ñame
is limited to denote one certain idea and no other. To which I
answer, that in the definition it is not said whether the surface
be great or small, black or white, ñor whether the sides are
long or short, equal or unequal, ñor with what angles they are
inclined to each other; in all which there may be great variety,
and consequently there is no one settled idea which limits the
signification of the word triangle. It is one thing for to keep a
ñame constantly to the same definition, and another to make it
stand everywhere for the same idea^^^: the one is necessary, the
other useless and impracticable.

19. But, to give a farther account how words carne to
produce the doctrine of abstract ideas, it must be observed that
it is a received opinión that language has no other end but the
communicating ideas, and that every significant ñame stands for
an idea. This being so, and it being withal certain that ñames
which yet are not thought altogether insignificant do not always
mark out particular conceivable ideas, it is straightway concluded
that they stand for abstract notions. That there are many ñames

“idea,” i.e. individual datum of sense or of imagination.

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in use amongst speculative men which do not always suggest to
others determínate, particular ideas, or in truth anything at all, is
what nobody will deny. And a little attention will discover that it
is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) that significant
ñames which stand for ideas should, every time they are used,
excite in the understanding the ideas they are made to stand for:
in reading and discoursing, ñames being for the most part used as
letters are in Algebra, in which, though a particular quantity be
marked by each letter, yet to proceed right it is not requisito that
in every step each letter suggest to your thoughts that particular
quantity it was appointed to stand for^*^’.

20. Resides, the communicating of ideas marked by words is
not the chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed.
There are other ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting
to or deterring from an action, the putting the mind in some
particular disposition; to which the former is in many cases
barely subservient, and sometimes entirely omitted, when these
can be obtained without it, as I think doth^*^^ not unfrequently
happen in the familiar use of language. I entreat the reader to
reflect with himself, and see if it doth not often happen, either
in hearing or reading a discourse, that the passions of fear, love,
hatred, admiration, and disdain, and the like, arise immediately
in his mind upon the perception of certain words, without any
ideas^°^ coming between. At first, indeed, the words might have
occasioned ideas that were fitting to produce those emotions;
but, if I mistake not, it will be found that, when language

See Leibniz on Symbolical Knowledge (Opera Philosophica, pp. 79, 80,
Erdmann), and Stewart in his Elements, vol. I. ch. 4, § 1, on our habit of using
language without realising, in individual examples or ideas, the meanings of
the common terms used.

“doth”—“does,” here and elsewhere in first edition.

“ideas,” i.e. representations in imagination of any of the individual objects
to which the ñames are applicable. The sound or sight of a verbal sign may do
duty for the concrete idea in which the notion signified by the word might be
exemplified.

Introduction

345

is once grown familiar, the hearing of the sounds or sight of
the characters is oft immediately attended with those passions
which at first were wont to be produced by the intervention of
ideas that are now quite omitted. May we not, for example,
be affected with the promise of a good thing, though we have
not an idea of what it is? Or is not the being threatened with
danger sufficient to excite a dread, though we think not of any
particular evil likely to befal us, ñor yet frame to ourselves an
idea of danger in abstract? If any one shall join ever so little
reflection of his own to what has been said, I believe that it will
evidently appear to him that general ñames are often used in the
propriety of language without the speakers designing them for
marks of ideas in his own, which he would have them raise in the
mind of the hearer. Even proper ñames themselves do not seem
always spoken with a design to bring into our view the ideas of
those individuáis that are supposed to be marked by them. For
example, when a schoolman tells me “Aristotle hath said it,” all I
conceive he means by it is to dispose me to embrace his opinión
with the deference and submission which custom has annexed to
that ñame. And this effect may be so instantly produced in the
minds of those who are accustomed to resign their judgment to
authority of that philosopher, as it is impossible any idea either of
his person, writings, or reputation should go before. cióse

and immediate a connexion may custom establish betwixt the
very word Aristotle^ and the motions of assent and reverence
in the minds of some men.] Innumerable examples of this kind
may be given, but why should I insist on those things which
every one's experience will, I doubt not, plentifully suggest unto
him?

This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

Elsewhere he mentions Aristotle as “ceitainly a great admirer and prometer
of the doctrine of abstraction,” and quotes his statement that there is hardly
anything so incomprehensible to men as notions of the utmost universality; for
they are the most remóte from sense. Metaph., Bk. I. ch. 2.

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21. We have, I think, shewn the impossibility of Abstrae!
Ideas. We have considered what has been said for them by their
ablest patrons; and endeavoured to shew they are of no use for
those ends to which they are thought necessary. And lastly, we
have traced them to the source from whence they flow, which
appears evidently to be Language.

It cannot be denied that words are of excellent use, in that by
their means all that stock of knowledge which has been purchased
by the joint labours of inquisitivo men in all ages and nations may
be drawn into the view and made the possession of one single
person. But [^^^at the same time it must be owned that] most parts
of knowledge have been [^^^so] strangely perplexed and darkened
by the abuse of words, and general ways of speech wherein they
are delivered, [that it may almost be made a question whether
language has contributed more to the hindrance or advancement
of the Sciences^ Since therefore words are so apt to impose
on the understanding, [I am resolved in my inquirios to make as
little use of them as possibly I can^^^:] whatever ideas I consider,
I shall endeavour to take them haré and naked into my view;
keeping out of my thoughts, so far as I am able, those ñames
which long and constan! use hath so strictly united with them.
From which I may expect to derive the following advantages:—

22. First, I shall be sure to get olear of all controversies
purely verbal, the springing up of which weeds in almost all
the Sciences has been a main hindrance to the growth of true
and sound knowledge. Secondly, this seems to be a sure way to
extricate myself out of that fine and subtle net of abstrae! ideas,
which has so miserably perplexed and entangled the minds of
men; and that with this peculiar circumstance, that by how much

Added in second edition.

Omitted in second edition.

Introduction

347

the finer and more curious was the wit of any man, by so much
the deeper was he likely to be ensnared and faster held therein.
Thirdly, so long as I eonfine my thoughts to my own ideas^^^,
divested of words, I do not see how I ean easily be mistaken.
The objeets I eonsider, I elearly and adequately know. I eannot
be deeeived in thinking I have an idea whieh I have not. It is
not possible for me to imagine that any of my own ideas are
alike or unlike that are not truly so. To diseern the agreements or
disagreements there are between my ideas, to see what ideas are
ineluded in any eompound idea and what not, there is nothing
more requisite than an attentive pereeption of what passes in my
own understanding.

23. But the attainment of all these advantages does presuppose
an entire deliveranee from the deeeption of words; whieh I daré
hardly promise myself, so diffieult a thing it is to dissolve an
unión so early begun, and eonfirmed by so long a habit as that
betwixt words and ideas. Whieh diffieulty seems to have been
very mueh inereased by the doetrine of abstraction. For, so long
as men thought abstract ideas were annexed to their words, it
does not seem strange that they should use words for ideas; it
being found an impraetieable thing to lay aside the word, and
retain the abstract idea in the mind; whieh in itself was perfeetly
ineoneeivable. This seems to me the prineipal eause why those
who have so emphatieally reeommended to others the laying
aside all use of words in their meditations, and eontemplating
their bare ideas, have yet failed to perform it themselves. Of
late many have been very sensible of the absurd opinions and
insignifieant disputes whieh grow out of the abuse of words.
And, in order to remedy these evils, they advise well^^’, that
we attend to the ideas signified, and draw off our attention from

“my own ideas,” i.e. the concrete phenomena whieh I can realise as
perceptions of sense, or in imagination.

He prohably refers to Locke.

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the words which signify them^^^. But, how good soever this
advice may be they have given others, it is plain they could not
have a due regard to it themselves, so long as they thought the
only immediate use of words was to signify ideas, and that the
immediate signification of every general ñame was a determinate
abstract idea.

24. But these being known to be mistakes, a man may
with greater ease prevent bis being imposed on by words. He
that knows he has no other than particular ideas, will not puzzle
himself in vain to find out and conceive the abstract idea annexed
to any ñame. And he that knows ñames do not always stand
for ideas^^^ will spare himself the labour of looking for ideas
where there are none to be had. It were, therefore, to be wished
that every one would use his utmost endeavours to obtain a olear
view of the ideas he would consider; separating from them all
that dress and incumbrance of words which so much contribute
to blind the judgment and divide the attention. In vain do we
extend our view into the heavens and pry into the entrails of the
earth, in vain do we consult the writings of learned men and trace
the dark footsteps of antiquity. We need only draw the curtain
of words, to behold the fairest tree of knowledge, whose fruit is
excellent, and within the reach of our hand.

25. Unless we take care to olear the First Principies of

According to Locke, “that which has most contributed to hinder the
due tracing of our ideas, and finding out their relations, and agreements or
disagreements one with another, has been, I suppose, the ill use of words. It is
impossible that men should ever truly seek, or certainly discover, the agreement
or disagreement of ideas themselves, whilst their thoughts flutter about, or
stick only in sounds of doubtful and uncertain significations. Mathematicians,
abstracting their thoughts from ñames, and accustoming themselves to set
before their minds the ideas themselves that they would consider, and not
sounds instead of them, have avoided thereby a great part of that perplexity,
puddering, and confusión which has so much hindered men's progress in other
parts of knowledge.” Essay, Bk. IV. ch. 3, § 30. See also Bk. III. ch. 10, 11.

General ñames involve in their signification intellectual relations among
ideas or phenomena; but the relations, per se, are unimaginable.

Introduction

349

Knowledge from the embarras and delusion of Words, we may
make infinite reasonings upon them to no purpose; we may draw
eonsequenees from eonsequenees, and be never the wiser. The
farther we go, we shall only lose ourselves the more irreeoverably,
and be the deeper entangled in diffieulties and mistakes. Whoever
therefore designs to read the following sheets, I entreat him that
he would make my words the oeeasion of his own thinking, and [256]
endeavour to attain the same train of thoughts in reading that I
had in writing them. By this means it will be easy for him to
diseover the truth or falsity of what I say. He will be out of
all danger of being deeeived by my words. And I do not see
how he ean be led into an error by eonsidering his own naked,
undisguised ideas^^**.

[257]

The rough draft of the Introduction, prepared two years before the
publication of the Principies (see Appendix, vol. III), should be compared
with the published versión. He there tells that “there was a time when,
being bantered and abused by words,” he “did not in the least doubf’ that
he was “able to abstract his ideas”; adding that “after a strict survey of my
abilities, I not only discovered my own deficiency on this point, but also cannot
conceive it possible that such a power should be even in the most perfect and
exalted understanding.” What he thus pronounces “impossible,” is a sensuous
perception or imagination of an intellectual relation, as to which most thinkers
would agree with him. But in so arguing, he seems apt to discard the intellectual
relations themselves that are necessarily embodied in experience.

David Hume refers thus to Berkeley's doctrine about “abstract ideas”:—“A
great philosopher has asserted that all general ideas are nothing but particular
ones annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification.
I look upon this to be one of the greatest and most valuable discoveries that
has been made of late years in the republic of letters.” (Treatise ofH. N. Pt. I,
sect. 7.)

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1. It is evident to any one who takes a survey of the objects of
human knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted
on the senses; or else sueh as are pereeived by attending to the
passions and operations of the mind; or lastly, ideas formed by
help of memory and imagination—either eompounding, dividing,
or barely representing those originally pereeived in the aforesaid
ways. By sight I have the ideas of light and eolours, with their
several degrees and variations. By toueh I pereeive hard and soft,
heat and eold, motion and resistanee; and of all these more and
less either as to quantity or degree. Smelling furnishes me with
odours; the palate with tastes; and hearing eonveys sounds to the
mind in all their variety of tone and eomposition^^^

And as several of these are observed to aeeompany eaeh other,
they eome to be marked by one ñame, and so to be reputed
as one thing. Thus, for example, a eertain eolour, taste, smell,
figure and eonsistenee having been observed to go together, are
aeeounted one distinet thing, signified by the ñame apple; other
eolleetions of ideas eonstitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like
sensible things; which as they are pleasing or disagreeable exeite
the passions of love, hatred, joy, grief, and so forth^^^.

2. But, besides all that endless variety of ideas or objeets
of knowledge, there is likewise Something whieh knows or
pereeives them; and exereises divers operations, as willing,

This resembles Locke's account of the ideas with which human knowledge
is concerned. They are all originally presented to the senses, or got by reflexión
upon the passions and acts of the mind; and the materials contributed in this
extemal and internal experience are, with the help of memory and imagination,
elaborated by the human understanding in ways innumerable, true and false.
See Locke's Essay, Bk. II, ch. I, §§ 1-5; ch. 10, II, 12.

The ideas or phenomena of which we are percipient in our five senses make
their appearance, not isolated, but in individual masses, constituting the things,
that occupy their respective places in pereeived ambient space. It is as qualities
of things that the ideas or phenomena of sense arise in human experience.

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imagining, remembering, about them. This perceiving, active
being is what I cali mind, spirit, soul, or myself. By which words
1 do not denote any one of my ideas, but a thing entirely distinct
from them, wherein they exist, or, which is the same thing,
whereby they are perceived; for the existence of an idea consists
in being perceived^^^.

3. That neither our thoughts, ñor passions, ñor ideas formed
by the imagination, exist without the mind is what everybody
will allow. And to me it seems no less evident that the various
sensations, or ideas imprinted on the Sense, however blended
or combined together (that is, whatever objects they compose),
cannot exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving them^^^. 1 think
an intuitivo knowledge may be obtained of this, by any one that
shall attend to what is meant by the term exist when applied to
sensible things^^^. The table 1 write on 1 say exists; that is, 1 see
and feel it: and if 1 were out of my study 1 should say it existed;
meaning thereby that if 1 was in my study 1 might perceive it,
or that some other spirit actually does perceive it. There was
an odour, that is, it was smelt; there was a sound, that is, it
was heard; a colour or figure, and it was perceived by sight or
touch. This is all that 1 can understand by these and the like

This is an advance upon the language of the Commonplace Book, in which
“mind” is spoken of as only a “congeries of perceptions.” Here it is something
“entirely distinct” from ideas or perceptions, in which they exist and are
perceived, and on which they ultimately depend. Spirit, intelligent and active,
presupposed with its implicates in ideas, thus becomes the basis of Berkeley's
philosophy. Is this subjective idealism only? Locke appears in sect. 1,
Descartes, if not Kant by anticipation, in sect. 2.

This sentence expresses Berkeley's New Principie, which filled his thoughts
in the Commonplace Book. Note “in a mind,” not necessarily in my mind.

That is to say, one has only to put concrete meaning into the terms existence
and reality, in order to have “an intuitivo knowledge” that matter depends for
its real existence on percipient spirit.

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[ 260 ]

expressions^^^. For as to what is said of the absolute existence of
unthinking things, without any relation to their being perceived,
that is to me perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipv, ñor
is it possible they should have any existence out of the minds or
thinking things which perceive them^^^.

4. It is indeed an opinión strangely prevailing amongst
men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible
objects, have an existence, natural or real^^*, distinct from their
being perceived by the understanding. But, with how great
an assurance and acquiescence soever this Principie may be
entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to
cali it in question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a
manifest contradiction. For, what are the forementioned objects
but the things we perceive by sense? and what do we perceive
besides our own^^^ ideas or sensations? and is it not plainly
repugnant that any one of these, or any combination of them,
should exist unperceived?

5. If we thoroughly examine this tenet^^*’ it will, perhaps, be
found at bottom to depend on the doctrine of abstract ideas. For
can there be a nicer strain of abstraction than to distinguish the
existence of sensible objects from their being perceived, so as to

In other words, the things of sense become real, only in the concrete
experience of living mind, which gives them the only reality we can conceive
or have any sort of concern with. Extinguish Spirit and the material world
necessarily ceases to be real.

That esse is percipi is Berkeley's initial Principie, called “intuitive” or
self-evident.

Mark that it is the “natural or real existence” of the material world, in the
absence of all realising Spirit, that Berkeley insists is impossible—meaningless.

“our own”—yet not exclusively mine. They depend for their reality upon a
percipient, not on my perception.

“this tenet,” i.e. that the concrete material world could still be a reality after
the annihilation of all realising spiritual life in the universe—divine or other.

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conceive them existing unperceived^^^? Light and colours, heat
and coid, extensión and figures—in a word the things we see and
feel—what are they but so many sensations, notions^^^, ideas,
or impressions on the sense? and is it possible to sepárate, even
in thought, any of these from perception? For my part, I might
as easily divide a thing from itself. I may, indeed, divide in my
thoughts, or conceive apart from each other, those things which
perhaps I never perceived by sense so divided. Thus, I imagine
the trunk of a human body without the limbs, or conceive the
smell of a rose without thinking on the rose itself. So far, I
will not deny, I can abstract; if that may properly be called
abstraction which extends only to the conceiving separately such
objects as it is possible may really exist or be actually perceived
asunder. But my conceiving or imagining power does not extend
beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Henee, as
it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual
sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive
in my thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the
sensation or perception of it. [^^^In truth, the object and the
sensation are the same thing, and cannot therefore be abstracted
from each other.]

6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that
a man need only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this
important one to be, viz. that all the choir of heaven and furniture
of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty
frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind;
that their being is to be perceived or known; that consequently
so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist

“existing unperceived,” i.e. existing without being realised in any living
percipient experience—existing in a totally abstract existence, whatever that
can mean.

“notions”—a term elsewhere (see sect. 27, 89, 142) restricted, is here
applied to the immediate data of the senses—the ideas of sense.

This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

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in my mind, or that of any other created spirit, they must either
have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some
Eternal Spirit: it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving
all the absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of
them an existence independent of a spirit. [^^^To be convinced of
which, the reader need only reflect, and try to sepárate in his own
thoughts the being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.]
7. From what has been said it is evident there is not any
other Substance than Spirit, or that which perceives^^^. But, for
the fuller proof^^^ of this point, let it be considered the sensible
qualities are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, and such like,
that is, the ideas perceived by sense. Now, for an idea to exist
in an unperceiving thing is a manifest contradiction; for to have
an idea is all one as to perceive: that therefore wherein colour,
figure, and the like qualities exist must perceive them. Henee it
is olear there can be no unthinking substance or substratum of
those ideas.

8. But, say you, though the ideas themselves^^^ do not exist
without the mind, yet there may be things like them, whereof
they are copies or resemblances; which things exist without the
mind, in an unthinking substance^^^. I answer, an idea can be

In the first edition, instead of this sentence, we have the following: “To
make this appear with all the light and evidence of an Axiom, it seems sufficient
if I can but awaken the reflexión of the reader, that he may take an impartial
view of his own meaning, and turn his thoughts upon the subject itself; free
and disengaged from all embarras of words and prepossession in favour of
received mistakes.”

In other words, active percipient Spirit is at the root of all intelligible
trustworthy experience.

’proof—“demonstration” in first edition; yet he calis it “intuitive.”

“the ideas themselves,” i.e. the phenomena immediately presented in sense,
and that are thus realised in and through the percipient experience of living
mind, as their factor.

As those say who assume that perception is ultimately only representative

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355

like nothing but an idea; a colour or figure ean be like nothing
but another eolour or figure. If we look but never so little into
our thoughts, we shall find it impossible for us to eoneeive a
likeness exeept only between our ideas. Again, I ask whether
those supposed origináis, or external things, of whieh our ideas
are the pietures or representations, be themselves pereeivable or
no? If they are, then they are ideas, and we have gained our
point: but if you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it
be sense to assert a eolour is like something whieh is invisible;
hard or soft, like something whieh is intangible; and so of the
rest.

9. Some there are who make a distinetion betwixt primary
and secondary qualities^^^. By the former they mean extensión,
figure, motion, rest, solidity or impenetrability, and number;
by the latter they denote all other sensible qualities, as eolours,
sounds, tastes, and so forth. The ideas we have of these last they
aeknowledge not to be the resemblanees of anything existing
without the mind, or unpereeived; but they will have our ideas
of the primary qualities to be patterns or images of things whieh
exist without the mind, in an unthinking substanee whieh they eall
Matter. By Matter, therefore, we are to understand an inert^^'^,
senseless substanee, in whieh extensión, figure, and motion do
aetually subsist. But it is evident, from what we have already
shewn, that extensión, figure, and motion are only ideas existing
in the mind^^\ and that an idea ean be like nothing but another
idea; and that eonsequently neither they ñor their arehetypes ean

of the material reality, the very things themselves not making their appearance
to US at all.

He refers especially to Locke, whose account of Matter is accordingly
charged with being incoherent.

“inert.” See the De Motu.

“ideas existing in the mind,” i.e. phenomena of whieh some mind is
percipient; whieh are realised in the sentient experience of a living spirit,
human or other.

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exist in an unperceiving substance. Henee, it is plain that the
very notion of what is called Matter or corporeal substance,
involves a contradiction in it. [^^^Insomuch that I should not
think it necessary to spend more time in exposing its absurdity.
But, because the tenet of the existence of Matter^^^ seems to ha ve
taken so deep a root in the minds of philosophers, and draws
after it so many ill consequences, I choose rather to be thought
prolix and tedious than omit anything that might conduce to the
full discovery and extirpation of that prejudice.]

10. They who assert that figure, motion, and the rest of
the primary or original qualities^^^ do exist without the mind,
in unthinking substances, do at the same time acknowledge that
colours, sounds, heat, coid, and suchlike secondary qualities,
do not; which they tell us are sensations, existing in the mind
alone, that depend on and are occasioned by the different size,
texture, and motion of the minute partióles of matter^^^. This
they take for an undoubted truth, which they can demónstrate
beyond all exception. Now, if it be certain that those original
qualities are inseparably united with the other sensible qualities,
and not, even in thought, capable of being abstracted from them,
it plainly follows that they exist only in the mind. But I desire
any one to reflect, and try whether he can, by any abstraction of
thought, conceive the extensión and motion of a body without
all other sensible qualities. For my own part, I see evidently that
it is not in my power to frame an idea of a body extended and
moving, but I must withal give it some colour or other sensible
quality, which is acknowledged to exist only in the mind. In

What follows to the end of the section is omitted in the second edition.

“the existence of Matter,” i.e. the existence of the material world, regarded
as a something that does not need to he perceived in order to he real.

Sometimes called objective qualities, hecause they are supposed to he
realised in an ahstract objectivity, which Berkeley insists is meaningless.

See Locke’s Essay, Bk. II, ch. 8, §§ 13, 18; ch. 23, § II; Bk. IV, ch. 3,
§ 24-26. Locke suggests this relation hetween the secondary and the primary
qualities of matter only hypothetically.

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short, extensión, figure and motion, abstracted from all other
qualities, are inconceivable. Where therefore the other sensible
qualities are, there must these be also, to wit, in the mind and
no where else^^^.

11. Again, great and small, swift and slow, are allowed to
exist nowhere without the mind^^’; being entirely relative, and
changing as the frame or position of the organs of sense varíes.

The extensión therefore which exists without the mind is neither
great ñor small, the motion neither swift ñor slow; that is, they
are nothing at all. But, say you, they are extensión in general, and
motion in general. Thus we see how much the tenet of extended
moveable substances existing without the mind depends on that
strange doctrine of abstract ideas. And here I cannot but remark
how nearly the vague and indeterminate description of Matter, or [264]
corporeal substance, which the modern philosophers are run into

by their own principies, resembles that antiquated and so much
ridiculed notion of materia prima, to be met with in Aristotle and
his followers. Without extensión solidity cannot be conceived:
since therefore it has been shewn that extensión exists not in an
unthinking substance, the same must also be true of solidity^^^.

12. That number is entirely the creature of the mind^^^,
even though the other qualities be allowed to exist without,
will be evident to whoever considers that the same thing bears

“in the mind, and nowhere else,” i.e. perceived or conceived, hut in no
other manner can they he real or concrete.

“without the mind,” i.e. independently of all percipient experience.

Extensión is thus the distinguishing characteristic of the material world.
Geometrical and physical solidity, as well as motion, imply extensión.

“number is the creature of the mind,” i.e. is dependent on being realised
in percipient experience. This dependence is here illustrated by the relation
of concrete number to the point of view of each mind; as the dependence
of the other primary qualities was illustrated by their dependence on the
organisation of the percipient. In this, the preceding, and the following
sections, Berkeley argües the inconsistency of the abstract reality attributed to
the primary qualities with their acknowledged dependence on the necessary
conditions of sense perception.

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a different denomination of number as the mind views it with
different respects. Thus, the same extensión is one, or three, or
thirty-six, according as the mind considers it with reference to
a yard, a foot, or an inch. Number is so visibly relativo, and
dependent on men's understanding, that it is strange to think
how any one should give it an absoluto existence without the
mind. We say one book, one page, one line, &c.; all these are
equally units, though some contain several of the others. And
in each instance, it is plain, the unit relates to some particular
combination of ideas arbitrarily put together by the mind^^°.

13. Unity I know some^^^ will have to be a simple or
uncompounded idea, accompanying all other ideas into the mind.
That I have any such idea answering the word unity I do not find;
and if I had, methinks I could not miss finding it; on the contrary,
it should be the most familiar to my understanding, since it is
said to accompany all other ideas, and to be perceived by all
the ways of sensation and reflexión. To say no more, it is an
abstract idea.

14. I shall farther add, that, after the same manner as modern
philosophers prove certain sensible qualities to have no existence
in Matter, or without the mind, the same thing may be likewise
proved of all other sensible qualities whatsoever. Thus, for
instance, it is said that heat and coid are affections only of
the mind, and not at all patterns of real beings, existing in the
corporeal substances which excite them; for that the same body
which appears coid to one hand seems warm to another. Now,
why may we not as well argüe that figure and extensión are not
patterns or resemblances of qualities existing in Matter; because
to the same eye at different stations, or eyes of a different texture
at the same station, they appear various, and cannot therefore be
the images of anything settled and determinate without the mind?
Again, it is pro ved that sweetness is not really in the sapid thing;

Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 109.

e.g. Locke, Essay, Bk. II, ch. 7, § 7; ch. 16, § I.

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because the thing remaining unaltered the sweetness is changed
into bitter, as in case of a fever or otherwise vitiated palate. Is
it not as reasonable to say that motion is not without the mind;
since if the succession of ideas in the mind become swifter, the
motion, it is acknowledged, shall appear slower, without any
alteration in any external object^^^?

15. In short, let any one consider those arguments which are
thought manifestly to prove that colours and tastes exist only in
the mind, and he shall find they may with equal forcé be brought
to prove the same thing of extensión, figure, and motion. Though
it must be confessed this method of arguing does not so much
prove that there is no extensión or colour in an outward object,
as that we do not know by sense which is the true extensión
or colour of the object. But the arguments foregoing^^^ plainly
shew it to be impossible that any colour or extensión at all, or
other sensible quality whatsoever, should exist in an unthinking
subject without the mind, or in truth that there should be any
such thing as an outward object^^^.

16. But let US examine a little the received opinión. It is said
extensión is a mode or accident of Matter, and that Matter is the
substratum that supports it. Now I desire that you would explain
to me what is meant by Matter's supporting extensión. Say you, I
have no idea of Matter; and therefore cannot explain it. I answer,
though you have no positivo, yet, if you have any meaning at
all, you must at least have a relative idea of Matter; though you
know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what
relation it bears to accidents, and what is meant by its supporting
them. It is evident support cannot here be taken in its usual or
literal sense, as when we say that pillars support a building. In

“without any alteration in any external object”—“without any external
alteration”—in first edition.

These arguments, founded on the mind-dependent nature of all the qualities
of matter, are expanded in the First Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.

“an outward object,” i.e. an object wholly abstract from living Mind.

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what sense therefore must it be taken? For my part, I am not
able to discover any sense at all that can be applicable to it.]

17. If we inquire into what the most accurate philosophers
declare themselves to mean by material substance, we shall find
them acknowledge they have no other meaning annexed to those
sounds but the idea of Being in general, together with the relative
notion of its supporting accidents. The general idea of Being
appeareth to me the most abstract and incomprehensible of all
other; and as for its supporting accidents, this, as we have just
now observed, cannot be understood in the common sense of
those words: it must therefore be taken in some other sense,
but what that is they do not explain. So that when I consider
the two parts or branches which make the signification of the
words material substance, I am convinced there is no distinct
meaning annexed to them. But why should we trouble ourselves
any farther, in discussing this material substratum or support
of figure and motion and other sensible qualities? Does it not
suppose they have an existence without the mind? And is not
this a direct repugnancy, and altogether inconceivable?

18. But, though it were possible that solid, figured, moveable
substances may exist without the mind, corresponding to the
ideas we have of bodies, yet how is it possible for us to know
this? Either we must know it by Sense or by Reason^^^. As
for our senses, by them we have the knowledge only of our
sensations, ideas, or those things that are immediately perceived
by sense, cali them what you will: but they do not inform us that
things exist without the mind, or unperceived, like to those which
are perceived. This the materialists themselves acknowledge.—It
remains therefore that if we have any knowledge at all of external
things, it must be by reason inferring their existence from what

This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

“reason,” i.e. reasoning. It is argued, in this and the next section, that
a reality unrealised in percipient experience cannot be proved, either by our
senses or by reasoning.

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is immediately perceived by sense. But do not see) what
reason can induce us to believe the existence of bodies without the
mind, from what we perceive, since the very patrons of Matter
themselves do not pretend there is any necessary connexion
betwixt them and our ideas? I say it is granted on all hands (and
what happens in dreams, frensies, and the like, puts it beyond
dispute) that it is possible we might be affected with all the
ideas we have now, though no bodies existed without resembling
them^^^. Henee it is evident the supposition of external bodies^^^
is not necessary for the producing our ideas; since it is granted
they are produced sometimes, and might possibly be produced
always, in the same order we see them in at present, without their
concurrence.

19. But, though we might possibly have all our sensations
without them, yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive
and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external
bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might
be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite
their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said. For,
though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by
their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas
are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend
in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible
it should imprint any idea in the mind^^°. Henee it is evident [ 268 ]
the production of ideas or sensations in our minds^^\ can be no

Omitted in the second edition, and the sentence converted into a question.

But the ideas of which we are cognizant in waking dreams, and dreams of
sleep, differ in important characteristics from the external ideas of which we
are percipient in sense. Cf. sect. 29-33.

“external bodies,” i.e. bodies supposed to be real independently of all
percipients in the universe.

i.e. they cannot shew how their unintelligible hypothesis of Matter accounts
for the experience we have, or expect to have; or which we believe other
persons have, or to be about to have.

“the production,” &c., i.e. the fact that we and others have percipient

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reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances^^^;
since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or
without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies
to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so must needs be
a very precarious opinión; since it is to suppose, without any
reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are
entirely useless, and serve to no manner of purpose.

20 . In short, if there were external bodies^^^, it is impossible
we should ever come to know it; and if there were not, we might
have the very same reasons to think there were that we have
now. Suppose—what no one can deny possible—an intelligence,
without the help of external bodies, to be affected with the same
train of sensations or ideas that you are, imprinted in the same
order and with like vividness in his mind. I ask whether that
intelligence hath not all the reason to believe the existence of
Corporeal Substances, represented by his ideas, and exciting
them in his mind, that you can possibly have for believing
the same thing? Of this there can be no question. Which
one consideration were enough to make any reasonable person
suspect the strength of whatever arguments he may think himself
to have, for the existence of bodies without the mind.

21. Were it necessary to add any farther proof against the
existence of Matter^®^, after what has been said, I could instance
several of those errors and difficulties (not to mention impieties)
which have sprung from that tenet. It has occasioned numberless
controversies and disputes in philosophy, and not a few of far
greater moment in religión. But I shall not enter into the detail of
them in this place, as well because I think arguments a posteriori
are unnecessary for confirming what has been, if I mistake not,

experience.

Mind-dependent Matter he not only allows to exist, but maintains its reality
to be intuitively evident.

i.e. bodies existing in abstraction from living percipient spirit.

“Matter,” i.e. abstract Matter, unrealised in sentient intelligence.

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sufficiently demonstrated a priori, as because I shall hereafter [269]
find occasion to speak somewhat of them.

22. I am afraid I have given cause to think I am needlessly
prolix in handling this subject. For, to what purpose is it to dilate
on that which may be demonstrated with the utmost evidence in
a line or two, to any one that is capable of the least reflexión?
It is but looking into your own thoughts, and so trying whether
you can conceive it possible for a sound, or figure, or motion,
or colour to exist without the mind or unperceived. This easy
triai565 perhaps make you see that what you contend for is
a downright contradiction. Insomuch that I am content to put
the whole upon this issue:—If you can but conceive it possible
for one extended moveable substance, or in general for any one
idea, or anything like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind
perceiving it^^^, I shall readily give up the cause. And, as for
all that compages of external bodies you contend for, I shall
grant you its existence, though you cannot either give me any
reason why you believe it exists, or assign any use to it when it
is supposed to exist. I say, the bare possibility of your opinions
being true shall pass for an argument that it is so.

23. But, say you, surely there is nothing easier than for me
to imagine trees, for instance, in a park, or books existing in a
closet, and nobody by to perceive them. I answer, you may so,
there is no difficulty in it. But what is all this, I beseech you,
more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you cali
books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea
of any one that may perceive them? But do not you yourself
perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing
to the purpose: it only shews you have the power of imagining,

The appeal here and elsewhere is to consciousness—directly in each person's
experience, and indirectly in that of others.

i.e. otherwise than in the form of an idea or actual appearance presented to

our senses.

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or forming ideas in your mind; but it does not shew that you can
conceive it possible the objects of your thought may exist without
the mind^^^. To make out this, it is necessary that you conceive
them existing unconceived or unthought of; which is a manifest
repugnancy. When we do our utmost to conceive the existence of
external bodies^^^, we are all the while only contemplating our
own ideas. But the mind, taking no notice of itself, is deluded to
think it can and does conceive bodies existing unthought of, or
without the mind, though at the same time they are apprehended
by, or exist in, itself. A little attention will discover to any one the
truth and evidence of what is here said, and make it unnecessary
to insist on any other proofs against the existence of material
substance.

24. [^^^Could men but forbear to amuse themselves with
words, we should, I believe, soon come to an agreement in this
point.] It is very obvious, upon the least inquiry into our own
thoughts, to know whether it be possible for us to understand
what is meant by the absolute existence of sensible objects in
themselves, or without the mincf^. To me it is evident those
words mark out either a direct contradiction, or else nothing
at all. And to convince others of this, I know no readier or
fairer way than to entreat they would calmly attend to their own
thoughts; and if by this attention the emptiness or repugnancy of

This implies that the material world may be realised in imagination as well
as in sensuous perception, but in a less degree of reality; for reality, he assumes,
admits of degrees.

“to conceive the existence of external bodies,” i.e. to conceive bodies that
are not conceived—that are not ideas at all, but which exist in abstraction. To
suppose what we conceive to be unconceived, is to suppose a contradiction.

This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

570 “jjjg existence of things without mind,” or in the absence of all spiritual
life and perception, is what Berkeley argües against, as meaningless, if not
contradictory, not the existence of a material world, when this means the
realised order of nature, regulated independently of individual will, and to
which our actions must conform if we are to avoid physical pain.

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those expressions does appear, surely nothing more is requisite
for their conviction. It is on this therefore that I insist, to wit, that
the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a
meaning, or whieh inelude a eontradietion. This is what I repeat
and ineuleate, and earnestly reeommend to the attentive thoughts
of the reader.

25. All our ideas, sensations, notions^^^ or the things whieh
we pereeive, by whatsoever ñames they may be distinguished,
are visibly inaetive: there is nothing of power or ageney ineluded
in them. So that one idea or objeet of thought eannot produee
or make any alteration in another^^^. To be satisfied of the truth
of this, there is nothing else requisite but a haré observation of
our ideas. For, sinee they and every part of them exist only in
the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is
pereeived; but whoever shall attend to bis ideas, whether of sense
or reflexión, will not pereeive in them any power or aetivity;
there is, therefore, no sueh thing eontained in them. A little
attention will diseover to us that the very being of an idea implies
passiveness and inertness in it; insomueh that it is impossible
for an idea to do anything, or, strietly speaking, to be the eause
of anything: neither ean it be the resemblanee or pattern of any
aetive being, as is evident from seet. 8. Whenee it plainly follows
that extensión, figure, and motion eannot be the eause of our
sensations. To say, therefore, that these are the effeets of powers
resulting from the eonfiguration, number, motion, and size of

Here again notion is undistinguished from idea.

This and the three following sections argüe for the essential impotence of
matter, and that, as far as we are concemed, so-called “natural causes” are
only signs whieh foretell the appearance of their so-called effeets. The material
World is presented to our senses as a procession of orderly, and therefore
interpretable, yet in themselves powerless, ideas or phenomena: motion is
always an effect, never an originating active cause.

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corpuscles^^^, must certainly be false.

26. We perceive a continual succession of ideas; some are
anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is
therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and
which produces and changes them^^^. That this cause cannot be
any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is olear from the
preceding section. It must therefore be a substance', but it has
been shewn that there is no corporeal or material substance: it
remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active
substance or Spirit^’^.

27. A Spirit is one simple, undivided active being—as it
perceives ideas it is called the understanding, and as it produces
or otherwise operates about them it is called the will. Henee there
can be no idea formed of a soul or spirit; for all ideas whatever,
being passive and inert (vid. sect. 25), they cannot represent
unto US, by way of image or likeness, that which acts. A little
attention will make it plain to any one, that to have an idea which
shall be like that active Principie of motion and change of ideas
is absolutely impossible. Such is the nature of Spirit, or that
which acts, that it cannot be of itself perceived, but only by the
effects which it produceth^^^. If any man shall doubt of the truth
of what is here delivered, let him but reflect and try if he can
frame the idea of any power or active being; and whether he has

As Locke suggests.

This tacitly presupposes the necessity in reason of the Principie of Causality,
or the ultímate need for an efficient cause of every change. To determine the
sort of Causation that constitutes and pervades the universe is the aim of his
philosophy.

In other words, the material world is not only real in and through percipient
spirit, but the changing forms which its phenomena assume, in the natural
evolution, are the issue of the perpetual activity of in-dwelling Spirit. The
argument in this section requires a deeper criticism of its premisses.

In other words, an agent cannot, as such, be perceived or imagined, though
its effects can. The spiritual term agent is not meaningless; yet we have no
sensuous idea of its meaning.

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ideas of two principal powers, marked by the ñames will and
understanding, distinct from each other, as well as from a third
idea of Substance or Being in general, with a relative notion of its
supporting or being the subject of the aforesaid powers—which
is signified by the ñame soul or spirit. This is what some hold;
but, so far as I can see, the words will, [^''''understanding, mind,]
soul, spirit, do not stand for different ideas, or, in truth, for any
idea at all, but for something which is very different from ideas,
and which, being an agent, cannot be like unto, or represented by,
any idea whatsoever. [^^^Though it must be owned at the same
time that we have some notion of soul, spirit, and the operations
of the mind, such as willing, loving, hating—inasmuch as we
know or understand the meaning of these words.]

28. I find I can excite ideas^^^ in my mind at pleasure, and
vary and shift the scene as oft as I think fit. It is no more than
willing, and straightway this or that idea arises in my fancy;
and by the same power it is obliterated and makes way for [ 273 ]
another. This making and unmaking of ideas doth very properly
denominate the mind active. Thus much is certain and grounded
on experience: but when we talk of unthinking agents, or of
exciting ideas exclusive of volition, we only amuse ourselves
with words^^*’.

Omitted in second edition.

This sentence is not contained in the first edition. It is remarkable for first
introducing the term notion, to signify idealess meaning, as in the words soul,
active power, &c. Here he says that “the operations of the mind” belong to
notions, while, in sect. 1, he speaks of “ideas perceived by attending to the
‘operations’ of the mind.”

“ideas,” i.e. fancies of imagination; as distinguished from the more real
ideas or phenomena that present themselves objectively to our senses.

With Berkeley the world of external ideas is distinguished from Spirit
by its essential passivity. Active power is with him the essence of Mind,
distinguishing me from the changing ideas of which I am percipient. We must
not attribute free agency to phenomena presented to our senses.

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29. But, whatever power I may have over my own thoughts,
I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like
dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes,
it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or
to determine what particular objects shall presen! themselves to
my view: and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the
ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will^^^ There is
therefore some other Will or Spirit that produces them.

30. The ideas of Sense are more strong, lively, and distinct
than those of the Imagination^*^; they have likewise a steadiness,
order, and coherence, and are not excited at random, as those
which are the effects of human wills often are, but in a regular
train or series—the admirable connexion whereof sufficiently
testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Author. Now the set
rules, or established methods, wherein the Mind we depend on
excites in us the ideas of Sense, are called the laws of nature',
and these we learn by experience, which teaches us that such and
such ideas are attended with such and such other ideas, in the
ordinary course of things.

31. This gives us a sort of foresight, which enables us to
regúlate our actions for the benefit of life. And without this we
should be eternally at a loss: we could not know how to act
anything that might procure us the least pleasure, or remove the
least pain of sense. That food nourishes, sleep refreshes, and
fire warms us; that to sow in the seed-time is the way to reap
in the harvest; and in general that to obtain such or such ends,
such or such means are conducive—all this we know, not by

In this and the four following sections, Berkeley mentions marks by
which the ideas or phenomena that present themselves to the senses may be
distinguished from all other ideas, in consequence of which they may be termed
“external,” while those of feeling and imagination are wholly subjective or
individual.

This mark—the superior strength and liveliness of the ideas or phenomena
that are presented to the senses—was afterwards noted by Hume. See Inquiry
concerning Human Understanding, sect. II.

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discovering any necessary connexion between our ideas, but only
by the observation of the settled laws of nature; without which
we should be all in uneertainty and eonfusion, and a grown man
no more know how to manage himself in the affairs of Ufe than
an infant just born^^^.

32. And yet this eonsistent uniform working, whieh so
evidently displays the Goodness and Wisdom of that Governing
Spirit whose Will eonstitutes the laws of nature, is so far from
leading our thoughts to Him, that it rather sends them wandering
after seeond eauses^^^. For, when we pereeive eertain ideas of
Sense eonstantly followed by other ideas, and we know this is
not of our own doing, we forthwith attribute power and ageney
to the ideas themselves, and make one the eause of another,
than whieh nothing ean be more absurd and unintelligible. Thus,
for example, having observed that when we pereeive by sight
a eertain round luminous figure, we at the same time pereeive
by toueh the idea or sensation eahed heat, we do from thenee
eonelude the sun to be the cause of heat. And in like manner
perceiving the motion and eohision of bodies to be attended
with sound, we are inelined to think the latter the effect of the
former^^^.

33. The ideas imprinted on the Senses by the Author of nature
are ealled real things: and those exeited in the imagination, being
less regular, vivid, and eonstant, are more properly termed ideas

Berkeley here and always insists on the arbitrary character of “settled laws”
of change in the world, as contrasted with “necessary connexions” discovered
in mathematics. The material world is thus virtually an interpretable natural
language, constituted in what, at our point of view, is arbitrariness or
contingency.

Under this conception of the universe, “seeond causes” are divinely
established signs of impending changes, and are only metaphorically ealled
“causes.”

So Schiller, in Don Carlos, Act III, where he represents sceptics as failing
to see the God who veils Himself in everlasting laws. But in truth God is
eternal law or order vitalised and moralised.

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[275]

or images of things, which they copy and represent. But then our
sensations, be they never so vivid and distinct, are nevertheless
ideas^*^: that is, they exist in the mind, or are perceived by it,
as truly as the ideas of its own framing. The ideas of Sense
are allowed to have more reality^^’ in them, that is, to be more
strong, orderly, and coherent than the creatures of the mind; but
this is no argument that they exist without the mind. They are
also less dependent on the spirit or thinking substance which
perceives them, in that they are excited by the will of another and
more powerful Spirit; yet still they are ideas: and certainly no
idea, whether faint or strong, can exist otherwise than in a mind
perceiving it^^^.

34. Before we proceed any farther it is necessary we spend
some time in answering Objections^^^ which may probably be
made against the Principies we have hitherto laid down. In doing
of which, if I seem too prolix to those of quick apprehensions, I
desire I may be excused, since all men do not equally apprehend
things of this nature; and I am willing to be understood by every
one.

“sensations,” with Berkeley, are not mere feelings, but in a sense external
appearances.

“more reality.” This implies that reality admits of degrees, and that the
difference between the phenomena presented to the senses and those which are
only imagined is a difference in degree of reality.

In the preceding sections, two relations should be carefully
distinguished—that of the material world to percipient mind, in which it
becomes real, and that between changes in the world and spiritual agency.
These are Berkeley's two leading Principies. The first conducts to and
vindicates the second—inadequately, however, apart from explication of their
root in moral reason. The former gives a relation sui generis. The latter gives
our only example of active causality—the natural order of phenomena being
the outcome of the causal energy of intending Will.

Sect. 34-84 contain Berkeley's answers to supposed objections to the
foregoing Principies conceming Matter and Spirit in their mutual relations.

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First, then, it will be objected that by the foregoing principies
all that is real and substantial in nature is banished out of the
World, and instead thereof a chimerical scheme of ideas takes
place. All things that exist exist only in the mind; that is, they
are purely notional. What therefore becomes of the sun, moon,
and stars? What must we think of houses, rivers, mountains,
trees, stones; nay, even of our own bodies? Are all these but so
many chimeras and illusions on the fancy?—To all which, and [276]
whatever else of the same sort may be objected, 1 answer, that
by the Principies premised we are not deprived of any one thing
in nature. Whatever we see, feel, hear, or any wise conceive
or understand, remains as secure as ever, and is as real as ever.

There is a rerum natura, and the distinction between realities
and chimeras retains its full forcé. This is evident from sect. 29,

30, and 33, where we have shewn what is meant by real things,
in opposition to chimeras or ideas of our ownframing\ but then
they both equally exist in the mind, and in that sense^^° are alike
ideas.

35. 1 do not argüe against the existence of any one thing that
we can apprehend, either by sense or reflection. That the things 1
see with my eyes and touch with my hands do exist, really exist,

1 make not the least question. The only thing whose existence
we deny is that which philosophers cali Matter or corporeal
substance. And in doing of this there is no damage done to the
rest of mankind, who, 1 daré say, will never miss it. The Atheist
indeed will want the colour of an empty ñame to support his
impiety; and the Philosophers may possibly find they have lost
a great handle for trifling and disputation. [^^^But that is all the

To be an “idea” is, with Berkeley, to be the imaginable object of a percipient
spirit. But he does not define precisely the relation of ideas to mind. “Existence
in mind” is existence in this relation. His question (which he determines in
the negative) is, the possibility of concrete phenomena, naturally presented to
sense, yet out of all relation to living mind.

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harm that I can see done.]

36. If any man thinks this detracts from the existence or
reality of things, he is very far from understanding what hath
been premised in the plainest terms I could think of. Take
here an abstract of what has been said:—There are spiritual
substances, minds, or human souls, which will or excite ideas^^^
in themselves at pleasure; but these are faint, weak, and unsteady
in respect of others they perceive by sense: which, being
impressed upon them according to certain rules or laws of
nature, speak themselves the effects of a Mind more powerful
and wise than human spirits^^^. These latter are said to have more
reality^^"^ in them than the former;—^by which is meant that they
are more affecting, orderly, and distinct, and that they are not
fictions of the mind perceiving them^^^. And in this sense the
sun that I see by day is the real sun, and that which I imagine by
night is the idea of the former. In the sense here given of reality,
it is evident that every vegetable, star, mineral, and in general
each part of the mundane system, is as much a real being by our
principies as by any other. Whether others mean anything by the
term reality different from what I do, I entreat them to look into
their own thoughts and see.

37. It will be urged that thus much at least is true, to wit, that we
take away all corporeal substances. To this my answer is, that if
the Word substance be taken in the vulgar sense, for a combination
of sensible qualities, such as extensión, solidity, weight, and the
like—this we cannot be accused of taking away: but if it be taken
in a philosophic sense, for the support of accidents or qualities
without the mind—then indeed I acknowledge that we take it

i.e. of imagination. Cf. sect. 28-30.

Cf. sect. 29.

“more reality.” This again implies that reality admits of degrees. What is
perceived in sense is more real than what is imagined, and eternal realities are
more deeply real than the transitory things of sense.

Cf. sect. 33. “Not fictions,” i.e. they are presentative, and therefore cannot
misrepresent.

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away, if one may be said to take away that which never had any
existence, not even in the imagination^^^.

38. But after all, say you, it sounds very harsh to say we eat
and drink ideas, and are elothed with ideas. I aeknowledge it
does so—the word idea not being used in common diseourse to
signify the several eombinations of sensible qualities whieh are
ealled things', and it is eertain that any expression whieh varies
from the familiar use of language will seem harsh and ridieulous.

But this doth not eoneern the truth of the proposition, whieh in
other words is no more than to say, we are fed and elothed with
those things whieh we pereeive immediately by our senses^^^.

The hardness or softness, the eolour, taste, warmth, figure, and
suehlike qualities, whieh eombined together^^^ eonstitute the
several sorts of vietuals and apparel, have been shewn to exist [ 278 ]
only in the mind that pereeives them: and this is all that is meant

by ealling them ideas', whieh word, if it was as ordinarily used
as thing, would sound no harsher ñor more ridieulous than it.

I am not for disputing about the propriety, but the truth of the
expression. If therefore you agree with me that we eat and drink
and are elad with the immediate objeets of sense, whieh eannot
exist unpereeived or without the mind, I shall readily grant it is
more proper or eonformable to eustom that they should be ealled
things rather than ideas.

39. If it be demanded why I make use of the word idea,
and do not rather in eomplianee with eustom eall them things', I
answer, I do it for two reasons:—First, beeause the term thing,
in eontradistinetion to idea, is generally supposed to denote
somewhat existing without the mind: Seeondly, beeause thing

With Berkeley substance is either (a) active reason, i.e. spirit—substance
proper, or (b) an aggregate of sense-phenomena, ealled a “sensible
thing”—substance conventionally and superficially.

And which, beeause realised in living perception, are ealled ideas —to
remind us that reality is attained in and through percipient mind.

“eombined together,” i.e. in the form of “sensible things,” according to
natural laws. Cf. sect. 33.

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hath a more comprehensive signification than idea, including
spirits, or thinking things^^^, as well as ideas. Since therefore
the objects of sense exist only in the mind, and are withal
thoughtless and inactive, I chose to mark them by the word idea',
which implies those properties^*’®.

40. But, say what we can, some one perhaps may be apt
to reply, he will still believe bis senses, and never suffer any
arguments, how plausible soever, to prevalí over the certainty of
them. Be it so; assert the evidence of sense as high as you picase,
we are willing to do the same. That what I see, hear, and feel
doth exist, that is to say, is perceived by me, I no more doubt
than I do of my own being. But I do not see how the testimony
of sense can be alleged as a proof for the existence of anything
which is not perceived by sense. We are not for having any man
turn sceptic and disbelieve his senses; on the contrary, we give
them all the stress and assurance imaginable; ñor are there any
principies more opposite to Scepticism than those we have laid
down, as shall be hereafter clearly shewn^°^.

41. Secondly, it will be objected that there is a great difference
betwixt real fire for instance, and the idea of fire, betwixt
dreaming or imagining oneself burnt, and actually being so.
[ 602 if suspect it to be only the idea of fire which you see,
do but put your hand into it and you will be convinced with a
witness.] This and the like may be urged in opposition to our

“thinking things”—more appropriately called persons.

™ Berkeley uses the word idea to mark the fact, that sensible things are real
only as they manifest themselves in the form of passive objects, presented to
sense-percipient mind; but he does not, as popularly supposed, regard “sensible
things” as created and regulated by the activity of his own individual mind.
They are perceived, but are neither created ñor regulated, by the individual
percipient, and are thus practically external to each person.

Cf. sect. 87-91, against the scepticism which originates in alleged fallacy
of sense.

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tenets.—To all which the answer is evident from what hath been
already said^°^; and I shall only add in this place, that if real fire
be very different from the idea of fire, so also is the real pain that
it occasions very different from the idea of the same pain, and
yet nobody will pretend that real pain either is, or can possibly
be, in an unperceiving thing, or without the mind, any more than
its idea^°^.

42. Thirdly, it will be objected that we see things actually
without or at a distance from us, and which consequently do not
exist in the mind; it being absurd that those things which are seen
at the distance of several miles should be as near to us as our own
thoughts^*^^.—In answer to this, I desire it may be considered
that in a dream we do oft perceive things as existing at a great
distance off, and yet for all that, those things are acknowledged
to have their existence only in the mind.

43. But, for the fuller clearing of this point, it may be worth
while to consider how it is that we perceive distance, and things
placed at a distance, by sight. For, that we should in truth see
external space, and bodies actually existing in it, some nearer,
others farther off, seems to carry with it some opposition to [ 280 ]
what hath been said of their existing nowhere without the mind.

The consideration of this difficulty it was that gave birth to my
Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, which was published
not long since^*’^. Wherein it is shewn that distance or outness

It is always to be remembered that with Berkeley ideas or phenomena
presented to sense are themselves the real things, whilst ideas of imagination
are representative (or misrepresentative).

Here feelings of pleasure or pain are spoken of, without qualification, as in
like relation to living mind as sensible things or ideas are.

That the ideas of sense should be seen “at a distance of several miles” seems
not inconsistent with their being dependent on a percipient, if ambient space is
itself(a.s Berkeley asserts) dependent on percipient experience. Cf. sect. 67.

**** In the preceding year.

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is neither immediately of itself perceived by sight^°^, ñor yet
apprehended or judged of by Unes and angles, or anything that
hath a necessary connexion with but that it is only suggested
to our thoughts by certain visible ideas, and sensations attending
visión, which in their own nature have no manner of similitude or
relation either with distance or things placed at a distance^®^; but,
by a connexion taught us by experience, they come to signify
and suggest them to us, after the same manner that words of
any language suggest the ideas they are made to stand for^^*^.
Insomuch that a man born blind, and afterwards made to see,
would not, at first sight, think the things he saw to be without
bis mind, or at any distance from him. See sect. 41 of the
forementioned treatise.

44. The ideas of sight and touch make two species entirely
distinct and heterogeneous^'^ The former are marks and
prognostics of the latter. That the proper objects of sight
neither exist without the mind, ñor are the images of external
things, was shewn even in that treatise^^^. Though throughout the
same the contrary be supposed true of tangible objects ',—not that
to suppose that vulgar error was necessary for establishing the
notion therein laid down, but because it was beside my purpose
to examine and refute it, in a discourse concerning Vision. So
that in strict truth the ideas of sight^'^, when we apprehend by
them distance, and things placed at a distance, do not suggest
or mark out to us things actually existing at a distance, but only
admonish us what ideas of touch^^^ will be imprinted in our

Essay, sect. 2.

Ibid. sect. 11-15.

Ibid. sect. 16-28.

““ Ibid. sect. 51.

Ibid. sect. 47-49, 121-141.

Ibid. sect. 43.

Le. what we are immediately percipient of in seeing.

Touch is here and elsewhere taken in its wide meaning, and ineludes
our muscular and locomotive experience, all which Berkeley included in the

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minds at such and such distances of time, and in consequence of
such or such actions. It is, I say, evident, from what has been [ 28 i]
said in the foregoing parts of this Treatise, and in sect. 147 and
elsewhere of the Essay concerning Vision, that visible ideas are
the Language whereby the Governing Spirit on whom we depend
informs us what tangible ideas he is about to imprint upon us, in
case we excite this or that motion in our own bodies. But for a
fuller information in this point 1 refer to the Essay itself.

45. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing
principies it follows things are every moment annihilated and
created anew. The objects of sense exist only when they are
perceived: the trees therefore are in the garden, or the chairs
in the parlour, no longer than while there is somebody by to
perceive them. Upon shutting my eyes all the furniture in the
room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening them it
is again created^^^.—In answer to all which, 1 refer the reader
to what has been said in sect. 3, 4, &c.; and desire he will
consider whether he means anything by the actual existence of
an idea distinct from its being perceived. Eor my part, after
the nicest inquiry 1 could make, 1 am not able to discover that
anything else is meant by those words; and 1 once more entreat
the reader to sound bis own thoughts, and not suffer himself to
be imposed on by words. If he can conceive it possible either
for bis ideas or their archetypes to exist without being perceived,
then 1 give up the cause. But if he cannot, he will acknowledge

“tactual” meaning of distance.

To explain the condition of sensible things during the intervals of our
perception of them, consistently with the belief of all sane persons regarding
the material world, is a challenge which has been often addressed to the
advocates of ideal Realism. According to Berkeley, there are no intervals
in the existence of sensible things. They are permanently perceivable, under
the laws of nature, though not always perceived by this, that or the other
individual percipient. Moreover they always exist really in the Divine Idea,
and potentially, in relation to finite minds, in the Divine Will.

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it is unreasonable for him to stand up in defence of he knows
not what, and pretend to charge on me as an absurdity, the not
assenting to those propositions which at bottom have no meaning
in them^^^.

46. It will not be amiss to observe how far the received
principies of philosophy are themselves chargeable with those
pretended absurdities. It is thought strangely absurd that upon
closing my eyelids all the visible objects around me should
be reduced to nothing; and yet is not this what philosophers
commonly acknowledge, when they agree on all hands that light
and colours, which alone are the proper and immediate objects
of sight, are mere sensations that exist no longer than they are
perceived? Again, it may to some perhaps seem very incredible
that things should be every moment creating; yet this very notion
is commonly taught in the schools. For the Schoolmen, though
they acknowledge the existence of Matter^'^, and that the whole
mundane fabric is framed out of it, are nevertheless of opinión
that it cannot subsist without the divine conservation; which by
them is expounded to be a continual creation^'^.

Berkeley allows to bodies unperceived by me potential, but (for me) not
real existence. When I say a body exists thus conditionally, I mean that if, in
the light, I open my eyes, I shall see it, and that if I move my hand, I must feel
it.

i.e. unperceived material suhstance.

Berkeley remarks, in a letter to the American Samuel Johnson, that “those
who have contended for a material world have yet acknowledged that natura
naturans (to use the language of the Schoolmen) is God; and that the Divine
conservation of things is equipollent to, and in fact the same thing with, a
continued repeated creation;—in a word, that conservation and creation differ
only as the terminus a quo. These are the common opinions of Schoolmen;
and Durandus, who held the world to be a machine, like a dock made up and
put in motion hy God, but afterwards continued to go of itself, was therein
particular, and had few followers. The very poets teach a doctrine not unlike
the Schools— mens agitatmolem (Virgil, ^Eneid, VI). The Stoics and Platonists
are everywhere full of the same notion. I am not therefore singular in this
point itself, so much as in my way of proving it.” Cf. Alciphron, Dial. IV.
sect. 14; Vindication ofNew Theory of Vision, sect. 8, 17, &c.; Siris, passim,

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47. Farther, a little thought will discover to us that, though we
allow the existence of Matter or corporeal substance, yet it will
unavoidably follow, from the principies which are now generally
admitted, that the particular bodies, of what kind soever, do none
of them exist whilst they are not perceived. For, it is evident, from
sect. 11 and the following sections, that the Matter philosophers
contend for is an incomprehensible Somewhat, which hath none
of those particular qualities whereby the bodies falling under our
senses are distinguished one from another. But, to make this
more plain, it must be remarked that the infinite divisibility of
Matter is now universally allowed, at least by the most approved
and considerable philosophers, who on the received principies
demónstrate it beyond all exception. Henee, it follows there is an
infinite number of parts in each partióle of Matter which are not
perceived by sense^^^. The reason therefore that any particular
body seems to be of a finite magnitude, or exhibits only a finite
number of parts to sense, is, not because it contains no more, since
in itself it contains an infinite number of parts, but because the
sense is not acute enough to discern them. In proportion therefore
as the sense is rendered more acute, it perceives a greater number
of parts in the object, that is, the object appears greater; and its
figure varíes, those parts in its extremities which were before
unperceivable appearing now to bound it in very different lines
and angles from those perceived by an obtuser sense. And at
length, after various changos of size and shape, when the sense
becomes infinitely acute, the body shall seem infinite. During all
which there is no alteration in the body, but only in the sense.
Each body therefore, considered in itself, is infinitely extended,
and consequently void of all shape and figure. From which it
follows that, though we should grant the existence of Matter to

but especially in the latter part. See also Correspondence between Clarke and
Leibniz (1717). Is it not possible that the universe of things and persons is in
continuous natural creation, unbeginning and unending?

Cf. sect. 123-132.

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be never so certain, yet it is withal as certain, the materialists
themselves are by their own principies forced to acknowledge,
that neither the particular bodies perceived by sense, ñor anything
like them, exists without the mind. Matter, I say, and each partióle
thereof, is according to them infinite and shapeless; and it is the
mind that frames all that variety of bodies which compose the
visible World, any one whereof does not exist longer than it is
perceived.

48. But, after all, if we consider it, the objection proposed in
sect. 45 will not be found reasonably charged on the Principies we
have premised, so as in truth to make any objection at all against
our notions. For, though we hold indeed the objects of sense to
be nothing else but ideas which cannot exist unperceived, yet
we may not henee conclude they have no existence except only
while they are perceived by us', since there may be some other
spirit that perceives them though we do not. Wherever bodies
are said to have no existence without the mind, I would not be
understood to mean this or that particular mind, but all minds
whatsoever. It does not therefore follow from the foregoing
Principies that bodies are annihilated and created every moment,
or exist not at all during the intervals between our perception of
them.

49. Fifthly, it may perhaps be objected that if extensión and
figure exist only in the mind, it follows that the mind is extended
and figured; since extensión is a mode or attribute which (to
speak with the Schools) is predicated of the subject in which it
exists.—I answer, those qualities are in the mind only as they
are perceived by it;—that is, not by way of mode or attribute,
but only by way of idea^^^. And it no more follows the soul

He distinguishes “idea” from “mode or attribute.” With Berkeley, the
“substance” of matter (if the term is still to be applied to sensible things)
is the naturally constituted aggregate of phenomena of which each particular
thing consists. Now extensión, and the other qualities of sensible things, are

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or mind is extended, beeause extensión exists in it alone, than
it does that it is red or bine, beeause those eolours are on all
hands aeknowledged to exist in it, and nowhere else. As to what
philosophers say of subjeet and mode, that seems very groundless
and unintelligible. For instanee, in this proposition “a die is hard,
extended, and square,” they will have it that the word die denotes
a subjeet or substanee, distinet from the hardness, extensión, and
figure whieh are predieated of it, and in whieh they exist. This
1 eannot eomprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinet
from those things whieh are termed its modes or aeeidents. And,
to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those [ 285 ]
qualities to a subjeet distinet from and supporting them, but only
an explieation of the meaning of the word die.

50. Sixthly, you will say there have been a great many
things explained by matter and motion; take away these and
you destroy the whole eorpuseular philosophy, and undermine
those meehanieal prineiples whieh have been applied with
so mueh sueeess to aeeount for the phenomena. In short,
whatever advanees have been made, either by aneient or
modern philosophers, in the study of nature do all proeeed
on the supposition that eorporeal substanee or Matter doth really
exist.—To this 1 answer that there is not any one phenomenon
explained on that supposition whieh may not as well be explained
without it, as might easily be made appear by an induetion of
partieulars. To explain the phenomena, is all one as to shew why,
upon sueh and sueh oeeasions, we are affeeted with sueh and

not, Berkeley argües, “in mind” either (a) according to the abstract relation
of substanee and attribute of whieh philosophers speak; ñor (b) as one idea
or phenomenon is related to another idea or phenomenon, in the natural
aggregation of sense-phenomena whieh eonstitute, with him, the substanee
of a material thing. Mind and its “ideas” are, on the eontrary, related as
pereipient to pereeived—in whatever “othemess” that altogether sui generis
relation implies.

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such ideas. But how Matter should opérate on a Spirit, or produce
any idea in it, is what no philosopher will pretend to explain; it
is therefore evident there can be no use of Matter^^^ in natural
philosophy. Besides, they who attempt to account for things
do it, not by corporeal substance, but by figure, motion, and
other qualities; which are in truth no more than mere ideas, and
therefore cannot be the cause of anything, as hath been already
shewn. See sect. 25.

51. Seventhly, it will upon this be demanded whether it does
not seem absurd to take away natural causes^^^, and ascribe
everything to the immediate operation of spirits? We must no
longer say upon these principies that fire heats, or water cools, but
that a spirit heats, and so forth. Would not a man be deservedly
laughed at, who should talk after this manner?—I answer, he
would so: in such things we ought to think with the learned and
speak with the vulgar. They who to demonstration are convinced
of the truth of the Copernican system do nevertheless say “the
sun rises,” “the sun sets,” or “comes to the meridian”; and if they
affected a contrary style in common talk it would without doubt
appear very ridiculous. A little refiection on what is here said will
make it manifest that the common use of language would receive
no manner of alteration or disturbance from the admission of our
tenets^^^.

52. In the ordinary affairs of life, any phrases may be retained,

“Matter,” i.e. abstract material Substance, as distinguished from the concrete
things that are realised in living perceptions.

“take away natural causes,” i.e. empty the material world of all originative
power, and refer the supposed powers of bodies to the constant and omnipresent
agency of God.

Some philosophers ha ve treated the relation of Matter to Mind in perception
as one of cause and effect. This, according to Berkeley, is an illegitimate
analysis, which creates a fictitious duality. On his New Principies, philosophy
is based on a recognition of the fact, that perception is neither the cause ñor the
effect of its object, but in a relation to it that is altogether sui generis.

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so long as they excite in us proper sentiments, or dispositions
to act in such a manner as is necessary for our well-being, how
false soever they may be if taken in a strict and speculative
sense. Nay, this is unavoidable, since, propriety being regulated
by custom, language is suited to the received opinions, which
are not always the truest. Henee it is impossible—even in the
most rigid, philosophic reasonings—so far to alter the bent and
genius of the tongue we speak as never to give a handle for
cavillers to pretend difficulties and inconsistencies. But, a fair
and ingenuous reader will collect the sense from the scope and
tenor and connexion of a discourse, making allowances for those
inaccurate modes of speech which use has made inevitable.

53. As to the opinión that there are no corporeal causes, this
has been heretofore maintained by some of the Schoolmen, as it
is of late by others among the modern philosophers; who though
they allow Matter to exist, yet will have God alone to be the
immediate efficient cause of all things^^^. These men saw that
amongst all the objects of sense there was none which had any
power or activity included in it; and that by consequence this was
likewise true of whatever bodies they supposed to exist without [ 287 ]
the mind, like unto the immediate objects of sense. But then, that
they should suppose an innumerable multitude of created beings,
which they acknowledge are not capable of producing any one
effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no manner of
purpose, since God might have done everything as well without
them—this I say, though we should allow it possible, must yet
be a very unaccountable and extravagant supposition^^^.

54. In the eighth place, the universal concurrent assent of

He refers to Descartes, and perhaps Geulinx and Malebranche, who, while
they argued for material substance, denied the causal ejficiency of sensible
things. Berkeley's new Principies are presented as the foundation in reason for
this denial, and for the essential spirituality of all active power in the universe.

On the principie, “Entia non sunt multiplicanda prteter necessitatem.”

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mankind may be thought by some an invincible argument in
behalf of Matter, or the existence of external things^^^. Must we
suppose the whole world to be mistaken? And if so, what cause
can be assigned of so widespread and predominant an error?—I
answer, first, that, upon a narrow inquiry, it will not perhaps be
found so many as is imagined do really believe the existence
of Matter or things without the mind^^^. Strictly speaking, to
believe that which involves a contradiction, or has no meaning
in it^^^, is impossible; and whether the foregoing expressions
are not of that sort, I refer it to the impartial examination of the
reader. In one sense, indeed, men may be said to believe that
Matter exists; that is, they act as if the immediate cause of their
sensations, which affects them every moment, and is so nearly
present to them, were some senseless unthinking being. But,
that they should clearly apprehend any meaning marked by those
words, and form thereof a settled speculative opinión, is what I
am not able to conceive. This is not the only instance wherein
men impose upon themselves, by imagining they believe those
propositions which they have often heard, though at bottom they
have no meaning in them.

55. But secondly, though we should grant a notion to be
never so universally and stedfastly adhered to, yet this is but
a weak argument of its truth to whoever considers what a
vast number of prejudices and false opinions are everywhere
embraced with the utmost tenaciousness, by the unreflecting
(which are the far greater) part of mankind. There was a time
when the antipodes and motion of the earth were looked upon

“external things,” i.e. things in the abstract.

That the unreflecting part of mankind should have a confused conception
of what should be meant by the external reality of matter is not wonderful.
It is the office of philosophy to improve their conception, making it deeper
and truer, and this was Berkeley's preliminary task; as a mean for shewing
the impotence of the things of sense, and conclusive evidence of omnipresent
spiritual activity.

Cf. sect. 4, 9, 15, 17, 22, 24.

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as monstrous absurdities even by men of learning: and if it
be considered what a small proportion they bear to the rest of
mankind, we shall find that at this day those notions have gained
but a very inconsiderable footing in the world.

56. But it is demanded that we assign a cause of this prejudice,
and account for its obtaining in the world. To this I answer,
that men knowing they perceived several ideas, whereof they
themselves were, not the authors^^^, as not being excited from
within, ñor depending on the operation of their wills, this made
them maintain those ideas or objects of perception, had an
existence independent of and without the mind, without ever
dreaming that a contradiction was involved in those words. But,
philosophers having plainly seen that the immediate objects of
perception do not exist without the mind, they in some degree
corrected the mistake of the vulgar^^°; but at the same time
run into another, which seems no less absurd, to wit, that there
are certain objects really existing without the mind, or having
a subsistence distinct from being perceived, of which our ideas
are only images or resemblances, imprinted by those objects
on the mind^^^ And this notion of the philosophers owes its
origin to the same cause with the former, namely, their being
conscious that they were not the authors of their own sensations;
which they evidently knew were imprinted from without, and [ 289 ]
which therefore must have some cause, distinct from the minds
on which they are imprinted.

i.e. their sense-ideas. —Though sense-ideas, i.e. the appearances presented
to the senses, are independent of the will of the individual percipient, it does
not follow that they are independent of all perception, so that they can be real
in the absence of realising percipient experience. Cf. sect. 29-33.

By shewing that what we are percipient of in sense must be idea, or that it
is immediately known by us only as sensuous appearance.

i.e. “imprinted” by unperceived Matter, which, on this dogma of a
representative sense-perception, was assumed to exist behind the perceived
ideas, and to be the cause of their appearance. Cf. Third Dialogue between
Hylas and Philonous.

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57. But why they should suppose the ideas of sense to be
excited in us by things in their likeness, and not rather have
recourse to Spirit, which alone can act, may be accounted for.
First, because they were not aware of the repugnancy there is,
as well in supposing things like unto our ideas existing without,
as in attributing to them power or activity. Secondly, because
the Supreme Spirit which excites those ideas in our minds, is
not marked out and limited to our view by any particular finite
collection of sensible ideas, as human agents are by their size,
complexión, limbs, and motions. And thirdly, because His
operations are regular and uniform. Whenever the course of
nature is interrupted by a miracle, men are ready to own the
presence of a Superior Agent. But, when we see things go on
in the ordinary course, they do not excite in us any reflexión;
their order and concatenation, though it be an argument of the
greatest wisdom, power, and goodness in their Creator, is yet
so constant and familiar to us, that we do not think them the
immediate effects of a Free Spirif, especially since inconsistency
and mutability in acting, though it be an imperfection, is looked
on as a mark oí freedonfi^^.

58. Tenthly, it will be objected that the notions we advance
are inconsistent with several sound truths in philosophy and
mathematics. For example, the motion of the earth is now
universally admitted by astronomers as a truth grounded on the
clearest and most convincing reasons. But, on the foregoing
Principies, there can be no such thing. For, motion being only
an idea, it follows that if it be not perceived it exists not: but
the motion of the earth is not perceived by sense.—I answer.

Henee the difficulty men have in recognising that Divine Reason and Will,
and Law in Nature, are coincident. But the advance of scientific discovery of
the laws which express Divine Will in nature, instead of narrowing, extends
our knowledge of God. And divine or absolutely reasonable “arhitrariness” is
not caprice.

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That tenet, if rightly understood, will be found to agree with
the Principies we have premised: for, the question whether the
earth moves or no amounts in reality to no more than this, to
wit, whether we have reason to conclude, from what has been
observed by astronomers, that if we were placed in such and such
circumstances, and such or such a position and distance both
from the earth and sun, we should perceive the former to move
among the choir of the planets, and appearing in all respects like
one of them: and this, by the established rules of nature, which
we have no reason to mistrust, is reasonably collected from the
phenomena.

59. We may, from the experience we have had of the train and
succession of ideas^^^ in our minds, often make, I will not say
uncertain conjectures, but sure and well-grounded predictions
concerning the ideas we shall be affected with pursuant to a
great train of actions; and be enabled to pass a right judgment
of what would have appeared to us, in case we were placed in
circumstances very different from those we are in at present.
Herein consists the knowledge of nature, which may preserve
its use and certainty very consistently with what hath been said.
It will be easy to apply this to whatever objections of the like
sort may be drawn from the magnitude of the stars, or any other
discoveries in astronomy or nature.

60. In the eleventh place, it will be demanded to what
purpose serves that curious organization of plants, and the animal
mechanism in the parts of animáis. Might not vegetables grow,
and shoot forth leaves and blossoms, and animáis perform all
their motions, as well without as with all that variety of internal
parts so elegantly contrived and put together;—which, being
ideas, have nothing powerful or operativo in them, ñor have any

“ideas,” i.e. ideas of sense. This “experience” implied an association of
sensuous ideas, according to the divine or reasonable order of nature.

[ 290 ]

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necessary connexion with the effects ascribed to them? If it be
a Spirit that immediately produces every effect by a fíat, or act
of bis we must think all that is fine and artificial in the

Works, whether of man or nature, to be made in vain. By this
doctrine, though an artist hath made the spring and wheels, and
every movement of a watch, and adjusted them in such a manner
as he knew would produce the motions he designed; yet he must
think all this done to no purpose, and that it is an Intelligence
which directs the Índex, and points to the hour of the day. If so,
why may not the Intelligence do it, without his being at the pains
of making the movements and putting them together? Why does
not an empty case serve as well as another? And how comes
it to pass, that whenever there is any fault in the going of a
watch, there is some corresponding disorder to be found in the
movements, which being mended by a skilful hand all is right
again? The like may be said of all the Clockwork of Nature,
great part whereof is so wonderfully fine and subtle as scarce to
be discerned by the best microscope. In short, it will be asked,
how, upon our Principies, any tolerable account can be given, or
any final cause assigned of an innumerable multitude of bodies
and machines, framed with the most exquisite art, which in the
common philosophy have very apposite uses assigned them, and
serve to explain abundance of phenomena?

61. To all which I answer, first, that though there were
some difficulties relating to the administration of Providence,
and the uses by it assigned to the several parts of nature, which
I could not solve by the foregoing Principies, yet this objection
could be of small weight against the truth and certainty of those
things which may be proved a priori, with the utmost evidence
and rigour of demonstration^^^. Secondly, but neither are the

Cf. sect. 25-33, and other passages in Berkeley's writings in which he
insists upon the arbitrariness —divine or reasonable—of the natural laws and
sense-symbolism.

Cf. sect. 3, 4, 6, 22-24, 26, in which he proceeds upon the intuitive certainty

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received principies free from the like difficulties; for, it may
still be demanded to what end God should take those roundabout
methods of effecting things by instruments and machines, which
no one can deny might ha ve been effected by the mere command
of His will, without all that apparatus. Nay, if we narrowly
consider it, we shall find the objection may be retorted with
greater forcé on those who hold the existence of those machines
without the mind; for it has been made evident that solidity, bulk,
figure, motion, and the like have no activity or ejficacy in them, [ 292 ]
so as to be capable of producing any one effect in nature. See
sect. 25. Whoever therefore supposes them to exist (allowing
the supposition possible) when they are not perceived does it
manifestly to no purpose; since the only use that is assigned
to them, as they exist unperceived, is that they produce those
perceivable effects which in truth cannot be ascribed to anything
but Spirit.

62. But, to come nigher the difficulty, it must be observed
that though the fabrication of all those parts and organs be
not absolutely necessary to the producing any effect, yet it is
necessary to the producing of things in a constant regular way,
according to the laws of nature. There are certain general laws
that run through the whole chain of natural effects: these are
learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men
applied, as well to the framing artificial things for the use and
ornament of Ufe as to the explaining the various phenomena.
Which explication consists only in shewing the conformity any
particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or,
which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in
the production of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever
shall attend to the several instances wherein philosophers pretend
to account for appearances. That there is a great and conspicuous
use in these regular constant methods of working observed by
the Supreme Agent hath been shewn in sect. 31. And it is no

of his two leading Principies, conceming Reality and Causation.

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less visible that a particular size, figure, motion, and disposition
of parts are necessary, though not absolutely to the producing
any effect, yet to the producing it according to the standing
mechanical laws of nature. Thus, for instance, it cannot be
denied that God, or the Intelligence that sustains and rules the
ordinary course of things, might if He were minded to produce
a miracle, cause all the motions on the dial-plate of a watch,
though nobody had ever made the movements and put them in
it. But yet, if He will act agreeably to the rules of mechanism,
by Him for wise ends established and maintained in the creation,
it is necessary that those actions of the watchmaker, whereby
he makes the movements and rightly adjusts them, precede the
production of the aforesaid motions; as also that any disorder
in them be attended with the perception of some corresponding
disorder in the movements, which being once corrected all is
right again^^®.

63. It may indeed on some occasions be necessary that the
Author of nature display His overruling power in producing some
appearance out of the ordinary series of things. Such exceptions
from the general rules of nature are proper to surprise and awe
men into an acknowledgment of the Divine Being; but then they
are to be used but seldom, otherwise there is a plain reason why
they should fail of that effect. Besides, God seems to choose the
convincing our reason of His attributes by the works of nature,
which discover so much harmony and contrivance in their make,
and are such plain indications of wisdom and beneficence in their
Author, rather than to astonish us into a belief of His Being by
anomalous and surprising events^^’.

In short, what is virtually the language of universal natural order is the
divine way of revealing omnipresent Intelligence; ñor can we conceive how
this revelation could be made through a capricious or chaotic succession of
changes.

He here touches on moral purpose in miraculous phenomena, but
without discussing their relation to the divine, or perfectly reasonable,
order of the universe. Relatively to a fine knowledge of nature, they

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64. To set this matter in a yet clearer light, I shall observe
that what has been objeeted in seet. 60 amounts in reality to
no more than this:— ideas^^^ are not anyhow and at random
produeed, there being a eertain order and eonnexion between
them, like to that of eause and effeet: there are also several
eombinations of them, made in a very regular and artifieial
manner, whieh seem like so many instruments in the hand of
nature that, being hid as it were behind the seenes, have a seeret
operation in producing those appearanees whieh are seen on the
theatre of the world, being themselves diseernible only to the
eurious eye of the philosopher. But, sinee one idea eannot be
the eause of another, to what purpose is that eonnexion? And
sinee those instruments, being barely inejficacious pereeptions

in the mind, are not subservient to the produetion of natural [ 294 ]
effeets, it is demanded why they are made; or, in other words,
what reason ean be assigned why God should make us, upon a
elose inspeetion into His works, behold so great variety of ideas,
so artfully laid together, and so mueh aeeording to rule; it not
being eredible] that He would be at the expense (if one may
so speak) of all that art and regularity to no purpose?

65. To all whieh my answer is, first, that the eonnexion of
ideas^^° does not imply the relation of cause and ejfect, but only
of a mark or sign with the thing signified. The fire whieh 1 see
is not the eause of the pain 1 suffer upon my approaehing it, but
the mark that forewarns me of it. In like manner the noise that
1 hear is not the effeet of this or that motion or eollision of the
ambient bodies, but the sign thereof^"^^. Seeondly, the reason

seem anomalous—exceptions from general rules, whieh nevertheless express,
immediately and constantly, perfect active Reason.

“ideas,” i.e. the phenomena presented to the senses.

“imaginable”—in first edition.

“the eonnexion of ideas,” i.e. the presence of law or reasonable uniformity
in the coexistence and succession of the phenomena of sense; whieh makes
them interpretable signs.

Aeeording to Berkeley, it is by an abuse of language that the term “power”

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why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular
combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into
words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great
number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously
combined together. And to the end their use be permanent and
universal, these combinations must be made by rule, and with
wise contrivance. By this means abundance of information is
conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such
and such actions, and what methods are proper to be taken for
the exciting such and such ideas^^^. Which in effect is all that
I conceive to be distinctly meant when it is said^^^ that, by
discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts
of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know
the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature
of the thing.

66. Henee, it is evident that those things which, under the
notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production
of effects, are altogether inexplicable and run us into great
absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper
and obvious use assigned to them, when they are considered only
as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching
after and endeavouring to understand this Language (if I may so
cali it) of the Author of Nature, that ought to be the employment
of the natural philosopher; and not the pretending to explain
things by corporeal causes, which doctrine seems to have too
much estranged the minds of men from that Active Principie,
that supreme and wise Spirit “in whom we live, move, and have

is applied to those ideas which are invariable antecedents of other ideas—the
prior forms of their existence, as it were.

Berkeley, in meeting this objection, thus implies Universal Natural
Symbolism as the essential character of the sensible world, in its relation
to man.

See Locke's Essay, Bk. IV, ch. 3, § 25-28, &c., in which he suggests
that the secondary qualities of bodies may be the natural issue of the different
relations and modifications of their primary qualities.

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our being.”

67. In the twelfth place, it may perhaps be objected
that—though it be clear from what has been said that there
can be no such thing as an inert, senseless, extended, solid,
figured, moveable Substance, existing without the mind, such as
philosophers describe Matter; yet, if any man shall leave out of
bis idea of Matter the positivo ideas of extensión, figure, solidity
and motion, and say that he means only by that word an inert,
senseless substance, that exists without the mind, or unperceived,
which is the occasion of our ideas, or at the presence whereof
God is pleased to excite ideas in us—it doth not appear but
that Matter taken in this sense may possibly exist.—In answer
to which I say, first, that it seems no less absurd to suppose
a substance without accidents, than it is to suppose accidents
without a substance^^^. But secondly, though we should grant
this unknown substance may possibly exist, yet where can it
be supposed to be? That it exists not in the mind^^^ is agreed;
and that it exists not in place is no less certain, since all place

or extensión exists only in the mind^"^^, as hath been already [ 296 ]
proved. It remains therefore that it exists nowhere at all.

68. Let US examine a little the description that is here given
US of Matter. It neither acts, ñor perceives, ñor is perceived:
for this is all that is meant by saying it is an inert, senseless,
unknown substance; which is a definition entirely made up of
negativos, excepting only the relativo notion of its standing under

^ With Berkeley, material substance is merely the natural combination
of sense-presented phenomena, which, under a divine or reasonable
“arbitrariness,” constitute a concrete thing. Divine Will, or Active Reason, is
the constantly sustaining cause of this combination or substantiation.

i.e. that it is not realised in a living percipient experience.

For “place” is realised only as perceived—percipient experience being its
concrete existence. Living perception is, with Berkeley, the condition of the
possibility of concrete locality.

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or supporting. But then it must be observed that it supports
nothing at all, and how nearly this comes to the description of
a nonentity I desire may be considered. But, say you, it is the
unknown occasion^^^, at the presence of which ideas are excited
in US by the will of God. Now, I would fain know how anything
can be present to us, which is neither perceivable by sense ñor
reflexión, ñor capable of producing any idea in our minds, ñor is
at all extended, ñor hath any form, ñor exists in any place. The
words “to be present,” when thus applied, must needs be taken
in some abstract and strange meaning, and which I am not able
to comprehend.

69. Again, let us examine what is meant by occasion. So
far as I can gather from the common use of language, that word
signifies either the agent which produces any effect, or else
something that is observed to accompany or go before it, in the
ordinary course of things. But, when it is applied to Matter,
as above described, it can be taken in neither of those senses;
for Matter is said to be passive and inert, and so cannot be an
agent or efficient cause. It is also unperceivable, as being devoid
of all sensible qualities, and so cannot be the occasion of our
perceptions in the latter sense; as when the burning my finger is
said to be the occasion of the pain that attends it. What therefore
can be meant by calling matter an occasion! This term is either
used in no sense at all, or else in some very distant from its
received signification.

70. You will perhaps say that Matter, though it be not
perceived by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom it
is the occasion of exciting ideas in our minds^^^. For, say you,
since we observe our sensations to be imprinted in an orderly and
constant manner, it is but reasonable to suppose there are certain
constant and regular occasions of their being produced. That
is to say, that there are certain permanent and distinct pareéis

So in the Cartesian theory of occasional causes.

So Geulinx and Malebranche.

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of Matter, corresponding to our ideas, which, though they do
not excite them in our minds, or anywise immediately affect
US, as being altogether passive, and unperceivable to us, they
are nevertheless to God, by whom they are perceived^^^, as it
were so many occasions to remind Him when and what ideas to
imprint on our minds: that so things may go on in a constant
uniform manner.

71. In answer to this, I observe that, as the notion of Matter
is here stated, the question is no longer concerning the existence
of a thing distinct from Spirit and idea, from perceiving and
being perceived; but whether there are not certain Ideas (of I
know not what sort) in the mind of God, which are so many
marks or notes that direct Him how to produce sensations in our
minds in a constant and regular method: much after the same
manner as a musician is directed by the notes of music to produce
that harmonious train and composition of sound which is called
a tune; though they who hear the music do not perceive the
notes, and may be entirely ignorant of them. But this notion of
Matter (which after all is the only intelligible one that I can pick
from what is said of unknown occasions) seems too extravagant
to deserve a confutation. Resides, it is in effect no objection
against what we have advanced, viz. that there is no senseless
unperceived substance.

72. If we follow the light of reason, we shall, from the
constant uniform method of our sensations, collect the goodness
and wisdom of the Spirit who excites them in our minds; but
this is all that I can see reasonably concluded from thence. To
me, I say, it is evident that the being of a Spirit—infinitely wise,
good, and powerful—is abundantly sufficient to explain all the

As known in Divine intelligence, they are accordingly Divine Ideas. And,
if this means that the sensible system is the expression of Divine Ideas, which
are its ultímate archetype—that the Ideas of God are symbolised to our senses,
and then interpreted (or misinterpreted) by human minds, this allies itself with
Platonic Idealism.

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appearances of nature^^*’. But, as for inert, senseless Matter,
nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it,
or leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one
explain any the meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or shew any
manner of reason, though in the lowest rank of probability, that
he can have for its existence; or even make any tolerable sense
or meaning of that supposition. For, as to its being an occasion,
we have, I think, evidently shewn that with regard to us it is
no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all, the
occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts
to we have just now seen.

73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which
induced men to suppose the existence of material substance',
that so having observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of
those motives or reasons, we may proportionably withdraw the
assent that was grounded on them. First, therefore, it was thought
that colour, figure, motion, and the rest of the sensible qualities
or accidents, did really exist without the mind; and for this
reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking substratum
or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be
conceived to exist by themselves^^^ Afterwards, in process of
time, men^^^ being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest
of the sensible, secondary qualities had no existence without
the mind, they stripped this substratum or material substance of
those qualities, leaving only the primary ones, figure, motion,
and suchlike; which they still conceived to exist without the
mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material support.

“It seems to me,” Hume says, “that this theory of the universal energy
and operation of the Supreme Being is too bold ever to carry conviction with
it to a mind sufficiently apprised of the weakness of human reason, and the
narrow limits to which it is confined in all its operations.” But is it not virtually
presupposed in the assumed trustworthiness of our experience of the universe?

Accordingly we are led to ask, what the deepest support of their reality
must be. Is it found in living Spirit, i.e. Active Reason, or in blind Matter?

e.g. Descartes, Malebranche, Locke, &c.

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But, it having been shewn that none even of these can possibly
exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them,
it follows that we have no longer any reason to suppose the
being of Matter^^^, nay, that it is utterly impossible there should [ 299 ]
be any such thing;—so long as that word is taken to denote an
unthinking substratum of qualities or accidents, wherein they
exist without the mind^^^.

74. But—though it be allowed by the materialists themselves
that Matter was thought of only for the sake of supporting
accidents, and, the reason entirely ceasing, one might expect the
mind should naturally, and without any reluctance at all, quit the
belief of what was solely grounded thereon: yet the prejudice
is riveted so deeply in our thoughts that we can scarce tell how
to part with it, and are therefore inclined, since the thing itself
is indefensibie, at least to retain the ñame', which we apply to
I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or
occasion, though without any shew of reason, at least so far as I
can see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive,
amongst all the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted
on our minds, either by sense or reflexión, from whence may
be inferred the existence of an inert, thoughtless, unperceived
occasion? and, on the other hand, on the part of an All-sufficient
Spirit, what can there be that should make us believe or even
suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite ideas in our
minds?

75. It is a very extraordinary instance of the forcé of prejudice,
and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so
great a fondness, against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid
thoughtless Somewhat, by the interposition whereof it would as
it were screen itself from the Providence of God, and remove

In short, if we mean by Matter, something unrealised in percipient
experience of sense, what is called its reality is something unintelligible.

And if sensible phenomena are sufficiently extemalised, when regarded as
regulated by Divine Reason.

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it farther off from the affairs of the world. But, though we do
the utmost we can to secure the belief of Matter; though, when
reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our opinión on the
haré possibility of the thing, and though we indulge ourselves in
the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to make
out that poor possibility; yet the upshot of all is—that there are
certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything,
is all that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God.
And this at the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but
for the name^^^.

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of
God, and whether they may be called by the ñame Matter, I shall
not dispute^^^. But, if you stick to the notion of an unthinking
substance or support of extensión, motion, and other sensible
qualities, then to me it is most evidently impossible there should
be any such thing; since it is a plain repugnancy that those
qualities should exist in, or be supported by, an unperceiving
substance^^’.

77. But, say you, though it be granted that there is no
thoughtless support of extensión, and the other qualities or
accidents which we perceive, yet there may perhaps be some inert,
unperceiving substance or substratum of some other qualities,

Twenty years after the publication of the Principies, in a letter to his
American friend Johnson, Berkeley says:—“I have no objection against calling
the Ideas in the mind of God archetypes of ours. But I object against those
archetypes by philosophers supposed to be real things, and so to have an
absolute rational existence distinct from their being perceived by any mind
whatsoever; it being the opinión of all materialists that an ideal existence in the
Divine Mind is one thing, and the real existence of material things another.”

Berkeley's philosophy is not inconsistent with Divine Ideas which receive
expression in the laws of nature, and of which human Science is the imperfect
interpretation. In this view, assertion of the existence of Matter is simply an
expression of faith that the phenomenal universe into which we are bom is a
reasonable and interpretable universe; and that it would be fully interpreted, if
our notions could be fully harmonised with the Divine Ideas which it expresses.

Cf. sect. 3-24.

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as incomprehensible to us as colours are to a man born blind,
because we have not a sense adapted to them. But, if we had a
new sense, we should possibly no more doubt of their existence
than a blind man made to see does of the existence of light and
colours.—I answer, first, if what you mean by the word Matter
be only the unknown support of unknown qualities, it is no matter
whether there is such a thing or no, since it no way concerns us.

And I do not see the advantage there is in disputing about what
we know not what, and we know not why.

78. But, secondly, if we had a new sense, it could only
furnish us with new ideas or sensations; and then we should
have the same reason against their existing in an unperceiving
substance that has been already offered with relation to figure, [30i]
motion, colour, and the like. Qualities, as hath been shewn,
are nothing else but sensations or ideas, which exist only in a
mind perceiving them; and this is true not only of the ideas we
are acquainted with at present, but likewise of all possible ideas
whatsoever^^^.

79. But you will insist, What if I have no reason to believe
the existence of Matter? what if I cannot assign any use to it, or
explain anything by it, or even conceive what is meant by that
word? yet still it is no contradiction to say that Matter exists, and
that this Matter is in general a substance, or occasion of ideas',
though indeed to go about to unfold the meaning, or adhere to any
particular explication of those words may be attended with great
difficulties.—I answer, when words are used without a meaning,
you may put them together as you picase, without danger of
running into a contradiction. You may say, for example, that
twice two is equal to seven', so long as you declare you do not
take the words of that proposition in their usual acceptation, but

So that superhuman persons, endowed with a million senses, would be no
nearer this abstract Matter than man is, with his few senses.

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for marks of you know not what. And, by the same reason, yon
may say there is an inert thoughtless substance without accidents,
which is the occasion of our ideas. And we shall understand just
as much by one proposition as the other.

80. In the last place, you will say, What if we give up the
cause of material Substance, and stand to it that Matter is an
unknown Somewhat —neither substance ñor accident, spirit ñor
idea—inert, thoughtless, indivisible, immoveable, unextended,
existing in no place? For, say you, whatever may be urged
against substance or occasion, or any other positive or relative
notion of Matter, hath no place at all, so long as this negative
definition of Matter is adhered to.—I answer, You may, if so
it shall seem good, use the word matter in the same sense as
other men use nothing, and so make those terms convertible in
your style. For, after all, this is what appears to me to be the
result of that definition; the parts whereof, when I consider with
attention, either collectively or sepárate from each other, I do not
find that there is any kind of effect or impression made on my
mind, different from what is excited by the term nothing.

81. You will reply, perhaps, that in the foresaid definition is
included what doth sufficiently distinguish it from nothing—the
positive abstract idea of quiddity, entity, or existence. I own,
indeed, that those who pretend to the faculty of framing abstract
general ideas do talk as if they had such an idea, which is, say
they, the most abstract and general notion of all: that is to me the
most incomprehensible of all others. That there are a great variety
of spirits of different orders and capacities, whose faculties, both
in number and extent, are far exceeding those the Author of my
being has bestowed on me, I see no reason to deny. And for me
to pretend to determine, by my own few, stinted, narrow inlets of
perception, what ideas the inexhaustible power of the Supreme
Spirit may imprint upon them, were certainly the utmost folly
and presumption. Since there may be, for aught that I know.

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innumerable sorts of ideas or sensations, as different from one
another, and from all that 1 have pereeived, as eolours are from
sounds^^^. But, how ready soever 1 may be to aeknowledge
the seantiness of my eomprehension, with regard to the endless
variety of spirits and ideas that may possibly exist, yet for any
one to pretend to a notion of Entity or Existenee, abstracted from
spirit and idea, from pereeived and being pereeived, is, 1 suspeet,
a downright repugnaney and trifling with words.

It remains that we eonsider the objeetions whieh may possibly
be made on the part of Religión.

82. Some there are who think that, though the arguments for
the real existenee of bodies whieh are drawn from Reason be
allowed not to amount to demonstration, yet the Holy Seriptures
are so elear in the point, as will suffieiently eonvinee every good [303]
Christian, that bodies do really exist, and are something more
than mere ideas; there being in Holy Writ innumerable faets
related whieh evidently suppose the reality of timber and stone,
mountains and rivers, and eities, and human bodies^^'^—To whieh
1 answer that no sort of writings whatever, saered or profane,
whieh use those and the like words in the vulgar aeeeptation, or so
as to have a meaning in them, are in danger of having their truth
ealled in question by our doetrine. That all those things do really
exist; that there are bodies, even eorporeal substanees, when
taken in the vulgar sense, has been shewn to be agreeable to our

Matter and physical Science is relative, so far that we may suppose in other
percipients than men, an indefinite number of additional senses, affording
corresponding varieties of qualities in things, of course inconceivable by man.

Or, we may suppose an intelligence destitute of all our senses, and so in a
material world wholly different in its appearances from ours.

The authority of Holy Scripture, added to our natural tendency to believe in
extemal reality, are grounds on whieh Malebranche and Norris infer a material
World. Berkeley's material world claims no logical proof of its reality. His is
not to prove the reality of the world, but to shew what we should mean when
we affirm its reality, and the basis of its explicability in Science.

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principies: and the difference betwixt things and ideas, realities
and chimeras, has been distinctly explained. See sect. 29, 30,
33, 36, &c. And I do not think that either what philosophers
cali Matter, or the existence of objects without the mind^^^, is
anywhere mentioned in Scripture.

83. Again, whether there be or be not external things^^^, it is
agreed on all hands that the proper use of words is the marking
our conceptions, or things only as they are known and perceived
by us: whence it plainly follows, that in the tenets we ha ve
laid down there is nothing inconsistent with the right use and
significancy of language, and that discourse, of what kind soever,
so far as it is intelligible, remains undisturbed. But all this seems
so very manifest, from what has been largely set forth in the
premises, that it is needless to insist any farther on it.

84. But, it will be urged that miracles do, at least, lose much of
their stress and import by our principies. What must we think of
Moses' rod? was it not really turned into a serpent? or was there
only a change of ideas in the minds of the spectators? And, can it
be supposed that our Saviour did no more at the marriage-feast in
Cana than impose on the sight, and smell, and taste of the guests,
so as to create in them the appearance or idea only of wine? The
same may be said of all other miracles: which, in consequence of
the foregoing principies, must be looked upon only as so many
cheats, or illusions of fancy.—To this I reply, that the rod was
changed into a real serpent, and the water into real wine. That
this does not in the least contradict what I have elsewhere said
will be evident from sect. 34 and 35. But this business of real
and imaginary has been already so plainly and fully explained,
and so often referred to, and the difficulties about it are so easily
answered from what has gone before, that it were an affront to
the reader's understanding to resume the explication of it in this

i.e. existing unrealised in any intelligence—human or Divine.

“external things,” i.e. things existing really, yet out of all relation to active
living spirit.

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place. I shall only observe that if at table all who were present
should see, and smell, and taste, and drink wine, and find the
effects of it, with me there could be no doubt of its reality^^^.
So that at bottom the scruple concerning real miracles has no
place at all on ours, but only on the received principies, and
consequently makes rather for than against what has been said.

85. Having done with the Objections, which I endeavoured
to propose in the clearest light, and gave them all the forcé and
weight I could, we proceed in the next place to take a view
of our tenets in their Consequences^^^. Some of these appear
at first sight—as that several difficult and obscure questions,
on which abundance of speculation has been thrown away, are
entirely banished from philosophy. Whether corporeal substance
can think? Whether Matter be infinitely divisible? And how
it operates on spirit?—these and the like inquines have given
infinite amusement to philosophers in all ages. But, depending [ 305 ]
on the existence of Matter, they have no longer any place on our
Principies. Many other advantages there are, as well with regard
to religión as the Sciences, which it is easy for any one to deduce
from what has been premised. But this will appear more plainly
in the sequel.

86. From the Principies we have laid down it follows human
knowledge may naturally be reduced to two heads—that of ideas

Simultaneous perception of the “same” (similar?) sense-ideas, by dijferent
persons, as distinguished from purely individual consciousness of feelings and
fancies, is here taken as a test of the virlually external reality of the former.

Berkeley does not ask whether the change of the rod into a serpent, or of
the water into wine, is the issue of divine agency and order, otherwise than as
all natural evolution is divinely providential.

^ Some of the Consequences of adoption of the New Principies, in their
application to the physical Sciences and mathematics, and then to psychology
and theology, are unfolded in the remaining sections of the Principies.

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and that of Spirits. Of each of these I shall treat in order.

And First as to ideas, or unthinking things. Our knowledge
of these has been very much obscured and confounded, and we
have been led into very dangerous errors, by supposing a two-fold
existence of sense—the one intelligible or in the mind, the other
real and without the mind^^^. Whereby unthinking things are
thought to have a natural subsistence of their own, distinct from
being perceived by spirits. This, which, if I mistake not, hath
been shewn to be a most groundless and absurd notion, is the very
root of Scepticism; for, so long as men thought that real things
subsisted without the mind, and that their knowledge was only
so far forth real as it was conformable to real things, it follows
they could not be certain that they had any real knowledge at all.
For how can it be known that the things which are perceived are
conformable to those which are not perceived, or exist without
the mind^'^6?

87. Colour, figure, motion, extensión, and the like, considered
only as so many sensations in the mind, are perfectly known;
there being nothing in them which is not perceived. But, if
they are looked on as notes or images, referred to things or
archetypes existing without the mind, then are we involved all
in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and not the real
qualities of things. What may be the extensión, figure, or motion
of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible
for US to know, but only the proportion or relation they bear
to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary; and

Berkeley disclaims the supposed representative character of the ideas given
in sensuous perception, and recognises as the real object only what is ideally
presented in consciousness.

So Hume, Reid, and Hamilton, who all see in a wholly representative
sense-perception, with its double object, the germ of total scepticism. Berkeley
claims that, under his interpretation of what the reality of the material world
means, immediate knowledge of mind-dependent matter is given in sense.

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which of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent
the true quality really existing in the thing, it is out of our reach
to determine. So that, for aught we know, all we see, hear,
and feel, may be only phantom and vain ehimera, and not at
all agree with the real things existing in rerum natura. All this
seeptieism^^^ follows from our supposing a differenee between
things and ideas, and that the former have a subsistenee without
the mind, or unpereeived. It were easy to dilate on this subjeet,
and shew how the arguments urged by seepties in all ages depend
on the supposition of external objeets. [^^*But this is too obvious
to need being insisted on.]

88. So long as we attribute areal existenee to unthinking things,
distinet from their being pereeived, it is not only impossible for
US to know with evidenee the nature of any real unthinking being,
but even that it exists. Henee it is that we see philosophers distrust
their senses, and doubt of the existenee of heaven and earth, of
everything they see or feel, even of their own bodies. And
after all their labouring and struggle of thought, they are foreed
to own we eannot attain to any self-evident or demonstrative
knowledge of the existenee of sensible things^^^. But, all this
doubtfulness, whieh so bewilders and eonfounds the mind and
makes philosophy ridieulous in the eyes of the world, vanishes
if we annex a meaning to our words, and do not amuse ourselves
with the terms absolute, external, exist, and sueh like, signifying
we know not what. I ean as well doubt of my own being as of
the being of those things whieh I aetually pereeive by sense: it
being a manifest eontradietion that any sensible objeet should
be immediately pereeived by sight or toueh, and at the same

“scepticism”—“sceptical cant” in the first edition.

*** This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

Berkeley's argument against a finally representative perception so far
resembles that afterwards employed by Reid and Hamilton. They differ as
regards the dependence of the sensible objeet upon percipient spirit for its
reality.

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time have no existence in nature; since the very existence of an
unthinking being consists in being perceived.

89. Nothing seems of more importance towards erecting a
firm System of sound and real knowledge, which may be proof
against the assaults of Scepticism, than to lay the beginning in a
distinct explication of what is meant by thing, reality, existence',
for in vain shall we dispute concerning the real existence of
things, or pretend to any knowledge thereof, so long as we have
not fixed the meaning of those words. Thing or being is the most
general ñame of all: it comprehends under it two kinds, entirely
distinct and heterogeneous, and which have nothing common
but the ñame, viz. spirits and ideas. The former are active,
indivisible, [^^°incorruptible] substances: the latter are inert,
fleeting, [^^^perishable passions,] or dependent beings; which
subsist not by themselves^^^, but are supported by, or exist in,
minds or spiritual substances.

[673we comprehend our own existence by inward feeling or
reflection, and that of other spirits by reason^^^. We may be
said to have some knowledge or notion^^^ of our own minds, of
spirits and active beings; whereof in a strict sense we have not
ideas. In like manner, we know and have a notion of relations
between things or ideas; which relations are distinct from the
ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived
by US without our perceiving the former. To me it seems that
ideas, spirits, and relations are all in their respective kinds the

Omitted in second edition.

But whilst unthinking things depend on being perceived, do not our spirits
depend on ideas of some sort for their percipient life?

The important passage within brackets was added in the second edition.

“reason,” i.e. reasoning.

“Notion,” in its stricter meaning, is thus confined by Berkeley to
apprehension of the Ego, and intelligence of relations. The term “notion,” in
this contrast with his “idea,” becomes important in his vocabulary, although he
sometimes uses it vaguely.

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object of human knowledge and subject of discourse; and that the
term idea would be improperly extended to signify everything
we know or have any notion

90. Ideas imprinted on the senses are real things, or do
really exist^’^: this we do not deny; but we deny they can
subsist without the minds which perceive them, or that they are
resemblances of any arehetypes existing without the mind^^*;
sinee the very being of a sensation or idea eonsists in being
pereeived, and an idea can be like nothing but an idea. Again, the
things pereeived by sense may be termed external, with regard
to their origin; in that they are not generated from within by the
mind itself, but imprinted by a Spirit distinct from that which
perceives them. Sensible objects may likewise be said to be
“without the mind” in another sense, namely when they exist in
some other mind. Thus, when I shut my eyes, the things I saw
may still exist; but it must be in another mind^’^.

91. It were a mistake to think that what is here said derogates
in the least from the reality of things. It is acknowledged, on
the received principies, that extensión, motion, and in a word
all sensible qualities, have need of a support, as not being able
to subsist by themselves. But the objects pereeived by sense
are allowed to be nothing but combinations of those qualities,
and consequently cannot subsist by themselves^**^. Thus far it
is agreed on all hands. So that in denying the things pereeived
by sense an existence independent of a substance or support
wherein they may exist, we detract nothing from the received
opinión of their reality, and are guilty of no innovation in that

Locke uses idea in this wider signification.

Inasmuch as they are real in and through living percipient mind.

i.e. unthinking arehetypes.

In this section Berkeley explains what he means by externality. Men cannot
act, cannot live, without assuming an external world—in some meaning of
the term “external.” It is the Business of the philosopher to explicate its true
meaning.

i.e. they are not substances in the truest or deepest meaning of the word.

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respect. All the difference is that, according to us, the unthinking
beings perceived by sense have no existence distinct from being
perceived, and cannot therefore exist in any other substance than
those unextended indivisible substances, or spirits, which act,
and think and perceive them. Whereas philosophers vulgarly
hold that the sensible qualities do exist in an inert, extended,
unperceiving Substance, which they cali Matter, to which they
attribute a natural subsistence, exterior to all thinking beings, or
distinct from being perceived by any mind whatsoever, even the
Eternal Mind of the Creator; wherein they suppose only Ideas of
the corporeal substances^^^ created by Him: if indeed they allow
them to be at all created^^^.

92. For, as we have shewn the doctrine of Matter or Corporeal
Substance to have been the main pillar and support of Scepticism,
so likewise upon the same foundation have been raised all the
impious schemes of Atheism and Irreligión. Nay, so great a
difficulty has it been thought to conceive Matter produced out of
nothing, that the most celebrated among the ancient philosophers,
even of those who maintained the being of a God, have thought
Matter to be uncreated and co-eternal with Him^*^. How great a
friend material substance has been to Atheists in all ages were
needless to relate. All their monstrous systems have so visible
and necessary a dependence on it, that when this corner-stone
is once removed, the whole fabric cannot choose but fall to the

*** “Ideas of the corporeal substances.” Berkeley might perhaps say—Divine
Ideas which are themselves our world of sensible things in its ultimate form.

On the scheme of ideal Realism, “creation” of matter is presenting to finite
minds sense-ideas or phenomena, which are, as it were, letters of the alphabet,
in that language of natural order which God employs for the expression of His
Ideas to us.

The independerá eternity of Matter must be distinguished from an
unbeginning and endless creation of sensible ideas or phenomena, in percipient
spirits, according to divine natural law and order, with implied immanence of
God.

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ground; insomuch that it is no longer worth while to bestow a
particular consideration on the absurdities of every wretched sect
of Atheists^^^.

93. That impious and profane persons should readily fall in
with those Systems which favour their inclinations, by deriding
immaterial substance, and supposing the soul to be divisible, and
subject to corruption as the body; which exelude all freedom,
intelligence, and design from the formation of things, and instead
thereof make a self-existent, stupid, unthinking substance the
root and origin of all beings; that they should hearken to those
who deny a Providence, or inspection of a Superior Mind over
the affairs of the world, attributing the whole series of events
either to blind chance or fatal necessity, arising from the impulse
of one body on another—all this is very natural. And, on the
other hand, when men of better principies observe the enemies
of religión lay so great a stress on unthinking Matter, and all of
them use so much industry and artífice to reduce everything to it;
methinks they should rejoice to see them deprived of their grand
support, and driven from that only fortress, without which your
Epicureans, Hobbists, and the like, have not even the shadow of
a pretence, but become the most cheap and easy triumph in the
world.

94. The existence of Matter, or bodies unperceived, has not
only been the main support of Atheists and Fatalists, but on the
same principie doth Idolatry likewise in all its various forms
depend. Did men but consider that the sun, moon, and stars, and
every other object of the senses, are only so many sensations
in their minds, which have no other existence but barely being
perceived, doubtless they would never fall down and worship
their own ideas', but rather address their homage to that Eternal
Invisible Mind which produces and sustains all things.

Because the question at issue with Atheism is, whether the universe of
things and persons is finally substantiated and evolved in unthinking Matter or
in the perfect Reason of God.

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95. The same absurd principie, by mingling itself with
the articles of our faith, hath occasioned no small difficulties
to Christians. For example, about the Resurrection, how many
scruples and objections have been raised by Socinians and others?
But do not the most plausible of them depend on the supposition
that a body is denominated the same, with regard not to the
form, or that which is perceived by sense^*^, but the material
substance, which remains the same under several forms? Take
away this material substance —about the identity whereof all the
dispute is—and mean by body what every plain ordinary person
means by that word, to wit, that which is immediately seen and
felt, which is only a combination of sensible qualities or ideas:
and then their most unanswerable objections come to nothing.

96. Matter^^® being once expelled out of nature drags with
it so many sceptical and impious notions, such an incredible
number of disputes and puzzling questions, which have been
thorns in the sides of divines as well as philosophers, and made
so much fruitless work for mankind, that if the arguments we
have produced against it are not found equal to demonstration
(as to me they evidently seem), yet I am sure all friends to
knowledge, peace, and religión have reason to wish they were.

97. Beside the external^^^ existence of the objects of
perception, another great source of errors and difficulties with
regard to ideal knowledge is the doctrine of abstract ideas, such
as it hath been set forth in the Introduction. The plainest things
in the World, those we are most intimately acquainted with and
perfectly know, when they are considered in an abstract way,
appear strangely difficult and incomprehensible. Time, place,

Of which Berkeley does not predícate a numerical identity. Cf. Third
Dialogue between Hylas and Philonous.

*** “matter,” i.e. matter abstracted from all percipient life and voluntary
activity.

“external”—not in Berkeley's meaning of extemality. Cf. sect. 90, note 2.

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and motion, taken in particular or concrete, are what everybody
knows; but, having passed through the hands of a metaphysician,
they become too abstract and fine to be apprehended by men
of ordinary sense. Bid your servant meet yon at such a time,
in such a place, and he shall never stay to delibérate on the
meaning of those words. In conceiving that particular time and
place, or the motion by which he is to get thither, he finds not
the least difficulty. But if time be taken exclusive of all those
particular actions and ideas that diversify the day, merely for
the continuation of existence or duration in abstract, then it will
perhaps gravel even a philosopher to comprehend it.

98. For my own part, whenever 1 attempt to frame a simple
idea of time, abstracted from the succession of ideas in my mind,
which flows uniformly, and is participated by all beings, 1 am
lost and embrangled in inextricable difficulties. 1 have no notion
of it at all: only 1 hear others say it is infinitely divisible, and
speak of it in such a manner as leads me to harbour odd thoughts
of my existence: since that doctrine lays one under an absoluto
necessity of thinking, either that he passes away innumerable
ages without a thought, or else that he is annihilated every
moment of his Ufe: both which seem equally absurd^^^. Time
therefore being nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas
in our minds, it follows that the duration of any finite spirit must
be estimated by the number of ideas or actions succeeding each

*** Si non ragas, intelligo. Berkeley writes long after this to Johnson thus:—“A
succession of ideas (phenomena) I take to constitute time, and not to be only
the sensible measure thereof, as Mr. Locke and others think. But in these
matters every man is to think for himself, and speak as he finds. One of my
earliest inquines was about time\ which led me into several paradoxes that
I did not think it fit or necessary to publish, particularly into the notion that
the resurrection follows the next moment after death. We are confounded and
perplexed about time—supposing a succession in God; that we have an abstract
idea of time; that time in one mind is to be measured by succession of ideas in
another mind: not considering the true use of words, which as often terminate
in the will as in the understanding, being employed to excite and direct action
rather than to produce clear and distinct ideas.” Cf. Introduction, sect. 20.

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other in that same spirit or mind. Henee, it is a plain consequence
that the soul always thinks. And in truth whoever shall go about
to divide in his thoughts or abstract the existence of a spirit from
its cogitation, will, I believe, find it no easy task^^^.

99. So likewise when we attempt to abstract extensión and
motion from all other qualities, and consider them by themselves,
we presently lose sight of them, and run into great extravagances.
[690 Henee spring those odd paradoxes, that the fire is not hot,
ñor the wall white; or that heat and colour are in the objects
nothing but figure and motion.] All which depend on a twofold
abstraction: first, it is supposed that extensión, for example, may
be abstracted from all other sensible qualities; and, secondly, that
the entity of extensión may be abstracted from its being perceived.
But, whoever shall reflect, and take care to understand what he
says, will, if 1 mistake not, acknowledge that all sensible qualities
are alike sensations, and alike real, that where the extensión is,
there is the colour too, to wit, in his mind^^^, and that their
archetypes can exist only in some other mind\ and that the
objects of sense^^^ are nothing but those sensations, combined,
blended, or (if one may so speak) concreted together; none of
all which can be supposed to exist unperceived. And that
consequently the wall is as truly white as it is extended, and in
the same sense.]

100. What it is for a man to be happy, or an object good,
every one may think he knows. But to frame an abstract idea of

As the esse of unthinking things is percipi, according to Berkeley, so
the esse of persons is percipere. The real existence of individual Mind thus
depends on having ideas of some sort: the real existence of matter depends on
a percipient.

This sentence is omitted in the second edition.

Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 43.

“objects of sense,” i.e. sensible things, practically external to each person.
Cf. sect. 1, on the meaning of thing, as distinct from the distinguishable ideas
or phenomena that are naturally aggregated in the form of concrete things.

Omitted in second edition.

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happiness, prescinded from all particular pleasure, or of goodness
from everything that is good, this is what few can pretend to. So
likewise a man may be just and virtuous without having precise
ideas of justice and virtue. The opinión that those and the like
words stand for general notions, abstracted from all particular
persons and actions, seems to have rendered morality difficult,
and the study thereof of less use to mankind. [^^^And in effect
one may make a great progress in school ethics without ever
being the wiser or better man for it, or knowing how to behave
himself in the affairs of life more to the advantage of himself or
his neighbours than he did before.] And in effect the doctrine of
abstraction has not a little contributed towards spoiling the most
useful parts of knowledge.

101. The two great provinces of speculative Science conversant
about ideas received from sense and their relations, are Natural
Philosophy and Mathematics. With regard to each of these 1 shall
make some observations.

And first 1 shall say somewhat of Natural Philosophy. On
this subject it is that the sceptics triumph. All that stock of
arguments they produce to deprecíate our faculties and make
mankind appear ignoran! and low, are drawn principally from
this head, namely, that we are under an invincible blindness as
to the true and real nature of things. This they exaggerate, and
love to enlarge on. We are miserably bantered, say they, by our
senses, and amused only with the outside and shew of things. The
real essence, the internal qualities and constitution of every the [3i4]
meanest object, is hid from our view: something there is in every
drop of water, every grain of sand, which it is beyond the power

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of human understanding to fathom or comprehend^^^. But, it
is evident from what has been shewn that all this complaint is
groundless, and that we are influenced by false principies to that
degree as to mistrust our senses, and think we know nothing of
those things which we perfectly comprehend.

102. One great inducement to our pronouncing ourselves
ignorant of the nature of things is, the current opinión that every
thing ineludes within itself the cause of its properties: or that there
is in each object an inward essence, which is the source whence
its discernible qualities flow, and whereon they depend. Some
have pretended to account for appearances by occult qualities;
but of late they are mostly resolved into mechanical causes,
to wit, the figure, motion, weight, and suchlike qualities, of
insensible particles^^^: whereas, in truth, there is no other agent
or efficient cause than spirit, it being evident that motion, as
well as all other ideas, is perfectly inert. See sect. 25. Henee,
to endeavour to explain the production of colours or sounds, by
figure, motion, magnitude, and the like, must needs be labour in
vain. And accordingly we see the attempts of that kind are not at
all satisfactory. Which may be said in general of those instances
wherein one idea or quality is assigned for the cause of another. 1
need not say how many hypotheses and speculations are left out,
and how much the study of nature is abridged by this doctrine^^^.

103. The great mechanical principie now in vogue is
attraction. That a stone falls to the earth, or the sea swells
towards the moon, may to some appear sufficiently explained
thereby. But how are we enlightened by being told this is done
by attraction? Is it that that word signifies the manner of the

Cf. Introduction, sect. 1-3. With Berkeley, the real essence of sensible
things is given in perception—so far as our perceptions carry us.

e.g. Locke's Essay, Bk. IV. ch. 3.

Berkeley advócales a Realism, which eliminates effective causation from
the material world, concéntrales it in Mind, and in physical research seeks
among data of sense for their divinely maintained natural laws.

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tendency, and that it is by the mutual drawing of bodies instead [3i5]
of their being impelled or protruded towards each other? But
nothing is determined of the manner or action, and it may as
truly (for aught we know) be termed impulse, or protrusion,
as attraction. Again, the parts of Steel we see eohere firmly
together, and this also is aeeounted for by attraetion; but, in
this, as in the other instanees, 1 do not pereeive that anything
is signified besides the effeet itself; for as to the manner of the
aetion whereby it is produeed, or the eause whieh produees it,
these are not so mueh as aimed at.

104. Indeed, if we take a view of the several phenomena,
and eompare them together, we may observe some likeness and
eonformity between them. For example, in the falling of a
stone to the ground, in the rising of the sea towards the moon, in
eohesion and erystallization, there is something alike; namely, an
unión or mutual approaeh of bodies. So that any one of these or
the like phenomena may not seem strange or surprising to a man
who has nieely observed and eompared the effeets of nature. For
that only is thought so whieh is uneommon, or a thing by itself,
and out of the ordinary eourse of our observation. That bodies
should tend towards the eentre of the earth is not thought strange,
beeause it is what we pereeive every moment of our Uves. But
that they should have a like gravitation towards the eentre of the
moon may seem odd and unaeeountable to most men, beeause it
is diseerned only in the tides. But a philosopher, whose thoughts
take in a larger eompass of nature, having observed a eertain
similitude of appearanees, as well in the heavens as the earth,
that argüe innumerable bodies to have a mutual tendeney towards
eaeh other, whieh he denotes by the general ñame attraction,
whatever ean be redueed to that, he thinks justly aeeounted for.

Thus he explains the tides by the attraetion of the terraqueous
globe towards the moon; whieh to him doth not appear odd or
anomalous, but only a partieular example of a general rule or law
of nature.

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105. If therefore we consider the difference there is
betwixt natural philosophers and other men, with regard to
their knowledge of the phenomena, we shall find it consists,
not in an exacter knowledge of the efficient cause that produces
them—for that can be no other than the will of a spirit —^but
only in a greater largeness of comprehension, whereby analogies,
harmonies, and agreements are discovered in the works of nature,
and the particular effects explained, that is, reduced to general
rules, see sect. 62: which rules, grounded on the analogy and
uniformness observed in the production of natural effects, are
most agreeable and sought after by the mind; for that they extend
our prospect beyond what is present and near to us, and enable
US to make very probable conjectures touching things that may
have happened at very great distances of time and place, as well
as to predict things to come: which sort of endeavour towards
Omniscience is much affected by the mind.

106. But we should proceed warily in such things: for we are
apt to lay too great a stress on analogies, and, to the prejudice of
truth, humour that eagerness of the mind, whereby it is carried
to extend its knowledge into general theorems. For example,
gravitation or mutual attraction, because it appears in many
instances, some are straightway for pronouncing universal', and
that to attract and be attracted by every other body is an essential
quality inherent in all bodies whatsoever. Whereas it is evident
the fixed stars have no such tendency towards each other; and,
so far is that gravitation from being essential to bodies that in
some instances a quite contrary principie seems to shew itself;
as in the perpendicular growth of plants, and the elasticity of the
air. There is nothing necessary or essential in the case^^^; but

In interpreting the data of sense, we are obliged to assume that every new
phenomenon must have previously existed in some equivalent form—^but not
necessarily in this or that particular form, for a knowledge of which we are
indebted to inductive comparisons of experience.

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it depends entirely on the will of the Governing Spirit^^^, who
causes certain bodies to cleave together or tend towards each
other according to various laws, whilst He keeps others at a fixed
distance; and to some He gives a quite contrary tendency to fly
asunder, just as He sees convenient.

107. After what has been premised, 1 think we may lay down
the following conclusions. First, it is plain philosophers amuse
themselves in vain, when they enquire for any natural efficient
cause, distinct from a mind or spirit. Secondly, considering
the whole creation is the workmanship of a wise and good
Agent, it should seem to become philosophers to employ their
thoughts (contrary to what some hold^°*’) about the final causes
of things. For, besides that this would prove a very pleasing
entertainment to the mind, it might be of great advantage, in that it
not only discovers to us the attributes of the Creator, but may also
direct us in several instances to the proper uses and applications
of things.] And 1 must confess 1 see no reason why pointing
out the various ends to which natural things are adapted, and for
which they were originally with unspeakable wisdom contrived,
should not be thought one good way of accounting for them, and
altogether worthy a philosopher. Thirdly, from what has been
premised, no reason can be drawn why the history of nature
should not still be studied, and observations and experiments
made; which, that they are of use to mankind, and enable us to
draw any general conclusions, is not the result of any immutable
habitudes or relations between things themselves, but only of
God's goodness and kindness to men in the administration of the
World. See sects. 30 and 31. Fourthly, by a diligent observation
of the phenomena within our view, we may discover the general

The preceding forms of new phenomena, being finally determined by Will,
are, in that sense, arbitrary; but not capricious, for the Will is perfect Reason.
God is the immanent cause of the natural order.

He probably refers to Bacon.

’*** Omitted in second edition.

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laws of nature, and from them deduce other phenomena. I do
not say demónstrate', for all deductions of that kind depend on a
supposition that the Author of Nature always operates uniformly,
and in a constant observance of those rules we take for principies,
which we cannot evidently know’*’^.

108. It appears from sect. 66, &c. that the steady consistent
methods of nature may not unfitly be styled the Language of
its Author, whereby He discovers His attributes to our view and
directs us how to act for the convenience and felicity of life.
Those men who frame^°^ general rules from the phenomena,
and afterwards derive^*’^ the phenomena from those rules, seem
to consider signs^*^^ rather than causes. ’^'^A man may well
understand natural signs without knowing their analogy, or being
able to say by what rule a thing is so or so. And, as it is very
possible to write improperly, through too strict an observance
of general grammar-rules; so, in arguing from general laws of
nature, it is not impossible we may extend^°^ the analogy too far,
and by that means run into mistakes.

109. To carry on the resemblance.] As in reading other
books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and
apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on
the language; so, in perusing the volume of nature, methinks it is
beneath the dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing
each particular phenomenon to general rules, or shewing how

What we are able to discover in the all-comprehensive order may be
subordínate and provisional only. Nature in its deepest meaning explains itself
in the Divine Omniscience.

i.e. inductively.

i.e. deductively.

“seem to consider signs,” i.e. to be grammarians rather than philosophers:
physical Sciences deal with the grammar of the divine language of nature.

“A man may be well read in the language of nature without understanding
the grammar of it, or being able to say,” &c.—in first edition.

“extend”—“stretch”—in first edition.

’*** Omitted in second edition.

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it follows from them. We should propose to ourselves nobler
views, such as to recreate and exalt the mind with a prospect of
the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural things: henee,
by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grandeur,
wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator: and lastly, to make the
several parts of the creation, so far as in us lies, subservient to the
ends they were designed for—God's glory, and the sustentation
and comfort of ourselves and fellow-creatures.

110. The best key for the aforesaid analogy, or natural
Science, will be easily acknowledged to be a certain celebrated
Treatise of Mechantes.} In the entrance of which justly admired [3i9]
treatise. Time, Space, and Motion are distinguished into absolute

and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and vulgar: which
distinction, as it is at large explained by the author, does suppose
those quantities to have an existence without the mind: and that
they are ordinarily conceived with relation to sensible things, to
which nevertheless in their own nature they bear no relation at
all.

111. As for Time, as it is there taken in an absolute or abstracted
sense, for the duration or perseverance of the existence of things,

1 have nothing more to add concerning it after what has been
already said on that subject. Sects. 97 and 98. For the
rest, this celebrated author holds there is an absolute Space,
which, being unperceivable to sense, remains in itself similar
and immoveable; and relative space to be the measure thereof,

’*** In the first edition, the section commences thus: “The hest grammar of
the kind we are speaking of will be easily acknowledged to be a treatise
of Mechamos, demonstrated and applied to Nature, by a philosopher of a
neighbouring nation, whom all the world admire. I shall not take upon me
to make remarks on the performance of that extraordinary person: only some
things he has advanced so directly opposite to the doctrine we have hitherto laid
down, that we should be wanting in the regard due to the authority of so great
a man did we not take some notice of them.” He refers, of course, to Newton.

The first edition of Berkeley's Principies was published in Ireland—henee
“neighbouring nation.” Newton's Principia appeared in 1687.

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which, being moveable and defined by its situation in respect of
sensible bodies, is vulgarly taken for immoveable space. Place
he defines to be that part of space which is occupied by any
body: and according as the space is absolute or relative so also is
the place. Absolute Motion is said to be the translation of a body
from absolute place to absolute place, as relative motion is from
one relative place to another. And because the parts of absolute
space do not fall under our senses, instead of them we are obliged
to use their sensible mensures; and so define both place and
motion with respect to bodies which we regard as immoveable.
But it is said, in philosophical matters we must abstract from our
senses; since it may be that none of those bodies which seem to
be quiescent are truly so; and the same thing which is moved
relatively may be really at rest. As likewise one and the same
body may be in relative rest and motion, or even moved with
contrary relative motions at the same time, according as its place
is variously defined. All which ambiguity is to be found in the
apparent motions; but not at all in the true or absolute, which
should therefore be alone regarded in philosophy. And the true
we are told are distinguished from apparent or relative motions
by the following properties. First, in true or absolute motion, all
parts which preserve the same position with respect of the whole,
partake of the motions of the whole. Secondly, the place being
moved, that which is placed therein is also moved: so that a
body moving in a place which is in motion doth participate the
motion of its place. Thirdly, true motion is never generated or
changed otherwise than by forcé impressed on the body itself.
Fourthly, true motion is always changed by forcé impressed on
the body moved. Fifthly, in circular motion, barely relative, there
is no centrifugal forcé, which nevertheless, in that which is true
or absolute, is proportional to the quantity of motion.

112. But, notwithstanding what hath been said, I must confess
it does not appear to me that there can be any motion other than

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relative^^^: so that to conceive motion there must be conceived
at least two bodies; whereof the distance or position in regard to
each other is varied. Henee, if there was one only body in being it
could not possibly be moved. This seems evident, in that the idea
I have of motion doth necessarily inelude relation.—[^^^Whether
others ean coneeive it otherwise, a little attention may satisfy
them.]

113. But, though in every motion it be necessary to eoneeive
more bodies than one, yet it may be that one only is moved,
namely, that on whieh the foree causing the ehange in the distanee
or situation of the bodies is impressed. For, however some may
define relative motion, so as to term that body moved whieh
changes its distance from some other body, whether the forcé
[^^^or action] causing that ehange were impressed on it or no,
yet, as relative motion is that whieh is perceived by sense, and
regarded in the ordinary affairs of Ufe, it follows that every man
of common sense knows what it is as well as the best philosopher.

Now, 1 ask any one whether, in his sense of motion as he walks
along the streets, the stones he passes over may be said to move,
because they ehange distance with his feet? To me it appears that
though motion ineludes a relation of one thing to another, yet it
is not necessary that each term of the relation be denominated
from it. As a man may think of somewhat whieh does not think, [32i]
so a body may be moved to or from another body whieh is not
therefore itself in motion, 1 mean relative motion, for other 1

am not able to conceive.]

114. As the place happens to be variously defined, the motion
whieh is related to it varies^^^. A man in a ship may be said to be

“Motion,” in various aspeets, is treated specially in the De Motu. An
imagination of trinal space presupposes locomotive experience—unimpeded,
in contrast with—impeded locomotion. Cf. sect. 116.

Omitted in second edition.

Added in second edition.

Omitted in second edition.

See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.

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quiescent with relation to the sides of the vessel, and yet move
with relation to the land. Or he may move eastward in respect
of the one, and westward in respect of the other. In the common
affairs of life, men never go beyond the Earth to define the place
of any body; and what is quiescent in respect of that is accounted
absolutely to be so. But philosophers, who have a greater extent
of thought, and juster notions of the system of things, discover
even the Earth itself to be moved. In order therefore to fix their
notions, they seem to conceive the Corporeal World as finite, and
the utmost unmoved walls or shell thereof to be the place whereby
they estímate true motions. If we sound our own conceptions, I
believe we may find all the absolute motion we can frame an idea
of to be at bottom no other than relative motion thus defined. Eor,
as has been already observed, absolute motion, exclusive of all
external relation, is incomprehensible: and to this kind of relative
motion all the above-mentioned properties, causes, and effects
ascribed to absolute motion will, if I mistake not, be found to
agree. As to what is said of the centrifugal forcé, that it does
not at all belong to circular relative motion, I do not see how
this follows from the experiment which is brought to prove it.
See Newton's Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, in
Schol. Def VIII. Eor the water in the vessel, at that time wherein
it is said to have the greatest relative circular motion, hath, I
think, no motion at all: as is plain from the foregoing section.

115. Eor, to denomínate a body moved, it is requisite, first,
that it change its distance or situation with regard to some other
body: and secondly, that the forcé occasioning that change be
applied to’^^ it. If either of these be wanting, I do not think that,
agreeably to the sense of mankind, or the propriety of language, a
body can be said to be in motion. I grant indeed that it is possible
for US to think a body, which we see change its distance from
some other, to be moved, though it have no forcé applied to^^^

“applied to”—“impressed on”—in first edition.

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it (in which sense there may be apparent motion); but then it is
because the forcé causing the change^^^ of distance is imagined
by US to be [’^^applied or] impressed on that body thought to
move. Which indeed shews we are capable of mistaking a thing
to be in motion which is not, and that is all. [^^^But it does
not prove that, in the common acceptation of motion, a body is
moved merely because it changes distance from another; since
as soon as we are undeceived, and find that the moving forcé was
not communicated to it, we no longer hold it to be moved. So, on
the other hand, when one only body (the parts whereof preserve
a given position between themselves) is imagined to exist, some
there are who think that it can be moved all manner of ways,
though without any change of distance or situation to any other
bodies; which we should not deny, if they meant only that it
might have an impressed forcé, which, upon the haré creation of
other bodies, would produce a motion of some certain quantity
and determination. But that an actual motion (distinct from the
impressed forcé, or power, productivo of change of place in case
there were bodies present whereby to define it) can exist in such
a single body, I must confess I am not able to comprehend.]

116. From what has been said, it follows that the philosophic
consideration of motion doth not imply the being of an absolute
Space, distinct from that which is perceived by sense, and related
to bodies: which that it cannot exist without the mind is clear
upon the same principies that demónstrate the like of all other
objects of sense. And perhaps, if we inquire narrowly, we shall
find we cannot even frame an idea of puré Space exclusive of all
body. This I must confess seems impossible’^°, as being a most [ 323 ]
abstract idea. When I excite a motion in some part of my body,
if it be free or without resistance, I say there is Space. But if I
find a resistance, then I say there is Body. and in proportion as

“the/orce causing the change”—which “forcé,” according to Berkeley, can
only be attributed metaphorically to the so-called impelling body; inasmuch as
bodies, or the data of sense, can only be signs of their consequent events, not

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the resistance to motion is lesser or greater, I say the space is
more or less puré. So that when I speak of puré or empty space,
it is not to be supposed that the word space stands for an idea
distinct from, or conceivable without, body and motion. Though
indeed we are apt to think every noun substantive stands for a
distinct idea that may be separated from all others; which hath
occasioned infinite mistakes. When, therefore, supposing all the
World to be annihilated besides my own body, I say there still
remains puré Space', thereby nothing else is meant but only that I
conceive it possible for the limbs of my body to be moved on all
sides without the least resistance: but if that too were annihilated
then there could be no motion, and consequently no Space^^^
Some, perhaps, may think the sense of seeing doth furnish them
with the idea of puré space; but it is plain from what we have
elsewhere shewn, that the ideas of space and distance are not
obtained by that sense. See the Essay concerning Vision.

117. What is here laid down seems to put an end to all those
disputes and difficulties that have sprung up amongst the learned
concerning the nature of puré Space. But the chief advantage
arising from it is that we are freed from that dangerous dilemma,
to which several who have employed their thoughts on that
subject imagine themselves reduced, viz. of thinking either that
Real Space is God, or else that there is something beside God
which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable. Both
which may justly be thought pernicious and absurd notions. It is
certain that not a few divines, as well as philosophers of great
note, have, from the difficulty they found in conceiving either

efficient causes of change.

Added in second edition.

What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition.

™ “seems impossihle”—“is above my capacity”—in first edition.

In short, empty Space is the sensuous idea of unresisted motion. This is
implied in the New Theory of Vision. He minimises Space, treating it as a
datum of sense.

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limits or annihilation of space, concluded it must be divine. And
some of late have set themselves partieularly to shew that the
ineommunicable attributes of God agree to it. Which doctrine,
how unworthy soever it may seem of the Divine Nature, yet I
must confess I do not see how we can get clear of it, so long as
we adhere to the received opinions^^^.

118. Hitherto of Natural Philosophy. We come now
to make some inquiry concerning that other great branch of
speculative knowledge, to wit, Mathematics^^^. These, how
celebrated soever they may be for their clearness and certainty
of demonstration, which is hardly anywhere else to be found,
cannot nevertheless be supposed altogether free from mistakes, if
in their principies there lurks some secret error which is common
to the professors of those Sciences with the rest of mankind.
Mathematicians, though they deduce their theorems from a great
height of evidence, yet their first principies are limited by
the consideration of Quantity. And they do not ascend into any
inquiry concerning those transcendental maxims which influence
all the particular Sciences; each part whereof, Mathematics not
excepted, doth consequently participate of the errors involved
in them. That the principies laid down by mathematicians are
true, and their way of deduction from those principies clear
and incontestible, we do not deny. But we hold there may
be certain erroneous maxims of greater extent than the object
of Mathematics, and for that reason not expressly mentioned,
though tacitly supposed, throughout the whole progress of that

He probably refers to Samuel Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and
Attributes of God, which appeared in 1706, and a treatise De Spatio Reali,
published in the same year.

Sect. 118-132 are accordingly concerned with the New Principies in their
application to Mathematics. The foundation of the mathematical Sciences
engaged much of Berkeley's thought in early Ufe and in his later years. See his
Analyst.

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Science; and that the ill effects of those secret unexamined errors
are diffused through all the branches thereof. To be plain, we
suspect the mathematicians are no less deeply concerned than
other men in the errors arising from the doctrine of abstract
general ideas, and the existence of objects without the mind.

119. Arithmetic hath been thought to have for its object
abstract ideas of number. Of which to understand the properties
and mutual habitudes, is supposed no mean part of speculative
knowledge. The opinión of the puré and intellectual nature
of numbers in abstract has made them in esteem with those
philosophers who seem to have affected an uncommon fineness
and elevation of thought. It hath set a price on the most trifling
numerical speculations, which in practice are of no use, but serve
only for amusement; and hath heretofore so far infected the minds
of some, that they have dreamed of mighty mysteries involved
in numbers, and attempted the explication of natural things by
them. But, if we narrowly inquire into our own thoughts, and
consider what has been premised, we may perhaps entertain a
low opinión of those high flights and abstractions, and look on all
inquines about numbers only as so many dijficiles nugae, so far
as they are not subservient to practice, and promote the benefit
of life.

120. Unity in abstract we have before considered in sect. 13;
from which, and what has been said in the Introduction, it plainly
follows there is not any such idea. But, number being defined
a collection of units, we may conclude that, if there be no such
thing as unity, or unit in abstract, there are no ideas of number in
abstract, denoted by the numeral ñames and figures. The theories
therefore in Arithmetic, if they are abstracted from the ñames
and figures, as likewise from all use and practice, as well as from
the particular things numbered, can be supposed to have nothing
at all for their object. Henee we may see how entirely the Science
of numbers is subordinate to practice, and how jejune and trifling

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it becomes when considered as a matter of mere speeulation^^^.

121. However, sinee there may be some who, deluded by
the speeious show of diseovering abstraeted verities, waste their
time in arithmetieal theorems and problems whieh have not any
use, it will not be amiss if we more fully eonsider and expose the
vanity of that pretenee. And this will plainly appear by taking
a view of Arithmetie in its infaney, and observing what it was
that originally put men on the study of that seienee, and to what
seope they direeted it. It is natural to think that at first, men, for
ease of memory and help of eomputation, made use of eounters,
or in writing of single strokes, points, or the like, eaeh whereof
was made to signify an unit, i.e. some one thing of whatever
kind they had oeeasion to reekon. Afterwards they found out [ 326 ]
the more eompendious ways of making one eharaeter stand in
plaee of several strokes or points. And, lastly, the notation of
the Arabians or Indians eame into use; wherein, by the repetition
of a few eharaeters or figures, and varying the signifieation
of eaeh figure aeeording to the plaee it obtains, all numbers
may be most aptly expressed. Whieh seems to have been done
in imitation of language, so that an exaet analogy is observed
betwixt the notation by figures and ñames, the nine simple figures
answering the nine first numeral ñames and plaees in the former,
eorresponding to denominations in the latter. And agreeably to
those eonditions of the simple and loeal valué of figures, were
eontrived methods of finding, from the given figures or marks of
the parts, what figures and how plaeed are proper to denote the
whole, or vice versa. And having found the sought figures, the
same rule or analogy being observed throughout, it is easy to read
them into words; and so the number beeomes perfeetly known.

For then the number of any partieular things is said to be known,
when we know the ñame or figures (with their due arrangement)
that aeeording to the standing analogy belong to them. For, these

Numerical relations are realised only in concrete experience.

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signs being known, we can by the operations of arithmetic know
the signs of any part of the particular sums signified by them; and
thus computing in signs, (because of the connexion established
betwixt them and the distinct multitudes of things, whereof one
is taken for an unit), we may be able rightly to sum up, divide,
and proportion the things themselves that we intend to number.

122. In Arithmetic, therefore, we regard not the things but the
signs', which nevertheless are not regarded for their own sake,
but because they direct us how to act with relation to things, and
dispose rightly of them. Now, agreeably to what we have before
observed of Words in general (sect. 19, Introd.), it happens
here likewise, that abstract ideas are thought to be signified by
numeral ñames or characters, while they do not suggest ideas of
particular things to our minds. I shall not at present enter into a
more particular dissertation on this subject; but only observe that
it is evident from what has been said, those things which pass for
abstract truths and theorems concerning numbers, are in reality
conversant about no object distinct from particular numerable
things; except only ñames and characters, which originally carne
to be considered on no other account but their being signs, or
capable to represent aptly whatever particular things men had
need to compute. Whence it follows that to study them for
their own sake would be just as wise, and to as good purpose,
as if a man, neglecting the true use or original intention and
subserviency of language, should spend his time in impertinent
criticisms upon words, or reasonings and controversies purely
verbaF^^.

123. From numbers we proceed to speak of extension^^^,
which, considered as relative, is the object of Geometry. The
infinite divisibility oífinite extensión, though it is not expressly
laid down either as an axiom or theorem in the elements of that
Science, yet is throughout the same everywhere supposed, and

Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 107, &c.

™ Ibid. sect. 122-125, 149-160.

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thought to have so inseparable and essential a connexion with the
principies and demonstrations in Geometry that mathematicians
never admit it into doubt, or make the least question of it. And as
this notion is the source from whence do spring all those amusing
geometrical paradoxes which have such a direct repugnancy to
the plain common sense of mankind, and are admitted with so
much reluctance into a mind not yet debauched by learning; so
is it the principal occasion of all that nice and extreme subtilty,
which renders the study of Mathematics so very difficult and
tedious. Henee, if we can make it appear that no finite extensión
contains innumerable parts, or is infinitely divisible, it follows
that we shall at once olear the Science of Geometry from a
great number of difficulties and contradictions which have ever
been esteemed a reproach to human reason, and withal make the
attainment thereof a business of much less time and pains than it
hitherto hath been.

124. Every particular finite extensión which may possibly be
the object of our thought is an idea existing only in the mind; and
consequently each part thereof must be perceived. If, therefore,

I cannot perceive innumerable parts in any finite extensión that I
consider, it is certain they are not contained in it. But it is evident
that I cannot distinguish innumerable parts in any particular Une, [ 328 ]
surface, or solid, which I either perceive by sense, or figure to
myself in my mind. Wherefore I conclude they are not contained
in it. Nothing can be plainer to me than that the extensions
I have in view are no other than my own ideas; and it is no
less plain that I cannot resolve any one of my ideas into an
infinite number of other ideas; that is, that they are not infinitely
divisible^^^. lí hy finite extensión be meant something distinct

™ An infinitely divided extensión, being unperceived, must be unreal—if
its existence is made real only in and through actual perception, or at least
imagination. The only possible extensión is, accordingly, sensible extensión,
which could not be infinitely divided without the supposed parts ceasing to be
perceived or real.

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[ 329 ]

from a finite idea, I declare I do not know what that is, and so
cannot affirm or deny anything of it. But if the terms extensión,
parís, and the like, are taken in any sense conceivable—that is,
for ideas ,—then to say a finite quantity or extensión consists of
parts infinite in number is so manifest and glaring a contradiction,
that every one at first sight acknowledges it to be so. And it
is impossible it should ever gain the assent of any reasonable
creature who is not brought to it by gentle and slow degrees, as a
converted Gentile’^^ to the belief of transubstantiation. Ancient
and rooted prejudices do often pass into principies. And those
propositions which once obtain the forcé and credit of a principie,
are not only themselves, but likewise whatever is deducible from
them, thought privileged from all examination. And there is no
absurdity so gross, which, by this means, the mind of man may
not be prepared to swallow^^^.

125. He whose understanding is prepossessed with the doctrine
of abstract general ideas may be persuaded that (whatever be
thought of the ideas of sense) extensión in abstract is infinitely
divisible. And one who thinks the objects of sense exist without
the mind will perhaps, in virtue thereof, be brought to admit^^*’
that a line but an inch long may contain innumerable parts really
existing, though too small to be discerned. These errors are
grafted as well in the minds of geometricians as of other men, and
have a like influence on their reasonings; and it were no difficult
thing to shew how the arguments from Geometry made use of
to support the infinite divisibility of extensión are bottomed on
them. But this, if it be thought necessary, we may hereafter
find a proper place to treat of in a particular manner.] At present
we shall only observe in general whence it is the mathematicians

™ “converted Gentile”—“pagan convert”—in first edition.

™ Cf. Locke's Essay, Bk. I, ch. 3, § 25.

“will perhaps in virtue thereof be brought to admit,” &c.—“will not stick
to affirm,” &c.—in first edition.

Omitted in second edition. See the Analyst.

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are all so fond and tenacious of that doctrine.

126. It has been observed in another place that the theorems
and demonstrations in Geometry are conversant about universal
ideas (sect. 15, Introd.): where it is explained in what sense this
ought to be understood, to wit, the particular Unes and figures
included in the diagram are supposed to stand for innumerable
others of different sizes; or, in other words, the geometer
considers them abstracting from their magnitude: which doth
not imply that he forms an abstract idea, but only that he cares
not what the particular magnitude is, whether great or small, but
looks on that as a thing indifferent to the demonstration. Henee
it follows that a line in the scheme but an inch long must be
spoken of as though it contained ten thousand parts, since it is
regarded not in itself, but as it is universal; and it is universal
only in its signification, whereby it represents innumerable lines
greater than itself, in which may be distinguished ten thousand
parts or more, though there may not be above an inch in it. After
this manner, the properties of the lines signified are (by a very
usual figure) transferred to the sign; and thence, through mistake,
thought to appertain to it considered in its own nature.

127. Because there is no number of parts so great but it is
possible there may be a line containing more, the inch-line is said
to contain parts more than any assignable number; which is true,
not of the inch taken absolutely, but only for the things signified
by it. But men, not retaining that distinction in their thoughts,
slide into a belief that the small particular line described on paper
contains in itself parts innumerable. There is no such thing [ 330 ]
as the ten thousandth part of an inch; but there is of a mile or
diameter of the earth, which may be signified by that inch. When
therefore 1 delinéate a triangle on paper, and take one side, not
above an inch for example in length, to be the radius, this 1
consider as divided into 10,000 or 100,000 parts, or more. For,
though the ten thousandth part of that line considered in itself,

is nothing at all, and consequently may be neglected without

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[ 331 ]

any error or inconveniency, yet these described Unes, being only
marks standing for greater quantities, whereof it may be the ten
thousandth part is very considerable, it follows that, to prevent
notable errors in practice, the radius must be taken of 10,000
parts, or more.

128. From what has been said the reason is plain why, to the
end any theorem may become universal in its use, it is necessary
we speak of the Unes described on paper as though they contained
parts which really they do not. In doing of which, if we examine
the matter throughly, we shall perhaps discover that we cannot
conceive an inch itself as consisting of, or being divisible into,
a thousand parts, but only some other Une which is far greater
than an inch, and represented by it; and that when we say a Une
is infinitely divisible, we must mean^^^ a Une which is infinitely
great. What we have here observed seems to be the chief cause,
why to suppose the infinite divisibility of finite extensión has
been thought necessary in geometry.

129. The several absurdities and contradictions which flowed
from this false principie might, one would think, have been
esteemed so many demonstrations against it. But, by I know not
what logic, it is held that proofs a posteriori are not to be admitted
against propositions relating to Infinity. As though it were not
impossible even for an Infinite Mind to reconcile contradictions;
or as if anything absurd and repugnant could have a necessary
connexion with truth, or flow from it. But whoever considers the
weakness of this pretence, will think it was contrived on purpose
to humour the laziness of the mind, which had rather acquiesce
in an indolent scepticism than be at the pains to go through with
a severe examination of those principies it has ever embraced for
true.

130. Of late the speculations about Infinites have run so high,
and grown to such strange notions, as have occasioned no small

“we must mean”—“we mean (if we mean anything)”—in first edition.

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scruples and disputes among the geometers of the present age.

Some there are of great note who, not eontent with holding that
finite Unes may be divided into an infinite number of parts, do
yet farther maintain, that eaeh of those Infinitesimals is itself
subdivisible into an infinity of other parts, or Infinitesimals of a
seeond order, and so on ad infinitum. These, I say, assert there
are Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals, without ever
eoming to an end. So that aecording to them an inch does not
barely eontain an infinite number of parts, but an infinity of an
infinity of an infinity ad infinitum of parts. Others there be who
hold all orders of Infinitesimals below the first to be nothing at
all; thinking it with good reason absurd to imagine there is any
positive quantity or part of extensión whieh, though multiplied
infinitely, ean ever equal the smallest given extensión. And yet
on the other hand it seems no less absurd to think the square, eube,
or other power of a positive real root, should itself be nothing at
all; whieh they who hold Infinitesimals of the first order, denying
all of the subsequent orders, are obliged to maintain.

131. Have we not therefore reason to eonclude they are both
in the wrong, and that there is in effeet no sueh thing as parts
infinitely smah, or an infinite number of parts eontained in any
finite quantity? But you wih say that if this doetrine obtains it
will fohow the very foundations of Geometry are destroyed, and
those great men who have raised that seience to so astonishing
a height, have been ah the while building a castle in the air. To
this it may be replied, that whatever is useful in geometry, and
promotes the benefit of human life, does still remain firm and
unshaken on our Principies; that seience considered as practical
will rather receive advantage than any prejudice from what has
been said. But to set this in a due hght,[^^^ and shew how lines
and figures may be measured, and their properties investigated, [ 332 ]
without supposing finite extensión to be infinitely divisible,] may

Omitted in the seeond edition.

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be the proper business of another place^^^. For the rest, though it
should follow that some of the more intricate and subtle parts of
Speculative Mathematics may be pared off without any prejudice
to truth, yet I do not see what damage will be thence derived to
mankind. On the contrary, I think it were highly to be wished that
men of great abilities and obstínate application^^^ would draw
off their thoughts from those amusements, and employ them in
the study of such things as lie nearer the concerns of Ufe, or have
a more direct influence on the manners.

132. If it be said that several theorems, undoubtedly true,
are discovered by methods in which Infinitesimals are made use
of, which could never have been if their existence included a
contradiction in it:—I answer, that upon a thorough examination
it will not be found that in any instance it is necessary to
make use of or conceive infinitesimal parts of finite lines,
or even quantities less than the minimum sensibile: nay, it
will be evident this is never done, it being impossible.

And whatever mathematicians may think of Fluxions, or the
Differential Calculus, and the like, a little reflexión will shew
them that, in working by those methods, they do not conceive or
imagine lines or surfaces less than what are perceivable to sense.
They may indeed cali those little and almost insensible quantities
Infinitesimals, or Infinitesimals of Infinitesimals, if they picase.
But at bottom this is all, they being in truth finite; ñor does the
solution of problems require the supposing any other. But this
will be more clearly made out hereafter.]

133. By what we have hitherto said, it is plain that very
numerous and important errors have taken their rise from those
false Principies which were impugned in the foregoing parts of

Does this refer to the intended “Pait 11” of the Principies!

“men of great abilities and obstínate application,” &c.—“men of the greatest
abilities and most obstínate application,” &c.—in first edition.

What follows to the end of this section is omitted in the second edition.

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this Treatise; and the opposites of those erroneous tenets at the
same time appear to be most fruitful Prineiples, from whenee
do flow innumerable eonsequenees, highly advantageous to true
philosophy as well as to religión. Partieularly Matter, or the
absolute^^'' existence of corporeal objects, hath been shewn to
be that wherein the most avowed and pernieious enemies of
all knowledge, whether human or divine, have ever plaeed their
ehief strength and eonfidenee. And surely if by distinguishing the
real existenee of unthinking things from their being pereeived,
and allowing them a subsistenee of their own, out of the minds
of spirits, no one thing is explained in nature, but on the eontrary
a great many inexplieable diffieulties arise; if the supposition of
Matter^^^ is barely preearious, as not being grounded on so mueh
as one single reason; if its eonsequenees eannot endure the light
of examination and free inquiry, but sereen themselves under the
dark and general pretenee of infinites being incomprehensible',
if withal the removal of this Matter be not attended with the
least evil eonsequenee; if it be not even missed in the world,
but everything as well, nay mueh easier eoneeived without it;
if, lastly, both Seepties and Atheists are for ever sileneed upon
supposing only spirits and ideas, and this seheme of things is
perfeetly agreeable both to Reason and Religión: methinks we
may expeet it should be admitted and firmly embraeed, though it
were proposed only as an hypothesis, and the existenee of Matter
had been allowed possible; whieh yet I think we have evidently
demonstrated that it is not.

134. True it is that, in eonsequenee of the foregoing Prineiples,
several disputes and speeulations whieh are esteemed no mean
parts of learning are rejeeted as useless and in effeet

“absolute,” i.e. abstract, independent, irrelative existence—as something of
whieh there can be no sensuous perception or conception.

™ Matter unrealised in perception—not the material world that is realised in
percipient experience of sense.

Omitted in second edition.

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[ 334 ]

conversant about nothing at all]. But how great a prejudice
soever against our notions this may give to those who have
already been deeply engaged, and made large advances in studies
of that nature, yet by others we hope it will not be thought
any just ground of dislike to the principies and tenets herein laid
down, that they abridge the labour of study, and make human
Sciences more olear, compendious, and attainable than they were
before.

135. Having despatched what we intended to say concerning
the knowledge of ideas, the method we proposed leads us in the
next place to treat of spirits^"^^: with regard to which, perhaps,
human knowledge is not so deficient as is vulgarly imagined.
The great reason that is assigned for our being thought ignorant
of the nature of Spirits is our not having an idea of it. But, surely
it ought not to be looked on as a defect in a human understanding
that it does not perceive the idea of Spirit, if it is manifestly
impossible there should be any such idea. And this if I mistake
not has been demonstrated in section 27. To which I shall here
add that a Spirit has been shewn to be the only substance or
support wherein unthinking beings or ideas can exist: but that
this substance which supports or perceives ideas should itself be
an idea, or like an idea, is evidently absurd.

136. It will perhaps be said that we want a sense (as some
have imagined^^^) proper to know substances withal; which, if
we had, we might know our own soul as we do a triangle. To
this I answer, that in case we had a new sense bestowed upon

Sect. 135-156 treat of consequences of the New Principies, in their
application to Sciences concerned with our notions of Spirit or Mind\ as
distinguished from Sciences of ideas in external Nature, and their mathematical
relations. Individual mind, with Berkeley, needs data of sense in order to its
realisation in consciousness; while it is dependent on God, in a relation which
he does not define distinctly.

e.g. Locke suggests this.

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US, we could only receive thereby some new sensations or ideas
of sense. But I believe nobody will say tbat wbat be means
by tbe terms soul and substance is only some partieular sort
of idea or sensation. We may tberefore infer tbat, all tbings
duly eonsidered, it is not more reasonable to tbink our faeulties
defeetive, in tbat tbey do not furnisb us witb an idea of Spirit, or
aetive tbinking substanee, tban it would be if we sbould blame
tbem for not being able to eomprebend a round square^^^.

137. From tbe opinión tbat Spirits are to be known after
tbe manner of an idea or sensation bave risen many absurd and
beterodox tenets, and mueb seeptieism about tbe nature of tbe
soul. It is even probable tbat tbis opinión may bave produeed a
doubt in some wbetber tbey bad any soul at all distinet from tbeir
body; sinee upon inquiry tbey eould not find tbey bad an idea
of it. Tbat an idea, wbieb is inaetive, and tbe existenee wbereof
eonsists in being pereeived, sbould be tbe image or likeness of an
agent subsisting by itself, seems to need no otber refutation tban
barely attending to wbat is meant by tbose words. But perbaps
you will say tbat tbougb an idea eannot resemble a Spirit in its
tbinking, aeting, or subsisting by itself, yet it may in some otber
respeets; and it is not neeessary tbat an idea or image be in all
respeets like tbe original.

138.1 answer, If it does not in tbose mentioned, it is impossible
it sbould represen! it in any otber tbing. Do but leave out tbe
power of willing, tbinking, and pereeiving ideas, and tbere
remains notbing else wberein tbe idea ean be like a spirit. For,
by tbe word spirit we mean only tbat wbieb tbinks, wills, and
perceives; tbis, and tbis alone, eonstitutes tbe signifieation of tbat
term. If tberefore it is impossible tbat any degree of tbose powers
sbould be represented in an idea [’^^or notion], it is evident tbere
ean be no idea [or notion] of a Spirit.

Is this analogy applicable?

Omitted in second edition, as he had previously leamed to distinguish
notion from idea. Cf. sect. 89, 142.

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[ 336 ]

139. But it will be objected that, if there is no idea
signified by the terms soul, spirit, and substance, they are
wholly insignificant, or have no meaning in them. I answer,
those words do mean or signify a real thing; which is neither
an idea ñor like an idea, but that which perceives ideas, and
wills, and reasons about them. What I am myself, that which I
denote by the term I, is the same with what is meant by soul, or
spiritual substance. [^^^But if I should say that I was nothing,
or that I was an idea or notion, nothing could be more evidently
absurd than either of these propositions.] If it be said that
this is only quarrelling at a word, and that, since the immediate
significations of other ñames are by common consent called
ideas, no reason can be assigned why that which is signified by
the ñame spirit or soul may not partake in the same appellation. I
answer, all the unthinking objects of the mind agree in that they
are entirely passive, and their existence consists only in being
perceived: whereas a soul or spirit is an active being, whose
existence consists, not in being perceived, but in perceiving ideas
and thinking^^^. It is therefore necessary, in order to prevent
equivocation and confounding natures perfectly disagreeing and
unlike, that we distinguish between spirit and idea. See sect. 27.

140. In a large sense indeed, we may be said to have an
idea [^^^or rather a notion] of spirit. That is, we understand the
meaning of the word, otherwise we could not affirm or deny
anything of it. Moreover, as we conceive the ideas that are in the
minds of other spirits by means of our own, which we suppose to
be resemblances of them, so we know other spirits by means of
our own soul: which in that sense is the image or idea of them; it
having a like respect to other spirits that blueness or heat by me

Ibid. In the omitted passage it will be seen that he makes idea and notion
synonymous.

Is the reality of mind as dependent on having ideas (of some sort) as ideas
are on mind; although mind is more deeply and truly real than its ideas are?

Introduced in second edition.

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perceived has to those ideas perceived by another^^^.

141. [^^^The natural immortality of the soul is a necessary
consequence of the foregoing doctrine. But before we attempt to
prove this, it is fit that we explain the meaning of that tenet.] It
must not be supposed that they who assert the natural immortality
of the sour^^ are of opinión that it is absolutely incapable of
annihilation even by the infinite power of the Creator who first
gave it being, but only that it is not hable to be broken or
dissolved by the ordinary laws of nature or motion They indeed
who hold the soul of man to be only a thin vital flame, or system
of animal spirits, make it perishing and corruptible as the body;
since there is nothing more easily dissipated than such a being,
which it is naturally impossible should survive the ruin of the
tabernacle wherein it is inclosed. And this notion hath been
greedily embraced and cherished by the worst part of mankind,
as the most effectual antidote against all impressions of virtue
and religión. But it hath been made evident that bodies, of what
frame or texture soever, are barely passive ideas in the mind,
which is more distant and heterogeneous from them than light
is from darkness^^*’. We have shewn that the soul is indivisible,
incorporeal, unextended; and it is consequently incorruptible.
Nothing can be plainer than that the motions, changes, decays,
and dissolutions which we hourly see befal natural bodies (and
which is what we mean by the course of nature) cannot possibly
affect an active, simple, uncompounded substance: such a being
therefore is indissoluble by the forcé of nature; that is to say, the

We know otherfinite persons through sense-presented phenomena, but not
as themselves phenomena. Cf. sect. 145. It is a medíate knowledge that we
have of other persons. The question about the individuality of finite egos, as
distinguished from God, Berkeley has not touched.

These sentences are omitted in the second edition.

“the soul,” i.e. the individual Ego.

™ Cf. sect. 2; 25-27.

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[ 338 ]

soul ofman is naturally immortaf^^.

142. After what has been said, it is, I suppose, plain that
our souls are not to be known in the same manner as senseless,
inactive objects, or by way of idea. Spirits and ideas are things
so wholly different, that when we say “they exist,” “they are
known,” or the like, these words must not be thought to signify
anything common to both natures^^^. There is nothing alike or
common in them; and to expect that by any multiplication or
enlargement of our faculties, we may be enabled to know a spirit
as we do a triangle, seems as absurd as if we should hope to
see a sound. This is inculcated because I imagine it may be
of moment towards clearing several important questions, and
preventing some very dangerous errors concerning the nature of
the soul.

[753we may not, I think, strictly be said to have an idea of an
active being, or of an action; although we may be said to have
a notion of them. I have some knowledge or notion of my mind,
and its acts about ideas; inasmuch as I know or understand what

This is Berkeley's application of his new conception of the reality of
matter, to the final human question of the self-conscious existence of the
individual human Ego, after physical death. Philosophers and theologians were
accustomed in his generation to ground their argument for a future life on the
metaphysical assumption of the physical indivisibility of our self-conscious
spirit, and on our contingent connexion with the body. “Our bodies,” says
Bishop Butler, “are no more ourselves, or part of ourselves, than any other
matter around us.” This train of thought is foreign to us at the present day, when
men of Science remind us that self-conscious life is found only in correlation
with corporeal organisation, whatever may be the abstract possibility. Hope of
continued life after physical death seems to depend on ethical considerations
more than on metaphysical arguments, and on what is suggested by faith in the
final outcome of personal life in a divinely constituted universe.

Mind and the ideas presented to the senses are at opposite poles of existence.
But he does not say that, thus opposed, they are each independent of the other.

What follows was introduced in the second edition, in which notion is
contrasted with idea.

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is meant by these words. What I know, that I have some notion
of. I will not say that the terms idea and notion may not be used
convertibly, if the world will have it so. But yet it eondueeth to
clearness and propriety, that we distinguish things very different
by different ñames. It is also to be remarked that, all relations
ineluding an aet of the mind^^^, we eannot so properly be said to
have an idea, but rather a notion, of the relations and habitudes
between things. But if, in the modern way’^^, the word idea is
extended to spirits, and relations, and acts, this is, after all, an
affair of verbal eoneern.]

143. It will not be amiss to add, that the doetrine of abstract
ideas has had no small share in rendering those seienees intrieate
and obseure whieh are partieularly eonversant about spiritual
things. Men have imagined they eould frame abstraet notions of
the powers and acts of the mind, and eonsider them preseinded as
well from the mind or spirit itself, as from their respeetive objeets
and effeets. Henee a great number of dark and ambiguous terms,
presumed to stand for abstract notions, have been introduced into
metaphysics and morality; and from these have grown infinite
distractions and disputes amongst the learned^^^.

144. But, nothing seems more to have contributed towards
engaging men in controversies and mistakes with regard to the
nature and operations of the mind, than the being used to speak
of those things in terms borrowed from sensible ideas. For
example, the will is termed the motion of the soul: this infuses a
belief that the mind of man is as a ball in motion, impelled and
determined by the objeets of sense, as necessarily as that is by
the stroke of a racket. Henee arise endless scruples and errors of

Here is a germ of Kantism. But Berkeley has not analysed that activity
of mind which constitutes relation, ñor systematically unfolded the relations
involved in the rational constitution of experience. There is more disposition
to this in Siris.

As with Locke, for example.

Note this condemnation of the tendeney to substantiate “powers of mind.”

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[ 340 ]

dangerous consequence in morality. All which, I doubt not, may
be cleared, and ttuth appear plain, uniform, and consistent, could
but philosophers be prevailed on to [^^^depart from some received
prejudices and modes of speech, and] retire into themselves, and
attentively consider their own meaning. [^^^But the difficulties
arising on this head demand a more particular disquisition than
suits with the design of this treatise.]

145. From what hath been said, it is plain that we cannot know
the existence of other spirits otherwise than by their operations,
or the ideas by them, excited in us. I perceive several motions,
changes, and combinations of ideas, that inform me there are
certain particular agents, like myself, which accompany them,
and concur in their production. Henee, the knowledge I have of
other spirits is not immediate, as is the knowledge of my ideas;
but depending on the intervention of ideas, by me referred to

agents or spirits distinct from myself, as effects or concomitant
759

signs .

146. But, though there be some things which convince
US human agents are concerned in producing them, yet it is
evident to every one that those things which are called the
Works of Nature, that is, the far greater part of the ideas or

Omitted in second edition. Berkeley was after all reluctant to “depart from
received modes of speech,” notwithstanding their often misleading associations.

Omitted in second edition.

This is one of the notable sections in the Principies, as it suggests the
rationale of Berkeley's rejection of Panegoism or Solipsism. Is this consistent
with his conception of the reality of the material world? It is objected (e.g. by
Reid) that ideal realism dissolves our faith in the existence of other persons.
The difficulty is to shew how appearances presented to my senses, which are
sensuous and subjective, can be media of communication between persons. The
question carnes us back to the theistic presupposition in the trustworthiness of
experience—which is adapted to deceive if I am the only person existing. With
Berkeley a chief function of ideas of sense is to signify other persons to each
person. See Alciphron, Dial. IV; New Theory of Vision Vindicated, and Siris.

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sensations perceived by us, are not produced by, or dependent
on, the wills of men. There is therefore some other Spirit that
causes them; since it is repugnant^®*^ that they should subsist by
themselves. See sect. 29. But, if we attentively consider the
constant regularity, order, and concatenation of natural things,
the surprising magnificence, beauty and perfection of the larger,
and the exquisite contrivance of the smaller parts of the creation,
together with the exact harmony and correspondence of the
whole, but above all the never-enough-admired laws of pain and
pleasure, and the instincts or natural inclinations, appetites, and
passions of animáis;—I say if we consider all these things, and at
the same time attend to the meaning and import of the attributes
One, Eternal, Infinitely Wise, Good, and Perfect, we shall clearly
perceive that they belong to the aforesaid Spirit, “who works all
in all” and “by whom all things consist.”

147. Henee, it is evident that God is known as certainly and
immediately as any other mind or spirit whatsoever, distinct from
ourselves. We may even assert that the existence of God is far
more evidently perceived than the existence of men; because the
effects of Nature are infinitely more numerous and considerable
than those ascribed to human agents. There is not any one mark
that denotes a man, or effect produced by him, which does not
more strongly evince the being of that Spirit who is the Author
of Nature^^^ For it is evident that, in affecting other persons, the
will of man hath no other object than barely the motion of the
limbs of his body; but that such a motion should be attended by,
or excite any idea in the mind of another, depends wholly on [34i]
the will of the Creator. He alone it is who, “upholding all things
by the word of His power,” maintains that intercourse between
spirits whereby they are able to perceive the existence of each

“repugnant”—for it would involve thought in incoherence, by paralysis of
its indispensable causal presupposition.

Is not God the indispensable presupposition of trustworthy experience,
rather than an empirical inference?

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[342]

other^^^. And yet this puré and olear Light which enlightens
everyone is itself invisible the greatest part of mankind].

148. It seems to be a general pretence of the unthinking herd
that they cannot see God. Could we but see Him, say they, as
we see a man, we should believe that He is, and believing obey
His commands. But alas, we need only open our eyes to see the
Sovereign Lord of all things, with a more full and olear view than
we do any one of our fellow-creatures. Not that I imagine we
see God (as some will ha ve it) by a direct and immediate view;
or see corporeal things, not by themselves, but by seeing that
which represents them in the essence of God; which doctrine is,
I must confess, to me incomprehensible’^^. But I shall explain
my meaning. A human spirit or person is not perceived by sense,
as not being an idea. When therefore we see the colour, size,
figure, and motions of a man, we perceive only certain sensations
or ideas excited in our own minds; and these being exhibited
to our view in sundry distinct collections, serve to mark out
unto US the existence of finite and created spirits like ourselves.
Henee it is plain we do not see a man, if by man is meant, that
which lives, moves, perceives, and thinks as we do: but only
such a certain collection of ideas, as directs us to think there
is a distinct principie of thought and motion, like to ourselves,
accompanying and represented by it. And after the same manner
we see God: all the difference is that, whereas some one finite

This suggests an explanation of the objective reality and significance of
ideas of sense\ through which they become media of social intercourse in the
fundamentally divine universe. God so regulates the sense-given ideas of which
human beings are individually percipient, as that, while numerically different,
as in each mind, those ideas are nevertheless a sufficient médium for social
intercourse, if the Power universally at work is morally trustworthy. Unless
our God-given experience is deceiving, Solipsism is not a necessary result of
the fact that no one but myself can be percipient of my sensuous experience.

Omitted in second edition.

Malebranche, as understood by Berkeley. See Recherche, Liv. III. p. ii. ch.
6, &c.

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and narrow assemblage of ideas denotes a partieular human mind,
whithersoever we direet our view we do at all times and in all
plaees pereeive manifest tokens of the Divinity: everything we
see, hear, feel, or anywise pereeive by sense, being a sign or
effeet of the power of God; as is our perception of those very
motions which are produced by men’^^.

149. It is therefore plain that nothing can be more evident to
any one that is capable of the least reflexión than the existence of
God, or a Spirit who is intimately present to our minds, producing
in them all that variety of ideas or sensations which continually
affect US, on whom we have an absolute and entire dependence,
in short “in whom we Uve, and move, and have our being.” That
the discovery of this great truth, which lies so near and obvious
to the mind, should be attained to by the reason of so very few,
is a sad instance of the stupidity and inattention of men, who,
though they are surrounded with such olear manifestations of the
Deity, are yet so little affected by them that they seem, as it were,
blinded with excess of light^^^.

150. But you will say—Hath Nature no share in the production
of natural things, and must they be all ascribed to the immediate
and solé operation of God? I answer, If by Nature is meant
only the visible series of effects or sensations imprinted on our
minds according to certain fixed and general laws, then it is
plain that Nature, taken in this sense, cannot produce anything
at alF^’. But if by Nature is meant some being distinct from
God, as well as from the laws of nature and things perceived

For all finite persons somehow live, and move, and have their being “in
God.” The existence of eternal living Mind, and the present existence of
other men, are both inferences, resting on the same foundation, according to
Berkeley.

The theistic trust in which our experience is rooted remaining latent, or
being unintelligent.

Cf. sect. 25-28, 51-53, 60-66. His conception of Divine causation in Nature,
as the constant omnipresent agency in all natural law, is the deepest part of his
philosophy. It is pursued in the De Motu.

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by sense, I must confess that word is to me an empty sound,
without any intelligible meaning annexed to it. Nature, in this
acceptation, is a vain chimera, introduced by those heathens who
had not just notions of the omnipresence and infinite perfection
of God. But it is more unaccountable that it should be received
among Christians, professing belief in the Holy Scriptures, which
constantly ascribe those effects to the immediate hand of God
that heathen philosophers are wont to impute to Nature. “The
Lord, He causeth the vapours to ascend; He maketh lightnings
with rain; He bringeth forth the wind out of His treasures.” Jerem.
X. 13. “He turneth the shadow of death into the morning, and
maketh the day dark with night.” Amos v. 8. “He visiteth the
earth, and maketh it soft with showers: He blesseth the springing
thereof, and crowneth the year with His goodness; so that the
pastures are clothed with flocks, and the valleys are covered over
with corn.” See Psal. Ixv. But, notwithstanding that this is the
constant language of Scripture, yet we have I know not what
aversión from believing that God concerns Himself so nearly in
our affairs. Fain would we suppose Him at a great distance off,
and substitute some blind unthinking deputy in His stead; though
(if we may believe Saint Paul) “He be not far from every one of

US.”

151. It will, 1 doubt not, be objected that the slow, gradual,
and roundabout methods observed in the production of natural
things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand
of an Almighty Agent: besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits
blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries
inciden! to human life, and the like, are so many arguments
that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and
superintended by a Spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But
the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from
sect. 62; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are
absolutely necessary in order to working by the most simple and
general rules, and after a steady and consisten! manner; which

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argües both the wisdom and goodness of God^^^. [^^^For, it doth
henee follow that the finger of God is not so conspicuous to the
resolved and careless sinner; which gives him an opportunity to
barden in his impiety and grow ripe for vengeance. (Vid. sect.
57.)] Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine
of Nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike
on our senses, the Hand which actuates the whole is itself
unperceivable to men of fiesh and blood. “Verily” (saith the
prophet) “thou art a God that hidest thyself.” Isaiah xlv. 15. But,
though the Lord conceal Himself from the eyes of the sensual
and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought^’*^,
yet to an unbiassed and attentive mind, nothing can be more
plainly legible than the intímate presence of an All-wise Spirit,
who fashions, regulates, and sustains the whole system of Being.
It is olear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the
operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for
our guidance in the affairs of Ufe, and letting us into the secret
of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all
human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose.
It were even impossible there should be any such faculties or
powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration
abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may
thence arise’^'.

152. We should further consider, that the very blemishes and
defeets of nature are not without their use, in that they make an
agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of
the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter
and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to

Is not the unbeginning and unending natural evolution, an articúlate
revelation of Eternal Spirit or Active Reason at the heart of the whole?

Omitted in second edition.

So Pascal in the Pensées.

Divine reason ever active in Nature is the necessary correlate to reason in
man; inasmuch as otherwise the changing universe in which we live would be
unfit to be reasoned about or acted in.

[ 344 ]

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examine, whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos,
and accidental destruction of plants and animáis before they come
to full maturity, as an imprudence in the Author of nature, be not
the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent
and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those
things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry
may be esteemed wisdom. But we must not imagine that the
inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the
great Creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a
pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an Omnipotent
Spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act
of his will. Henee it is plain that the splendid profusión of
natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality
in the Agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an
argument of the riches of His power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the
World, pursuant to the general laws of Nature, and the actions
of finite, imperfect Spirits, this, in the State we are in at present,
is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects
are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one
particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil. Whereas,
if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends,
connexions, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and
in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the
nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put
into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those
particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be
evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the
whole System of beings^^^.

The existence of moral evil, or what ought not to exist, is the difficulty
which besets faith in the fundamental divinity or goodness of the universe.
Yet that faith is presupposed in interpretation of nature, which proceeds on the
postúlate of universal order; and this implies the moral trustworthiness of the
World which we begin to realise when we begin to be conscious. That we are

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154. From what hath been said, it will be manifest to
any considering person, that it is merely for want of attention
and comprehensiveness of mind that there are any favourers
of Atheism or the Maniehean Heresy to be found. Little and
unrefleeting souls may indeed burlesque the works of Providenee;
the beauty and order whereof they have not eapaeity, or will not
be at the pains, to eomprehend^^^. But those who are masters of
any justness and extent of thought, and are withal used to refleet,

ean never suffieiently admire the divine traees of Wisdom and [ 346 ]
Goodness that shine throughout the eeonomy of Nature. But
what truth is there whieh glares so strongly on the mind that, by
an aversión of thought, a wilful shutting of the eyes, we may
not eseape seeing it? Is it therefore to be wondered at, if the
generality of men, who are ever intent on business or pleasure,
and little used to fix or open the eye of their mind, should not
have all that eonvietion and evidenee of the Being of God whieh
might be expeeted in reasonable ereatures^’^?

155. We should rather wonder that men ean be found so stupid
as to negleet, than that negleeting they should be uneonvineed
of sueh an evident and momentous truth^’^. And yet it is to be

living and having our being in omnipotent goodness is thus not an inference,
but the implied basis of all real inferences. I have expanded this thought in my
Philosophy ofTheism. We cannot prove God, for we must assume God, as the
basis of all proof. Faith even in the uniformity of nature is virtually faith in
omnipotent goodness immanent in the universe.

So Leibniz in his Theodicée, whieh was published in the same year as
Berkeley's Principies.

The divine presupposition, latent in all human reasoning and experience, is
hid from the unrefleeting, in whom the higher life is dormant, and the ideal
in the universe is aeeordingly undiscemed. Unless the universe is assumed to
be physieally and morally trustworthy, i.e. unless God is presupposed, even
natural seienee has no adequate foundation.

Our neeessarily incomplete knowledge of the Universe in whieh we find
ourselves is apt to disturb the fundamental faith, that the phenomena presented
to US are significant of God. Yet we tacitly assume that they are thus significant
when we interpret real experience, physical or moral.

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[ 347 ]

feared that too many of parts and leisure, who Uve in Christian
countries, are, merely through a supine and dreadful negligence,
sunk into a sort of Atheism. [^’^They cannot say there is not a
God, but neither are they convinced that there is. For what else
can it be but some lurking infidelity, some secret misgivings of
mind with regard to the existence and attributes of God, which
permits sinners to grow and barden in impiety?] Since it is
downright impossible that a soul pierced and enlightened with a
thorough sense of the omnipresence, holiness, and justice of that
Almighty Spirit should persist in a remorseless violation of His
laws. We ought, therefore, earnestly to meditate and dwell on
those important points; that so we may attain conviction without
all scruple “that the eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding
the evil and the good; that He is with us and keepeth us in all
places whither we go, and giveth us bread to eat and raiment
to put on;” that He is present and conscious to our innermost
thoughts; and, that we have a most absolute and immediate
dependence on Him. A olear view of which great truths cannot
choose but fill our hearts with an awful circumspection and holy
fear, which is the strongest incentive to Virtue, and the best guard
against Vice.

156. For, after all, what deserves the first place in our studies
is, the consideration of God and our Duty; which to promote, as
it was the main drift and design of my labours, so shall I esteem
them altogether useless and ineffectual if, by what I have said, I
cannot inspire my readers with a pious sense of the Presence of
God; and, having shewn the falseness or vanity of those barren
speculations which make the chief employment of learned men,
the better dispose them to reverence and embrace the salutary
truths of the Gospel; which to know and to practise is the highest
perfection of human nature.

776

Omitted in second edition.

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[ 349 ]

Three Dialogues Between Hylas
And Philonous The Design Of
Which Is Plainly To Demónstrate
The Reality And Perfection Of
Human Knowledge, The Incorporeal
Nature Of The Soul, And The
Immediate Providence Of A Deity,
In Opposition To Sceptics And
Atheists, Also To Open A Method
For Rendering The Sciences More
Easy, Useful, And Compendious

[ 351 ]

First published in 1713

Editor's Preface

This Work is the gem of British metaphysical literature.
Berkeley's claim to be the great modern master of Soeratie
dialogue rests, perhaps, upon Alciphron, whieh surpasses the
eonversations between Hylas and Philonous in expression of
individual eharaeter, and in dramatie effeet. Here eonversation
is adopted as a eonvenient way of treating objeetions to the
eoneeption of the reality of Matter whieh had been unfolded
systematieally in the book of Principies. But the lueid thought,
the eolouring of faney, the glow of human sympathy, and the
earnestness that pervade the subtle reasonings pursued through
these dialogues, are unique in English metaphysieal literature.
Exeept perhaps Hume and Eerrier, none approaeh Berkeley in
the art of uniting metaphysieal thought with easy, graeeful, and
transparent style. Our surprise and admiration are inereased
when we reeolleet that this eharming produetion of reason and
imagination eame from Ireland, at a time when that eountry was
seareely known in the world of letters and philosophy.

The immediate impression produeed by the publieation of [352]
the Principies, is shewn in Berkeley's eorrespondenee with Sir
John Pereival. Berkeley was eager to hear what people had
to say for or against what looked like a paradox apt to shoek
the reader; but in those days he was not immediately informed
by professional erities. “If when you reeeive my book”—he
wrote from Dublin in July, 1710, to Sir John Pereivaf^^, then
in Eondon,—“you ean proeure me the opinión of some of your
aequaintanees who are thinking men, addieted to the study of
natural philosophy and mathematies, I shall be extremely obliged

For the following extracts from previously unpublished eorrespondenee of
Berkeley and Sir John Pereival, I am indebted to the kindness of his deseendant,
the late Lord Egmont.

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[ 353 ]

to you.” In the following month he was informed by Sir John that
it was “incredible what prejudice can work in the best geniuses,
even in the lovers of novelty. For I did but ñame the subject
matter of your book of Principies to some ingenious friends of
mine and they immediately treated it with ridicule, at the same
time refusing to read it, which I have not yet got one to do. A
physician of my acquaintance undertook to discover your person,
and argued you must needs be mad, and that you ought to take
remedies. A bishop pitied you, that a desire of starting something
new should put you upon such an undertaking. Another told
me that you are not gone so far as a gentleman in town, who
asserts not only that there is no such thing as Matter, but that we
ourselves have no being at all.”

Berkeley's reply is interesting. “I am not surprised,” he says,
“that I should be ridiculed by those who won't take the pains to
understand me. If the raillery and scorn of those who criticise
what they will not be at the pains to understand had been
sufficient to deter men from making any attempts towards curing
the ignorance and errors of mankind, we should not have been
troubled with some very fair improvements in knowledge. The
common cry's being against any opinión seems to me, so far
from proving false, that it may with as good reason pass for an
argument of its truth. However, I imagine that whatever doctrine
contradicts vulgar and settled opinión had need be introduced
with great caution into the world. For this reason it was that I
omitted all mention of the non-existence of Matter in the title-
page, dedication, preface and introduction to the Treatise on
the Principies of Human Knowledge', that so the notion might
steal unawares upon the reader, who probably might never have
meddled with the book if he had known that it contained such
paradoxes.”

With characteristic fervour he disclaims “variety and love of
Paradox” as motives of the book of Principies, and professes faith
in the unreality of abstract unperceived Matter, a faith which he

Editor's Preface

455

has held for some years, “the conceit being at first warm in
my imagination, but since carefully examined, both by my own
judgment and that of ingenious friends.” What he especially
complained of was “that men who have never considered my
book should confound me with the sceptics, who doubt the
existence of sensible things, and are not positive as to any one
truth, no, not so much as their own being—which I find by your
letter is the case of some wild visionist now in London. But
whoever reads my book with attention will see that there is a
direct opposition between the principies that are contained in it
and those of the sceptics, and that I question not the existence of
anything we perceive by our senses. I do not deny the existence
of the sensible things which Moses says were created by God.

They existed from all eternity, in the Divine Intellect; and they
became perceptible (i.e. were created) in the same manner and
order as is described in Génesis. For I take creation to belong
to things only as they respect finite spirits; there being nothing
new to God. Henee it follows that the act of creation consists
in God's willing that those things should become perceptible to [354]
other spirits which before were known only to Himself. Now
both reason and scripture assure us that there are other spirits
besides men, who, 'tis possible, might have perceived this visible
World as it was successively exhibited to their view before man's
creation. Besides, for to agree with the Mosaic account of the
creation, it's sufficient if we suppose that a man, in case he was
existing at the time of the chaos of sensible things, might have
perceived all things formed out of it, in the very order set down
in scripture; all which is in no way repugnan! to my principies.”

Sir John in his next letter, written from London in October,

1716, reports that the book of Principies had fallen into the
hands of the highest living English authority in metaphysical
theology, Samuel Clarke, who had produced his Demonstration
of the Being and Attributes of God four years before. The
book had also been read by Whiston, Newton's successor at

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Cambridge. “I can only report at second-hand,” he says, “that
they think yon a fair arguer, and a olear writer; but they say your
first principies yon lay down are false. They look upon yon as
an extraordinary genius, ranking yon with Father Malebranche,
Norris, and another whose ñame I forget, all of whom they think
extraordinary men, but of a particular turn of mind, and their
labours of little use to mankind, on account of their abstruseness.
This may arise from these gentlemen not caring to think after
a new manner, which would oblige them to begin their studies
anew; or else it may be the strength of prejudice.”

Berkeley was vexed by this treatment on the part of Clarke
and Whiston. He sent under Sir John's care a letter to each of
them, hoping through him to discover “their reasons against his
notions, as truth is his solé aim.” “As to what is said of ranking
me with Father Malebranche and Mr. Norris, whose writings are
thought to be too fine-spun to be of any great use to mankind, I
have this answer, that I think the notions I embrace are not in the
least agreeing with theirs, but indeed plainly inconsistent with
them in the main points, inasmuch as I know few writers I take
myself at bottom to differ more from than from them. Fine-spun
metaphysics are what on all occasions I declare against, and if
any one shall shew anything of that sort in my Treatise I will
willingly correct it.” Sir John delivered the letters to two friends
of Clarke and Whiston, and reported that “Dr. Clarke told his
friend in reply, that he did not care to write you his thoughts,
because he was afraid it might draw him into a dispute upon a
matter which was already olear to him. He thought your first
principies you go on are false; but he was a modest man, his friend
said, and uninclined to shock any one whose opinions on things
of this nature differed from his own.” This was a disappointment
to the ardent Berkeley. “Dr. Clarke's conduct seems a little
surprising,” he replies. “That an ingenious and candid person (as
I take him to be) should refuse to shew me where my error lies
is something unaccountable. I never expected that a gentleman

Editor's Preface

457

otherwise so well employed as Dr. Clarke should think it worth
his while to enter into a dispute with me concerning any notions
of mine. But, seeing it was clear to him I went upon false
principies, I hoped he would vouchsafe, in a line or two, to point
them out to me, that so I may more closely review and examine
them. If he but once did me this favour, he need not apprehend
I should give him any further trouble. I should be glad if you
have opportunity that you would let his friend know this. There
is nothing that I more desire than to know thoroughly all that
can be said against what I take for truth.” Clarke, however, was
not to be drawn. The incident is thus referred to by Whiston, in
his Memoirs of Clarke. “Mr. Berkeley,” he says, “published [356]
in 1710, at Dublin, the metaphysical notion, that matter was not
a real thing^^*; nay, that the common opinión of its reality was
groundless, if not ridiculous. He was pleased to send Mr. Clarke
and myself each of us a book. After we had perused it, I went to
Mr. Clarke to discourse with him about it, to this effect, that I,
being not a metaphysician, was not able to answer Mr. Berkeley's
subtle premises, though I did not believe his absurd conclusions.

I therefore desired that he, who was deep in such subtleties,
but did not appear to believe Mr. Berkeley's conclusión, would
answer him. Which task he declined.”

What Clarke's criticism of Berkeley might have been is
suggested by the following sentences in his Remarks on Human
Liberty, published seven years after this correspondence: “The
case as to the proof of our free agency is exactly the same as in
that notable question, whether the [material] world exists or no?

There is no demonstration of it from experience. There always
remains a haré possibility that the Supreme Being may have so
framed my mind, that I shall always be necessarily deceived
in every one of my perceptions as in a dream—though possibly

What Berkeley seeks to shew is, not that the world of the senses is unreal,
but in what its reality consists. Is it inexplicable chaos, or explicable expression
of ever active Intelligence, more or less interpreted in natural Science?

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[357]

there be no material world, ñor any other creature existing besides
myself. And yet no man in bis senses argües from thence, that
experience is no proof to us of the existence of things. The bare
physical possibility too of our being so framed by the Author
of Nature as to be unavoidably deceived in this matter by every
experience of every action we perform, is no more any ground
to doubt the truth of our liberty, than the bare natural possibility
of our being all our lifetime in a dream, deceived in our [natural]
belief of the existence of the material world, is any just ground
to doubt the reality of its existence.” Berkeley would hardly
have accepted this analogy. Does the conception of a material
world being dependen! on percipient mind for its reality imply
deception on the part of the “Supreme Being”? “Dreams,” in
ordinary language, may signify illusory fancies during sleep,
and so understood the term is misapplied to a universally mind-
dependent universo with its steady natural order. Berkeley
disclaims emphatically any doubt of the reality of the sensible
world, and professes only to shew in what its reality consists, or
its dependence upon percipient life as the indispensable realising
factor. To suppose that we can be “necessarily deceived in every
one of our perceptions” is to interpret the universo atheistically,
and virtually obliges us in final nescience to acknowledge that
it is wholly uninterpretable; so that experience is impossible,
because throughout unintelligible. The moral trustworthiness
or perfect goodness of the Universal Power is I suppose the
fundamental postúlate of Science and human life. If all our
temporal experience can be called a dream it must at any rate
be a dream of the sort supposed by Leibniz. “Nullo argumento
absoluto demonstrar! potes!, dari corpora; nec quidquam prohibet
somnia qucedam bene ordinata menti nostrse, objecta esse, quse
a nobis vera judicentur, et ob consensum ínter se quoad usum
veris equivalent^^^.”

779

Leibniz: De modo distinguendi Phenomena Realia ab Imaginariis (1707).

Editor's Preface

459

The three Dialogues discuss what Berkeley regarded as the
most plausible Objections, popular and philosophical, to bis
account of living Mind or Spirit, as the indispensable factor and
final cause of the reality of the material world.

The principal aim of the First Dialogue is to illustrate the [358]
contradictory or unmeaning character and sceptical tendency of
the common philosophical opinión—that we perceive in sense a
material world which is real only in as far as it can exist in absolute
independence of perceiving mind. The impossibility of any of
the qualities in which Matter is manifested to man—the primary
qualities not less than the secondary—having real existence in
a mindless or unspiritual universo is argued and illustrated in
detail. Abstrae! Matter, unrealised in terms of percipient life, is
meaningless, and the material world becomes real only in and
through living perception. And Matter, as an abstrae! substance
without qualities, cannot, without a contradiction, it is also
argued, be presented or represented, in sense. What is called
matter is thus melted in a spiritual solution, from which it issues
the flexible and intelligible médium of intercourse for spiritual
beings such as men are; whose faculties moreover are educated
in interpreting the cosmical order of the phenomena presented to
their senses.

The Second Dialogue is in the first place directed against
modifications of the scholastic account of Matter, which
attributes our knowledge of it to inference, founded on sense-
ideas assumed to be representative, or not presentative of the
reality. The advocates of Matter independen! and supremo,
are here assailed in their various conjectures—that this Matter
may be the active Cause, or the Instrument, or the Occasion of
our sense-experience; or that it is an Unknowable Something

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[ 359 ]

somehow connected with that experience. It is argued in this
and in the preceding Dialogue, by Philonous (who personales
Berkeley), that unrealised Matter—intending by that term either
a qualified substance, or a Something of which we cannot affirm
anything—is not merely unproved, but a proved impossibility:
it must mean nothing, or it must mean a contradiction, which
comes to the same thing. It is not perceived', ñor can it be
suggested by what we perceive; ñor demonstrated by reasoning;
ñor believed in as an article in the fundamental faith of intuitive
reason. The only consistent theory of the universe accordingly
implies that concrete realities must all be either (a) phenomena
presented to the senses, or else (b) active spirits percipient
of presented phenomena. And neither of these two sorts of
concrete realities is strictly speaking independent of the other;
although the latter, identical amid the variations of the sensuous
phenomena, are deeper and more real than the mere data of the
senses. The Second Dialogue ends by substituting, as concrete
and intelligible Realism, the universal and constant dependence
of the material world upon active living Spirit, in place of the
abstract hypothetical and unintelligible Realism, which defends
Matter unrealised in percipient life, as the type of reality.

In the Third Dialogue plausible objections to this conception
of what the reality of the material world means are discussed.

Is it said that the new conception is sceptical, and Berkeley
another Protagoras, on account of it? His answer is, that
the reality of sensible things, as far as man can in any way
be concerned with them, does not consist in what cannot be
perceived, suggested, demonstrated, or even conceived, but in
phenomena actually seen and touched, and in the working faith
that future sense-experience may be anticipated by the analogies
of present sense-experience.

But is not this negation of the Matter that is assumed to
be real and independent of Spirit, an unproved conjecture?

Editor's Preface

461

It is answered, that the affirmation of this abstrae! matter is
itself a mere conjecture, and one self-convicted by its implied [360]
contradictions, while its negation is only a simple falling back
on the facts of experience, without any attempt to explain them.

Again, is it objected that the reality of sensible things involves
their continued reality during intervals of our perception of
them? It is answered, that sensible things are indeed permanently
dependen! on Mind, but not on this, that, or the other finite
embodied spirit.

Is it further alleged that the reality of Spirit or Mind is open
to all the objections against independen! Matter; and that, if
we deny this Matter, we must in consistency allow that Spirit
can be only a succession of isolated feelings? The answer is,
that there is no parity between self-conscious Spirit, and Matter
out of all relation to any Spirit. We find, in memory, our own
personality and identity; that we are not our ideas, “but somewhat
else”—a thinking, active principie, that perceives, knows, wills,
and operates about ideas, and that is revealed as continuously
real. Each person is conscious of himself; and may reasonably
infer the existence of other self-conscious persons, more or less
like what he is conscious of in himself. A universe of self-
conscious persons, with their common sensuous experiences all
under cosmical order, is not open to the contradictions involved
in a pretended universe of Matter, independen! of percipient
realising Spirit.

Is it still said that sane people cannot help distinguishing
between the real existence of a thing and its being perceived?

It is answered, that all they are entitled to mean is, to
distinguish between being perceived exclusively by me, and
being independen! of the perception of all sentient or conscious
beings.

Does an objector complain that this ideal realism dissolves
the distinction between facts and fancies? He is reminded of
the meaning of the word idea. That term is not limited by [36i]

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The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[ 362 ]

Berkeley to chimeras of fancy: it is applied also to the objective
phenomena of our sense-experience.

Is the supposition that Spirit is the only real Cause of all
changes in nature declaimed against as baseless? It is answered,
that the supposition of unthinking Power at the heart of the
cosmos of sensible phenomena is absurd.

Is the negation of Abstract Matter repugnant to the common
belief of mankind? It is argued in reply, that this unrealised
Matter is foreign to common belief, which is incapable of even
entertaining the conception; and which only requires to reflect
upon what it does entertain to be satisfied with a relative or ideal
reality for sensible things.

But, if sensible things are the real things, the real moon, for
instance, it is alleged, can be only a foot in diameter. It is
maintained, in opposition to this, that the term real moon is
applied only to what is an inference from the moon, one foot in
diameter, which we immediately perceive; and that the former
is a part of our previsivo or mediate inference, due to what is
perceived.

The dispute, after all, is merely verbal, it is next objected;
and, since all partios refer the data of the senses and the things
which they compose to a Power external to each finite percipient,
why not cali that Power, whatever it may be, Matter, and not
Spirit? The reply is, that this would be an absurd misapplication
of language.

But may we not, it is next suggested, assume the possibility of
a third nature—neither idea ñor Spirit? Not, replies Philonous,
if we are to keep to the rule of having meaning in the words
we use. We know what is meant by a spirit, for each of us
has immediate experience of one; and we know what is meant
by sense-ideas and sensible things, for we have immediate and
mediate experience of them. But we have no immediate, and
therefore can have no mediate, experience of what is neither
perceived by our senses, ñor realised in inward consciousness:

Editor's Preface

463

moreover, “entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem.”

Again, this conception of the realities implies, it is said,
imperfection, because sentient experience, in God. This
objection, it is answered, implies a confusión between
being actually sentient and merely conceiving sensations, and
employing them, as God does, as signs for expressing His
conceptions to our minds.

Further, the negation of independent powerful Matter seems
to annihilate the explanations of physical phenomena given by
natural philosophers. But, to be assured that it does not, we
have only to recollect what physical explanation means—that it
is the reference of an apparently irregular phenomenon to some
acknowledged general rule of co-existence or succession among
sense-ideas. It is interpretation of sense-signs.

Is the proposed ideal Realism summarily condemned as a
novelty? It can be answered, that all discoveries are novelties at
first; and moreover that this one is not so much a novelty as a
deeper interpretation of the common faith.

Yet it seems, at any rate, it is said, to change real things into
mere ideas. Here consider on the contrary what we mean when
we speak of sensible things as real. The changing appearances
of which we are percipient in sense, united objectively in their
cosmical order, are what is truly meant by the realities of sense.

But this reality is inconsistent with the continued identity of
material things, it is complained, and also with the fact that
different persons can be percipient of the same thing. Not so,
Berkeley explains, when we attend to the truc meaning of the
Word same, and dismiss from our thoughts a supposed abstract [363]
idea of identity which is nonsensical.

But some may exclaim against the supposition that the material
World exists in mind, regarding this as an implied assertion that
mind is extended, and therefore material. This proceeds, it is
replied, on forgetfulness of what “existence in mind” means. It

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The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[364]

is intended to express the fact that matter is real in being an
objective appearance of which a living mind is sensible.

Lastly, is not the Mosaic account of the creation of Matter
inconsistent with the perpetual dependence of Matter for its
reality upon percipient Spirit? It is answered that the conception
of creation being dependent on the existence of finite minds is in
perfect harmony with the Mosaic account: it is what is seen and
felt, not what is unseen and unfelt, that is created.

The Third Dialogue closes with a representation of the
new principie regarding Matter being the harmony of two
apparently discordant propositions—the one-sided proposition
of ordinary common sense; and the one-sided proposition of the
philosophers. It agrees with the mass of mankind in holding
that the material world is actually presented to our senses, and
with the philosophers in holding that this same material world is
realised only in and through the percipient experience of living
Spirit.

Most of the objections to Berkeley's conception of Matter
which have been urged in the last century and a half, by its
British, French, and Germán critics, are discussed by anticipation
in these Dialogues. The history of objections is very much a
history of misconceptions. Conceived or misconceived, it has
tacitly simplified and purified the methods of physical Science,
especially in Britain and Trance.

The first elabórate criticism of Berkeley by a British author is
found in Andrew Baxter's Inquiry into the Nature of the Human
Soul, published in 1735, in the section entitled “Dean Berkeley's
Scheme against the existence of Matter examined, and shewn to
be inconclusive.” Baxter alleges that the new doctrine tends to
encourage scepticism. To deny Matter, for the reasons given,
involves, according to this critic, denial of mind, and so a

Editor's Preface

465

universal doubt. Accordingly, a few years later, Hume sought, in
his Treatise of Human Nature, to work out Berkeley's negation
of abstrae! Matter into sceptical phenomenalism—against which
Berkeley sought to guard by anticipation, in a remarkable passage
introduced in his last edition of these Dialogues.

In Scotland the writings of Reid, Beattie, Oswald, Dugald
Stewart, Thomas Brown, and Sir W. Hamilton form a magazine
of objections. Reid—who curiously seeks to refute Berkeley by
refuting, not more clearly than Berkeley had done before him, the
hypothesis of a wholly representative sense-perception—urges
the spontaneous belief or common sense of mankind, which
obliges US all to recognise a direct presentation of the external
material world to our senses. He overlooks what with Berkeley
is the only question in debate, namely, the meaning of the term
extemal', for. Reid and Berkeley are agreed in holding to the
reality of a world regulated independently of the will of finite
percipients, and is sufficiently objective to be a médium of social
intercourse. With Berkeley, as with Reid, this is practically self-
evident. The same objection, more scientifically defined—that
we have a natural belief in the existence of Matter, and in our
own immediate perception of its qualities—is Sir W. Hamilton's
assumption against Berkeley; but Hamilton does not explain the
reality thus claimed for it. “Men naturally believe,” he says, [365]
“that they themselves exist—^because they are conscious of a Self
or Ego; they believe that something dijferent from themselves
exists—because they believe that they are conscious of this Not-
self or Non-ego.” {Discussions, p. 193.) Now, the existence of
a Power that is independen! of each finite Ego is at the roo! of
Berkeley's principies. According to Berkeley and Hamilton alike,
we are immediately percipient of solid and extended phenomena;
but with Berkeley the phenomena are dependen! on, at the
same time that they are “entirely distinct” from, the percipient.

The Divine and finite spirits, signified by the phenomena that
are presented to our senses in cosmical order, form Berkeley's

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The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[366]

external world.

That Berkeley sows the seeds of Universal Scepticism; that
his conception of Matter involves the Panegoism or Solipsism
which leaves me in absolute solitude; that his is virtually a system
of Pantheism, inconsistent with personal individuality and moral
responsibility—these are probably the three most comprehensive
objections that have been alleged against it. They are in a measure
due to Berkeley's imperfect criticism of first principies, in his
dread of a departure from the concrete data of experience in quest
of empty abstractions.

In England and France, Berkeley's criticism of Matter, taken
however only on its negative side, received a countenance denied
to it in Germany. Hartley and Priestley shew signs of affinity with
Berkeley. Also an anonymous Essay on the Nature andExistence
of the Material World, dedicated to Dr. Priestley and Dr. Price,
which appeared in 1781, is an argument, on empirical grounds,
which virtually makes the data of the senses at last a chaos of
isolated sensations. The author of the Essay is said to have been
a certain Russell, who died in the West Indies in the end of the
eighteenth century. A tendency towards Berkeley's negations,
but apart from his synthetic principies, appears in James Mili and
J.S. Mili. So too with Voltaire and the Encyclopedists.

The Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous were published
in Eondon in 1713, “printed by G. James, for Henry Clements,
at the Half-Moon, in St. Paul's churchyard,” unlike the Essay on
Vision and the Principies, which first appeared in Dublin. The
second edition, which is simply areprint, issued in 1725, “printed
for William and John Innys, at the West End of St. Paul's.” A
third, the last in the author's lifetime, “printed by Jacob Tonson,”
which contains some important additions, was published in 1734,
conjointly with a new edition of the Principies. The Dialogues
were reprinted in 1776, in the same volume with the edition of
the Principies, with Remarles.

Editor's Preface

467

The Dialogues have been translated into French and Germán.

The French versión appeared at Amsterdam in 1750. The
translator's ñame is not given, but it is attributed to the Abbé
Jean Paul de Gua de Malves^**^, by Barbier, in bis Dictionnaire
des Ouvrages anonymes et pseudonymes, tom. i. p. 283. It
contains a Prefatory Note by the translator, with three curious
vignettes (given in the note below) meant to symbolise the leading
thought in each Dialogue^^^ A Germán translation, by John [367]
Christopher Eschenbach, Professor of Philosophy in Rostock,
was published at Rostock in 1756. It forms the larger part of a
volume entitled Sammlung der vornehmsten Schriftsteller die die
Wirklichkeit ihres eignen Korpers und der ganzen Korperwelt
laugnen. This professed Collection of the most eminent authors
who are supposed to deny the reality of their own bodies and [368]
of the whole material world, consists of Berkeley's Dialogues,
and Arthur Collier's Clavis Universalis, or Demonstration of

suppose, et s'entretenant lá-dessus, et pour donner au Lecteur l'explication de
rembléme, on a mis au bas le vers suivant:

Urget aquas vis sursum, eadem flectitque deorsum.”

For some Information relative to Gua de Malves, see Querard's La France
Littéraire, tom. iii. p. 494.

The following is the translator's Prefatory Note, on the objects of the
Dialogues, and in explanation of the three illustrative vignettes:—

“L'Auteur expose dans le premier Dialogue le sentiment du Vulgaire et
celui des Philosophes, sur les qualités secondaires et premieres, la nature et
l'existence des corps; et il prétend prouver en méme tems finsuffisance de l'un
et de l'autre. La Vignette qu'on volt á la téte du Dialogue, fait allusion á cet
ohjet. Elle représente un Philosophe dans son cabinet, lequel est distrait de
son travail par un enfant qu'il appercoit se voyant lui-méme dans un miroir, en
tendant les mains pour embrasser sa propre image. Le Philosophe rit de l'erreur
oü il croit que tomhe l'enfant; tandis qu'on lui applique á lui-méme ces mots
tirés d'Horace:

Quid rides?....de te
Fabula narratur.

“Le second Dialogue est employé á exposer le sentiment de l'Auteur sur le
méme sujet, sfavoir, que les choses corporelles ont une existence réelle dans
les esprits qui les apperfoivent; mais qu'elles ne sfauroient exister hors de tous

468

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[369]

the Non-existence or Impossibility of an Extemal World. The
volume contains some annotations, and an Appendix in which
a counter-demonstration of the existence of Matter is attempted.
Eschenbach's principal argument is indirect, and of the nature of
a reductio ad absurdum. He argües (as others have done) that the
reasons produced against the independent reality of Matter are
equally conclusive against the independent reality of Spirit.

An interesting circumstance connected with the Dialogues
between Hylas and Philonous was the appearance, also in 1713,
of the Clavis Universalis, or demonstration of the impossibility of
Matter, of Arthur Collier, in which the merely ideal existence of
the sensible world is maintained. The production, simultaneously,
without concert, of conceptions of the material world which
verbally at least have much in common, is a curious coincidence.
It shews that the intellectual atmosphere of the Lockian epoch in

la gravité fait élever jusqu'á une certaine hauteur et retomber ensuite dans le
bassin d'oü elle étoit d'abord partie; on a pris cet embléme pour le sujet de la

Vignette de ce Dialogue; on a représenté en conséquence dans cette derniére
Vignette les deux Interlocuteurs, se promenant dans le lien oü l'Auteur les

les esprits á la fois, méme de l'esprit infini de Dieu; et que par conséquent
la Matiére, prise suivant l'acception ordinaire du mot, non seulement n'existe
point, mais seroit méme absolument irnpossible. On a taché de représenter aux
yeux ce sentiment dans la Vignette du Dialogue. Le mot grec voOc; qui signifie
ame, désigne l'áme: les rayons qui en partent marquen! l'attention que l'áme
donne á des idées ou objets; les tableaux qu'on a placés aux seuls endroits oü
les rayons aboutissent, et dont les sujets son! tirés de la description des beautés
de la nature, qui se trouve dans le livre, représentent les idées ou objets que
l'áme considere, pas le secours des facultes qu'elle a re^ues de Dieu; et l'action
de l'Étre supréme sur l'áme est figurée par un trait, qui, partant d'un triangle,
symbole de la Divinité, et perfant les nuages dont le triangle est environné.
s'étend jusqu'á l'áme pour la vivifier; enfin, on a fait en sorte de rendre le méme
sentiment par ces mots:

Quce noscere cumque Deus det,

Esse puta.

“L'objet du troisiéme Dialogue est de répondre aux difficultés auxquelles
le sentiment qu'on a établi dans les Dialogues précédens, peut étre sujet.

Editor's Preface

469

England contained elements favourable to a reconsideration of the
ultímate meaning of Matter. They are both the germine produce of
the age of Eocke and Malebranche. Neither Berkeley ñor Collier
were, when they published their books, familiar with ancient
Greek speculations; those of modern Germany had only begun to
loom in the distance. Absolute Idealism, the Panphenomenalism
of Auguste Comte, and the modern evolutionary conception of
nature, have changed the conditions under which the universal
problem is studied, and are making intelligible to this generation
a manner of conceiving the Universe which, for nearly a century
and a half, the British and Erench critics of Berkeley were unable
to entertain.

Berkeley's Principies appeared three years before the Clavis
Universalis. Yet Collier tells us that it was “after a ten years'
pause and deliberation,” that, “rather than the world should
finish its course without once offering to inquire in what manner
it exists,” he had “resolved to put himself upon the trial of [370]
the common reader, without pretending to any better art of
gaining him than dry reason and metaphysical demonstration.”

Mr. Benson, his biographer, says that it was in 1703, at the
age of twenty-three, that Collier carne to the conclusión that
“there is no such thing as an external world”; and he attributes
the premises from which Collier drew this conclusión to his
neighbour, John Norris. Among Collier's MSS., there remains
the outline of an essay, in three chapters, dated January, 1708,
on the non-externality of the visible world.

There are several coincidences between Berkeley and Collier.
Berkeley virtually presented his new theory of Vision as the
first instalment of his explanation of the Reality of Matter. The

de l'éclaircir en cette sorte de plus, d'en développer toutes les heureuses
conséquences, enfin de faire voir, qu'étant bien entendu, il revient aux notions
les plus communes. Et comme l'Auteur exprime á la fin du livre cette demiére
pensée, en comparant ce qu'il vient de dire, á l'eau que les deux Interlocuteurs
sont supposés voir jaillir d'un jet, et qu'il remarque que la méme forcé de

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The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[371]

first of the two Parts into which Collier's Clavis is divided
consists of proofs that the Visible World is not, and cannot be,
external. Berkeley, in the Principies and the Dialogues, explains
the reality of Matter. In like manner the Second Part of the
Clavis consists of reasonings in proof of the impossibility of an
external world independen! of Spirit. Finally, in his full-blown
theory, as well as in its visual germ, Berkeley takes for granted,
as intuitively known, the existence of sensible Matter; meaning
by this, its relative existence, or dependence on living Mind. The
third proposition of Collier's system asserts the real existence of
visible matter in particular, and of sensible matter in general.

The invisibility of distances, as well as of real magnitudes
and situations, and their suggestion by interpretation of visual
symbols, propositions which occupy so large a space in
Berkeley's Theory of Vision, have no counterpart in Collier.
His proof of the non-externality of the visible world consists
of an induction of instances of visible objects that are allowed
by all not to be external, although they seem to be as much so
as any that are called external. His Demonstration consists of
nine proofs, which may be compared with the reasonings and
analyses of Berkeley. Collier's Demonstration concludes with
answers to objections, and an application of his account of the
material world to the refutation of the Román doctrine of the
substantial existence of Christ's body in the Eucharist.

The universal sense-symbolism of Berkeley, and his pervading
recognition of the distinction between physical or symbolical,
and efficient or originative causation, are wanting in the
narrow reasonings of Collier. Berkeley's more comprehensive
philosophy, with its human sympathies and beauty of style, is
now recognised as a striking expression and partial solution
of fundamental problems, while Collier is condemned to the
obscurity of the Schools^^^.

Collier never carne fairly in sight of the philosophical public of last century.
He is referred to in Germany by Bilfinger, in his Dilucidationes Philosophicce

Editor's Preface

471

[ 373 ]

(1746), and also in the Ada Eruditorum, Suppl. VI. 244, &c., and in England
by Corry in his Refleclions on Liberty and Necessity (1761), as well as in the
Remarks on the Reflections, and Answers to the Remarks, pp. 7, 8 (1763),
where he is described as “a weak reasoner, and a veiy dull writer also.” Collier
was dragged from his obscurity by Dr. Reid, in his Essays on the Intellectual
Powers, Essay II. ch. 10. He was a subject of correspondence between Sir
James Mackintosh, then at Bombay, and Dr. Parr, and an object of curiosity
to Dugald Stewart. A beautiful reprint of the Clavis (of the original edition of
which only seven copies were then known to exist) appeared in Edinburgh in
1836; and in the following year it was included in a collection of Metaphysical
Tracts by English Philosophers of the Eighteenth Century, prepared for the
press by Dr. Parr.

Dedication

[ 374 ]

TO THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE EORD BERKEEEY OE
STRATTON^*^

MASTER OF THE ROLES IN THE KINGDOM OF
IRELAND, CHANCELLOR OF THE DUCHY OF LAN-
CASTER, AND ONE OF THE LOROS OF HER
MAJESTY'S MOST HONOURABLE PRIVY COUNCIL.

My Eord,

The virtue, learning, and good sense which are aeknowledged
to distinguish your eharaeter, would tempt me to indulge myself
the pleasure men naturally take in giving applause to those whom
they esteem and honour: and it should seem of importanee to
the subjeets of Great Britain that they knew the eminent share
yon enjoy in the favour of your sovereign, and the honours she
has eonferred upon you, have not been owing to any applieation
from your lordship, but entirely to her majesty's own thought,
arising from a sense of your personal merit, and an inelination
to reward it. But, as your ñame is prefixed to this treatise with an
intention to do honour to myself alone, I shall only say that I am
eneouraged by the favour you have treated me with to address
these papers to your lordship. And I was the more ambitious

William, fourth Lord Berkeley of Stratton, born about 1663, succeeded bis
brother in 1697, and died in 1741 at Bruton in Somersetshire. The Berkeleys
of Stratton were descended from a younger son of Maurice, Lord Berkeley
of Berkeley Castle, who died in 1326. His descendant, Sir John Berkeley
of Bruton, a zealous Royalist, was created first Lord Berkeley of Stratton in
1658, and in 1669 became Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, an office which he held
till 1672, when he was succeeded by the Earl of Essex (see Burke's Extinct
Peerages). It is said that Bishop Berkeley's father was related to him. The
Bishop himself was introduced by Dean Swift, in 1713, to the Lord Berkeley of
Stratton, to whom the Dialogues are dedicated, as “a cousin of his Lordship.”
The tille of Berkeley of Stratton became extinct on the death of the fifth Lord
in 1773.

Dedication

473

of doing this, because a Philosophical Treatise could not so
properly be addressed to any one as to a person of your lordship's
character, who, to your other valuable distinctions, have added
the knowledge and relish of Philosophy.

I am, with the greatest respect,

My Lord,

Your lordship's most obedient and
most humble servant,

GEORGE BERKEEEY.

[ 375 ]

The Preface

[ 376 ]

784

Though it seems the general opinión of the world, no less than
the design of nature and providenee, that the end of speeulation
be Praetiee, or the improvement and regulation of our lives
and aetions; yet those who are most addieted to speeulative
studies, seem as generally of another mind. And indeed if
we eonsider the pains that have been taken to perplex the
plainest things, that distrust of the senses, those doubts and
seruples, those abstraetions and refinements that oeeur in the
very entranee of the seienees; it will not seem strange that men
of leisure and euriosity should lay themselves out in fruitless
disquisitions, without deseending to the praetieal parts of life, or
informing themselves in the more neeessary and important parts
of knowledge.

Upon the common prineiples of philosophers, we are not
assured of the existenee of things from their being pereeived.
And we are taught to distinguish their real nature from that whieh
falls under our senses. Henee arise seeptieism and paradoxes. It
is not enough that we see and feel, that we taste and smell a thing:
its true nature, its absolute external entity, is still eoneealed.
For, though it be the fietion of our own brain, we have made
it inaeeessible to all our faeulties. Sense is fallaeious, reason
defeetive. We spend our lives in doubting of those things whieh
other men evidently know, and believing those things whieh they
laugh at and despise.

In order, therefore, to divert the busy mind of man from vain
researehes, it seemed neeessary to inquire into the souree of its
perplexities; and, if possible, to lay down sueh Prineiples as, by
an easy solution of them, together with their own native evidenee,
may at onee reeommend themselves for genuine to the mind, and
reseñe it from those endless pursuits it is engaged in. Whieh,

This interesting Preface is omitted in his last edition of the Dialogues.

The Preface

475

with a plain demonstration of the Immediate Providence of an
all-seeing God, and the natural Immortality of the soul, should
seem the readiest preparation, as well as the strongest motive, to
the study and practice of virtue.

This design I proposed in the First Part of a treatise concerning
the Principies of Human Knowledge, published in the year 1710.
But, before I proceed to publish the Second Part^^^, I thought it
requisite to treat more clearly and fully of certain Principies laid
down in the First, and to place them in a new light. Which is the
business of the following Dialogues.

In this Treatise, which does not presuppose in the reader any
knowledge of what was contained in the former, it has been my
aim to introduce the notions I advance into the mind in the most
easy and familiar manner; especially because they carry with
them a great opposition to the prejudices of philosophers, which
have so far prevailed against the common sense and natural
notions of mankind.

If the Principies which I here endeavour to propágate are
admitted for true, the consequences which, I think, evidently
flow from thence are, that Atheism and Scepticism will be utterly
destroyed, many intricate points made plain, great difficulties
solved, several useless parts of Science retrenched, speculation
referred to practice, and men reduced from paradoxes to common
sense.

And although it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy reflexión to
some, that when they have taken a circuit through so many
refined and unvulgar notions, they should at last come to think
like other men; yet, methinks, this return to the simple díctales
of nature, after having wandered through the wild mazes of
philosophy, is not unpleasant. It is like coming borne from a long
voy age: a man reflects with pleasure on the many difficulties

The Second Part of the Principies was never puhlished, and only in part
written. See Editor's Preface to the Principies.

[ 377 ]

476

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

and perplexities he has passed through, sets his heart at ease, and
enjoys himself with more satisfaction for the future.

As it was my intention to convince Sceptics and Infidels by
reason, so it has been my endeavour strictly to observe the most
rigid laws of reasoning. And, to an impartial reader, I hope
it will be manifest that the sublime notion of a God, and the
comfortable expectation of Immortality, do naturally arise from
a cióse and methodical application of thought: whatever may be
the result of that loose, rambling way, not altogether improperly
termed Free-thinking by certain libertines in thought, who can
no more endure the restraints of logic than those of religión or
government.

It will perhaps be objected to my design that, so far as it
tends to ease the mind of difficult and useless inquines, it
can affect only a few speculative persons. But if, by their
speculations rightly placed, the study of morality and the law of
nature were brought more into fashion among men of parts and
genius, the discouragements that draw to Scepticism removed,
the measures of right and wrong accurately defined, and the
principies of Natural Religión reduced into regular systems, as
artfully disposed and clearly connected as those of some other
Sciences; there are grounds to think these effects would not only
have a gradual influence in repairing the too much defaced sense
of virtue in the world, but also, by shewing that such parts
of revelation as lie within the reach of human inquiry are most
agreeable to right reason, would dispose all prudent, unprejudiced
persons to a modest and wary treatment of those sacred mysteries
which are above the comprehension of our faculties.

It remains that I desire the reader to withhold his censure of
these Dialogues till he has read them through. Otherwise, he
may lay them aside in a mistake of their design, or on account
of difficulties or objections which he would find answered in the
sequel. A Treatise of this nature would require to be once read
over coherently, in order to comprehend its design, the proofs.

The Preface

477

solution of difficulties, and the connexion and disposition of its
parts. If it be thought to deserve a second reading, this, I imagine,
will make the entire scheme very plain. Especially if recourse [378]
be had to an Essay I wrote some years since upon Vision, and
the Treatise concerning the Principies of Human Knowledge',
wherein divers notions advanced in these Dialogues are farther
pursued, or placed in different lights, and other points handled
which naturally tend to confirm and illustrate them.

[ 379 ]

The First Dialogue

[ 380 ]

Philonous. Good morrow, Hylas: I did not expect to find you
abroad so early.

Hylas. It is indeed something unusual; but my thoughts were
so taken up with a subject I was discoursing of last night, that
finding I could not sleep, I resolved to rise and take a turn in the
garden.

Phil. It happened well, to let you see what innocent and
agreeable pleasures you lose every morning. Can there be a
pleasanter time of the day, or a more delightful season of the
year? That purple sky, those wild but sweet notes of birds, the
fragrant bloom upon the trees and flowers, the gentle influence of
the rising sun, these and a thousand nameless beauties of nature
inspire the soul with secret transports; its faculties too being at
this time fresh and lively, are fit for those meditations, which
the solitude of a garden and tranquillity of the morning naturally
dispose US to. But I am afraid I interrupt your thoughts: for you
seemed very intent on something.

Hyl. It is true, I was, and shall be obliged to you if you will
permit me to go on in the same vein; not that I would by any
means deprive myself of your company, for my thoughts always
flow more easily in conversation with a friend, than when I am
alone: but my request is, that you would suffer me to impart my
reflexions to you.

Phil. With all my heart, it is what I should have requested
myself if you had not prevented me.

Hyl. I was considering the odd fate of those men who have in
all ages, through an affectation of being distinguished from the
vulgar, or some unaccountable turn of thought, pretended either
to believe nothing at all, or to believe the most extravagant things
in the World. This however might be borne, if their paradoxes

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and scepticism did not draw after them some consequences of
general disadvantage to mankind. But the mischief lieth here;
that when men of less leisure see them who are supposed to have
spent their whole time in the pursuits of knowledge professing an
entire ignorance of all things, or advancing such notions as are
repugnant to plain and commonly received principies, they will
be tempted to entertain suspicions concerning the most important
truths, which they had hitherto held sacred and unquestionable^^^.

Phil. I entirely agree with yon, as to the ill tendency of the
affected doubts of some philosophers, and fantastical conceits of
others. I am even so far gone of late in this way of thinking, that
I have quitted several of the sublime notions I had got in their
schools for vulgar opinions. And I give it you on my word; since
this revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of
nature and common sense’^^, I find my understanding strangely
enlightened, so that I can now easily comprehend a great many
things which before were all mystery and riddle.

Hyl. I am glad to find there was nothing in the accounts I
heard of you.

Phil. Fray, what were those?

PIyl. You were represented, in last night's conversation, as one
who maintained the most extravagant opinión that ever entered
into the mind of man, to wit, that there is no such thing as
material substance in the world.

Phil. That there is no such thing as what philosophers cali
material substance, I am seriously persuaded: but, if I were made
to see anything absurd or sceptical in this, I should then have the
same reason to renounce this that I imagine I have now to reject
the contrary opinión.

Principies, Introduction, sect. 1.

Berkeley's philosophy is professedly a “revolt” from abstract ideas to an
enlightened sense of concrete realities. In these Dialogues Philonous personales
the revolt, and represents Berkeley. Hylas vindícales the uncritical conception
of independen! Matter.

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Hyl. What! can anything be more fantastical, more repugnant
to Common Sense, or a more manifest piece of Scepticism, than
to believe there is no such thing as matterl

Phil. Softly, good Hylas. What if it should prove that yon, who
hold there is, are, by virtue of that opinión, a greater sceptic, and
maintain more paradoxes and repugnances to Common Sense,
than I who believe no such thing?

Hyl. You may as soon persuade me, the part is greater than
the whole, as that, in order to avoid absurdity and Scepticism, I
should ever be obliged to give up my opinión in this point.

Phil. Well then, are you content to admit that opinión for true,
which upon examination shall appear most agreeable to Common
Sense, and remóte from Scepticism?

Hyl. With all my heart. Since you are for raising disputes
about the plainest things in nature, I am content for once to hear
what you have to say.

Phil. Fray, Hylas, what do you mean by a sceptic?

Hyl. I mean what all men mean—one that doubts of everything.

Phil. He then who entertains no doubt concerning some
particular point, with regard to that point cannot be thought a
sceptic.

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Whether doth doubting consist in embracing the
affirmative or negativo side of a question?

Hyl. In neither; for whoever understands English cannot but
know that doubting signifies a suspense between both.

Phil. He then that denles any point, can no more be said to
doubt of it, than he who affirmeth it with the same degree of
assurance.

Hyl. True.

Phil. And, consequently, for such bis denial is no more to be
esteemed a sceptic than the other.

Hyl. I acknowledge it.

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Phil. How cometh it to pass then, Hylas, that you pronounce
me a sceptic, because I deny what you affirm, to wit, the existence
of Matter? Since, for aught you can tell, I am as peremptory in
my denial, as you in your affirmation.

Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I have been a little out in my definition;
but every false step a man makes in discourse is not to be
insisted on. I said indeed that a sceptic was one who doubted of
everything; but I should have added, or who denies the reality
and truth of things.

Phil. What things? Do you mean the principies and theorems
of Sciences? But these you know are universal intellectual
notions, and consequently independen! of Matter. The denial
therefore of this doth not imply the denying them^^^.

Hyl. I grant it. But are there no other things? What think
you of distrusting the senses, of denying the real existence of
sensible things, or pretending to know nothing of them. Is not
this sufficient to denominate a man a scepticl

Phil. Shall we therefore examine which of us it is that denies
the reality of sensible things, or professes the greatest ignorance
of them; since, if I take you rightly, he is to be esteemed the
greatest scepticl

Hyl. That is what I desire.

Phil. What mean you by Sensible Things?

Hyl. Those things which are perceived by the senses. Can you
imagine that I mean anything else?

Phil. Pardon me, Hylas, if I am desirous clearly to apprehend
your notions, since this may much shorten our inquiry. Suffer
me then to ask you this farther question. Are those things
only perceived by the senses which are perceived immediately?
Or, may those things properly be said to be sensible which are
perceived mediately, or not without the intervention of others?

Berkeley's zeal against Matter in the abstract, and all abstract ideas
of concrete things, is therefore not necessarily directed against “universal
intellectual notions”—“the principies and theorems of Sciences.”

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Hyl. I do not sufficiently understand you.

Phil. In reading a book, what I immediately perceive are the
letters; but mediately, or by means of these, are suggested to my
mind the notions of God, virtue, truth, &c. Now, that the letters
are truly sensible things, or perceived by sense, there is no doubt:
but I would know whether you take the things suggested by them
to be so too.

Hyl. No, certainly: it were absurd to think God or virtue
sensible things; though they may be signified and suggested to
the mind by sensible marks, with which they have an arbitrary
connexion.

Phil. It seems then, that by sensible things you mean those
only which can be perceived immediately by sense?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Doth it not follow from this, that though I see one part
of the sky red, and another blue, and that my reason doth thence
evidently conclude there must be some cause of that diversity of
colours, yet that cause cannot be said to be a sensible thing, or
perceived by the sense of seeing?

Hyl. It doth.

Phil. In like manner, though I hear variety of sounds, yet I
cannot be said to hear the causes of those sounds?

Hyl. You cannot.

Phil. And when by my touch I perceive a thing to be hot and
heavy, I cannot say, with any truth or propriety, that I feel the
cause of its heat or weight?

Hyl. To prevent any more questions of this kind, I tell you
once for all, that by sensible things I mean those only which
are perceived by sense; and that in truth the senses perceive
nothing which they do not perceive immediately. for they make
no inferences. The deducing therefore of causes or occasions
from effects and appearances, which alone are perceived by

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483

sense, entirely relates to reason’^^.

Phil. This point then is agreed between us—That sensible
things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense.
You will farther inform me, whether we immediately perceive
by sight anything beside light, and colours, and figures’^®; or
by hearing, anything but sounds; by the palate, anything beside
tastes; by the smell, beside odours; or by the touch, more than
tangible qualities.

Hyl. We do not.

Phil. It seems, therefore, that if you take away all sensible
qualities, there remains nothing sensible?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. Sensible things therefore are nothing else but so many
sensible qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities?

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. Heat then is a sensible thing?

Hyl. Certainly.

Phil. Doth the reality of sensible things consist in being
perceived? or, is it something distinct from their being perceived,
and that bears no relation to the mind?

Hyl. To exist is one thing, and to be perceived is another.

Phil. I speak with regard to sensible things only. And of these
I ask, whether by their real existence you mean a subsistence
exterior to the mind, and distinct from their being perceived?

Hyl. I mean a real absolute being, distinct from, and without
any relation to, their being perceived.

Phil. Heat therefore, if it be allowed a real being, must exist
without the mind’^^?

Hyl. It must.

Here “reason” means reasoning or inference. Cf. Theory of Vision
Vindicated, sect. 42, including the distinction between “suggestion” and
“inference.”

“figure” as well as colour, is here included among the original data of sight.

“without the mind,” i.e. unrealised by any percipient mind.

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Phü. Tell me, Hylas, is this real existence equally compatible
to all degrees of heat, which we perceive; or is there any reason
why we should attribute it to some, and deny it to others? And if
there be, pray let me know that reason.

Hyl. Whatever degree of heat we perceive by sense, we may
be sure the same exists in the object that occasions it.

Phü. What! the greatest as well as the least?

Hyl. I tell yon, the reason is plainly the same in respect of
both. They are both perceived by sense; nay, the greater degree
of heat is more sensibly perceived; and consequently, if there is
any difference, we are more certain of its real existence than we
can be of the reality of a lesser degree.

Phü. But is not the most vehement and intense degree of heat
a very great pain?

Hyl. No one can deny it.

Phü. And is any unperceiving thing capable of pain or
pleasure?

Hyl. No, certainly.

Phü. Is your material substance a senseless being, or a being
endowed with sense and perception?

Hyl. It is senseless without doubt.

Phü. It cannot therefore be the subject of pain?

Hyl. By no means.

Phü. Ñor consequently of the greatest heat perceived by sense,
since you acknowledge this to be no small pain?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phü. What shall we say then of your external object; is it a
material Substance, or no?

Hyl. It is a material substance with the sensible qualities
inhering in it.

Phü. How then can a great heat exist in it, since you own
it cannot in a material substance? I desire you would olear this
point.

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Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I fear I was out in yielding intense heat
to be a pain. It should seem rather, that pain is something distinct
from heat, and the consequence or effect of it.

Phil. Upon putting your hand near the fire, do yon perceive
one simple uniform sensation, or two distinct sensations?

Hyl. But one simple sensation.

Phil. Is not the heat immediately perceived?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And the pain?

Hyl. True.

Phil. Seeing therefore they are both immediately perceived
at the same time, and the fire affects you only with one simple
or uncompounded idea, it follows that this same simple idea
is both the intense heat immediately perceived, and the pain;
and, consequently, that the intense heat immediately perceived
is nothing distinct from a particular sort of pain.

Hyl. It seems so.

Phil. Again, try in your thoughts, Hylas, if you can conceive
a vehement sensation to be without pain or pleasure.

Hyl. I cannot.

Phil. Or can you frame to yourself an idea of sensible pain or
pleasure in general, abstracted from every particular idea of heat,
coid, tastes, smells? &c.

Hyl. —I do not find that I can.

Phil. Doth it not therefore follow, that sensible pain is nothing
distinct from those sensations or ideas, in an intense degree?

Hyl. It is undeniable; and, to speak the truth, I begin to suspect
a very great heat cannot exist but in a mind perceiving it.

Phil. What! are you then in that sceptical State of suspense,
between affirming and denying?

Hyl. I think I may be positive in the point. A very violent and
painful heat cannot exist without the mind.

Phil. It hath not therefore, according to you, any real being?

Hyl. I own it.

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Phü. Is it therefore certain, that there is no body in nature
really hot?

Hyl. I have not denied there is any real heat in bodies. I only
say, there is no such thing as an intense real heat.

Phü. But, did yon not say before that all degrees of heat were
equally real; or, if there was any difference, that the greater were
more undoubtedly real than the lesser?

PIyl. True: but it was because I did not then consider the
ground there is for distinguishing between them, which I now
plainly see. And it is this: because intense heat is nothing else
but a particular kind of painful sensation; and pain cannot exist
but in a perceiving being; it follows that no intense heat can
really exist in an unperceiving corporeal substance. But this is
no reason why we should deny heat in an inferior degree to exist
in such a substance.

Phü. But how shall we be able to discern those degrees of heat
which exist only in the mind from those which exist without it?

PIyl. That is no difficult matter. You know the least pain
cannot exist unperceived; whatever, therefore, degree of heat is
a pain exists only in the mind. But, as for all other degrees of
heat, nothing obliges us to think the same of them.

Phü. I think you granted before that no unperceiving being
was capable of pleasure, any more than of pain.

Hyl. I did.

Phü. And is not warmth, or a more gentle degree of heat than
what causes uneasiness, a pleasure?

Hyl. What then?

Phü. Consequently, it cannot exist without the mind in an
unperceiving substance, or body.

Hyl. So it seems.

Phü. Since, therefore, as well those degrees of heat that are not
painful, as those that are, can exist only in a thinking substance;
may we not conclude that external bodies are absolutely incapable
of any degree of heat whatsoever?

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Hyl. On second thoughts, I do not think it so evident that
warmth is a pleasure as that a great degree of heat is a pain.

Phil. I do not pretend that warmth is as great a pleasure as
heat is a pain. But, if you grant it to be even a small pleasure, it
serves to make good my conclusión.

Hyl. I could rather cali it an indolencel It seems to be nothing
more than a privation of both pain and pleasure. And that such a
quality or State as this may agree to an unthinking substance, I
hope you will not deny.

Phil. If you are resolved to maintain that warmth, or a gentle
degree of heat, is no pleasure, I know not how to convince you
otherwise than by appealing to your own sense. But what think
you of coid?

Hyl. The same that I do of heat. An intense degree of coid
is a pain; for to feel a very great coid, is to perceive a great
uneasiness: it cannot therefore exist without the mind; but a
lesser degree of coid may, as well as a lesser degree of heat.

Phil. Those bodies, therefore, upon whose application to our
own, we perceive a modérate degree of heat, must be concluded
to have a modérate degree of heat or warmth in them; and those,
upon whose application we feel a like degree of coid, must be
thought to have coid in them.

Hyl. They must.

Phil. Can any doctrine be true that necessarily leads a man
into an absurdity?

Hyl. Without doubt it cannot.

Phil. Is it not an absurdity to think that the same thing should
be at the same time both coid and warm?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Suppose now one of your hands hot, and the other coid,
and that they are both at once put into the same vessel of water, in
an intermediate State; will not the water seem coid to one hand.

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and warm to the other’^^?

Hyl. It will.

Phil. Ought we not therefore, by your principies, to conclude
it is really both coid and warm at the same time, that is, according
to your own concession, to believe an absurdity?

Hyl. I confess it seems so.

Phil. Consequently, the principies themselves are false, since
yon have granted that no true principie leads to an absurdity.

Hyl. But, after all, can anything be more absurd than to say,
there is no heat in the firel

Phil. To make the point still clearer; tell me whether, in two
cases exactly alike, we ought not to make the same judgment?

Hyl. We ought.

Phil. When a pin pricks your finger, doth it not rend and
divide the fibres of your flesh?

Hyl. It doth.

Phil. And when a coal burns your finger, doth it any more?

Hyl. It doth not.

Phil. Since, therefore, you neither judge the sensation itself
occasioned by the pin, ñor anything like it to be in the pin; you
should not, conformably to what you have now granted, judge
the sensation occasioned by the fire, or anything like it, to be in
the fire.

Hyl. Well, since it must be so, I am content to yield this point,
and acknowledge that heat and coid are only sensations existing
in our minds. But there still remain qualities enough to secure
the reality of external things.

Phil. But what will you say, Hylas, if it shall appear that the
case is the same with regard to all other sensible qualities^^^,
and that they can no more be supposed to exist without the mind,
than heat and coid?

Cf. Principies, sect. 14.

Cf. Principies, sect. 14, 15.

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489

Hyl. Then indeed you will have done something to the purpose;
but that is what I despair of seeing proved.

Phil. Let US examine them in order. What think you of
tastes —do they exist without the mind, or no?

Hyl. Can any man in his senses doubt whether sugar is sweet,
or wormwood bitter?

Phil. Inform me, Hylas. Is a sweet taste a particular kind of
pleasure or pleasant sensation, or is it not?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And is not bitterness some kind of uneasiness or pain?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. If therefore sugar and wormwood are unthinking
corporeal substances existing without the mind, how can
sweetness and bitterness, that is, pleasure and pain, agree to
them?

Hyl. Hold, Philonous, I now see what it was deluded me
all this time. You asked whether heat and coid, sweetness and
bitterness, were not particular sorts of pleasure and pain; to which
I answered simply, that they were. Whereas I should have thus
distinguished:—those qualities, as perceived by us, are pleasures
or pains; but not as existing in the external objects. We must not
therefore conclude absolutely, that there is no heat in the fire,
or sweetness in the sugar, but only that heat or sweetness, as
perceived by us, are not in the fire or sugar. What say you to
this?

Phil. I say it is nothing to the purpose. Our discourse proceeded
altogether concerning sensible things, which you defined to be,
the things we immediately perceive by our senses. Whatever
other qualities, therefore, you speak of, as distinct from these, I
know nothing of them, neither do they at all belong to the point
in dispute. You may, indeed, pretend to have discovered certain
qualities which you do not perceive, and assert those insensible
qualities exist in fire and sugar. But what use can be made of this
to your present purpose, I am at a loss to conceive. Tell me then

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once more, do yon acknowledge that heat and coid, sweetness
and bitterness (meaning those qualities which are perceived by
the senses), do not exist without the mind?

Hyl. I see it is to no purpose to hold out, so I give up the
cause as to those mentioned qualities. Though I profess it sounds
oddly, to say that sugar is not sweet.

Phil. But, for your farther satisfaction, take this along with
yon: that which at other times seems sweet, shall, to a distempered
palate, appear bitter. And, nothing can be plainer than that divers
persons perceive different tastes in the same food; since that
which one man delights in, another abhors. And how could this
be, if the taste was something really inherent in the food?

Hyl. I acknowledge I know not how.

Phil. In the next place, odours are to be considered. And, with
regard to these, I would fain know whether what hath been said
of tastes doth not exactly agree to them? Are they not so many
pleasing or displeasing sensations?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. Can yon then conceive it possible that they should exist
in an unperceiving thing?

Hyl. I cannot.

Phil. Or, can you imagine that filth and ordure affect those
brute animáis that feed on them out of cholee, with the same
smells which we perceive in them?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. May we not therefore conclude of smells, as of the
other forementioned qualities, that they cannot exist in any but a
perceiving substance or mind?

Hyl. I think so.

Phil. Then as to sounds, what must we think of them: are they
accidents really inherent in external bodies, or not?

Hyl. That they inhere not in the sonorous bodies is plain
from henee: because a bell struck in the exhausted receiver of

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an air-pump sends forth no sound. The air, therefore, must be
thought the subject of sound.

Phil. What reason is there for that, Hylas?

Hyl. Because, when any motion is raised in the air, we
perceive a sound greater or lesser, according to the air's motion;
but without some motion in the air, we never hear any sound at
all.

Phil. And granting that we never hear a sound but when some
motion is produced in the air, yet I do not see how you can infer
from thence, that the sound itself is in the air.

PIyl. It is this very motion in the external air that produces in
the mind the sensation of sound. For, striking on the drum of the
ear, it causeth a vibration, which by the auditory nerves being
communicated to the brain, the soul is thereupon affected with
the sensation called sound.

Phil. What! is sound then a sensation?

PIyl. I tell you, as perceived by us, it is a particular sensation
in the mind.

Phil. And can any sensation exist without the mind?

Hyl. No, certainly.

Phil. How then can sound, being a sensation, exist in the air,
if by the air you mean a senseless substance existing without the
mind?

Hyl. You must distinguish, Philonous, between sound as it
is perceived by us, and as it is in itself; or (which is the same
thing) between the sound we immediately perceive, and that
which exists without us. The former, indeed, is a particular kind
of sensation, but the latter is merely a vibrative or undulatory
motion in the air.

Phil. I thought I had already obviated that distinction, by the
answer I gave when you were applying it in a like case before.
But, to say no more of that, are you sure then that sound is really
nothing but motion?

Hyl. I am.

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Phü. Whatever therefore agrees to real sound, may with truth
be attributed to motion?

Hyl. It may.

Phü. It is then good sense to speak of motion as of a thing that
is loud, sweet, acute, or grave.

Hyl. I see you are resolved not to understand me. Is it not
evident those accidents or modes belong only to sensible sound,
or sound in the common acceptation of the word, but not to sound
in the real and philosophic sense; which, as I just now told you,
is nothing but a certain motion of the air?

Phü. It seems then there are two sorts of sound—the one
vulgar, or that which is heard, the other philosophical and real?

Hyl. Even so.

Phü. And the latter consists in motion?

Hyl. I told you so before.

Phü. Tell me, Hylas, to which of the senses, think you, the
idea of motion belongs? to the hearing?

Hyl. No, certainly; but to the sight and touch.

Phü. It should follow then, that, according to you, real sounds
may possibly be seen orfelt, but never heard.

Hyl. Look you, Philonous, you may, if you picase, make a jest
of my opinión, but that will not alter the truth of things. I own,
indeed, the inferences you draw me into sound something oddly;
but common language, you know, is framed by, and for the use of
the vulgar: we must not therefore wonder if expressions adapted
to exact philosophic notions seem uncouth and out of the way.

Phü. Is it come to that? I assure you, I imagine myself to
have gained no small point, since you make so light of departing
from common phrases and opinions; it being a main part of our
inquiry, to examine whose notions are widest of the common
road, and most repugnant to the general sense of the world. But,
can you think it no more than a philosophical paradox, to say that
real sounds are never heard, and that the idea of them is obtained

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by some other sense? And is there nothing in this contrary to
nature and the truth of things?

Hyl. To deal ingenuously, I do not like it. And, after the
concessions already made, I had as well grant that sounds too
have no real being without the mind.

Phil. And I hope you will make no difficulty to acknowledge
the same of colours.

Hyl. Pardon me: the case of colours is very different. Can
anything be plainer than that we see them on the objects?

Phil. The objects you speak of are, I suppose, corporeal
Substances existing without the mind?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. And have true and real colours inhering in them?

Hyl. Each visible object hath that colour which we see in it.

Phil. How! is there anything visible but what we perceive by
sight?

Hyl. There is not.

Phil. And, do we perceive anything by sense which we do not
perceive immediately?

Hyl. How often must I be obliged to repeat the same thing? I
tell you, we do not.

Phil. Have patience, good Hylas; and tell me once more,
whether there is anything immediately perceived by the senses,
except sensible qualities. I know you asserted there was not; but
I would now be informed, whether you still persist in the same
opinión.

Hyl. I do.

Phil. Pray, is your corporeal substance either a sensible
quality, or made up of sensible qualities?

Hyl. What a question that is! who ever thought it was?

Phil. My reason for asking was, because in saying, each
visible object hath that colour which we see in it, you make
visible objects to be corporeal substances; which implies either
that corporeal substances are sensible qualities, or else that there

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is something beside sensible qualities perceived by sight: but, as
this point was formerly agreed between us, and is still maintained
by yon, it is a olear consequence, that your corporeal substance
is nothing distinct from sensible qualities^'^'^.

Hyl. Yon may draw as many absurd consequences as yon
please, and endeavour to perplex the plainest things; but yon
shall never persuade me out of my senses. I clearly understand
my own meaning.

Phil. I wish you would make me understand it too. But, since
you are unwilling to have your notion of corporeal substance
examined, I shall urge that point no farther. Only be pleased to
let me know, whether the same colours which we see exist in
external bodies, or some other.

Hyl. The very same.

Phil. What! are then the beautiful red and purple we see on
yonder clouds really in them? Or do you imagine they have in
themselves any other form than that of a dark mist or vapour?

Hyl. I must own, Philonous, those colours are not really in the
clouds as they seem to be at this distance. They are only apparent
colours.

Phil. Apparent cali you them? how shall we distinguish these
apparent colours from real?

Hyl. Very easily. Those are to be thought apparent which,
appearing only at a distance, vanish upon a nearer approach.

Phil. And those, I suppose, are to be thought real which are
discovered by the most near and exact survey.

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Is the nearest and exactest survey made by the help of a
microscope, or by the naked eye?

Hyl. By a microscope, doubtless.

Phil. But a microscope often discovers colours in an object
different from those perceived by the unassisted sight. And, in

“Sensible qualities,” i.e. the significant appearances presented in sense.

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case we had microscopes magnifying to any assigned degree, it
is certain that no object whatsoever, viewed through them, would
appear in the same colour which it exhibits to the naked eye.

Hyl. And what will yon conclude from all this? Yon cannot
argüe that there are really and naturally no colours on objects:
because by artificial managements they may be altered, or made
to vanish.

Phil. I think it may evidently be concluded from your own
concessions, that all the colours we see with our naked eyes are
only apparent as those on the clouds, since they vanish upon a
more cióse and accurate inspection which is afforded us by a
microscope. Then, as to what you say by way of prevention: I
ask you whether the real and natural State of an object is better
discovered by a very sharp and piercing sight, or by one which
is less sharp?

Hyl. By the former without doubt.

Phil. Is it not plain from Dioptrics that microscopes make
the sight more penetrating, and represent objects as they would
appear to the eye in case it were naturally endowed with a most
exquisite sharpness?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Consequently the microscopical representation is to be
thought that which best sets forth the real nature of the thing, or
what it is in itself. The colours, therefore, by it perceived are
more genuine and real than those perceived otherwise.

Hyl. I confess there is something in what you say.

Phil. Resides, it is not only possible but manifest, that there
actually are animáis whose eyes are by nature framed to perceive
those things which by reason of their minuteness escape our sight.
What think you of those inconceivably small animáis perceived
by glasses? Must we suppose they are all stark blind? Or, in case
they see, can it be imagined their sight hath not the same use in
preserving their bodies from injuries, which appears in that of
all other animáis? And if it hath, is it not evident they must see

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particles less than their own bodies; which will present them with
a far different view in each object from that which strikes our
senses^^^? Even our own eyes do not always represent objects to
US after the same manner. In the jaundice every one knows that
all things seem yellow. Is it not therefore highly probable those
animáis in whose eyes we discern a very different texture from
that of ours, and whose bodies abound with different humours,
do not see the same colours in every object that we do? From all
which, should it not seem to follow that all colours are equally
apparent, and that none of those which we perceive are really
inherent in any outward object?

Hyl. It should.

Phil. The point will be past all doubt, if you consider that, in
case colours were real properties or affections inherent in external
bodies, they could admit of no alteration without some change
wrought in the very bodies themselves: but, is it not evident from
what hath been said that, upon the use of microscopes, upon a
change happening in the humours of the eye, or a variation of
distance, without any manner of real alteration in the thing itself,
the colours of any object are either changed, or totally disappear?
Nay, all other circumstances remaining the same, change but
the situation of some objects, and they shall present different
colours to the eye. The same thing happens upon viewing an
object in various degrees of light. And what is more known than
that the same bodies appear differently coloured by candle-light
from what they do in the open day? Add to these the experiment
of a prism which, separating the heterogeneous rays of light,
alters the colour of any object, and will cause the whitest to
appear of a deep blue or red to the naked eye. And now tell me
whether you are still of opinión that every body hath its true real
colour inhering in it; and, if you think it hath, I would fain know
farther from you, what certain distance and position of the object,

Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 80-86.

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what peculiar texture and formation of the eye, what degree or
kind of light is necessary for ascertaining that true colour, and
distinguishing it from apparent ones.

Hyl. I own myself entirely satisfied, that they are all equally
apparent, and that there is no such thing as colour really inhering
in external bodies, but that it is altogether in the light. And
what confirms me in this opinión is, that in proportion to the
light colours are still more or less vivid; and if there be no light,
then are there no colours perceived. Besides, allowing there
are colours on external objects, yet, how is it possible for us to
perceive them? For no external body affects the mind, unless it
acts first on our organs of sense. But the only action of bodies
is motion; and motion cannot be communicated otherwise than
by impulse. A distan! object therefore cannot act on the eye; ñor
consequently make itself or its properties perceivable to the soul.
Whence it plainly follows that it is immediately some contiguous
substance, which, operating on the eye, occasions a perception
of colours: and such is light.

Phil. How! is light then a substance?

Hyl. I tell you, Philonous, external light is nothing but a thin
fluid substance, whose minute partióles being agitated with a
brisk motion, and in various manners reflected from the different
surfaces of outward objects to the eyes, communicate different
motions to the optic nerves; which, being propagated to the brain,
cause therein various impressions; and these are attended with
the sensations of red, blue, yellow, &c.

Phil. It seems then the light doth no more than shake the optic
nerves.

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. And consequent to each particular motion of the nerves,
the mind is affected with a sensation, which is some particular
colour.

Hyl. Right.

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Phil. And these sensations have no existence without the
mind.

Hyl. They have not.

Phil. How then do yon affirm that colours are in the light;
since by light yon understand a corporeal substance external to
the mind?

PIyl. Light and colours, as immediately perceived by us, I grant
cannot exist without the mind. But in themselves they are only
the motions and configurations of certain insensible particles of
matter.

Phil. Colours then, in the vulgar sense, or taken for the
immediate objects of sight, cannot agree to any but a perceiving
substance.

PIyl. That is what I say.

Phil. Well then, since you give up the point as to those sensible
qualities which are alone thought colours by all mankind beside,
you may hold what you picase with regard to those invisible
ones of the philosophers. It is not my business to dispute about
them-, only I would advise you to bethink yourself, whether,
considering the inquiry we are upon, it be prudent for you to
affirm— the red and blue which we see are not real colours, but
certain unknown motions and figures which no man ever did or
can see are truly so. Are not these shocking notions, and are not
they subject to as many ridiculous inferences, as those you were
obliged to renounce before in the case of sounds?

Hyl. I frankly own, Philonous, that it is in vain to stand out
any longer. Colours, sounds, tastes, in a word all those termed
secondary qualities, have certainly no existence without the mind.
But by this acknowledgment I must not be supposed to derógate
any thing from the reality of Matter, or external objects; seeing it is
no more than several philosophers maintain^^^, who nevertheless
are the farthest imaginable from denying Matter. For the clearer

796

Descartes and Locke for example.

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499

understanding of this, you must know sensible qualities are by
philosophers divided into Primary and Secondary^^''. The former
are Extensión, Figure, Solidity, Gravity, Motion, and Rest; and
these they hold exist really in Bodies. The latter are those
above enumerated; or, briefly, all sensible qualities beside the [ 398 ]
Primary, which they assert are only so many sensations or ideas
existing nowhere but in the mind. But all this, I doubt not, you
are apprised of. For my part, I have been a long time sensible
there was such an opinión curren! among philosophers, but was
never thoroughly convinced of its truth until now.

Phil. You are still then of opinión that extensión md figures
are inherent in external unthinking substances?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. But what if the same arguments which are brought
against Secondary Qualities will hold good against these also?

PIyl. Why then I shall be obliged to think, they too exist only
in the mind.

Phil. Is it your opinión the very figure and extensión which
you perceive by sense exist in the outward object or material
substance?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Have all other animáis as good grounds to think the same
of the figure and extensión which they see and feel?

Hyl. Without doubt, if they have any thought at all.

Phil. Answer me, Hylas. Think you the senses were bestowed
upon all animáis for their preservation and well-being in life? or
were they given to men alone for this end?

Hyl. I make no question but they have the same use in all
other animáis.

On Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter, and their mutual relations,
cf. Principies, sect. 9-15. See also Descartes, Meditations, III, Principia, I.
sect. 69; Malebranche, Recherche, Liv. VI. Pt. II. sect. 2; Locke's Essay, Bk.

II. ch. 8.

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Phil. If so, is it not necessary they should be enabled by them
to perceive their own limbs, and those bodies which are capable
of harming them?

Hyl. Certainly.

Phil. A mite therefore must be supposed to see bis own
foot, and things equal or even less than it, as bodies of some
considerable dimensión; though at the same time they appear to
yon scarce discernible, or at best as so many visible points^^*?

p[yl. I cannot deny it.

Phil. And to creatures less than the mite they will seem yet
larger?

Plyl. They will.

Phil. Insomuch that what yon can hardly discern will to another
extremely minute animal appear as some huge mountain?

Plyl. All this I grant.

Phil. Can one and the same thing be at the same time in itself
of different dimensions?

Hyl. That were absurd to imagine.

Phil. But, from what you have laid down it follows that both
the extensión by you perceived, and that perceived by the mite
itself, as likewise all those perceived by lesser animáis, are each
of them the true extensión of the mite's foot; that is to say, by
your own principies you are led into an absurdity.

Hyl. There seems to be some difficulty in the point.

Phil. Again, have you not acknowledged that no real inherent
property of any object can be changed without some change in
the thing itself?

Hyl. I have.

Phil. But, as we approach to or recede from an object, the
visible extensión varies, being at one distance ten or a hundred
times greater than at another. Doth it not therefore follow from
henee likewise that it is not really inherent in the object?

798

Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 80.

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501

Hyl. I own I am at a loss what to think.

Phil. Your judgment will soon be determined, if you will
venture to think as freely concerning this quality as you have
done concerning the rest. Was it not admitted as a good argument,
that neither heat ñor coid was in the water, because it seemed
warm to one hand and coid to the other?

Hyl. It was.

Phil. Is it not the very same reasoning to conclude, there is no
extensión or figure in an object, because to one eye it shall seem
little, smooth, and round, when at the same time it appears to the
other, great, uneven, and angular?

Hyl. The very same. But does this latter fact ever happen?

Phil. You may at any time make the experiment, by looking [ 400 ]
with one eye haré, and with the other through a microscope.

Hyl. I know not how to maintain it; and yet I am loath to give
up extensión, I see so many odd consequences following upon
such a concession.

Phil. Odd, say you? After the concessions already made, I
hope you will stick at nothing for its oddness. But, on the
other hand, should it not seem very odd, if the general reasoning
which ineludes all other sensible qualities did not also inelude
extensión? If it be allowed that no idea, ñor anything like an idea,
can exist in an unperceiving substance, then surely it follows that
no figure, or mode of extensión, which we can either perceive,
or imagine, or have any idea of, can be really inherent in Matter;
not to mention the peculiar difficulty there must be in conceiving
a material substance, prior to and distinct from extensión, to
be the substratum of extensión. Be the sensible quality what it
will—figure, or sound, or colour, it seems alike impossible it
should subsist in that which doth not perceive it.]

What follows, within brackets, is not contained in the first and second
editions.

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Hyl. I give up the point for the present, reserving still a right
to retract my opinión, in case I shall hereafter discover any false
step in my progress to it.

Phil. That is a right yon cannot be denied. Figures and
extensión being despatched, we proceed next to motion. Can a
real motion in any external body be at the same time both very
swift and very slow?

Hyl. It cannot.

Phil. Is not the motion of a body swift in a reciprocal
proportion to the time it takes up in describing any given space?
Thus a body that describes a mile in an hour moves three times
faster than it would in case it described only a mile in three hours.

Hyl. I agree with yon.

Phil. And is not time measured by the succession of ideas in
our minds?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And is it not possible ideas should succeed one another
twice as fast in your mind as they do in mine, or in that of some
spirit of another kind?

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. Consequently the same body may to another seem to
perform its motion over any space in half the time that it doth to
yon. And the same reasoning will hold as to any other proportion:
that is to say, according to your principies (since the motions
perceived are both really in the object) it is possible one and the
same body shall be really moved the same way at once, both very
swift and very slow. How is this consisten! either with common
sense, or with what you just now granted?

Hyl. I have nothing to say to it.

Phil. Then as for solidity, either you do not mean any sensible
quality by that word, and so it is beside our inquiry: or if you do,
it must be either hardness or resistance. But both the one and the
other are plainly relative to our senses: it being evident that what
seems hard to one animal may appear soft to another, who hath

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503

greater forcé and firmness of limbs. Ñor is it less plain that the
resistance I feel is not in the body.

Hyl. I own the very sensation of resistance, which is all you
immediately perceive, is not in the body; but the cause of that
sensation is.

Phil. But the causes of our sensations are not things
immediately perceived, and therefore are not sensible. This
point I thought had been already determined.

Hyl. I own it was; but you will pardon me if I seem a little
embarrassed: I know not how to quit my oíd notions.

Phil. To help you out, do but consider that if extensión
be once acknowledged to have no existence without the mind,
the same must necessarily be granted of motion, solidity, and
gravity; since they all evidently suppose extensión. It is therefore
superfluous to inquire particularly concerning each of them. In
denying extensión, you have denied them all to have any real
existence^^*^.

Hyl. I wonder, Philonous, if what you say be true, why
those philosophers who deny the Secondary Qualities any real
existence should yet attribute it to the Primary. If there is no
difference between them, how can this be accounted for?

Phil. It is not my business to account for every opinión of the
philosophers. But, among other reasons which may be assigned
for this, it seems probable that pleasure and pain being rather
annexed to the former than the latter may be one. Heat and
coid, tastes and smells, have something more vividly pleasing
or disagreeable than the ideas of extensión, figure, and motion
affect US with. And, it being too visibly absurd to hold that
pain or pleasure can be in an unperceiving Substance, men are
more easily weaned from believing the external existence of the
Secondary than the Primary Qualities. You will be satisfied there
is something in this, if you recollect the difference you made

** Percipient mind is, in short, the indispensable realising factor of all the
qualities of sensible things.

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between an intense and more modérate degree of heat; allowing
the one a real existence, while yon denied it to the other. But,
after all, there is no rational ground for that distinction; for,
surely an indifferent sensation is as truly a sensation as one more
pleasing or painful; and consequently should not any more than
they be supposed to exist in an unthinking subject.

Hyl. It is just come into my head, Philonous, that I have
somewhere heard of a distinction between absolute and sensible
extensión*®^ Now, though it be acknowledged that great and
small, consisting merely in the relation which other extended
beings have to the parts of our own bodies, do not really inhere
in the substances themselves; yet nothing obliges us to hold
the same with regard to absolute extensión, which is something
abstracted from great and small, from this or that particular
magnitude or figure. So likewise as to motion; swift and slow
are altogether relative to the succession of ideas in our own
minds. But, it doth not follow, because those modifications of
motion exist not without the mind, that therefore absolute motion
abstracted from them doth not.

Phil. Fray what is it that distinguishes one motion, or one
part of extensión, from another? Is it not something sensible, as
some degree of swiftness or slowness, some certain magnitude
or figure peculiar to each?

Hyl. I think so.

Phil. These qualities, therefore, stripped of all sensible
properties, are without all specific and numerical differences, as
the schools cali them.

Hyl. They are.

Phil. That is to say, they are extensión in general, and motion
in general.

Hyl. Let it be so.

**** Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 122-126; Principies, sect. 123, &c.; Siris,
sect. 270, &c.

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Phil. But it is a universally received maxim that Everything
which exists is particular^^^. How then can motion in general, or
extensión in general, exist in any corporeal substance?

Hyl. I will take time to solve your difficulty.

Phil. But I think the point may be speedily decided. Without
doubt you can tell whether you are able to frame this or that
idea. Now I am content to put our dispute on this issue. If you
can frame in your thoughts a distinct abstract idea of motion
or extensión, divested of all those sensible modes, as swift and
slow, great and small, round and square, and the like, which are
acknowledged to exist only in the mind, I will then yield the point
you contend for. But if you cannot, it will be unreasonable on
your side to insist any longer upon what you have no notion^°^
of.

PIyl. To confess ingenuously, I cannot.

Phil. Can you even sepárate the ideas of extensión and motion
from the ideas of all those qualities which they who make the
distinction term secondaryl

PIyl. What! is it not an easy matter to consider extensión
and motion by themselves, abstracted from all other sensible
qualities? Fray how do the mathematicians treat of them?

Phil. I acknowledge, Hylas, it is not difficult to form
general propositions andreasonings about those qualities, without
mentioning any other; and, in this sense, to consider or treat of
them abstractedly^*’^. But, how doth it follow that, because I can
pronounce the word motion by itself, I can form the idea of it in
my mind exclusive of body? or, because theorems may be made [ 404 ]
of extensión and figures, without any mention of great or small,
or any other sensible mode or quality, that therefore it is possible
such an abstract idea of extensión, without any particular size or

Cf. Principies, Introduction, sect. 15.

Is “notion” here a synonym for idea?

Cf. Principies, Introduction, sect. 16.

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figure, or sensible quality^*^^, should be distinctly formed, and
apprehended by the mind? Mathematicians treat of quantity,
without regarding what other sensible qualities it is attended
with, as being altogether indifferent to their demonstrations. Bul,
when laying aside the words, they contémplate the bare ideas, I
believe yon will find, they are not the puré abstracted ideas of
extensión.

Hyl. But what say you to puré intellect? May not abstracted
ideas be framed by that faculty?

Phil. Since I cannot frame abstract ideas at all, it is plain
I cannot frame them by the help of puré intellecf, whatsoever
faculty you understand by those words^°^. Besides, not to inquire
into the nature of puré intellect and its spiritual objects, as
virtue, reason, God, or the like, thus much seems manifest—that
sensible things are only to be perceived by sense, or represented
by the imagination. Figures, therefore, and extensión, being
originally perceived by sense, do not belong to puré intellect:
but, for your farther satisfaction, try if you can frame the idea
of any figure, abstracted from all particularities of size, or even
from other sensible qualities.

Hyl.Let me think a little-1 do not find that I can.

Phil. And can you think it possible that should really exist in
nature which implies a repugnancy in its conception?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. Since therefore it is impossible even for the mind to
disunite the ideas of extensión and motion from all other sensible
qualities, doth it not follow, that where the one exist there
necessarily the other exist likewise?

Hyl. It should seem so.

“Size or figure, or sensible quality”—“size, color &c.,” in the first and
second editions.

In Berkeley's later and more exact terminology, the data or implicares of
puré intellect are called notions, in contrast to his ideas, which are concrete or
individual sensuous presentations.

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507

Phil. Consequently, the very same arguments which you
admitted as conclusive against the Secondary Qualities are,
without any farther application of forcé, against the Primary too.
Resides, if you will trust your senses, is it not plain all sensible
qualities coexist, or to them appear as being in the same place?
Do they ever represen! a motion, or figure, as being divested of
all other visible and tangible qualities?

Hyl. You need say no more on this head. I am free to own, if
there be no secret error or oversight in our proceedings hitherto,
that all sensible qualities are alike to be denied existence without
the mind*'^^. But, my fear is that I have been too liberal in my
former concessions, or overlooked some fallacy or other. In
short, I did not take time to think.

Phil. For that matter, Hylas, you may take what time you
picase in reviewing the progress of our inquiry. You are at liberty
to recover any slips you might have made, or offer whatever you
have omitted which makes for your first opinión.

PIyl. One great oversight I take to be this—that I did not
sufficiently distinguish the object from the sensation^^^. Now,
though this latter may not exist without the mind, yet it will not
thence follow that the former cannot.

Phil. What object do you mean? the object of the senses?

PIyl. The same.

Phil. It is then immediately perceived?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Make me to understand the difference between what is
immediately perceived and a sensation.

Hyl. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving;
besides which, there is something perceived; and this I cali the
object. For example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But

***’ They need living percipient mind to make them real.

**** So Reid's Inquiry, ch. ii, sect. 8, 9; Essays on the Intellectual Powers, II.
ch. 16. Cf. New Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 8, &c.

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[ 406 ]

then the act of perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in
the tulip.

Phil. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?

Hyl. The same.

Phil. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and
extension*°^?

P¡yl. Nothing.

Phil. What you would say then is that the red and yellow are
coexistent with the extensión; is it not?

p[yl. That is not all; I would say they have a real existence
without the mind, in some unthinking substance.

Phil. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see
is manifest. Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist
independen! of your mind or mine; but, that any immediate object
of the senses—that is, any idea, or combination of ideas—should
exist in an unthinking substance, or exterior to all minds, is
in itself an evident contradiction. Ñor can I imagine how this
follows from what you said just now, to wit, that the red and
yellow were on the tulip you saw, since you do not pretend to see
that unthinking substance.

Hyl. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our
inquiry from the subject.

Phil. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return
then to your distinction between sensation and objecf, if I take
you right, you distinguish in every perception two things, the one
an action of the mind, the other not.

Hyl. True.

Phil. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any
unthinking thing^^°; but, whatever beside is implied in a
perception may?

Hyl. That is my meaning.

i.e. figured or extended visible colour. Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 43,
&c.

Cf. Principies, sect. 25, 26.

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Phil. So that if there was a perception without any act of
the mind, it were possible such a perception should exist in an
unthinking substance?

Hyl. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a
perception.

Phil. When is the mind said to be active?

PIyl. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.

Phil. Can the mind produce, discontinué, or change anything,
but by an act of the will?

PIyl. It cannot.

Phil. The mind therefore is to be accounted active in its
perceptions so far forth as volition is included in them?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by
the motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition;
so likewise in applying it to my nose. But is either of these
smelling?

Hyl. No.

Phil. I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my
breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition.
But neither can this be called smelling: for, if it were, I should
smell every time I breathed in that manner?

Hyl. True.

Phil. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever
more there is—as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any
smell at all—this is independent of my will, and therein I am
altogether passive. Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?

Hyl. No, the very same.

Phil. Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your
eyes, or keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?

Hyl. Without doubt.

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[ 408 ]

Phil. But, doth it in like manner depend on your will that in
looking on this flower yon perceive white rather than any other
colour? Or, directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the
heaven, can you avoid seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the
effect of your volition?

Hyl. No, certainly.

Phil. You are then in these respects altogether passive?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. Tell me now, whether seeing consists in perceiving light
and colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?

Hyl. Without doubt, in the former.

Phil. Since therefore you are in the very perception of light
and colours altogether passive, what is become of that action
you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And,
doth it not follow from your own concessions, that the perception
of light and colours, including no action in it, may exist in an
unperceiving substance? And is not this a plain contradiction?

Hyl. 1 know not what to think of it.

Phil. Besides, since you distinguish the active and passive
in every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is
it possible that pain, be it as little active as you picase, should
exist in an unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the
point, and then confess ingenuously, whether light and colours,
tastes, sounds, &c. are not all equally passions or sensations in
the soul. You may indeed cali them extemal objects, and give
them in words what subsistence you picase. But, examine your
own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be not as 1 say?

Hyl. 1 acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation
of what passes in my mind, 1 can discover nothing else but that 1
am a thinking being, affected with variety of sensations; neither
is it possible to conceive how a sensation should exist in an
unperceiving substance.—But then, on the other hand, when 1
look on sensible things in a different view, considering them as
so many modes and qualities, 1 find it necessary to suppose a

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material substratum, without which they cannot be conceived to
exist*^^

Phil. Material substratum cali you it? Fray, by which of your
senses carne you acquainted with that being?

Hyl. It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being
perceived by the senses.

Phil. I presume then it was by reflexión and reason you
obtained the idea of it?

PIyl. I do not pretend to any proper positive idea of it. However,
I conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist
without a support.

Phil. It seems then you have only a relative notion of it, or that
you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it
bears to sensible qualities?

Hyl. Right.

Phil. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation
consists.

Hyl. Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term substratum, or
substancel

Phil. If so, the Word substratum should import that it is spread
under the sensible qualities or accidents?

Hyl. True.

Phil. And consequently under extensión?

Hyl. I own it.

Phil. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct
from extensión?

Hyl. I tell you, extensión is only a mode, and Matter is
something that supports modes. And is it not evident the thing
supported is different from the thing supporting?

*** After maintaining, in the preceding part of this Dialogue, the inevitable
dependence of all the qualities of Matter upon percipient Spirit, the argument
now proceeds to dispose of the supposition that Matter may still be an
unmanifested or unqualified substratum, independent of living percipient
Spirit.

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[ 410 ]

Phü. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of,
extensión is supposed to be the substratum of extensión?

Hyl. Just so.

Phü. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without
extensión? or is not the idea of extensión necessarily included in
spreadingl

Hyl It is.

Phü. Whatsoever therefore yon suppose spread under anything
must have in itself an extensión distinct from the extensión of
that thing under which it is spread?

Hyl It must.

Phü. Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the
substratum of extensión, must have in itself another extensión,
by which it is qualified to be a substratum: and so on to infinity?
And 1 ask whether this be not absurd in itself, and repugnan!
to what you granted just now, to wit, that the substratum was
something distinct from and exclusive of extensión?

Hyl Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. 1 do not mean
that Matter is spread in a gross literal sense under extensión.
The Word substratum is used only to express in general the same
thing with substance.

Phü. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term
substance. Is it not that it stands under accidents?

Hyl The very same.

Phü. But, that one thing may stand under or support another,
must it not be extended?

Hyl It must.

Phü. Is not therefore this supposition hable to the same
absurdity with the former?

Hyl You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not
fair, Philonous.

Phü. 1 am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are
at liberty to explain them as you picase. Only, 1 beseech you,
make me understand something by them. You tell me Matter

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supports or stands under accidents. How! is it as your legs
support your body?

Hyl. No; that is the literal sense.

Phil. Fray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you
understand it in.—How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?

Hyl. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I
understood well enough what was meant by Matter's supporting
accidents. But now, the more I think on it the less can I
comprehend it: in short I find that I know nothing of it.

Phil. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative
ñor positivo, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, ñor
what relation it bears to accidents?

Hyl. I acknowledge it.

Phil. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how
qualities or accidents should really exist, without conceiving at
the same time a material support of them?

Hyl. I did.

Phil. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of
qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot
conceive?

Hyl. It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some
fallacy or other. Fray what think you of this? It is just come
into my head that the ground of all our mistake lies in your
treating of each quality by itself. Now, I grant that each quality
cannot singly subsist without the mind. Colour cannot without
extensión, neither can figure without some other sensible quality.

But, as the several qualities united or blended together form
entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may not
be supposed to exist without the mind.

Phil. Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory.
Though indeed we went through all the qualities by ñame one
after another, yet my arguments, or rather your concessions,
nowhere tended to prove that the Secondary Qualities did not
subsist each alone by itself; but, that they were not ai a// without [411]

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the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure and motion we concluded
they could not exist without the mind, because it was impossible
even in thought to sepárate them from all secondary qualities, so
as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this was not
the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass
by all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if
you will have it so) 1 am content to put the whole upon this issue.
If you can conceive it possible for any mixture or combination
of qualities, or any sensible object whatever, to exist without the
mind, then 1 will grant it actually to be so.

Hyl. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What
more easy than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself,
independent of, and unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? 1 do
at this present time conceive them existing after that manner.

Phil. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the
same time unseen?

Hyl. No, that were a contradiction.

Phil. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of conceiving a
thing which is unconceived?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. The tree or house therefore which you think of is
conceived by you?

Hyl. How should it be otherwise?

Phil. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?

Hyl. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.

Phil. How then carne you to say, you conceived a house or
tree existing independent and out of all minds whatsoever?

Hyl. That was 1 own an oversight; but stay, let me consider
what led me into it.—It is a pleasant mistake enough. As 1
was thinking of a tree in a solitary place, where no one was
present to see it, methought that was to conceive a tree as
existing unperceived or unthought of; not considering that 1
myself conceived it all the while. But now 1 plainly see that all 1
can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. 1 may indeed conceive

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in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a mountain,
but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can conceive [4i2]
them existing out of the minds of all Spirits.

Phil. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive
how any one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than
in a mind?

Hyl I do.

Phil. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that
which you cannot so much as conceive?

Hyl. I profess I know not what to think; but still there are
some surupíes remain with me. Is it not certain I see things at a
distancel Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example,
to be a great way off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?

Phil. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like
objects?

Hyl. I do.

Phil. And have they not then the same appearance of being
distant?

Hyl. They have.

Phil. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a
dream to be without the mind?

Hyl. By no means.

Phil. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects
are without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein
they are perceived.

Hyl. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in
those cases?

Phil. By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately
perceive, neither sense ñor reason informs you that it actually
exists without the mind. By sense you only know that you are
affected with such certain sensations of light and colours, &c.
And these you will not say are without the mind.

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[413]

Hyl. True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight
suggests something of outness or distancel

Phil. Upon approaching a distan! object, do the visible size
and figure change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all
distances?

Hyl. They are in a continual change.

Phil. Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform
you, that the visible object you immediately perceive exists
at a distance*^^, or will be perceived when you advance
farther onward; there being a continued series of visible objects
succeeding each other during the whole time of your approach.

Hyl. It doth not; but still 1 know, upon seeing an object,
what object 1 shall perceive after having passed over a certain
distance: no matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is
still something of distance suggested in the case.

Phil. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then
tell me whether there be any more in it than this: From the ideas
you actually perceive by sight, you have by experience learned
to collect what other ideas you will (according to the standing
order of nature) be affected with, after such a certain succession
of time and motion.

Hyl. Upon the whole, 1 take it to be nothing else.

Phil. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind
was on a sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience
of what may be suggested by sight?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. He would not then, according to you, have any notion of
distance annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a
new set of sensations, existing only in his mind?

Hyl. It is undeniable.

[See the Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, and its Vindication.] Note
by the Author in the 1734 edition.

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Phil. But, to make it still more plain: is not distance a line
turned endwise to the eye^^^?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?

PIyl. It cannot.

Phil. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly
and immediately perceived by sight?

Hyl. It should seem so.

Phil. Again, is it your opinión that colours are at a distance^'^?

Hyl. It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.

Phil. But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the
same place with extensión and figures?

Hyl. They do.

Phil. How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist
without, when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible
appearance being the very same with regard to both?

Hyl. I know not what to answer.

Phil. But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately
perceived by the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed
out of the mind. For, whatever is immediately perceived is an
idea*^^: and can any idea exist out of the mind?

Hyl. To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous,
can we perceive or know nothing beside our ideas*^^?

Phil. As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, that
is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether
you perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And
I ask you, whether the things immediately perceived are other
than your own sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than
once, in the course of this conversation, declared yourself on

Cf. Essay on Vision, sect. 2.

Cf. Ibid., sect. 43.

“an idea,” i.e. a phenomenon present to our senses.

*** This was Reid's fundamental question in his criticism of Berkeley.

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[415]

those points; but you seem, by this last question, to have departed
from what you then thought.

Hyl. To speak the ttuth, Philonous, I think there are two
kinds of objects:—the one perceived immediately, which are
likewise called ideas', the other are real things or external objects,
perceived by the mediation of ideas, which are their images and
representations. Now, 1 own ideas do not exist without the mind;
but the latter sort of objects do. 1 am sorry 1 did not think of
this distinction sooner; it would probably have cut short your
discourse.

Phil. Are those external objects perceived by sense, or by
some other faculty?

Hyl. They are perceived by sense.

Phil. How! Is there anything perceived by sense which is not
immediately perceived?

Hyl. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when
1 look on a picture or statue of Julius Csesar, 1 may be said after a
manner to perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.

Phil. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are
immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and
that these also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a
conformity or resemblance to our ideas?

Hyl. That is my meaning.

Phil. And, in the same way that Julius Csesar, in himself
invisible, is nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in
themselves imperceptible, are perceived by sense.

Hyl. In the very same.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius
Csesar, do you see with your eyes any more than some colours
and figures, with a certain symmetry and composition of the
whole?

Hyl. Nothing else.

Phil. And would not a man who had never known anything of
Julius Csesar see as much?

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519

Hyl. He would.

Phil. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as
perfect a degree as you?

Hyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to
the Román emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from
the sensations or ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you
acknowledge you have no advantage over him in that respect.
It should seem therefore to proceed from reason and memory:
should it not?

Hyl. It should.

Phil. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance
that anything is perceived by sense which is not immediately
perceived. Though I grant we may, in one acceptation, be said to
perceive sensible things mediately by sense: that is, when, from
a frequently perceived connexion, the immediate perception of
ideas by one sense suggests to the mind others, perhaps belonging
to another sense, which are wont to be connected with them. For
instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets, immediately
I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have had
that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear
the coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness,
nothing can be heard but sound', and the coach is not properly
perceived by sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise
when we are said to see a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and
heat of the iron are not the objects of sight, but suggested to
the imagination by the colour and figure which are properly
perceived by that sense. In short, those things alone are actually
and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have been
perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred
on US. As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to
the mind by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to
return to your comparison of Cíesar's picture, it is plain, if you
keep to that, you must hold the real things, or archetypes of our

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[417]

ideas, are not perceived by sense, but by some internal faculty
of the soul, as reason or memory. I would therefore fain know
what arguments yon can draw from reason for the existence of
what yon cali real things or material objects. Or, whether yon
remember to have seen them formerly as they are in themselves;
or, if yon have heard or read of any one that did.

Hyl. I see, Philonous, yon are disposed to raillery; but that
will never convince me.

Phil. My aim is only to learn from yon the way to come
at the knowledge of material beings. Whatever we perceive is
perceived immediately or mediately: by sense, or by reason and
reflexión. But, as you have excluded sense, pray shew me what
reason you have to believe their existence; or what médium you
can possibly make use of to prove it, either to mine or your own
understanding.

Hyl. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point,
I do not find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much
seem pretty plain, that it is at least possible such things may really
exist. And, as long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I
am resolved to believe as I did, till you bring good reasons to the
contrary.

Phil. What! Is it come to this, that you only believe the
existence of material objects, and that your belief is founded
barely on the possibility of its being true? Then you will have me
bring reasons against it: though another would think it reasonable
the proof should lie on him who holds the affirmative. And, after
all, this very point which you are now resolved to maintain,
without any reason, is in effect what you have more than once
during this discourse seen good reason to give up. But, to pass
over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our ideas do
not exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images, or
representations, of certain origináis that do?

Hyl. You take me right.

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Phil. They are then like external things^^^?

Hyl. They are.

Phil. Have those things a stable and permanent nature,
independen! of our senses; or are they in a perpetual change,
upon our producing any motions in our bodies—suspending,
exerting, or altering, our faculties or organs of sense?

PIyl. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which
remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or
in the posture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect
the ideas in our minds, but it were absurd to think they had the
same effect on things existing without the mind.

Phil. How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting
and variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything
fixed and constan!? Or, in other words, since all sensible
qualities, as size, figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are
continually changing, upon every alteration in the distance,
médium, or instruments of sensation; how can any determinate
material objects be properly represented or painted forth by
several distinct things, each of which is so different from and
unlike the rest? Or, if you say it resembles some one only of our
ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy from all
the false ones?

PIyl. I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to
say to this.

Phil. But neither is this all. Which are material objects in
themselves—perceptible or imperceptible?

Hyl. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but
ideas. All material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible,
and to be perceived only by our ideas.

Phil. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or origináis
insensible?

Hyl. Right.

817

[418]

Cf. Principies, sect. 8.

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Phil. But how can that which is sensible be like that which is
insensible? Can a real thing, in itself invisible, be like a colour,
or a real thing, which is not audible, be like a sound? In a word,
can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or
idea?

Hyl. I must own, I think not.

Phil. Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do
yon not perfectly know your own ideas?

PIyl. I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or
know can be no part of my idea^^^.

Phil. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me
if there be anything in them which can exist without the mind:
or if yon can conceive anything like them existing without the
mind.

Hyl. Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive
or understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And
it is most evident that no idea can exist without the mind^^'^.

Phil. You are therefore, by your principies, forced to deny
the reality of sensible things; since you made it to consist in an
absoluto existence exterior to the mind. That is to say, you are
a downright sceptic. So I have gained my point, which was to
shew your principies led to Scepticism.

Hyl. For the present I am, if not entirely convinced, at least
silenced.

Phil. I would fain know what more you would require in
order to a perfect conviction. Have you not had the liberty of
explaining yourself all manner of ways? Were any little slips in
discourse laid hold and insisted on? Or were you not allowed
to retract or reinforce anything you had offered, as best served
your purpose? Hath not everything you could say been heard

*** Cf. Principies, sect. 25, 26.

*** In other words, the percipient activity of a living spirit is the necessary
condition of the real existence of all ideas or phenomena immediately present
to our senses.

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523

and examined with all the fairness imaginable? In a word, have [4i9]
you not in every point been convinced out of your own mouth?

And, if you can at presen! discover any flaw in any of your
former concessions, or think of any remaining subterfuge, any
new distinction, colour, or comment whatsoever, why do you not
produce it?

Hyl. A little patience, Philonous. I am at presen! so amazed to
see myself ensnared, and as it were imprisoned in the labyrinths
you have drawn me into, that on the sudden it cannot be expected
I should find my way out. You must give me time to look about
me and recollect myself.

Phil. Hark; is not this the college bell?

Hyl. It rings for prayers.

Phil. We will go in then, if you picase, and meet here again
to-morrow morning. In the meantime, you may employ your
thoughts on this morning's discourse, and try if you can find any
fallacy in it, or inven! any new means to extricate yourself.

Hyl. Agreed.

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[ 421 ]

Hylas. I beg your pardon, Philonous, for not meeting you sooner.
All this morning my head was so filled with our late conversation
that I had not leisure to think of the time of the day, or indeed of
anything else.

Philonous. I am glad you were so intent upon it, in hopes if
there were any mistakes in your eoneessions, or fallaeies in my
reasonings from them, you will now diseover them to me.

Hyl. I assure you I have done nothing ever sinee I saw you
but seareh after mistakes and fallaeies, and, with that view, have
minutely examined the whole series of yesterday's diseourse: but
all in vain, for the notions it led me into, upon review, appear
still more elear and evident; and, the more I eonsider them, the
more irresistibly do they foree my assent.

Phil. And is not this, think you, a sign that they are genuine,
that they proeeed from nature, and are eonformable to right
reason? Truth and beauty are in this alike, that the strietest
survey sets them both off to advantage; while the false lustre of
error and disguise eannot endure being reviewed, or too nearly
inspeeted.

Hyl. I own there is a great deal in what you say. Ñor ean
any one be more entirely satisfied of the truth of those odd
eonsequenees, so long as I have in view the reasonings that
lead to them. But, when these are out of my thoughts, there
seems, on the other hand, something so satisfaetory, so natural
and intelligible, in the modern way of explaining things that, I
profess, I know not how to rejeet it.

Phil. I know not what way you mean.

Hyl. I mean the way of aeeounting for our sensations or ideas.

Phil. How is that?

Hyl. It is supposed the soul makes her residenee in some
part of the brain, from whieh the nerves take their rise, and are
thenee extended to all parts of the body; and that outward objeets.

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by the difieren! impressions they make on the organs of sense,
communicate certain vibrative motions to the nerves; and these
being filled with spirits propágate them to the brain or seat of
the soul, which, according to the various impressions or traces
thereby made in the brain, is variously affected with ideas*^*^.

Phil. And cali yon this an explication of the manner whereby
we are affected with ideas?

Hyl. Why not, Philonous? Have yon anything to object against
it?

Phil. I would first know whether I rightly understand your
hypothesis. Yon make certain traces in the brain to be the causes
or occasions of our ideas. Pray tell me whether by the brain you
mean any sensible thing.

PIyl. What else think you I could mean?

Phil. Sensible things are all immediately perceivable; and
those things which are immediately perceivable are ideas; and
these exist only in the mind. Thus much you have, if I mistake
not, long since agreed to.

PIyl. I do not deny it.

Phil. The brain therefore you speak of, being a sensible thing,
exists only in the mind^^^ Now, I would fain know whether you
think it reasonable to suppose that one idea or thing existing in
the mind occasions all other ideas. And, if you think so, pray
how do you account for the origin of that primary idea or brain
itself?

Hyl. I do not explain the origin of our ideas by that brain which
is perceivable to sense—this being itself only a combination of
sensible ideas—^but by another which I imagine.

An “explanation” afterwards elaborately developed by Hartley, in bis
Observations on Man (1749). Berkeley has probably Hobbes in view.

The brain with the human body in which it is included constitutes a part of
the material world, and must equally with the rest of the material world depend
for its realisation upon percipient Spirit as the realising factor.

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Phil. But are not things imagined as truly in the mind as things
perceived^^^?

Hyl. I must confess they are.

Phil. It comes, therefore, to the same thing; and yon ha ve
been all this while accounting for ideas by certain motions or
impressions of the brain; that is, by some alterations in an idea,
whether sensible or imaginable it matters not.

Hyl. I begin to suspect my hypothesis.

Phil. Besides spirits, all that we know or conceive are our
own ideas. When, therefore, yon say all ideas are occasioned by
impressions in the brain, do yon conceive this brain or no? If
yon do, then yon talk of ideas imprinted in an idea causing that
same idea, which is absurd. If yon do not conceive it, yon talk
unintelligibly, instead of forming a reasonable hypothesis.

Hyl. I now clearly see it was a mere dream. There is nothing
in it.

Phil. Yon need not be much concerned at it; for after all,
this way of explaining things, as yon called it, could never have
satisfied any reasonable man. What connexion is there between
a motion in the nerves, and the sensations of sound or colour in
the mind? Or how is it possible these should be the effect of that?

Hyl. But I could never think it had so little in it as now it
seems to have.

Phil. Well then, are you at length satisfied that no sensible
things have a real existence; and that you are in truth an arrant
sceptic?

Hyl. It is too plain to be denied.

Phil. Look! are not the fields covered with a delightful
verdure? Is there not something in the woods and groves, in the
rivers and olear springs, that soothes, that delights, that transports
the soul? At the prospect of the wide and deep ocean, or some
huge mountain whose top is lost in the clouds, or of an oíd

822

Cf. Principies, sect. 23.

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gloomy forest, are not our minds filled with a pleasing horror?

Even in rocks and deserts is there not an agreeable wildness?

How sincere a pleasure is it to behold the natural beauties of
the earth! To preserve and renew our relish for them, is not the
veil of night alternately drawn over her face, and doth she not [423]
change her dress with the seasons? How aptly are the elements
disposed! What variety and use [^^^in the meanest productions
of nature!] What delicacy, what beauty, what contrivance, in
animal and vegetable bodies! How exquisitely are all things
suited, as well to their particular ends, as to constitute opposite
parts of the whole! And, while they mutually aid and support, do
they not also set off and illustrate each other? Raise now your
thoughts from this hall of earth to all those glorious luminaries
that adorn the high arch of heaven. The motion and situation of
the planets, are they not admirable for use and order? Were those
(miscalled erratic) globes once known to stray, in their repeated
journeys through the pathless void? Do they not measure arcas
round the sun ever proportioned to the times? So fixed, so
immutable are the laws by which the unseen Author of nature
actuates the universe. How vivid and radiant is the lustre of the
fixed stars! How magnificent and rich that negligent profusión
with which they appear to be scattered throughout the whole
azure vault! Yet, if you take the telescope, it brings into your
sight a new host of stars that escape the naked eye. Here they
seem contiguous and minute, but to a nearer view immense orbs
of light at various distances, far sunk in the abyss of space. Now
you must cali imagination to your aid. The feeble narrow sense
cannot descry innumerable worlds revolving round the central
fires; and in those worlds the energy of an all-perfect Mind
displayed in endless forms. But, neither sense ñor imagination
are big enough to comprehend the boundless extent, with all its
glittering furniture. Though the labouring mind exert and strain

“in stones and minerals”—in first and second editions.

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each power to its utmost reach, there still stands out ungrasped a
surplusage immeasurable. Yet all the vast bodies that compose
this mighty frame, how distant and remóte soever, are by some
secret mechanism, some Divine art and forcé, linked in a mutual
dependence and intercourse with each other; even with this earth,
which was almost slipt from my thoughts and lost in the crowd
of worlds. Is not the whole system immense, beautiful, glorious
beyond expression and beyond thought! What treatment, then,
do those philosophers deserve, who would, deprive these noble
and delightful scenes of all reality? How should those Principies
be entertained that lead us to think all the visible beauty of the
creation a false imaginary glare? To be plain, can you expect this
Scepticism of yours will not be thought extravagantly absurd by
all men of sense?

Hyl. Other men may think as they picase; but for your part
you have nothing to reproach me with. My comfort is, you are as
much a sceptic as I am.

Phil. There, Hylas, I must beg leave to differ from you.

Hyl. What! Have you all along agreed to the premises, and
do you now deny the conclusión, and leave me to maintain those
paradoxes by myself which you led me into? This surely is not
fair.

Phil. I deny that I agreed with you in those notions that led
to Scepticism. You indeed said the reality of sensible things
consisted in an absolute existence out of the minds of spirits, or
distinct from their being perceived. And pursuant to this notion of
reality, you are obliged to deny sensible things any real existence:
that is, according to your own definition, you profess yourself
a sceptic. But I neither said ñor thought the reality of sensible
things was to be defined after that manner. To me it is evident,
for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot exist
otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that
they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on
my thought, and have an existence distinct from being perceived

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by there musí be some other Mind wherein they exist. As

sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there
an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.

Hyl. What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold;
nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, and that He
knows and comprehends all things.

Phil. Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly
believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because
they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on the other side,
immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, [425]
because all sensible things must be perceived by Him^^^.

Hyl. But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter
is it how we come by that belief?

Phil. But neither do we agree in the same opinión. For
philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to
be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absoluto
subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind
whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between
saying, There is a God, therefore He perceives all things', and
saying. Sensible things do really exist; and, if they really exist,
they are necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind: therefore
there is an infinite Mind, or Gotf’^^? This furnishes you with
a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident
principie, of the being of a God. Divines and philosophers had
proved beyond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness

Cf. Principies, sect. 29-33; also sect. 90.—The permanence of a thing,
during intervals in which it may he unperceived and unimagined hy human
beings, is here assumed, as a natural conviction.

In other words, men are apt to treat the omniscience of God as an inference
from the dogmatic assumption that God exists, instead of seeing that our cosmic
experience necessarily presupposes omnipotent and omniscient Intelligence at
its root.

Cf. Principies, sect. 90. A permanent material world is grounded on Divine
Mind, because it cannot but depend on Mind, while its reality is only partially
and at intervals sustained by finite minds.

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of the several parts of the creation, that it was the workmanship
of God. But that—setting aside all help of astronomy and natural
philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and
adjustment of things—an infinite Mind should be necessarily
inferred from*^^ the haré existence of the sensible world, is an
advantage to them only who have made this easy reflexión: That
the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several
senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas;
and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than
in a mind. Yon may now, without any laborious search into
the Sciences, without any subtlety of reason, or tedious length
of discourse, oppose and baffle the most strenuous advócate
for Atheism. Those miserable refuges, whether in an eternal
succession of unthinking causes and effects, or in a fortuitous
concourse of atoms; those wild imaginations of Vanini, Hobbes,
and Spinoza: in a word, the whole system of Atheism, is it not
entirely overthrown, by this single reflexión on the repugnancy
included in supposing the whole, or any part, even the most rude
and shapeless, of the visible world, to exist without a Mind?
Let any one of those abettors of impiety but look into his own
thoughts, and there try if he can conceive how so much as a rock,
a desert, a chaos, or confused jumble of atoms; how anything
at all, either sensible or imaginable, can exist independent of a
Mind, and he need go no farther to be convinced of his folly.
Can anything be fairer than to put a dispute on such an issue,
and leave it to a man himself to see if he can conceive, even in
thought, what he holds to be true in fact, and from a notional to
allow it a real existence^^^?

Hyl. It cannot be denied there is something highly serviceable

“necessarily inferred from”—rather necessarily presupposed in.

The present reality of Something implies the etemal existence of living
Mind, if Something musí exist etemally, and if real or concrete existence
involves living Mind. Berkeley's conception of material nature presupposes a
theistic basis.

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to religión in what you advance. But do you not think it looks
very like a notion entertained by some eminent moderns^^^, of
seeing all things in Godl

Phil. I would gladly know that opinión: pray explain it to me.

Hyl. They conceive that the soul, being immaterial, is
incapable of being united with material things, so as to perceive
them in themselves; but that she perceives them by her unión
with the substance of God, which, being spiritual, is therefore
purely intelligible, or capable of being the immediate object of
a spirit's thought. Resides, the Divine essence contains in it
perfections correspondent to each created being; and which are,
for that reason, proper to exhibit or represent them to the mind.

Phil. I do not understand how our ideas, which are things
altogether passive and inert^^°, can be the essence, or any part
(or like any part) of the essence or substance of God, who is an
impassive, indivisible, puré, active being. Many more difficulties
and objections there are which occur at first view against this
hypothesis; but I shall only add, that it is hable to all the [427]
absurdities of the common hypothesis, in making a created world
exist otherwise than in the mind of a Spirit. Reside all which
it hath this peculiar to itself; that it makes that material world
serve to no purpose. And, if it pass for a good argument against
other hypotheses in the Sciences, that they suppose Nature, or
the Divine wisdom, to make something in vain, or do that by
tedious roundabout methods which might have been performed
in a much more easy and compendious way, what shall we think
of that hypothesis which supposes the whole world made in vain?

PIyl. But what say you? Are not you too of opinión that we
see all things in God? If I mistake not, what you advance comes
near it.

He refers of course to Malebranche and his Divine Vision.

But Malebranche uses idea in a higher meaning than Berkeley does—akin
to the Platonic, and in contrast to the sensuous phenomena which Berkeley
calis ideas.

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Phil. [^^^Few men think; yet all have opinions. Henee men's
opinions are superficial and confused. It is nothing strange
that tenets which in themselves are ever so difieren!, should
nevertheless be confounded with each other, by those who do
no! consider them attentively. I shall no! therefore be surprised if
some men imagine that I run into the enthusiasm of Malebranche;
though in truth I am very remóte from it. He builds on the most
abstrae! general ideas, which I entirely disclaim. He asserts an
absolute external world, which I deny. He maintains that we are
deceived by our senses, and know not the real natures or the true
forms and figures of extended beings; of all which I hold the
direct contrary. So that upon the whole there are no Principies
more fundamentally opposite than his and mine. It must be
owned that] I entirely agree with what the holy Scripture saith,
'That in God we Uve and move and have our being.' But that we
see things in His essence, after the manner above set forth, I am
far from believing. Take here in brief my meaning:—It is evident
that the things I perceive are my own ideas, and that no idea can
exist unless it be in a mind: ñor is it less plain that these ideas
or things by me perceived, either themselves or their archetypes,
exist independently of my mind, since I know myself not to be
their author, it being out of my power to determine at pleasure
what particular ideas I shall be affected with upon opening my
eyes or ears^^^: they must therefore exist in some other Mind,
whose Will it is they should be exhibited to me. The things,
I say, immediately perceived are ideas or sensations, cali them
which you will. But how can any idea or sensation exist in, or
be produced by, anything but a mind or spirit? This indeed is
inconceivable^^^. And to assert that which is inconceivable is to
talk nonsense: is it not?

Hyl. Without doubt.

The passage within brackets first appeared in the third edition.

Cf. Principies, sect. 25-33.

Cf. Ibid., sect. 3-24.

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533

Phil. But, on the other hand, it is very conceivable that they
should exist in and be produced by a Spirit; since ibis is no more
than I daily experience in myself^^^, inasmuch as I perceive
numberless ideas; and, by an act of my will, can form a great
variety of them, and raise them up in my imagination: though, it
must be confessed, these creatures of the fancy are not altogether
so distinct, so strong, vivid, and permanent, as those perceived by
my senses—which latter are called real things. From all which I
conclude, there is a Mind which ajfects me every moment with all
the sensible impressions Iperceive. And, from the variety, order,
and manner of these, I conclude the Author of them to be wise,
powerful, and good, beyond comprehension. Mark it well; I do
not say I see things by perceiving that which represents them in
the intelligible Substance of God. This I do not understand; but I
say, the things by me perceived are known by the understanding,
and produced by the will of an infinite Spirit. And is not all
this most plain and evident? Is there any more in it than what
a little observation in our own minds, and that which passeth
in them, not only enables us to conceive, but also obliges us to
acknowledge?

Hyl. I think I understand you very clearly; and own proof
you give of a Deity seems no less evident than it is surprising.

But, allowing that God is the supreme and universal Cause of all
things, yet, may there not be still a Third Nature besides Spirits
and Ideas? May we not admit a subordínate and limited cause of [429]
our ideas? In a word, may there not for all that be Matterl

Phil. How often must I incúlcate the same thing? You allow
the things immediately perceived by sense to exist nowhere
without the mind; but there is nothing perceived by sense which
is not perceived immediately; therefore there is nothing sensible

I can represent to myself another mind perceiving and conceiving things;
because I have an example of this my own conscious life. I cannot represent to
myself sensible things existing totally unperceived and unimagined; because I
cannot, without a contradiction, have an example of this in my own experience.

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that exists without the mind. The Matter, therefore, which you
still insist on is something intelligible, I suppose; something that
may be discovered by reason^^^, and not by sense.

Hyl. You are in the right.

Phil. Fray let me know what reasoning your belief of Matter
is grounded on; and what this Matter is, in your present sense of
it.

Hyl. I find myself affected with various ideas whereof I know
I am not the cause; neither are they the cause of themselves,
or of one another, or capable of subsisting by themselves, as
being altogether inactive, fleeting, dependent beings. They have
therefore some cause distinct from me and them: of which I
pretend to know no more than that it is the cause of my ideas.
And this thing whatever it be, I cali Matter.

Phil. Tell me, Hylas, hath every one a liberty to change the
current proper signification attached to a common ñame in any
language? For example, suppose a traveller should tell you that
in a certain country men pass unhurt through the fire; and, upon
explaining himself, you found he meant by the word fire that
which others cali water. Or, if he should assert that there are
trees that walk upon two legs, meaning men by the term trees.
Would you think this reasonable?

Hyl. No; I should think it very absurd. Common custom
is the standard of propriety in language. And for any man to
affect speaking improperly is to pervert the use of speech, and
can never serve to a better purpose than to protract and multiply
disputes where there is no difference in opinión.

Phil. And doth not Matter, in the common current acceptation
of the word, signify an extended solid moveable, unthinking,
inactive Substance?

Hyl. It doth.

835 .

‘‘reason,” i.e. by reasoning.

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535

Phil. And, hath it not been made evident that no such substance
can possibly exist^^^? And, though it should be allowed to exist,
yet how can that which is inactive be a cause', or that which
is unthinking be a cause of thoughtl You may, indeed, if
you picase, annex to the word Matter a contrary meaning to
what is vulgarly received; and tell me you understand by it, an
unextended, thinking, active being, which is the cause of our
ideas. But what else is this than to play with words, and run into
that very fault you just now condemned with so much reason? I
do by no means find fault with your reasoning, in that you collect
a cause from the phenomena: but I deny that the cause deducible
by reason can properly be termed Matter*^^.

Hyl. There is indeed something in what you say. But I am
afraid you do not thoroughly comprehend my meaning. I would
by no means be thought to deny that God, or an infinite Spirit,
is the Supreme Cause of all things. All I contend for is, that,
subordinate to the Supreme Agent, there is a cause of a limited
and inferior nature, which concurs in the production of our ideas,
not by any act of will, or spiritual efficiency, but by that kind of
action which belongs to Matter, viz. motion.

Phil. I find you are at every turn relapsing into your oíd
exploded conceit, of a moveable, and consequently an extended,
substance, existing without the mind. What! Have you already
forgotten you were convinced; or are you willing I should repeat
what has been said on that head? In truth this is not fair dealing
in you, still to suppose the being of that which you have so often
acknowledged to have no being. But, not to insist farther on
what has been so largely handled, I ask whether all your ideas
are not perfectly passive and inert, including nothing of action in

Berkeley's material substance is a natural or divinely ordered aggregate of
sensible qualities or phenomena.

Inasmuch as, according to Berkeley, it must be a living Spirit, and it would
be an abuse of language to cali this Matter.

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Hyl. They are.

Phil. And are sensible qualities anything else bul ideas?

Hyl. How often have I acknowledged that they are not.

Phil. But is not motion a sensible quality?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Consequently it is no action?

Hyl. I agree with yon. And indeed it is very plain that when
I stir my finger, it remains passive; but my will which produced
the motion is active.

Phil. Now, I desire to know, in the first place, whether,
motion being allowed to be no action, yon can conceive any
action besides volition: and, in the second place, whether to
say something and conceive nothing be not to talk nonsense^^^:
and, lastly, whether, having considered the premises, yon do
not perceive that to suppose any efficient or active Cause of our
ideas, other than Spirit, is highly absurd and unreasonable?

Hyl. I give up the point entirely. But, though Matter may not
be a cause, yet what hinders its being an instrument, subservient
to the supreme Agent in the production of our ideas?

Phil. An instrument say you; pray what may be the figure,
springs, wheels, and motions, of that instrument?

Hyl. Those I pretend to determine nothing of, both the
substance and its qualities being entirely unknown to me.

Phil. What? You are then of opinión it is made up of unknown
parts, that it hath unknown motions, and an unknown shape?

Hyl. I do not believe that it hath any figure or motion at all,
being already convinced, that no sensible qualities can exist in
an unperceiving substance.

Cf. Principies, sect. 25, 26.

It is here argued that as volition is the only originative cause implied in
our experience, and which consequently alone puts true meaning into the term
Cause, to apply that term to what is not volition is to make it meaningless, or
at least to misapply it.

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537

Phil. But what notion is it possible to frame of an instrument
void of all sensible qualities, even extensión itself?

Hyl. I do not pretend to have any notion of it.

Phil. And what reason have you to think this unknown, this
inconceivable Somewhat doth exist? Is it that you imagine God
cannot act as well without it; or that you find by experience the
use of some such thing, when you form ideas in your own mind? [432]

PIyl. You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Fray
what reasons have you not to believe it?

Phil. It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence
of anything, if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist
on reasons for believing, you will not so much as let me know
what it is you would have me believe; since you say you have no
manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider
whether it be like a philosopher, or even like a man of common
sense, to pretend to believe you know not what, and you know
not why.

PIyl. Hold, Philonous. When I tell you Matter is an instrument,

I do not mean altogether nothing. It is true I know not the
particular kind of instrument; but, however, I have some notion
of instrument in general, which I apply to it.

Phil. But what if it should prove that there is something, even
in the most general notion of instrument, as taken in a distinct
sense from cause, which makes the use of it inconsistent with the
Divine attributes?

Hyl. Make that appear and I shall give up the point.

Phil. What mean you by the general nature or notion of
instrumenté

Hyl. That which is common to all particular Instruments
composeth the general notion.

Phil. Is it not common to all Instruments, that they are applied
to the doing those things only which cannot be performed by
the mere act of our wills? Thus, for instance, I never use an
instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition.

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But I should use one if I were to remo ve part of a rock, or tear up
a tree by the roots. Are you of the same mind? Or, can you shew
any example where an instrument is made use of in producing an
effect immediately depending on the will of the agent?

Hyl. I own I cannot.

Phil. How therefore can you suppose that an All-perfect
Spirit, on whose Will all things have an absoluto and immediate
dependence, should need an instrument in his operations, or, not
needing it, make use of it? Thus it seems to me that you are
obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be
incompatible with the infinite perfection of God; that is, by your
own confession, to give up the point.

Hyl. It doth not readily occur what I can answer you.

Phil. But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth,
when it has been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings
of finite powers, are forced to make use of instruments. And the
use of an instrument sheweth the agent to be limited by rules of
another's prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in
such a way, and by such conditions. Whence it seems a olear
consequence, that the supremo unlimited Agent useth no tool or
instrument at all. The will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner
exerted than executed, without the application of means; which,
if they are employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of
any real efficacy that is in them, or necessary aptitude to produce
any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of nature, or
those conditions prescribed to them by the First Cause, who is
Himself above all limitation or prescription whatsoever^^®.

Hyl. I will no longer maintain that Matter is an instrument.

While thus arguing against the need for independent matter, as an instrument
needed hy God, Berkeley fails to explain how dependent matter can he a
médium of intercourse hetween persons. It must be more than a subjective
dream, however well ordered, if it is available for this purpose. Unless the
visible and audible ideas or phenomena presented to me are actually seen and
heard by other men, how can they be instrumental in intercommunication?

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539

However, I would not be understood to give up its existenee
neither; sinee, notwithstanding what hath been said, it may still
be an occasion^'^^.

Phil. How many shapes is your Matter to take? Or, how often
must it be proved not to exist, before you are eontent to part
with it? But, to say no more of this (though by all the laws of
disputation I may justly blame you for so frequently changing
the signification of the principal term)—I would fain know what
you mean by affirming that matter is an occasion, having already
denied it to be a cause. And, when you have shewn in what sense
you understand occasion, pray, in the next place, be pleased to
shew me what reason induceth you to believe there is such an
occasion of our ideas?

Hyl. As to the first point: by occasion I mean an inactive
unthinking being, at the presence whereof God excites ideas in
our minds.

Phil. And what may be the nature of that inactive unthinking
being?

PIyl. I know nothing of its nature.

Phil. Proceed then to the second point, and assign some reason
why we should allow an existenee to this inactive, unthinking,
unknown thing.

PIyl. When we see ideas produced in our minds, after an
orderly and constant manner, it is natural to think they have some
fixed and regular occasions, at the presence of which they are
excited.

Phil. You acknowledge then God alone to be the cause of our
ideas, and that He causes them at the presence of those occasions.

Hyl. That is my opinión.

Phil. Those things which you say are present to God, without
doubt He perceives.

Cf. Principies, sect. 68-79.

[434]

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Hyl. Certainly; otherwise they could not be to Him an occasion
of acting.

Phil. Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis,
or answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is hable
to: I only ask whether the order and regularity observable in the
series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be not sufficiently
accounted for by the wisdom and power of God; and whether
it doth not derógate from those attributes, to suppose He is
influenced, directed, or put in mind, when and what He is to
act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in case
I granted all yon contend for, it would make anything to your
purpose; it not being easy to conceive how the external or
absoluto existence of an unthinking substance, distinct from its
being perceived, can be inferred from my allowing that there are
certain things perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him
the occasion of producing ideas in us?

Hyl. I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of
occasion seeming now altogether as groundless as the rest.

Phil. Do you not at length perceive that in all these different
acceptations of Matter, you have been only supposing you know
not what, for no manner of reason, and to no kind of use?

Hyl. I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they
have been so accurately examined. But still, methinks, I have
some confused perception that there is such a thing as Matter.

Phil. Either you perceive the being of Matter immediately or
mediately. If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses
you perceive it. If mediately, let me know by what reasoning it is
inferred from those things which you perceive immediately. So
much for the perception. Then for the Matter itself, I ask whether
it is object, substratum, cause, instrument, or occasion? You
have already pleaded for each of these, shifting your notions,
and making Matter to appear sometimes in one shape, then in
another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved and
rejected by yourself. If you have anything new to advance I

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541

would gladly hear it.

Hyl. I think I have already offered all I had to say on those
heads. I am at a loss what more to urge.

Phil. And yet you are loath to part with your oíd prejudice.

But, to make you quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what
has been hitherto suggested, you will farther consider whether,
upon supposition that Matter exists, you can possibly conceive
how you should be affected by it. Or, supposing it did not exist,
whether it be not evident you might for all that be affected with
the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the very
same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have*^^.

Hyl. I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things
just as we do now, though there was no Matter in the world;
neither can I conceive, if there be Matter, how it should produce
any idea in our minds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely
satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as
Matter in any of the foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot
help supposing that there is Matter in some sense or other. What
that is I do not indeed pretend to determine.

Phil. I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of
that unknown being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is
a Substance; and if so, whether you can suppose a Substance [436]
without accidents; or, in case you suppose it to have accidents or
qualities, I desire you will let me know what those qualities are,
at least what is meant by Matter's supporting them?

Hyl. We have already argued on those points. I have no more
to say to them. But, to prevent any farther questions, let me
tell you I at present understand by Matter neither substance ñor
accident, thinking ñor extended being, neither cause, instrument,
ñor occasion, but Something entirely unknown, distinct from all
these^"^^.

Cf. Principies, sect. 20.

Cf. Principies, sect. 80, 81.

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Phü. It seems then you inelude in your presen! notion of
Matter nothing bu! the general abstrae! idea of entity.

Hyl. Nothing else; save only tha! I superadd to ibis general
idea the negation of all those particular things, qualities, or ideas,
that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise apprehend.

Phil. Fray where do you suppose this unknown Matter to
exist?

Hyl. Oh Philonous! now you think you have entangled me;
for, if I say it exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in
the mind, since it is agreed that place or extensión exists only in
the mind. But I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know
not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is
a negative answer for you. And you must expect no other to all
the questions you put for the future about Matter.

Phil. Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to
inform me after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what
you mean by its existencel

Hyl. It neither thinks ñor acts, neither perceives ñor is
perceived.

Phil. But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its
existence?

Hyl. Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive
notion or meaning at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to
own my ignorance. I know not what is meant by its existence, or
how it exists.

Phil. Continué, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part,
and tell me sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of
Entity in general, prescinded from and exclusive of all thinking
and corporeal beings^^^, all particular things whatsoever.

Hyl. Hold, let me think a little-1 profess, Philonous, I

do not find that I can. At first glance, methought I had some
dilute and airy notion of Puré Entity in abstrae!; but, upon closer

i.e. all Spirits and their dependen! ideas or phenomena.

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attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on
it, the more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving
none but negativo answers, and not pretending to the least degree
of any positivo knowledge or conception of Matter, its where, its
how, its entity, or anything belonging to it.

Phil. When, therefore, you speak of the existence of Matter,
you have not any notion in your mind?

Hyl. None at all.

Phil. Fray tell me if the case stands not thus:—At first, from a
belief of material substance, you would have it that the immediate
objects existed without the mind; then that they are archetypes;
then causes; next instruments; then occasions: lastly, something
in general, which being interpreted proves nothing. So Matter
comes to nothing. What think you, Hylas, is not this a fair
summary of your whole proceeding?

PIyl. Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our
not being able to conceive a thing is no argument against its
existence.

Phil. That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other
circumstance, there may reasonably be inferred the existence of
a thing not immediately perceived; and that it were absurd for
any man to argüe against the existence of that thing, from his
having no direct and positivo notion of it, I freely own. But,
where there is nothing of all this; where neither reason ñor
revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing; where
we have not even a relativo notion of it; where an abstraction is
made from perceiving and being perceived, from Spirit and idea:
lastly, where there is not so much as the most inadequate or faint
idea pretended to—I will not indeed thence conclude against the
reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my inference
shall be, that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words
to no manner of purpose, without any design or signification [ 438 ]
whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere jargon
should be treated.

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Hyl. To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments
seem in themselves unanswerable; but they ha ve not so great
an effect on me as to produce that entire conviction, that hearty
acquiescence, which attends demonstration*^^. I find myself still
relapsing into an obscure surmise of I know not what, matter.

Phil. But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must
concur to take away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in
the mind? Let a visible object be set in never so olear a light,
yet, if there is any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not
directed towards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And though
a demonstration be never so well grounded and fairly proposed,
yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a wrong bias on
the understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive
clearly, and adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is need of
time and pains: the attention must be awakened and detained by
a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same,
oft in different lights. I have said it already, and find I must
still repeat and incúlcate, that it is an unaccountable licence you
take, in pretending to maintain you know not what, for you know
not what reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be
paralleled in any art or Science, any sect or profession of men?
Or is there anything so barefacedly groundless and unreasonable
to be met with even in the lowest of common conversation?
But, perhaps you will still say, Matter may exist; though at the
same time you neither know what is meant by Matter, or by its
existence. This indeed is surprising, and the more so because it is

This, according to Hume (who takes for granted that Berkeley's
reasonings can produce no conviction), is the natural effect of Berkeley's
philosophy.—“Most of the writings of that very ingenious author (Berkeley)
form the best lessons of scepticism which are to be found either among the
ancient or modern philosophers, Bayle not excepted.... That all his arguments,
though otherwise intended, are, in reality, merely sceptical, appear from
this —that they admit of no answer, and produce no conviction. Their only
effect is to cause that momentary amazement and irresolution and confusión,
which is the result of scepticism.” (Hume's Essays, vol. II. Note N, p. 554.)

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altogether voluntary and of your own head], you not being [439]
led to it by any one reason; for I ehallenge you to shew me that
thing in nature which needs Matter to explain or aeeount for it.

Hyl. The reality of things eannot be maintained without
supposing the existenee of Matter. And is not this, think you, a
good reason why I should be earnest in its defenee?

Phil. The reality of things! What things? sensible or
intelligible?

Hyl. Sensible things.

Phil. My glove for example?

Hyl. That, or any other thing pereeived by the senses.

Phil. But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient
evidence to me of the existenee of this glove, that I see it, and feel
it, and wear it? Or, if this will not do, how is it possible I should
be assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see in
this place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never
did or can see, exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown
place, or in no place at all? How can the supposed reality of
that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really
exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or,
in general of anything which is imperceptible, that a perceptible
exists? Do but explain this and I shall think nothing too hard for
you.

Hyl. Upon the whole, I am content to own the existenee
of Matter is highly improbable; but the direct and absolute
impossibility of it does not appear to me.

Phil. But granting Matter to be possible, yet, upon that aeeount
merely, it can have no more claim to existenee than a golden
mountain, or a centaur.

Hyl. I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible;
and that which is possible, for aught you know, may actually
exist.

846

Omitted in last edition.

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[440]

Phü. I deny it to be possible; and have, if I mistake not,
evidently proved, from your own concessions, that it is not.
In the common sense of the word Matter, is there any more
implied than an extended, solid, figured, moveable substance,
existing without the mind? And have not yon acknowledged,
over and over, that yon have seen evident reason for denying the
possibility of such a substance?

Hyl. True, but that is only one sense of the term Matter.

Phü. But is it not the only proper genuine received sense?
And, if Matter, in such a sense, be proved impossible, may it not
be thought with good grounds absolutely impossible? Else how
could anything be proved impossible? Or, indeed, how could
there be any proof at all one way or other, to a man who takes
the liberty to unsettle and change the common signification of
words?

PIyl. I thought philosophers might be allowed to speak more
accurately than the vulgar, and were not always confined to the
common acceptation of a term.

Phü. But this now mentioned is the common received sense
among philosophers themselves. But, not to insist on that, have
you not been allowed to take Matter in what sense you pleased?
And have you not used this privilege in the utmost extent;
sometimes entirely changing, at others leaving out, or putting
into the definition of it whatever, for the present, best served
your design, contrary to all the known rules of reason and logic?
And hath not this shifting, unfair method of yours spun out our
dispute to an unnecessary length; Matter having been particularly
examined, and by your own confession refuted in each of those
senses? And can any more be required to prove the absolute
impossibility of a thing, than the proving it impossible in every
particular sense that either you or any one else understands it in?

PIyl. But I am not so thoroughly satisfied that you have proved
the impossibility of Matter, in the last most obscure abstracted
and indefinite sense.

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Phil. When is a thing shewn to be impossible?

Hyl. When a repugnancy is demonstrated between the ideas
comprehended in its definition.

Phil. But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can
be demonstrated between ideas?

PIyl. I agree with you.

Phil. Now, in that which you cali the obscure indefinite sense
of the Word Matter, it is plain, by your own confession, there
was included no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense;
which is the same thing as none. You are not, therefore, to expect
I should prove a repugnancy between ideas, where there are no
ideas; or the impossibility of Matter taken in an unknown sense,
that is, no sense at all. My business was only to shew you meant
nothing-, and this you were brought to own. So that, in all your [44i]
various senses, you have been shewed either to mean nothing at
all, or, if anything, an absurdity. And if this be not sufficient to
prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let me know
what is.

Hyl. I acknowledge you have proved that Matter is impossible;
ñor do I see what more can be said in defence of it. But, at
the same time that I give up this, I suspect all my other notions.

For surely none could be more seemingly evident than this once
was: and yet it now seems as false and absurd as ever it did
true before. But I think we have discussed the point sufficiently
for the present. The remaining part of the day I would willingly
spend in running over in my thoughts the several heads of this
morning's conversation, and to-morrow shall be glad to meet you
here again about the same time.

Phil. I will not fail to attend you.

[ 442 ]

The Third Dialogue

Philonous. ^^^Tell me, Hylas, what are the fruits of yesterday's
meditation? Has it eonfirmed you in the same mind you were in
at parting? or have you sinee seen eause to ehange your opinión?

Hylas. Truly my opinión is that all our opinions are alike
vain and uneertain. What we approve to-day, we eondemn to-
morrow. We keep a stir about knowledge, and spend our lives in
the pursuit of it, when, alas! we know nothing all the while: ñor
do I think it possible for us ever to know anything in this life.
Our faeulties are too narrow and too few. Nature eertainly never
intended us for speeulation.

Phil. What! Say you we ean know nothing, Hylas?

Hyl. There is not that single thing in the world whereof we
ean know the real nature, or what it is in itself.

Phil. Will you tell me I do not really know what fire or water
is?

Hyl. You may indeed know that fire appears hot, and water
fluid; but this is no more than knowing what sensations are
produeed in your own mind, upon the applieation of fire and
water to your organs of sense. Their internal eonstitution, their
true and real nature, you are utterly in the dark as to that.

Phil. Do I not know this to be a real stone that I stand on, and
that whieh I see before my eyes to be a real tree?

Hyl. Know? No, it is impossible you or any man alive should
know it. All you know is, that you have sueh a eertain idea or
appearanee in your own mind. But what is this to the real tree
[443] or stone? I tell you that eolour, figure, and hardness, whieh

you pereeive, are not the real natures of those things, or in the
least like them. The same may be said of all other real things, or
eorporeal substanees, whieh eompose the world. They have none
of them anything of themselves, like those sensible qualities by

“Tell me, Hylas,”—“So Hylas”—in first and second editions.

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US pereeived. We should not therefore pretend to affirm or know
anything of them, as they are in their own nature.

Phil. But surely, Hylas, I can distinguish gold, for example,
from iron: and how could this be, if I knew not what either truly
was?

Hyl. Believe me, Philonous, you can only distinguish between
your own ideas. That yellowness, that weight, and other sensible
qualities, think you they are really in the gold? They are only
relative to the senses, and have no absoluto existence in nature.

And in pretending to distinguish the species of real things, by
the appearances in your mind, you may perhaps act as wisely
as he that should conclude two men were of a different species,
because their clothes were not of the same colour.

Phil. It seems, then, we are altogether put off with the
appearances of things, and those false ones too. The very meat
I eat, and the cloth I wear, have nothing in them like what I see
and feel.

PIyl. Even so.

Phil. But is it not strange the whole world should be thus
imposed on, and so foolish as to believe their senses? And yet
I know not how it is, but men eat, and drink, and sleep, and
perform all the offices of life, as comfortably and conveniently
as if they really knew the things they are conversant about.

PIyl. They do so: but you know ordinary practice does not
require a nicety of speculative knowledge. Henee the vulgar
retain their mistakes, and for all that make a shift to bustle
through the affairs of life. But philosophers know better things.

Phil. You mean, they know that they know nothing.

Hyl. That is the very top and perfection of human knowledge.

Phil. But are you all this while in earnest, Hylas; and are you
seriously persuaded that you know nothing real in the world?
Suppose you are going to write, would you not cali for pen, ink, [444]
and paper, like another man; and do you not know what it is you
cali for?

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Hyl. How often must I tell you, that I know not the real
nature of any one thing in the universe? I may indeed upon
occasion make use of pen, ink, and paper. But what any one of
them is in its own true nature, I declare positively I know not.
And the same is true with regard to every other corporeal thing.
And, what is more, we are not only ignorant of the true and real
nature of things, but even of their existence. It cannot be denied
that we perceive such certain appearances or ideas; but it cannot
be concluded from thence that bodies really exist. Nay, now I
think on it, I must, agreeably to my former concessions, farther
declare that it is impossible any real corporeal thing should exist
in nature.

Phil. You amaze me. Was ever any thing more wild and
extravagant than the notions you now maintain: and is it not
evident you are led into all these extravagances by the belief of
material substancel This makes you dream of those unknown
natures^^^ in everything. It is this occasions your distinguishing
between the reality and sensible appearances of things. It is to
this you are indebted for being ignorant of what everybody else
knows perfectly well. Ñor is this all: you are not only ignorant
of the true nature of everything, but you know not whether
anything really exists, or whether there are any true natures
at all; forasmuch as you attribute to your material beings an
absolute or external existence, wherein you suppose their reality
consists. And, as you are forced in the end to acknowledge such
an existence means either a direct repugnancy, or nothing at all,
it follows that you are obliged to pulí down your own hypothesis
of material Substance, and positively to deny the real existence
of any part of the universe. And so you are plunged into the

Variously called noumena, “things-in-themselves,” absolute substances,
&c.—which Berkeley's philosophy banishes, on the ground of their
unintelligibility, and thus annihilates all farther questions conceming them.
Questions about existence are thus confined within the concrete or realising
experiences of living spirits.

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deepest and most deplorable scepticism that ever man was^^^.
Tell me, Hylas, is it not as I say?

Hyl. I agree with you. Material substance was no more than
an hypothesis; and a false and groundless one too. I will no
longer spend my breath in defenee of it. But whatever hypothesis
you advanee, or whatsoever seheme of things you introduce in
its stead, I doubt not it will appear every whit as false: let me but
be allowed to question you upon it. That is, suffer me to serve
you in your own kind, and I warrant it shall conduct you through
as many perplexities and contradictions, to the very same State
of scepticism that I myself am in at present.

Phil. I assure you, Hylas, I do not pretend to frame any
hypothesis at all^^*’. I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to
believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it
is my opinión that the real things are those very things I see, and
feel, and perceive*^^ by my senses. These I know; and, finding
they answer all the necessities and purposes of life, have no
reason to be solicitous about any other unknown beings. A piece
of sensible bread, for instance, would stay my stomach better
than ten thousand times as much of that insensible, unintelligible,
real bread you speak of. It is likewise my opinión that colours
and other sensible qualities are on the objects. I cannot for my life
help thinking that snow is white, and fire hot. You indeed, who by
SHOW and fire mean certain external, unperceived, unperceiving

Berkeley claims that his doctrine supersedes scepticism, and exeludes
the possibility of fallacy in sense, in excluding an ultimately representative
perception of Matter. He also assumes the reasonahleness of faith in the
reality and constaney of natural law. When we see an orange, the visual sense
guarantees only colour. The other phenomena, which we associate with this
colour—the other “qualities” of the orange—are, when we only see the orange,
matter of faith. We believe them to be realisable.

He accepts the common belief on which interpretation of sense symbols
proceeds—that sensible phenomena are evolved in rational order, under laws
that are independent of, and in that respect external to, the individual percipient.

Mediately as well as immediately.

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[ 446 ]

substances, are in the right to deny whiteness or heat to be
affections inherent in them. But I, who understand by those
words the things I see and feel, am obliged to think like other
folks. And, as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things,
so neither am I as to their existence. That a thing should be really
perceived by my senses*^^, and at the same time not really exist,
is to me a plain contradiction; since I cannot prescind or abstract,
even in thought, the existence of a sensible thing from its being
perceived. Wood, stones, fire, water, flesh, iron, and the like
things, which I ñame and discourse of, are things that I know.
And I should not have known them but that I perceived them by
my senses; and things perceived by the senses are immediately
perceived; and things immediately perceived are ideas; and ideas
cannot exist without the mind; their existence therefore consists
in being perceived; when, therefore, they are actually perceived
there can be no doubt of their existence. Away then with all
that scepticism, all those ridiculous philosophical doubts. What
a jest is it for a philosopher to question the existence of sensible
things, till he hath it proved to him from the veracity of God*^^;
or to pretend our knowledge in this point falls short of intuition
or demonstration^^^! I might as well doubt of my own being, as
of the being of those things I actually see and feel.

Hyl. Not so fast, Philonous: you say you cannot conceive how
sensible things should exist without the mind. Do you not?

We can hardly be said to have an immediate sense-perception of an
individual “thing”—meaning by “thing” a congeries of sense-ideas or
phenomena, presented to different senses. We immediately perceive some
of them, and believe in the others, which those suggest. See the last three notes.

He probably refers to Descartes, who argües for the trustworthiness of
our faculties from the veracity of God; thus apparently arguing in a circle,
seeing that the existence of God is manifested to us only through our suspected
faculties. But is not confidence in the trustworthiness of the Universal Power
at the heart of the universe, the fundamental presupposition of all human
experience, and God thus the basis and end of philosophy and of experience?

As Locke does. See Essay, Bk. IV. ch. 11.

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Phil. I do.

Hyl. Supposing you were annihilated, cannot you coneeive it
possible that things perceivable by sense may still exist^^^?

Phil. I can; but then it must be in another mind. When I
deny sensible things an existence out of the mind, I do not mean
my mind in particular, but all minds. Now, it is plain they
have an existence exterior to my mind; since I find them by
experience to be independent of it^^^. There is therefore some
other Mind wherein they exist, during the intervals between the
times of my perceiving them: as likewise they did before my
birth, and would do after my supposed annihilation. And, as
the same is true with regard to all other finite created spirits, it
necessarily follows there is an omnipresent etemal Mind, which
knows and comprehends all things, and exhibits them to our view
in such a manner, and according to such rules, as He Himself
hath ordained, and are by us termed the laws of nature^^’’.

Hyl. Answer me, Philonous. Are all our ideas perfectly inert
beings? Or have they any agency included in them?

Phil. They are altogether passive and inert^^*.

Hyl. And is not God an agent, a being purely active?

Phil. I acknowledge it.

Hyl. No idea therefore can be like unto, or represent the nature
of God?

Cf. Principies of Human Knowledge, sect. 45-48.

And to be thus extemal to individual minds.

It is here that Berkeley differs, for example, from Hume and Comte and J.S.
Mili; who accept sense-given phenomena, and assume the constancy of their
orderly reappearances, as a matter offact, while they confess total ignorance of
the cause of natural order. (Thus ignoran!, why do they assume reason or order
in nature?) The ground of sensible things, which Berkeley refers to Divine
Power, Mili expresses by the term “permanent possibility of sensation.” (See
his Examination of Hamilton, ch. 11.) Our belief in the continued existence
of a sensible thing in our absence merely means, with him, our conviction,
derived from custom, that we should perceive it under inexplicable conditions
which determine its appearance.

Cf. Principies, sect. 25, 26.

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[448]

Phil. It cannot.

Hyl. Since therefore yon have no idea of the mind of God,
how can yon conceive it possible that things should exist in His
mind? Or, if yon can conceive the mind of God, without having
an idea of it, why may not I be allowed to conceive the existence
of Matter, notwithstanding I have no idea of it?

Phil. As to your first question: I own I have properly no
idea, either of God or any other spirit; for these being active,
cannot be represented by things perfectly inert, as our ideas
are. I do nevertheless know that I, who am a spirit or thinking
substance, exist as certainly as I know my ideas exist^^^. Farther,
I know what I mean by the terms I and myself', and I know
this immediately or intuitively, though I do not perceive it
as I perceive a triangle, a colour, or a sound. The Mind,
Spirit, or Soul is that indivisible unextended thing which thinks,
acts, and perceives. I say indivisible, because unextended; and
unextended, because extended, figured, moveable things are
ideas; and that which perceives ideas, which thinks and wills, is
plainly itself no idea, ñor like an idea. Ideas are things inactive,
and perceived. And Spirits a sort of beings altogether different
from them. I do not therefore say my soul is an idea, or like
an idea. However, taking the word idea in a large sense, my
soul may be said to furnish me with an idea, that is, an image
or likeness of God—though indeed extremely inadequate. For,
all the notion I have of God is obtained by reflecting on my own
soul, heightening its powers, and removing its imperfections. I
have, therefore, though not an inactive idea, yet in myself some
sort of an active thinking image of the Deity. And, though I
perceive Him not by sense, yet I have a notion of Him, or know
Him by reflexión and reasoning. My own mind and my own
ideas I have an immediate knowledge of; and, by the help of
these, do mediately apprehend the possibility of the existence

Cf. Ibid., sect. 2, 27, 135-142.

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of other spirits and ideas^^°. Farther, from my own being, and
from the dependency I find in myself and my ideas, I do, by an
act of reason^^^ neeessarily infer the existenee of a God, and of
all created things in the mind of God. So much for your first
question. For the seeond: I suppose by this time you ean answer it
yourself. For you neither pereeive Matter^^^ objeetively, as you
do an inaetive being or idea; ñor know it, as you do yourself, by a
reflex aet^^^; neither do you mediately apprehend it by similitude [449]
of the one or the other^^^; ñor yet eolleet it by reasoning from
that which you know immediately^^^. All which makes the ease
of Matter widely different from that of the Deity.

You say your own soul supplies you with some sort of
an idea or image of God. But, at the same time, you acknowledge
you have, properly speaking, no idea of your own soul. You even
affirm that spirits are a sort of beings altogether different from
ideas. Consequently that no idea ean be like a spirit. We have

Inasmuch as I am conscious of myself, I can gather, through the sense
symbolism, the real existenee of other minds, external to my own. For I cannot,
of course, enter into the very consciousness of another person.

*** “reason,” i.e. reasoning or necessary inference—founded here on our sense
of personal dependence; not merely on our faith in sense symbolism and the
interpretability of the sensible world. Our belief in the existenee of finite
minds, external to our own, is, with Berkeley, an application of this faith.

“Matter,” i.e. Matter as abstract substance. Cf. Principies, sect. 135-138.

Does this imply that with Berkeley, self, as distinguished from the
phenomena of which the material world consists, is not a necessary
presuppostion of experience? He says in many places—I am conscious of
“my own being,” and that my mind is myself. Cf. Principies, sect, 2.

Cf. Principies, sect. 8.

Cf. Ibid., sect. 20

This important passage, printed within brackets, is not found in the first and
seeond editions of the Dialogues. It is, by anticipation, Berkeley's answer to
Hume's application of the objections to the reality of abstract or unperceived
Matter, to the reality of the Ego or Self, of which we are aware through
memory, as identical amid the changes of its successive States.

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[450]

therefore no idea of any spirit. Yon admit nevertheless that there
is spiritual Substance, although yon have no idea of it; while yon
deny there can be such a thing as material Substance, because
you have no notion or idea of it. Is this fair dealing? To act
consistently, you must either admit Matter or reject Spirit. What
say you to this?

Phil. I say, in the first place, that I do not deny the existence
of material substance, merely because I have no notion of it, but
because the notion of it is inconsistent; or, in other words, because
it is repugnant that there should be a notion of it. Many things, for
aught I know, may exist, whereof neither I ñor any other man hath
or can have any idea or notion whatsoever. But then those things
must be possible, that is, nothing inconsistent must be included
in their definition. I say, secondly, that, although we believe
things to exist which we do not perceive, yet we may not believe
that any particular thing exists, without some reason for such
belief: but I have no reason for believing the existence of Matter.
I have no immediate intuition thereof: neither can I immediately
from my sensations, ideas, notions, actions, or passions, infer
an unthinking, unperceiving, inactive Substance—either by
probable deduction, or necessary consequence. Whereas the
being of my Self, that is, my own soul, mind, or thinking
principie, I evidently know by reflexion^^’. You will forgive
me if I repeat the same things in answer to the same objections.
In the very notion or definition of material Substance, there
is included a manifest repugnance and inconsistency. But this
cannot be said of the notion of Spirit. That ideas should exist
in what doth not perceive, or be produced by what doth not act,
is repugnant. But, it is no repugnancy to say that a perceiving
thing should be the subject of ideas, or an active thing the cause
of them. It is granted we have neither an immediate evidence
ñor a demonstrative knowledge of the existence of other finite

See note 4 on preceding page.

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spirits; but it will not thenee follow that sueh spirits are on a foot
with material substanees: if to suppose the one be inconsistent,
and it be not inconsistent to suppose the other; if the one can be
inferred by no argument, and there is a probability for the other;
if we see signs and effects indicating distinct finite agents like
ourselves, and see no sign or symptom whatever that leads to a
rational belief of Matter. I say, lastly, that I have a notion of
Spirit, though I have not, strictly speaking, an idea of it^^^. I do
not perceive it as an idea, or by means of an idea, but know it by
reflexión.

Hyl. Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that,
according to your own way of thinking, and in consequence of
your own principies, it should follow that you are only a system
of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words
are not to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more
meaning in spiritual Substance than in material Substance, the
one is to be exploded as well as the other.

Phil. How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of
my own being; and that I myself am not my ideas, but somewhat
else*^^, a thinking, active principie that perceives, knows, wills,
and operates about ideas. I know that I, one and the same self,
perceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive
a sound, ñor a sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual
principie, distinct from colour and sound; and, for the same
reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am [ 45 1]
not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of
Matter^’*’. On the contrary, I know that nothing inconsistent can
exist, and that the existence of Matter implies an inconsistency.

*** Cf. Principies, sect. 142.

Cf. Ibid., sect. 2. Does he assume that he exists when he is not conscious of
ideas—sensible or other? Or, does he deny that he is ever unconscious?

That is of matter supposed to exist independently of any mind. Berkeley
speaks here of a consciousness of matter. Does he mean consciousness of
belief in abstrae! material Substance?

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Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual
substance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and
perceives ideas. But, I do not know what is meant when it is said
that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it and supports
either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon
the whole no parity of case between Spirit and Matter.]

Hyl. I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in
earnest think the real existence of sensible things consists in their
being actually perceived? If so; how comes it that all mankind
distinguish between them? Ask the first man you meet, and he
shall tell you, to be perceived is one thing, and to exist is another.

Phil. I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of
the World for the truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he
thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden, and he shall tell
you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives
it by his senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be
there, and he shall tell you, because he does not perceive it. What
he perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and saith it is
or exists; but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he saith,
hath no being.

Hyl. Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing
consists in being perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.

Phil. And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea
exist without being actually perceived? These are points long
since agreed between us.

Hyl. But, be your opinión never so true, yet surely you will
not deny it is shocking, and contrary to the common sense of
men^’^ Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath an existence
out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?

Phil. The same that I should myself, to wit, that it doth
exist out of his mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely

Cf. Principies, sect. 54-57.

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be shoeking to say, the real tree, existing without his mind, is
truly known and comprehended by (that is exists in) the infinite
mind of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware
of the direet and immediate proof there is of this; inasmuch as
the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing, implies a
mind wherein it is. But the point itself he eannot deny. The
question between the Materialists and me is not, whether things
have a real existenee out of the mind of this or that person^’^,
but, whether they have an absolute existenee, distinct from being
pereeived by God, and exterior to all minds^^^. This indeed some
heathens and philosophers have affirmed, but whoever entertains
notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy Seriptures will be of
another opinión.

Hyl. But, aecording to your notions, what difference is there
between real things, and chimeras formed by the imagination, or
the visions of a dream—sinee they are all equally in the mind^’^?

Phil. The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and
indistinet; they have, besides, an entire dependenee on the will.
But the ideas pereeived by sense, that is, real things, are more
vivid and elear; and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit
distinct from us, have not the like dependenee on our will. There
is therefore no danger of confounding these with the foregoing:
and there is as little of confounding them with the visions of
a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though
they should happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by
their not being connected, and of apiece with the preceding
and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be
distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you
distinguish things from chimeras on your scheme, the same, it is
evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must be, I presume,

Which he does not doubt.

This sentence expresses the whole question between Berkeley and his
antagonists.

Cf. Principies, sect. 29-41.

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by some perceived difference; and I am not for depriving yon of
any one thing that yon perceive.

Hyl. But still, Philonous, yon hold, there is nothing in
the World but spirits and ideas. And this, you must needs
acknowledge, sounds very oddly.

Phil. I own the word idea, not being commonly used
for thing, sounds something out of the way. My reason
for using it was, because a necessary relation to the mind is
understood to be implied by that term; and it is now commonly
used by philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the
understanding. But, however oddly the proposition may sound in
words, yet it ineludes nothing so very strange or shocking in its
sense; which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that
there are only things perceiving, and things perceived; or that
every unthinking being is necessarily, and from the very nature
of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite created
mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom 'we
live, and move, and have our being.' Is this as strange as to say,
the sensible qualities are not on the objects: or that we cannot
be sure of the existence of things, or know anything of their real
natures—though we both see and feel them, and perceive them
by all our senses?

Hyl. And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are
no such things as physical or corporeal causes; but that a Spirit is
the immediate cause of all the phenomena in nature? Can there
be anything more extravagant than this?

Phil. Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say—a thing
which is inert operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving
is the cause of our perceptions, [^^^without any regard either
to consisteney, or the oíd known axiom, Nothing can give to
another that which it hath not itself]. Besides, that which to you,
I know not for what reason, seems so extravagant is no more than

The words within brackets are omitted in the third edition.

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the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places. In them God is
represented as the solé and immediate Author of all those effects
which some heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to
Nature, Matter, Fate, or the like unthinking principie. This is so
much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to
confirm it by citations.

Hyl. You are not aware, Philonous, that, in making God the
immediate Author of all the motions in nature, you make Him
the Author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous
sins.

Phil. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation
of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with
or without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose God
to act by the mediation of an instrument, or occasion, called
Matter, you as truly make Him the author of sin as I, who
think Him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly
ascribed to Nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude
doth not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but
in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and
religión. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or
putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though
the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder.
Since, therefore, sin doth not consist in the physical action, the
making God an immediate cause of all such actions is not making
Him the Author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is
the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is true
I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits; but this
is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings, in
the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately
indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of
their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt
of their actions*^^.

The Índex pointing to the originative causes in the universe is thus the
ethical judgment, which fastens upon the free voluntary agency of persons, as

[454]

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Hyl. But the denying Matter, Philonous, or corporeal
Substance; there is the point. You can never persuade me
that this is not repugnant to the universal sense of mankind. Were
our dispute to be determined by most voices, I am confident you
would give up the point, without gathering the votes.

Phil. I wish both our opinions were fairly stated and submitted
to the judgment of men who had plain common sense, without
the prejudices of a learned education. Let me be represented
as one who trusts his senses, who thinks he knows the things
he sees and feels, and entertains no doubts of their existence;
and you fairly set forth with all your doubts, your paradoxes,
and your scepticism about you, and I shall willingly acquiesce
in the determination of any indifferent person. That there is
no substance wherein ideas can exist beside spirit is to me
evident. And that the objects immediately perceived are ideas,
is on all hands agreed*^^. And that sensible qualities are objects
immediately perceived no one can deny. It is therefore evident
there can be no substratum of those qualities but spirit; in which
they exist, not by way of mode or property, but as a thing
perceived in that which perceives it^’^. I deny therefore that
there is any unthinking substratum of the objects of sense, and
in that acceptation that there is any material substance. But if
by material substance is meant only sensible body —that which
is seen and felt (and the unphilosophical part of the world, I
daré say, mean no more)—then I am more certain of matter's
existence than you or any other philosopher pretend to be. If
there be anything which makes the generality of mankind averse
from the notions I espouse: it is a misapprehension that I deny the
reality of sensible things. But, as it is you who are guilty of that,

absolutely responsible causes, not merely caused causes.

That only ideas or phenomena are presented to our senses may be assented
to by those who nevertheless maintain that intelligent sensuous experience
implies more than the sensuous or empirical data.

Cf. Principies, sect. 49.

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and not I, it follows that in truth their aversión is against your
notions and not mine. I do therefore assert that I am as certain as
of my own being, that there are bodies or corporeal substanees
(meaning the things I perceive by my senses); and that, granting
this, the bulk of mankind will take no thought about, ñor think
themselves at all eoneerned in the fate of those unknown natures,
and philosophieal quiddities, which some men are so fond of.

Hyl. What say you to this? Since, according to yon, men
judge of the reality of things by their senses, how can a man be
mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot
in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an
oar, with one end in the water, crooked?

Phil. He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually
perceives, but in the inferences he makes from his present [ 456 ]
perceptions. Thus, in the case of the oar, what he immediately
perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the
right. But if he thence conclude that upon taking the oar out
of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it
would affect his touch as crooked things are wont to do: in that
he is mistaken. In like manner, if he shall conclude from what
he perceives in one station, that, in case he advances towards the
moon or tower, he should still be affected with the like ideas,
he is mistaken. But his mistake lies not in what he perceives
immediately, and at present, (it being a manifest contradiction
to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong
judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be
connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the
ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would
be perceived in other circumstances. The case is the same with
regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any
motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude,
that, in case we were placed at as great a distance from that as
we are now from the other planets, we should not then perceive

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its motion*’^.

Hyl. I understand you; and must needs own yon say things
plausible enough. Bul, give me leave to pul you in mind of one
thing. Fray, Philonous, were you not formerly as positivo that
Matter existed, as you are now that it does not?

Phil. I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my
positiveness was founded, without examination, upon prejudice;
but now, after inquiry, upon evidence.

Hyl. After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than
things. We agree in the thing, but differ in the ñame. That we
are affected with ideas/rom without is evident; and it is no less
evident that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers
without the mind^**’, corresponding to those ideas. And, as these
Powers cannot subsist by themselves, there is some subject of
them necessarily to be admitted; which I cali Matter, and you
cali Spirit. This is all the difference.

Phil. Pray, Hylas, is that powerful Being, or subject of powers,
extended?

Hyl. It hath not extensión; but it hath the power to raise in you
the idea of extensión,

Phil. It is therefore itself unextended?

Hyl. I grant it.

Phil. Is it not also active?

Hyl. Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute
powers to it?

Phil. Now let me ask you two questions: First, Whether it be
agreeable to the usage either of philosophers or others to give
the ñame Matter to an unextended active being? And, Secondly,
Whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply ñames contrary
to the common use of language?

Hyl. Well then, let it not be called Matter, since you will have
it so, but some Third Nature distinct from Matter and Spirit. For

Cf. Principies, sect. 58.

“without the mind,” i.e. without the mind of each percipient person.

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what reason is there why you should cali it Spirit? Does not the
notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active and
unextended?

Phil. My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some
notion of meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any
action distinct from volition, neither can I conceive volition to
be anywhere but in a spirit: therefore, when I speak of an active
being, I am obliged to mean a Spirit. Beside, what can be plainer
than that a thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them
to me; and, if it hath ideas, surely it must be a Spirit. To make
you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be possible. I
assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without,
we must allow Powers to be without, in a Being distinct from
ourselves. So far we are agreed. But then we differ as to the
kind of this powerful Being^*^ I will have it to be Spirit, you
Matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what)

Third Nature. Thus, I prove it to be Spirit. From the effects I
see produced, I conclude there are actions; and, because actions, [ 458 ]
volitions; and, because there are volitions, there must be a will.
Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their
archetypes, out of my mind: but, being ideas, neither they ñor
their archetypes can exist otherwise than in an understanding;
there is therefore an understanding. But will and understanding
constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful
cause, therefore, of my ideas is in strict propriety of speech a
Spirit.

Hyl. And now I warrant you think you have made the
point very clear, little suspecting that what you advance leads
directly to a contradiction. Is it not an absurdity to imagine any

*** This is the gist of the whole question. According to the Materialists, sense-
presented phenomena are due to unpresented, unperceived, abstract Matter;
according to Berkeley, to living Spirit; according to Hume and Agnostics,
their origin is unknowable, yet (incoherently) they claim that we can interpret
them—in physical Science.

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imperfection in God?

Phil. Without a doubt.

Hyl. To suffer pain is an imperfection?

Phil. It is.

Hyl. Are we not sometimes affected with pain and uneasiness
by some other Being?

Phil. We are.

Hyl. And have yon not said that Being is a Spirit, and is not
that Spirit God?

Phil. I grant it.

Hyl. But yon have asserted that whatever ideas we perceive
from without are in the mind which affects us. The ideas,
therefore, of pain and uneasiness are in God; or, in other words,
God suffers pain: that is to say, there is an imperfection in the
Divine nature: which, you acknowledged, was absurd. So you
are caught in a plain contradiction*^^.

Phil. That God knows or understands all things, and that
He knows, among other things, what pain is, even every sort
of painful sensation, and what it is for His creatures to suffer
pain, I make no question. But, that God, though He knows and
sometimes causes painful sensations in us, can Himself suffer
pain, I positively deny. We, who are limited and dependent
spirits, are hable to impressions of sense, the effects of an
external Agent, which, being produced against our wills, are
sometimes painful and uneasy. But God, whom no external
being can affect, who perceives nothing by sense as we do;
whose will is absoluto and independent, causing all things, and
hable to be thwarted or resisted by nothing: it is evident, such a
Being as this can suffer nothing, ñor be affected with any painful
sensation, or indeed any sensation at ah. We are chained to a
body: that is to say, our perceptions are connected with corporeal
motions. By the law of our nature, we are affected upon every

A similar objection is urged by Erdmann, in his criticism of Berkeley in the
Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie.

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alteration in the nervous parts of our sensible body; which
sensible body, rightly eonsidered, is nothing bul a eomplexion of
such qualities or ideas as have no existenee distinet from being
perceived by a mind. So that Ibis connexion of sensations with
eorporeal motions means no more than a eorrespondenee in the
order of nature, between two sets of ideas, or things immediately
pereeivable. But God is a Puré Spirit, disengaged from all sueh
sympathy, or natural ties. No eorporeal motions are attended
with the sensations of pain or pleasure in His mind. To know
everything knowable, is eertainly a perfection; but to endure, or
suffer, or feel anything by sense, is an imperfection. The former,

I say, agrees to God, but not the latter. God knows, or hath ideas;
but His ideas are not conveyed to Him by sense, as ours are.

Your not distinguishing, where there is so manifest a differenee,
makes you faney you see an absurdity where there is none.

Hyl. But, all this while you have not eonsidered that the
quantity of Matter has been demonstrated to be proportioned to
the gravity of bodies*^^. And what can withstand demonstration?

Phil. Let me see how you demónstrate that point.

Hyl. I lay it down for a principie, that the moments or quantities
of motion in bodies are in a direct compounded reason of the
velocities and quantities of Matter contained in them. Henee,
where the velocities are equal, it follows the moments are directly
as the quantity of Matter in each. But it is found by experience
that all bodies (bating the small inequalities, arising from the
resistance of the air) descend with an equal velocity; the motion
therefore of descending bodies, and consequently their gravity,
which is the cause or principie of that motion, is proportional to [460]
the quantity of Matter; which was to be demonstrated.

Phil. You lay it down as a self-evident principie that the
quantity of motion in any body is proportional to the velocity
and Matter taken together; and this is made use of to prove

Cf. Principies, sect. 50; Siris, sect. 319.

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a proposition from whence the existence of Matter is inferred.
Fray is not this arguing in a circle?

Hyl. In the premise I only mean that the motion is proportional
to the velocity, jointly with the extensión and solidity.

Phil. But, allowing this to be true, yet it will not thence
follow that gravity is proportional to Matter, in your philosophic
sense of the word; except yon take it for granted that unknown
substratum, or whatever else yon cali it, is proportional to
those sensible qualities; which to suppose is plainly begging the
question. That there is magnitude and solidity, or resistance,
perceived by sense, I readily grant; as likewise, that gravity may
be proportional to those qualities I will not dispute. But that
either these qualities as perceived by us, or the powers producing
them, do exist in a material substratum-, this is what I deny,
and you indeed affirm, but, notwithstanding your demonstration,
have not yet proved.

Hyl. I shall insist no longer on that point. Do you think,
however, you shall persuade me the natural philosophers have
been dreaming all this while? Fray what becomes of all their
hypotheses and explications of the phenomena, which suppose
the existence of Matter*^^?

Phil. What mean you, Hylas, by the phenomenal

Hyl. I mean the appearances which I perceive by my senses.

Phil. And the appearances perceived by sense, are they not
ideas?

Hyl. I have told you so a hundred times.

Phil. Therefore, to explain the phenomena is, to shew how
we come to be affected with ideas, in that manner and^^^ order
wherein they are imprinted on our senses. Is it not?

Hyl. It is.

Phil. Now, if you can prove that any philosopher has explained
the production of any one idea in our minds by the help of

Cf. Principies, sect. 58.

“order”—“series,” in first and second editions.

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Matter^^^, I shall for ever acquiesce, and look on all that hath
been said against it as nothing; but, if you cannot, it is vain to
urge the explication of phenomena. That a Being endowed with
knowledge and will should produce or exhibit ideas is easily
understood. But that a Being which is utterly destitute of these
faculties should be able to produce ideas, or in any sort to affect
an intelligence, this I can never understand. This I say, though
we had some positive conception of Matter, though we knew its
qualities, and could comprehend its existence, would yet be so
far from explaining things, that it is itself the most inexplicable
thing in the world. And yet, for all this, it will not follow that
philosophers have been doing nothing; for, by observing and
reasoning upon the connexion of ideas^^^, they disco ver the laws
and methods of nature, which is a part of knowledge both useful
and entertaining.

Hyl. After all, can it be supposed God would deceive all
mankind? Do you imagine He would have induced the whole
world to believe the being of Matter, if there was no such thing?

Phil. That every epidemical opinión, arising from prejudice,
or passion, or thoughtlessness, may be imputed to God, as the
Author of it, I believe you will not affirm. Whatsoever opinión
we father on Him, it must be either because He has discovered
it to US by supernatural revelation; or because it is so evident to
our natural faculties, which were framed and given us by God,
that it is impossible we should withhold our assent from it. But
where is the revelation? or where is the evidence that extorts the
belief of Matter? Nay, how does it appear, that Matter, taken
for something distinct from what we perceive by our senses, is
thought to exist by all mankind; or, indeed, by any except a few

“Matter,” i.e. when the reality of “matter” is supposed to signify what
Berkeley argües cannot be; because really meaningless.

“the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the physical coexistences and sequences,
maintained in constant order by Power external to the individual, and which
are disclosed in the natural Sciences.

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philosophers, who do not know what they would be at? Your
question supposes these points are olear; and, when yon have
cleared them, I shall think myself obliged to give yon another
answer. In the meantime, let it suffice that I tell yon, I do not
suppose God has deceived mankind at all.

Hyl. But the novelty, Philonous, the novelty! There lies the
danger. New notions should always be discountenanced; they
unsettle men's minds, and nobody knows where they will end.

Phil. Why the rejecting a notion that has no foundation, either
in sense, or in reason, or in Divine authority, should be thought to
unsettle the belief of such opinions as are grounded on all or any
of these, I cannot imagine. That innovations in government and
religión are dangerous, and ought to be discountenanced, I freely
own. But is there the like reason why they should be discouraged
in philosophy? The making anything known which was unknown
before is an innovation in knowledge: and, if all such innovations
had been forbidden, men would have made a notable progress
in the arts and Sciences. But it is none of my business to plead
for novelties and paradoxes. That the qualities we perceive are
not on the objects: that we must not believe our senses: that
we know nothing of the real nature of things, and can never be
assured even of their existence: that real colours and sounds are
nothing but certain unknown figures and motions: that motions
are in themselves neither swift ñor slow: that there are in bodies
absolute extensions, without any particular magnitude or figure:
that a thing stupid, thoughtless, and inactive, operates on a spirit:
that the least partióle of a body contains innumerable extended
parts:—these are the novelties, these are the strange notions
which shock the genuino uncorrupted judgment of all mankind;
and being once admitted, embarrass the mind with endless doubts
and difficulties. And it is against these and the like innovations
I endeavour to vindicate Common Sense. It is true, in doing
this, I may perhaps be obliged to use some ambages, and ways
of speech not common. But, if my notions are once thoroughly

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understood, that which is most singular in them will, in effeet,
be found to amount to no more than this:—that it is absolutely
impossible, and a plain contradiction, to suppose any unthinking [463]
Being should exist without being perceived by a Mind. And, if
this notion be singular, it is a shame it should be so, at this time
of day, and in a Christian eountry.

Hyl. As for the diffieulties other opinions may be bable to,
those are out of the question. It is your business to defend your
own opinión. Can anything be plainer than that you are for
changing all things into ideas? You, I say, who are not ashamed
to eharge me with scepticism. This is so plain, there is no denying
it.

Phil. You mistake me. I am not for changing things into ideas,
but rather ideas into things^^^; since those immediate objects of
perception, which, according to you, are only appearances of
things, I take to be the real things themselves^^^.

Hyl. Things! You may pretend what you picase; but it is
certain you leave us nothing but the empty forms of things, the
outside only which strikes the senses.

Phil. What you cali the empty forms and outside of things
seem to me the very things themselves. Ñor are they empty
or incomplete, otherwise than upon your supposition—that
Matter^^*’ is an essential part of all corporeal things. We both,
therefore, agree in this, that we perceive only sensible forms: but
herein we differ—you will have them to be empty appearances,

I real beings. In short, you do not trust your senses, I do.

Hyl. You say you believe your senses; and seem to applaud
yourself that in this you agree with the vulgar. According to

*** Cf. Principies, sect. 38. Berkeley is not for making things subjective, but
for recognising ideas or phenomena presented to the senses as objective.

*** They are not mere illusory appearances but are the very things themselves
making their appearance, as far as our limited senses allow them to be realised
for US.

i.e. abstract Matter.

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[464]

you, therefore, the true nature of a thing is discovered by the
senses. If so, whence comes that disagreement? Why is not the
same figure, and other sensible qualities, perceived all manner
of ways? and why should we use a microscope the better to
discover the true nature of a body, if it were discoverable to the
naked eye?

Phil. Strictly speaking, Hylas, we do not see the same object
that we feel*^^; neither is the same object perceived by the
microscope which was by the naked eye*^^. But, in case every
variation was thought sufficient to constitute a new kind or
individual, the endless number or confusión of ñames would
render language impracticable. Therefore, to avoid this, as well
as other inconveniences which are obvious upon a little thought,
men combine together several ideas, apprehended by divers
senses, or by the same sense at different times, or in different
circumstances, but observed, however, to have some connexion
in nature, either with respect to co-existence or succession;
all which they refer to one ñame, and consider as one thing.
Henee it follows that when I examine, by my other senses, a
thing I have seen, it is not in order to understand better the
same object which I had perceived by sight, the object of one
sense not being perceived by the other senses. And, when I
look through a microscope, it is not that I may perceive more
olearly what I perceived already with my haré eyes; the object
perceived by the glass being quite different from the former.
But, in both cases, my aim is only to know what ideas are
connected together; and the more a man knows of the connexion
of ideas^^^, the more he is said to know of the nature of things.
What, therefore, if our ideas are variable; what if our senses are
not in all circumstances affected with the same appearances? It

Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 49; and New Theory of Vision Vindicated,
sect. 9, 10, 15, &c.

Cf. New Theory of Vision, sect. 84-86.

“the connexion of ideas,” i.e. the order providentially maintained in nature.

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will not thence follow they are not to be trusted; or that they
are ineonsistent either with themselves or anything else: exeept
it be with your preconceived notion of (I know not what) one
single, unchanged, unperceivable, real Nature, marked by each
ñame. Whieh prejudice seems to have taken its rise from not
rightly understanding the eommon language of men, speaking
of several distinet ideas as united into one thing by the mind.
And, indeed, there is cause to suspect several erroneous conceits
of the philosophers are owing to the same original: while they
began to build their schemes not so much on notions as on words,
whieh were framed by the vulgar, merely for conveniency and
dispatch in the eommon actions of life, without any regard to
speculation^^^.

Hyl. Methinks I apprehend your meaning.

Phil. It is your opinión the ideas we perceive by our senses are
not real things, but images or copies of them. Our knowledge,
therefore, is no farther real than as our ideas are the true
representations of those origináis. But, as these supposed
origináis are in themselves unknown, it is impossible to know
how far our ideas resemble them; or whether they resemble
them at all^^^. We cannot, therefore, be sure we have any
real knowledge^^^. Farther, as our ideas are perpetually varied,

Cf. Principies, Introduction, sect. 23-25.

Cf. Principies, sect. 8-10, 86, 87.

This difficulty is thus pressed by Reid:—“The ideas in my mind cannot be
the same with the ideas in any other mind; therefore, if the objects I perceive be
only ideas, it is impossible that two or more such minds can perceive the same
thing. Thus there is one unconfutable consequence of Berkeley's system, whieh
he seems not to have attended to, and from whieh it will be found difficult,
if at all possible, to guard it. The consequence I mean is this—that, although
it leaves us sufficient evidence of a Supreme Mind, it seems to take away all
the evidence we have of other intelligent beings like ourselves. What I cali a
father, or a brother, or a friend, is only a parcel of ideas in my own mind ; they
cannot possibly have that relation to another mind whieh they have to mine,
any more than the pain felt by me can be the individual pain felt by another.
I am thus left alone as the only creature of God in the universe” (Hamilton's

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without any change in the supposed real things, it necessarily
follows they cannot all be true copies of them: or, if some are and
others are not, it is impossible to distinguish the former from the
latter. And this plunges us yet deeper in uncertainty^^^. Again,
when we consider the point, we cannot conceive how any idea,
or anything like an idea, should have an absolute existence out of
a mind: ñor consequently, according to yon, how there should be
any real thing in nature^^^. The result of all which is that we are
thrown into the most hopeless and abandoned scepticism. Now,
give me leave to ask yon, First, Whether your referring ideas
to certain absolutely existing unperceived substances, as their
origináis, be not the source of all this scepticism*^^? Secondly,
whether you are informed, either by sense or reason^*’®, of the
existence of those unknown origináis? And, in case you are not,
whether it be not absurd to suppose them? Thirdly, Whether,
upon inquiry, you find there is anything distinctly conceived
or meant by the absolute or external existence of unperceiving
substances'^^^1 Lastly, Whether, the premises considered, it be
not the wisest way to follow nature, trust your senses, and,
laying aside all anxious thought about unknown natures or
substances^®^, admit with the vulgar those for real things which
are perceived by the senses?

Hyl. For the present, I have no inclination to the answering
part. I would much rather see how you can get over what follows.
Fray are not the objects perceived by the senses of one, likewise
perceivable to others present? If there were a hundred more here.

Reid, pp. 284-285). Implied Solipsism or Panegoism is thus charged against
Berkeley, unless his conception of the material world is further guarded.

Reid and Hamilton argüe in like manner against a fundamentally
representative sense-perception.

Cf. Principies, sect. 6.

Cf. Ibid., sect. 87-90.

Cf. Ibid., sect. 18.

Cf. Principies, sect. 24.

“unknown,” i.e. unrealised in percipient life.

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they would all see the garden, the trees, and flowers, as I see
them. But they are not in the same manner affected with the
ideas I frame in my imagination. Does not this make a difference
between the former sort of objects and the latter?

Phil. I grant it does. Ñor have I ever denied a difference
between the objects of sense and those of imagination^**^. But
what would you infer from thence? You cannot say that sensible
objects exist unperceived, because they are perceived by many.

Hyl. I own I can make nothing of that objection: but it hath
led me into another. Is it not your opinión that by our senses we
perceive only the ideas existing in our minds?

Phil. It is.

Hyl. But the same idea which is in my mind cannot be in
yours, or in any other mind. Doth it not therefore follow, from
your principies, that no two can see the same thing^**^? And is
not this highly absurd?

Phil. If the term same be taken in the vulgar acceptation, it
is certain (and not at all repugnan! to the principies I maintain) [467]
that different persons may perceive the same thing; or the same
thing or idea exist in different minds. Words are of arbitrary
imposition; and, since men are used to apply the word same
where no distinction or variety is perceived, and I do not pretend
to alter their perceptions, it follows that, as men have said before,
several saw the same thing, so they may, upon like occasions,
still continué to use the same phrase, without any deviation
either from propriety of language, or the truth of things. But, if
the term same be used in the acceptation of philosophers, who
pretend to an abstracted notion of identity, then, according to

Cf. Principies, sect. 28-33.

See also Collier's Clavis Universalis, p. 6: “Two or more persons who are
present at a concert of music may indeed in some measure be said to hear the
same notes; yet the sound which the one hears is not the very same with the
sound which another hears, because the souls or persons are supposed to be
different.”

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their sundry definitions of this notion (for it is not yet agreed
wherein that philosophic identity consists), it may or may not
be possible for divers persons to perceive the same thing^*’^.
But whether philosophers shall think fit to cali a thing the same
or no, is, I conceive, of small importance. Let us suppose
several men together, all endued with the same faculties, and
consequently affected in like sort by their senses, and who had yet
never known the use of language; they would, without question,
agree in their perceptions. Though perhaps, when they carne
to the use of speech, some regarding the uniformness of what
was perceived, might cali it the same thing: others, especially
regarding the diversity of persons who perceived, might choose
the denomination of dijferent things. But who sees not that all
the dispute is about a word? to wit, whether what is perceived by
different persons may yet ha ve the term same applied to it^°^?
Or, suppose a house, whose walls or outward shell remaining
unaltered, the chambers are all pulled down, and new ones built
in their place; and that you should cali this the same, and I
should say it was not the same house:—would we not, for all
this, perfectly agree in our thoughts of the house, considered
in itself? And would not all the difference consist in a sound?
If you should say, We differed in our notions; for that you
superadded to your idea of the house the simple abstracted idea
of identity, whereas I did not; I would tell you, I know not
what you mean by the abstracted idea of identity, and should

Berkeley seems to hold that in things there is no identity other than perfect
similarity—only in persons. And even as to personal identity he is obscure. Cf.
Siris, sect. 347, &c.

But the question is, whether the very ideas or phenomena that are perceived
by me can be also perceived by other persons; and if not, how I can discover
that “other persons” exist, or that any finite person except myself is cognizant
of the ideal cosmos—if the sort of sameness that Berkeley advócales is all that
can be predicated of concrete ideas; which are thus only similar, or generically
the same. Unless the ideas are numerically the same, can different persons
make signs to one another through them?

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desire you to look into your own thoughts, and be sure you

understood yourself.-Why so silent, Hylas? Are you not yet

satisfied men may dispute about identity and diversity, without
any real difference in their thoughts and opinions, abstraeted
from ñames? Take this farther reflexión with you—that whether
Matter be allowed to exist or no, the ease is exaetly the same as to
the point in hand. For the Materialists themselves acknowledge
what we immediately pereeive by our senses to be our own ideas.
Your difflculty, therefore, that no two see the same thing, makes
equally against the Materialists and me.

Hyl. [^^^Ay, Philonous,] But they suppose an external
arehetype, to which referring their several ideas they may truly
be said to pereeive the same thing.

Phil. And (not to mention your having discarded those
arehetypes) so may you suppose an external arehetype on my
principies;— external, I mean, to your own mind: though indeed
it must be supposed to exist in that Mind which comprehends all
things; but then, this serves all the ends of identity, as well as if
it existed out of a mind^°*. And I am sure you yourself will not
say it is less intelligible.

Hyl. You have indeed clearly satisfied me—either that there is
no difflculty at bottom in this point; or, if there be, that it makes
equally against both opinions.

Phil. But that which makes equally against two contradictory
opinions can be a proof against neither.

Omitted in author's last edition.

This seems to imply that intercourse between finite persons is maintained
through ideas or phenomena presentad to the senses, under a tacit faith in
divinely guaranteed correspondence between the phenomena of which I am
conscious, and the phenomena of which my neighbour is conscious; so that
they are practically “the same.” If we are living in a fundamentally divine,
and therefore absolutely trustworthy, universa, the phenomena presentad to
my senses, which I attribute to the agency of another person, are so attributed
rightly. For if not, the so-called cosmos is adapted to mislead me.

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Hyl. I acknowledge it.

But, after all, Philonous, when I consider the substance of
what you advance against Scepticism, it amounts to no more than
this:—^We are sure that we really see, hear, feel; in a word, that
we are affected with sensible impressions.

Phil. And how are we concerned any farther? I see this cherry,
I feel it, I taste it: and I am sure nothing cannot be seen, or felt, or
tasted: it is therefore real. Take away the sensations of softness,
moisture, redness, tartness, and you take away the cherry, since it
is not a being distinct from sensations. A cherry, I say, is nothing
but a congeries of sensible impressions, or ideas perceived by
various senses: which ideas are united into one thing (or have
one ñame given them) by the mind, because they are observed to
attend each other. Thus, when the palate is affected with such a
particular taste, the sight is affected with a red colour, the touch
with roundness, softness, &c. Henee, when I see, and feel, and
taste, in such sundry certain manners, I am sure the cherry exists,
or is real; its reality being in my opinión nothing abstracted
from those sensations. But if by the word cherry you mean an
unknown nature, distinct from all those sensible qualities, and by
its existence something distinct from its being perceived; then,
indeed, I own, neither you ñor I, ñor any one else, can be sure it
exists.

Hyl. But, what would you say, Philonous, if I should bring the
very same reasons against the existence of sensible things in a
mind which you have offered against their existing in a material
substratuml

Phil. When I see your reasons, you shall hear what I have to
say to them.

Hyl. Is the mind extended or unextended?

Phil. Unextended, without doubt.

Hyl. Do you say the things you perceive are in your mind?

Phil. They are.

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Hyl. Again, have I not heard you speak of sensible
impressions?

Phil. I bebe ve you may.

Hyl. Explain to me now, O Philonous! how it is possible
there should be room for all those bees and houses to exist in
your mind. Can extended things be eontained in that which is
unextended? Or, are we to imagine impressions made on a thing
void of all solidity? You eannot say objects are in your mind,
as books in your study: or that things are imprinted on it, as the
figure of a seal upon wax. In what sense, therefore, are we to
understand those expressions? Explain me this if you ean: and I
shall then be able to answer all those quedes you formerly put to
me about my substratum.

Phil. Eook you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing in
the mind, or imprinted on the senses, I would not be understood
in the gross literal sense; as when bodies are said to exist in a
place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning
is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them; and that
it is affected from without, or by some being distinct from
itself^®^. This is my explication of your difficulty; and how it can
serve to make your tenet of an unperceiving material substratum
intelligible, I would fain know.

Hyl. Nay, if that be all, I confess I do not see what use can be
made of it. But are you not guilty of some abuse of language in
this?

Phil. None at all. It is no more than common custom, which
you know is the rule of language, hath authorised: nothing being
more usual, than for philosophers to speak of the immediate
objects of the understanding as things existing in the mind. Ñor
is there anything in this but what is conformable to the general
analogy of language; most part of the mental operations being
signified by words borrowed from sensible things; as is plain

This explanation is often overlooked by Berkeley's critics.

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in the terms comprehend, reflect, discourse, &c., which, being
applied to the mind, must not be taken in their gross, original
sense.

Hyl. Yon have, I own, satisfied me in this point. But there
still remains one great difficulty, which I know not how yon will
get over. And, indeed, it is of such importance that if yon could
solve all others, without being able to find a solution for this, yon
must never expect to make me a proselyte to your principies.

Phil. Let me know this mighty difficulty.

Hyl. The Scripture account of the creation is what appears to
me utterly irreconcilable with your notions^^*^. Moses tells us
of a creation: a creation of what? of ideas? No, certainly, but
of things, of real things, solid corporeal substances. Bring your
principies to agree with this, and I shall perhaps agree with you.

Phil. Moses mentions the sun, moon, and stars, earth and sea,
plants and animáis. That all these do really exist, and were in the
beginning created by God, I make no question. If by ideas you
mean fictions and fancies of the mind^^^, then these are no ideas.
If by ideas you mean immediate objects of the understanding,
or sensible things, which cannot exist unperceived, or out of a
mind^^^, then these things are ideas. But whether you do or
do not cali them ideas, it matters little. The difference is only
about a ñame. And, whether that ñame be retained or rejected,
the sense, the truth, and reality of things continúes the same. In
common talk, the objects of our senses are not termed ideas, but
things. Cali them so still: provided you do not attribute to them
any absolute external existence, and I shall never quarrel with
you for a word. The creation, therefore, I allow to have been
a creation of things, of real things. Neither is this in the least
inconsistent with my principies, as is evident from what I have
now said; and would have been evident to you without this, if

Cf. Principies, sect. 82-84.

i.e. if you take the term idea in its wholly subjective and popular meaning.

i.e. if you take the term idea in its objective meaning.

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you had not forgotten what had been so often said before. Bul
as for solid corporeal substanees, I desire you to shew where
Moses makes any mention of them; and, if they should be
mentioned by him, or any other inspired writer, it would still be
ineumbent on you to shew those words were not taken in the
vulgar aeeeptation, for things falling under our senses, but in the
philosophic^^^ aeeeptation, for Matter, or an unknown quiddity, [472]
with an absolute existence. When you have proved these points,
then (and not till then) may you bring the authority of Moses into
our dispute.

Hyl. It is in vain to dispute about a point so elear. I am eontent
to refer it to your own eonseienee. Are you not satisfied there
is some peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the
creation and your notions?

Phil. If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter
of Génesis may be conceived as consistently with my principies
as any other, then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But
there is no sense you may not as well conceive, believing as I
do. Since, besides spirits, all you conceive are ideas; and the
existence of these I do not deny. Neither do you pretend they
exist without the mind.

Hyl. Fray let me see any sense you can understand it in.

Phil. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation,

I should have seen things produced into being—that is become
perceptible—in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I
ever before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now
find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are
said to begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with
regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known
by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence
in His mind: but when things, before imperceptible to creatures,
are, by a decree of God, perceptible to them, then are they said to

“philosophic,” i.e. pieíído-philosophic, against which he argües.

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begin a relative existence, with respect to created minds. Upon
reading therefore the Mosaic account of the creation, I understand
that the several parts of the world became gradually perceivable
to finí te spirits, endowed with proper faculties; so that, whoever
such were present, they were in truth perceived by them^^'^. This
is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the
Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought,
either of substratum, instrument, occasion, or absoluto existence.
And, upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain
honest men, who believe the creation, never think of those things
any more than I. What metaphysical sense you may understand
it in, you only can tell.

Hyl. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that
you allow created things, in the beginning, only a relative, and
consequently hypothetical being: that is to say, upon supposition
there were men to perceive them; without which they have no
actuality of absoluto existence, wherein creation might termínate.
Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly impossible the
creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of man?
And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?

Phil. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin
to exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men.
You will not therefore be able to pro ve any contradiction between
Moses and my notions, unless you first show there was no other
order of finite created spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in
case we conceive the creation, as we should at this time, a parcel
of plants or vegetables of all sorts produced, by an invisible
Power, in a desert where nobody was present—that this way
of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with my principies,

Had this their relative existence—this realisation of the material world
through finite percipient and volitional life—any beginning? May not God
have been eternally presenting phenomena to the senses of percipient beings
in cosmical order, if not on this planet yet elsewhere, perhaps under other
conditions? Has there been any beginning in the succession of finite persons?

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sinee they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or imaginable;
that it exaetly suits with the eommon, natural, and undebauched
notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all things
on God; and eonsequently hath all the good effect or influence,
whieh it is possible that important article of our faith should have
in making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their [^^^great]
Creator. I say, moreover, that, in this naked eoneeption of things,
divested of words, there will not be found any notion of what you
cali the actuality of absolute existence. You may indeed raise a
dust with those terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose.
But I entreat you calmly to look into your own thoughts, and
then tell me if they are not a useless and unintelligible j argón.

Hyl. I own I have no very olear notion annexed to them. But
what say you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible
things consist in their being in a mind? And were not all things
eternally in the mind of God? Did they not therefore exist from
all eternity, according to you? And how could that whieh was
eternal be created in time? Can anything be clearer or better
connected than this?

Phil. And are not you too of opinión, that God knew all things
from eternity?

Hyl. I am.

Phil. Consequently they always had a being in the Divine
intellect.

Hyl. This I acknowledge.

Phil. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or
begins to be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in
that point.

Hyl. What shall we make then of the creation?

Phil. May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect
of finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly
be said to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed

In the first and second editions only.

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they should become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that
order and manner which He then established, and we now cali
the laws of nature? Yon may cali this a relative, or hypothetical
existence if yon picase. But, so long as it supplies us with the
most natural, obvious, and literal sense of the Mosaic history
of the creation; so long as it answers all the religious ends of
that great article; in a word, so long as yon can assign no other
sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this? Is it to
comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything
nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for
the glory of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and
conceivable that the corporeal world should have an absoluto
existence extrinsical to the mind of God, as well as to the minds
of all created spirits; yet how could this set forth either the
immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the necessary and
immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would it not
rather seem to derógate from those attributes?

Hyl. Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things
perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did
either execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain
time began to will what He had not actually willed before, but
only designed to will? If the former, then there could be no
creation, or beginning of existence, in finite things^^^. If the
latter, then we must acknowledge something new to befall the
Deity; which implies a sort of change: and all change argües
imperfection.

Phil. Fray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident
this objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense;
nay, against every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the
light of nature? None of which can we conceive, otherwise than
as performed in time, and having a beginning. God is a Being

Is “creation” by us distinguishable from continuous evolution, unbeginning
and unending, in divinely constituted order; and is there a distinction between
creation or evolution of things and creation or evolution of personsl

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of transcendent and unlimited perfeetions: His nature, therefore,
is ineomprehensible to finite spirits. It is not, therefore, to be
expeeted, that any man, whether Materialist or Immaterialist,
should have exactly just notions of the Deity, His attributes, and
ways of operation. If then you would infer anything against me,
your diffieulty must not be drawn from the inadequateness of our
eoneeptions of the Divine nature, whieh is unavoidable on any
sóbeme; but from the denial of Matter, of whieh there is not one
Word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objeeted.

Hyl. I must aeknowledge the diffieulties you are eoncerned
to olear are such only as arise from the non-existenee of Matter,
and are peeuliar to that notion. So far you are in the right.

But I eannot by any means bring myself to think there is no
such peculiar repugnancy between the creation and your opinión;
though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly know.

Phil. What would you have? Do I not aeknowledge a twofold
State of things—the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal
and eternal? The former was created in time; the latter existed
from everlasting in the mind of God^^^. Is not this agreeable to the
common notions of divines? or, is any more than this necessary
in order to conceive the creation? But you suspect some peculiar
repugnancy, though you know not where it lies. To take away [476]
all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this one
point. Either you are not able to conceive the creation on any
hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike
or complaint against any particular opinión on that score: or you
are able to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principies,
since thereby nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all
along been allowed the full scope of sense, imagination, and
reason. Whatever, therefore, you could before apprehend, either
immediately or mediately by your senses, or by ratiocination
from your senses; whatever you could perceive, imagine, or

Cf. Siris, sect. 347-349.

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understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion you
have of the creation by other Principies be intelligible, you have
it still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be
no notion at all; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it
seems to me very plain that the supposition of Matter, that is
a thing perfectly nnknown and inconceivable, cannot serve to
make us conceive any thing. And, I hope it need not be pro ved to
you that if the existence of Matter^^* doth not make the creation
conceivable, the creation's being without it inconceivable can be
no objection against its non-existence.

Hyl. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this
point of the creation.

Phil. I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied.
You tell me indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history
and Immaterialism: but you know not where it lies. Is this
reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I should solve a difficulty
without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all that, would not a
man think you were assured there is no repugnancy between the
received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?

Hyl. And so I am.

Phil. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood
in a plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and
out of the way?

Hyl. In the plain sense, doubtless.

Phil. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having
been created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly
signified by those words are suggested to every unphilosophical
reader?

Hyl. I cannot help thinking so.

Phil. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be
denied a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?

Hyl. This I have already acknowledged.

*** “Matter,” i.e. Matter in this pseudo-philosophical meaning of the word.

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587

Phil. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the
creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being,
bul of certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being,
wherein creation might terminate?

Hyl. True.

Phil. Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy
the plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are
utterly inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not
what; something equally unintelligible to themselves and me?

PIyl. I cannot contradict you.

Phil. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of
unknown quiddities, of occasions, or substratuml No, certainly;
but of things obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this
with your notions, if you expect I should be reconciled to them.

PIyl. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.

Phil. Then as to absolute existence', was there ever known
a more jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted
and unintelligible that you have frankly owned you could not
conceive it, much less explain anything by it. But allowing
Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute existence to be as olear
as light; yet, was this ever known to make the creation more
credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and infidels of
all ages with the most plausible arguments against a creation?

That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence
without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing,
by the mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so
contrary to all reason, so impossible and absurd, that not only the
most celebrated among the ancients, but even divers modern and
Christian philosophers have thought Matter co-eternal with the
Deity^^^. Lay these things together, and then judge you whether [478]
Materialism disposes men to believe the creation of things.

Thus Origen in the early Church. That “Matter” is co-eternal with God
would mean that God is eternally making things real in the percipient experience
of persons.

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Hyl. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the creation
is the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it
hath been sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now
remains to be overeóme but a sort of unaccountable backwardness
that I find in myself towards your notions.

Phil. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of
the question, can this, think yon, be anything else but the effect
of prejudice, which never fails to attend oíd and rooted notions?
And indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to
have very much the advantage over the contrary opinión, with
men of a learned education.

Hyl. I confess it seems to be as yon say.

Phil. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let
US throw into the scale the great advantages^^** that arise from
the belief of Immaterialism, both in regard to religión and human
learning. The being of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul,
those great articles of religión, are they not proved with the
clearest and most immediate evidence? When I say the being of a
God, I do not mean an obscure general Cause of things, whereof
we have no conception, but God, in the strict and proper sense of
the Word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence, providence,
omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous as
the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the
fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no
more reason to doubt than of our own being.—Then, with relation
to human Sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what
obscurities, what contradictions hath the belief of Matter led
men into! To say nothing of the numberless disputes about its
extent, continuity, homogeneity, gravity, divisibility, &c.—do
they not pretend to explain all things by bodies operating on
bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are they

Cf. Principies, sect. 85-156, in which the religious and scientific advantages
of the new conception of matter and the material cosmos are illustrated, when
it is rightly understood and applied.

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able to eomprehend how one body should move another? Nay,
admitting there was no difficulty in reeoneiling the notion of [ 479 ]
an inert being with a eause, or in eoneeiving how an accident
might pass from one body to another; yet, by all their strained
thoughts and extravagant suppositions, have they been able to
reaeh the mechanical produetion of any one animal or vegetable
body? Can they aeeount, by the laws of motion, for sounds,
tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular eourse of things?

Have they aeeounted, by physical principies, for the aptitude
and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the
universe? But, laying aside Matter and corporeal causes, and
admitting only the efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all
the effects of nature easy and intelligible? If the phenomena are
nothing else but ideas', God is a spirit, but Matter an unintelligent,
unperceiving being. If they demónstrate an unlimited power in
their cause; God is active and omnipotent, but Matter an inert
mass. If the order, regularity, and usefulness of them can never
be sufficiently admired; God is infinitely wise and provident, but
Matter destitute of all contrivance and design. These surely are
great advantages in Physics. Not to mention that the apprehension
of a distant Deity naturally disposes men to a negligence in their
moral actions; which they would be more cautious of, in case
they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their
minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second
causes.—Then in Metaphysics: what difficulties concerning
entity in abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principies, plástic
natures,^^^ substance and accident, principie of individuation,
possibility of Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner
how two independent substances so widely different as Spirit
and Matter, should mutually opérate on each other? what
difficulties, I say, and endless disquisitions, concerning these and
innumerable other the like points, do we escape, by supposing

“substance and accident”—“subjects and adjuncts,”—in the first and the
second edition.

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only Spirits and ideas?—Even the Mathematics themselves,
if we take away the absolute existence of extended things,
become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes
and intricate speculations in those Sciences depending on the
infinite divisibility of finite extensión; which depends on that
supposition.—But what need is there to insist on the particular
Sciences? Is not that opposition to all Science whatsoever, that
frenzy of the ancient and modern Sceptics, built on the same
foundation? Or can yon produce so much as one argument
against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of that avowed
utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose their
reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this
supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours
in a pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the
water, must be allowed to have weight. But these and the like
objections vanish, if we do not maintain the being of absolute
external origináis, but place the reality of things in ideas, fleeting
indeed, and changeable;—however, not changed at random, but
according to the fixed order of nature. For, herein consists that
constancy and truth of things which secures all the concerns
of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the irregular
visions of the fancy^^^.

Hyl. I agree to all you have now said, and must own that
nothing can incline me to embrace your opinión more than the
advantages I see it is attended with. I am by nature lazy; and
this would be a mighty abridgment in knowledge. What doubts,
what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement, what fields of
disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be avoided by
that single notion of Immaterialisml

Phil. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be

Cf. Principies, sect. 28-42. In Siris, sect. 294-297, 300-318, 335, 359-365,
we have glimpses of thought more allied to Platonism, if not to Hegelianism.

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done? You may remember you promised to embraee that
opinión whieh upon examination should appear most agreeable
to Common Sense and remóte from Scepticism. This, by your
own confession, is that whieh denies Matter, or the absolute
existenee of eorporeal things. Ñor is this all; the same notion has
been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued in
its eonsequenees, and all objeetions against it eleared. Can there
be a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have
all the marks of a true opinión and yet be false?

Hyl. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all
respects. But, what seeurity ean I have that I shall still eontinue
the same full assent to your opinión, and that no unthought-of
objection or diffieulty will oeeur hereafter?

Phil. Fray, Hylas, do you in other eases, when a point is onee
evidently proved, withhold your eonsent on aecount of objeetions
or difficulties it may be hable to? Are the difficulties that attend
the doetrine of ineommensurable quantities, of the angle of
eontaet, of the asymptotes to eurves, or the like, suffieient to
make you hold out against mathematieal demonstration? Or will
you disbelieve the Providence of God, because there may be
some partieular things whieh you know not how to reeoneile with
it? If there are diffieulties attending Immaterialism, there are at
the same time direet and evident proofs of it. But for the existenee
of Matter^^^ there is not one proof, and far more numerous and
insurmountable objeetions lie against it. But where are those
mighty diffieulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or
what they are; something whieh may possibly oeeur hereafter. If
this be a suffieient pretenee for withholding your full assent, you
should never yield it to any proposition, how free soever from
exeeptions, how elearly and solidly soever demonstrated.

Hyl. You have satisfied me, Philonous.

Phil. But, to arm you against all future objeetions, do but

“Matter,” i.e. matter unrealised in any mind, finite or Divine.

[ 481 ]

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consider: That which bears equally hard on two contradictory
opinions can be proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any
difficulty occurs, try if yon can find a solution for it on the
hypothesis of the Materialists. Be not deceived by words; but
sound your own thoughts. And in case yon cannot conceive
it easier by the help of Materialism, it is plain it can be no
objection against Immaterialism. Had yon proceeded all along
by this rule, yon would probably have spared yourself abundance
of trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge
you to shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is
not more unintelligible with than without that supposition; and
consequently makes rather against than for it. You should
consider, in each particular, whether the difficulty arises from
the non-existence of Matter. If it doth not, you might as well
argüe from the infinite divisibility of extensión against the Divine
prescience, as from such a difficulty against Immaterialism. And
yet, upon recollection, I believe you will find this to have been
often, if not always, the case. You should likewise take heed
not to argüe on a petitio principii. One is apt to say—The
unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather
than the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking
external substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in
the productions of our ideas? But is not this proceeding on
a supposition that there are such external substances? And to
suppose this, is it not begging the question? But, above all
things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that vulgar
sophism which is called ignorado clenchi. You talked often as if
you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things.
Whereas in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their
existence than I am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said,
positively deny it. Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way
perceived by the senses, is, on the principies I embrace, a real
being; but not on yours. Remember, the Matter you contend for is
an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it may be termed somewhat).

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which is quite stripped of all sensible qualities, and ean neither be
perceived by sense, ñor apprehended by the mind. Remember, I
say, that it is not any objeet which is hard or soft, hot or coid, blue
or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I affirm do
exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct from
being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever.

Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still
kept in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the State of
the question; without which your objections will always be wide
of the mark, and, instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as
more than once they have been) against your own notions.

Hyl. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept
me from agreeing with you more than this same mistaking the
question. In denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to
imagine you deny the things we see and feel: but, upon reflexión, [ 483 ]
find there is no ground for it. What think you, therefore, of
retaining the ñame Matter, and applying it to sensible thingsl
This may be done without any change in your sentiments: and,
believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them to some
persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words
than in opinión.

Phil. With all my heart: retain the word Matter, and apply it to
the objects of sense, if you picase; provided you do not attribute
to them any subsistence distinct from their being perceived.

I shall never quarrel with you for an expression. Matter, or
material substance, are terms introduced by philosophers; and,
as used by them, imply a sort of independency, or a subsistence
distinct from being perceived by a mind: but are never used by
common people; or, if ever, it is to signify the immediate objects
of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as the ñames of
all particular things, with the terms sensible, substance, body,
stujf, and the like, are retained, the word Matter should be never
missed in common talk. And in philosophical discourses it seems
the best way to leave it quite out: since there is not, perhaps, any

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one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the depraved
bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general
confused term.

Hyl. Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the
notion of an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think
you ought not to deny me the privilege of using the word Matter
as I picase, and annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities
subsisting only in the mind. I freely own there is no other
substance, in a strict sense, than Spirit. But I have been so long
accustomed to the term Matter that I know not how to part with
it: to say, there is no Matter in the world, is still shocking to me.
Whereas to say—There is no Matter, if by that term be meant
an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if by
Matter is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists
in being perceived, then there is Matter. —this distinction gives
it quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with
small difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For,
after all, the controversy about Matter in the strict acceptation
of it, lies altogether between you and the philosophers: whose
principies, I acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable
to the common sense of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours.
There is nothing we either desire or shun but as it makes, or
is apprehended to make, some part of our happiness or misery.
But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief, pleasure or
pain, to do with Absoluto Existence; or with unknown entities,
abstracted from all relation to usl It is evident, things regard
US only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can picase
or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther,
therefore, we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as
you found them. Yet still there is something new in this doctrine.
It is plain, I do not now think with the philosophers; ñor yet
altogether with the vulgar. I would know how the case stands in
that respect; precisely, what you have added to, or altered in my
former notions.

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Phil. I do not pretend to be a setter-up of new notions.

My endeavours tend only to unite, and plaee in a elearer light,
that truth which was before shared between the vulgar and the
philosophers:—the former being of opinión, that those things
they immediately perceive are the real things', and the latter,
that the things immediately perceived are ideas, which exist only
in the mind'^^^. Whieh two notions put together, do, in effeet,
constitute the substanee of what I advance.

Hyl. I have been a long time distrusting my senses: methought
I saw things by a dim light and through false glasses. Now
the glasses are removed and a new light breaks in upon my
understanding. I am clearly eonvineed that I see things in their
native forms, and am no longer in pain about their unknown
natures or absolute existence. This is the State I find myself in
at present; though, indeed, the eourse that brought me to it I do
not yet thoroughly comprehend. You set out upon the same [ 485 ]
prineiples that Aeademics, Cartesians, and the like seets usually
do; and for a long time it looked as if you were advancing their
philosophical Sceptieism: but, in the end, your eonclusions are
directly opposite to theirs.

Phil. You see, Hylas, the water of yonder fountain, how it is
forced upwards, in a round column, to a certain height; at which
it breaks, and falls back into the basin from whence it rose: its
ascent, as well as descent, proceeding from the same uniform law
or principie of gravitation. Just so, the same Principies which, at
first view, lead to Sceptieism, pursued to a certain point, bring
men back to Common Sense.

[ 487 ]

These two propositions are a summary of Berkeley's conception of the
material world. With him, the immediate objects of sense, realise in perception,
are independen! of the will of the percipient, and are thus extemal to his proper
personality. Berkeley's “material world” of enlightened Common Sense,
resulting from two factors. Divine and human, is independen! of each finite
mind; but not independen! of all living Mind.

De Motu: Si ve; De Motus Principio
Et Natura, Et De Causa
Communicationis Motuum

[489] First published in 1721

Editor's Preface To De Motu

This Latín dissertation on Motion, or change of place in the
component atoms of the material world, was written in 1720,
when Berkeley was returning to Ireland, after he had spent some
years in Italy, on leave of absence from Trinity College. A
prize for an essay on the “Cause of Motion,” had, it seems, been
offered in that year by the París Academy of Sciences. The
subject suggested an advance on the line of thought pursued
in Berkeley's Principies and Dialogues. The mind-dependent
reality of the material world, prominent in those works, was in
them insisted on, not as a speculative paradox, but mainly in order
to shew the spiritual character of the Power that is continually
at Work throughout the universe. This essay on what was thus a
congenial subject was finished at Lyons, and published early in
1721, soon after Berkeley arrived in London. It was reprinted
in bis Miscellany in 1752. I have not found evidence that it was
ever submitted to the French Academy. At any rate the prize was
awarded to Crousaz, the well-known logician and professor of
philosophy at Lausanne.

The De Motu is interesting biographically as well as
philosophically, as a revelation of Berkeley's way of thinking
about the causal relations of Matter and Spirit seven years after
the publication of the Dialogues. In 1713 bis experience of
life was confined to Ireland. Now, after months in London, in
the society of Swift, and Pope, and Addison, he had observed
nature and men in Trance and Italy. His eager temperament
and extraordinary social charm opened the way in those years
of travel to frequent intercourse with famous men. This, for the
time, superseded controversy with materialism and scepticism,
and diverted his enthusiasm to nature and high art. One likes to
see how he handles the oíd questions as they now arise in the
philosophical treatment of motion in space, which was regarded

[ 490 ]

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by many as the key to all other phenomena presented in the
material world.

For one thing, the unreality of the data of sense after total
abstraction of living mind, the chief Principie in the earlier works,
lies more in the background in the De Motu. Yet it is tacitly
assumed, as the basis of an argument for the powerlessness of
all sensible things, and for refunding all active power in the
universe into conscious agency. Mens agitat molem might be
taken as a motto for the De Motu. Then there is more frequent
reference to scientific and philosophical authorities than in his
more juvenile treatises. Plato and Aristotle are oftener in view.
Italy seems to have introduced him to the physical Science of
Borelli and Torricelli. Leibniz, who died in 1716, when Berkeley
was in Italy, is named by him for the first time in the De Motu.
Perhaps he had learned something when he was abroad about
the most illustrious philosopher of the time. And it is interesting
by the way to find in one of those years what is, I think, the
only allusion to Berkeley by Leibniz. It is contained in one of
the Germán philosopher's letters to Des Bosses, in 1715. “Qui
in Hybernia corporum realitatem impugna!,” Leibniz writes,
“videtur nec rationes afferre idóneas, nee mentem suam satis
explicare. Suspicor esse ex eo hominum genere qui per Paradoxa
cognosci volunt.” This sentence is interesting on account of the
writer, although it suggests vague, and perhaps second-hand
knowledge of the Irishman and his principies. The ñame of
Hobbes does not appear in the De Motu. Yet one might have
expected it, in consideration of the supreme place which motion
takes in his system, which rests upon the principie that all changes
in the universe may be resolved into change of place.

In the De Motu the favourite language of ideal realism is
abandoned for the most part. “Bodies,” not “ideas of sense,”
are contrasted with mind or spirit, although body still means
significan! appearance presented to the senses. Indeed the term
idea occurs less often in this and the subsequent writings of

Editor's Preface To De Motu

599

Berkeley.

I will now give some account of salient features in the De
Motu.

Like the Principies the tract opens with a protest against the
empty abstractions, and consequent frivolous discussions, which
even mechanical Science had countenanced although dealing
with matters so obvious to sense as the phenomena of motion.
Forcé, ejfort, solicitation of gravity, nisus, are examples of
abstract terms connected with motion, to which nothing in what
is presented to the senses is found to correspond. Yet corporeal
power is spoken of as if it were something perceptible by sense,
and so found within the bodies we see and touch (sect. 1-3).

But it turns out differently when philosophers and naturalists
try to imagine the physical forcé that is supposed to inhabit
bodies, and to explain their motions. The conception of motion
has been the parent of innumerable paradoxes and seeming
contradictions among ancient Greek thinkers; for it presents,
in a striking form, the metaphysical difficulties in the way of [ 492 ]
a reconciliation of the One and the Many—difficulties which
Berkeley had already attributed to perverse abstractions, with
which philosophers amused themselves and blocked up the way
to concrete knowledge; first wantonly raising a dust, and then
complaining that they could not see. Ñor has modern mechanical
Science in this respect fared better than the oíd philosophies. Even
its leaders, Torricelli, for instance, and Eeibniz, offer us scholastic
shadows—empty metaphysical abstractions—when they speak
about an active power that is supposed to be lodged within the
things of sense. Torricelli tells us that the forces within the things
around us, and within our own bodies, are “subtle quintessences,
enclosed in a corporeal substance as in the enchanted vase
of Circe”; and Eeibniz speaks of their active powers as their
“substantial form,” whatever that can be conceived to mean.
Others cali the power to which change of place is due, the

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[ 493 ]

hylarchic principie, an appetite in boches, a spontaneity inherent
in them; or they assume that, besides their extensión, solidity,
and other qualities which appear in sense, there is also something
named forcé, latent in them if not patent—in all which we have a
flood of words, empty of concrete thought. At best the language
is metaphorical (sect. 2-9).

For showing the active cause at work in the production of
motion in bodies, it is of no avail to ñame, as if it were a datum
of sense, what is not presentable to our senses. Let us, instead,
turn to the only other sort of data in realised experience. For
we find only two sorts of realities in experience, the one sort
revealed by our senses, the other by inward consciousness. We
can affirm nothing about the contents of bodies except what
our senses present, namely, concrete things, extended, figured,
solid, having also innumerable other qualities, which seem all to
depend upon change of place in the things, or in their constituent
particles. The contents of mind or spirit, on the other hand, are
disclosed to inner consciousness, which reveáis a sentient Ego
that is actively percipient and exertive. And it must be in the
second of these two concrete revelations of reality, that active
causation, on which motion and all other change depends, is to be
found—not in empty abstractions, covered by words like power,
cause, forcé, or nisus, which correspond to nothing perceived by
the senses (sect. 21).

So that which we cali body presents within itself nothing in
which change of place or State can origínate causally. Extensión,
figure, solidity, and all the other perceptible constituents of bodies
are appearances only—passive phenomena, which succeed one
another in an orderly cosmical procession, on which doubtless
our pains and pleasures largely depend. But there is no sensibly
perceptible power found among those sensuous appearances.
They can only be caused causes, adapted, as we presuppose, to
signify to US what we may expect to follow that appearance.
The reason of their significance, i.e. of the constancy of

Editor's Preface To De Motu

601

their sequences and coexistences, must be sought for outside
of themselves. Experimental research may discover new terms
among the correlated cosmical sequences or coexistences, but
the newly discovered terms must still be only passive phenomena
previously unperceived. Body means only what is presentable to
the senses. Those who attribute to it something not perceptible
by sense, which they cali the forcé or power in which its
motions origínate, say in other words that the origin of motion is
unknowable by sense (sect. 22-24).

Turn now from things of sense, the data of perception, to
Mind or Spirit, as revealed in inner consciousness. Here we
have a deeper and more real revelation of what underlies, or is
presupposed in, the passive cosmical procession that is presented
to the senses. Our inward consciousness plainly shews the
thinking being actually exercising power to move its animated [ 494 ]
body. We find that we can, by a causal exertion of which we are
distinctly conscious, either excite or arrest movements in bodies.

In voluntary exertion we have thus a concrete example of forcé
or power, producing and not merely followed by motion. In
the case of human volition this is no doubt conditioned power;
nevertheless it exemplifies Power on a greater scale than human,
even Divine power, universally and continuously operative, in
all natural motions, and in the cosmical laws according to which
they proceed (sect. 25-30).

Thus those who pretend to find forcé or active causation within
bodies, pretend to find what their sensuous experience does not
support, and they have to sustain their pretence by unintelligible
language. On the other hand, those who explain motion by
referring it to conscious exertion of personal agents, say what is
supported by their own consciousness, and confirmed by high
authorities, including Anaxagoras, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes,
and Newton, demonstrating that in Spirit only do we find power
to change its own State, as well as the States and mutual relations
of bodies. Motion in nature is God continuously acting (sect. 31-

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[ 495 ]

34). But physical Science is conveniently confined to the order
of the passive procession of sensuous appearances, including
experiments in quest of the rules naturally exemplified in the
motions of bodies: reasoning on mathematical and mechanical
principies, it leaves the contemplation of active causation to a
more exalted Science (sect. 35-42).

In all this it can hardly be said that Berkeley has in this
adequately sounded the depths of Causation. He proclaims
inability to find through his senses more than sequence of
significant sensuous appearances, which are each and all empty
of active power; while he apparently insists that he has found
active power in the mere feeling of exertiorr, which after all, as
such, is only one sort of anteceden! sign of the motion that is
found to follow it. This is still only sequence of phenomena; not
active power. But is not causation a relation that cannot be truly
presented empirically, either in outer or inner consciousness?
And is not the Divine order that is presupposed by us in all change,
a presupposition that is inevitable in trustworthy intercourse with
a changing universe; unless we are to confess atheistically, that
our whole sensuous experience may in the end put us to utter
confusión? The passive, uneasy feeling of strain, more or less
involved in the effort to move our bodies and their surroundings,
is no doubt apt to be confused with active causation; for as
David Hume remarks, “the animal nisus which we experience,
though it can afford no accurate precise idea of power, enters
very much into the vulgar, inaccurate idea which is formed of
it.” So when Berkeley supposes that he has found a concrete
example of originating power in the nisus of which we are
conscious when we move our bodies, he is surely too easily
satisfied. The nisus followed by motion is, per se, only a natural
sequence, a caused cause, which calis for an originating cause
that is absolutely responsible for the movement. Is not the Índex
to this absolutely responsible agency an ethical one, which points

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603

to a free moral agent as alone necessarily connected with, or
responsible for, the changes which he can control? Persons are
causally responsible for their own actions; and are accordingly
pronounced good or evil on account of acts of will that are not
mere caused causes—^passively dependen! terms in the endless
succession of cosmical change. They must origínate in self, be
absolutely self-referable, in a word supernatural issues of the
personality. Moral reason implies that they are not determined
ab extra, and so points to moral agents as our only concrete
examples of independen! power; but this only so far as those
issues go for which they are morally responsible. Is not faith in [ 496 ]
the Universal Power necessarily faith-venture in the absolutely
perfect and trustworthy moral agency of God?

While the principie of Causation, in its application to change
of place on the part of bodies and their constituent atoms, is
the leading thought in the De Motu, this essay also investigates
articulately the nature of the phenomenon which we cali motion
(sect. 43-66). It assumes that motion is only an effect, seeing that
no one who reflects can doubt that what is presented to our senses
in the case of motion is altogether passive: there is nothing in the
successive appearance of the same body in different places that
involves action on the part of either of the moving or the moved
body, or that can be more than inert effect (sect. 49). And all
concrete motion, it is assumed, must be something that can be
perceived by our senses. Accordingly it must be a perceptible
relation between bodies, as far as it is bodily: it could make no
appearance at all if space contained only one solitary body: a
plurality of bodies is indispensable to its appearance. Absolute
motion of a solitary body, in otherwise absolutely empty space,
is an unmeaning abstraction, a collocation of empty words. This
leads into an inquiry about relative space as well as relative place,
and the intelligibility of absolute space, place, and motion (sect.
52-64).

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[ 497 ]

Local motion is unintelligible unless we understand the
meaning of space. Now some philosophers distinguish between
absolute space, which with them is ultimately the only real space,
and that which is conditioned by the senses, or relative. The
former is said to be boundless, pervading and embracing the
material world, but not itself presentable to our senses; the other
is the space marked out or differentiated by bodies contained in
it, and it is in this way exposed to our senses (sect. 52). What
must remain after the annihilation of all bodies in the universe
is relativeless, undifferentiated, absolute space, of which all
attributes are denied, even its so-called extensión being neither
divisible ñor mensurable; necessarily imperceptible by sense,
unimaginable, and unintelligible, in every way unrealisable in
experience; so that the words employed about it denote nothing
(sect. 53).

It follows that we must not speak of the real space which a body
occupies as part of a space that is necessarily abstracted from all
sentient experience; ñor of real motion as change within absolute
space, without any relation between bodies, either perceived or
conceived. All change of place in one body must be relative
to other bodies, among which the moving body is supposed to
change its place—our own bodies which we animate being of
course recognised among the number. Motion, it is argued,
is unintelligible, as well as imperceptible and unimaginable,
without some relation between the moving body and at least one
other body: the truth of this is tested when we try to suppose the
annihilation of all other bodies, our own included, and retain only
a solitary globe: absolute motion is found unthinkable. So that,
on the whole, to see what motion means we must rise above the
mathematical postulates that are found convenient in mechanical
Science; we must beware of empty abstractions; we must treat
motion as something that is real only so far as it is presented
to our senses, and remain modestly satisfied with the perceived
relations under which it then appears (sect. 65-66).

Editor's Preface To De Motu

605

Finally, is motion, thus explained, something that can be
spoken of as an entity communicable from one body to another
body? May we think of it as a datum of sense existing in the
striking body, and then passing from it into the struck body, the
one losing exactly as much as the other receives? (sect. 67).
Deeper thought finds in those questions only a revival of the
previously exploded postúlate of “forcé” as something sensible, [ 498 ]
yet distinct from all the significant appearances sense presents.

The language used may perhaps be permitted in mathematical
hypotheses, or postulates of mechanical Science, in which we
do not intend to go to the root of things. But the obvious
fact is, that the moving body shews less perceptible motion,
and the moved body more. To dispute whether the perceptible
motion acquired is numerically the same with that lost leads into
frivolous verbal controversy about Identity and Difference, the
One and the Many, which it was Berkeley's aim to expel from
Science, and so to simplify its procedure and result. Whether we
say that motion passes from the striking body into the struck, or
that it is generated anew within the struck body and annihilated
in the striking, we make virtually the same statement. In each
way of expression the facts remain, that the one body presents
perceptible increase of its motion and the other diminution. Mind
or Spirit is the active cause of all that we then see. Yet in
mechanical Science—which explains things only physically, by
shewing the significant connexion of events with their mechanical
rules—terms which seem to imply the conveyance of motion out
of one body into another may be pardoned, in consideration
of the limits within which physical Science is confined, and its
narrower point of view. In physics we confine ourselves to
the sensuous signs which arise in experience, and their natural
interpretation, in all which mathematical hypotheses are found
convenient; so that gravitation, for example, and other natural
rules of procedure, are spoken of as causes of the events which

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conform to them, no account being taken of the Active Power
that is ultimately responsible for the rules. For the Active Power
in which we live, move, and have our being, is not a datum of
sense; meditation brings it into light. But to pursue this thought
[499] would carry us beyond the physical laws of Motion (sect. 69-72).

The De Motu may be compared with what we found in the
Principies, sect. 25-28 and 101-117. The total powerlessness
of the significant appearances presented to the senses, and the
omnipotence of Mind in the economy of external nature, is its
chief philosophical lesson.

[ 501 ]

De Motu

1. Ad veritatem inveniendam prEecipuum est cavisse ne voces
males intellect£e^^^ nobis officiant: quod omnes fere monent
philosophi, pauci observant. Quanquam id quidem haud adeo
difficile videtur, in rebus príesertim physicis tractandis, ubi
locum habent sensus, experientia, et ratiocinium geometricum.
Seposito igitur, quantum licet, omni prejudicio, tam a loquendi
consuetudine quam a philosphorum auctoritate nato, ipsa
rerum natura diligenter inspicienda. Ñeque enim cujusquam
auctoritatem usque adeo valere oportet, ut verba ejus et voces in
pretio sint, dummodo nihil clari et certi iis subesse comperiatur.

2. Motus contemplatio mire torsit veterum philosophorum^^^
mentes, unde nate sunt varié opiniones supra modem difficiles,
ne dicam absurde; que, quum jam fere in desuetudinem abierint,
haud merentur ut iis discutiendis nimio studio immoremur. Apud
recentiores autem et saniores hujus evi philosophos^^^, ubi de
Motu agitur, vocabula haud pauca abstráete nimium et obscure
significationis oceurrunt, cujusmodi sunt solicitatio gravitatis,
conatus, vires mortuce, &c., que scriptis, alioqui doctissimis,
tenebras offundunt, sententiisque non minus a vero, quam a
sensu hominum communi abhorrentibus, ortum prebent. Hec [ 502 ]
vero necesse est ut, veritatis grada, non alios refellendi studio,
accurate discutiantur.

“voces mate intellectEe.” Cf. Principies of Human Knowledge,
“Introduction,” sect. 6, 23-25, on the abuse of language, especially by
abstraction.

“veterum philosophorum.” The history of ancient speculations about
motion, from the paradoxes of Zeno downwards, is, in some soit, a history of
ancient metaphysics. It involves Space, Time, and the material world, with the
ultímate causal relation of Nature to Spirit.

“hujus tevi philosophos.” As in Bacon on motion, and in the questions raised
by Newton, Borelli, Leibniz, and others, discussed in the following sections.

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3. Solicitatio et nisus, sive conatus, rebus solummodo
animatis revera competunt^^^. Cum aliis rebus tribuuntur,
sensu metaphorico accipiantur necesse est. A metaphoris
autem abstinendum philosopho. Porro, seclusa omni tarn
anirnse affectione quam corporis motione, nihil clari ac distincti
iis vocibus significan, cuilibet constabit qui modo rem serio
perpenderit.

4. Quamdiu corpora gravia a nobis sustinentur, sentimos in
nobismet ipsis nisum, fatigationem, et molestiam. Percipimus
etiam in gravibus cadentibus motum acceleratum versus centrum
telluris; ope sensuum prseterea nihil. Ratione tamen colligitur
causam esse aliquam vel principium horum phsenomenon;
illud autem gravitas vulgo nuncupatur. Quoniam vero causa
descensos gravium cseca sit et incógnita, gravitas ea acceptione
proprie dici nequit qualitas sensibilis; est igitur qualitas occulta.
Sed vix, et ne vix quidem, concipere licet quid sit qualitas
occulta, aut qua ratione qualitas olla agere aut operari quidquam
possit. Melius itaque foret, si, missa qualitate occulta, homines
attenderent solummodo ad effectus sensibiles; vocibusque
abstractis (quantumvis illffi ad disserendum útiles sint) in
meditatione omissis, mens in particularibus et concretis, hoc
est in ipsis rebus, defigeretur.

5. Vis^^'^ similiter corporibus tribuitur: usurpatur autem
vocabulum illud, tanquam significaret qualitatem cognitam,
distinctamque tarn a motu, figura, omnique alia re sensibili,
quam ab omni animalis affectione: id vero nihil aliud esse quam
qualitatem occultam, rem acrius rimanti constabit. Nisus animalis
et motus corporeus vulgo spectantur tanquam symptomata et

Sect. 3-42 are concemed with the principie of Causality, exemplified in
the motion, or change of place and State, that is continually going on in the
material world, and which was supposed by some to explain all the phenomena
of the universe.

“vis.” The assumption that active power is an immediate datum of sense
is the example here offered of the abase of abstract words. He proceeds to
dissolve the assumption by shewing that it is meaningless.

De Motu

609

mensurse hujus qualitatis occultse.

6. Patet igitur gravitatem aut vim frustra poní pro principio^^*’
motus: nunquid enim principium illud clarius cognosci potest
ex eo quod dieatur qualitas oceulta? Quod ipsum occultum est,
nihil explicat: ut omittamus causam agentem incognitam reetius
diei posse substantiam quam qualitatem. Porro vis, gravitas,
et istiusmodi voees, ssepius, nee inepte, in concreto usurpantur;
ita ut connotent corpus motum, difficultatem resistendi, &c.
Ubi vero a philosophis adhibentur ad significandas naturas
quasdam, ab hisce ómnibus príecisas et abstractas, quse nee
sensibus subjiciuntur, nee ulla mentis vi intelligi nee imaginatione
effingi^^^ possunt, turn demum errores et confusionem pariunt.

7. Multos autem in errorem ducit, quod voces generales et
abstractas in disserendo útiles esse videant, nee tamen earum vim
satis capiant. Partim vero a consuetudine vulgari inventse sunt illse
ad sermonem abbreviandum, partim a philosophis ad docendum
excogitatse; non quod ad naturas rerum accommodatas sint,
qu£e quidem singulares et concretse existunt; sed quod idonese ad
tradendas disciplinas, propterea quod faciant notiones, vel saltem
propositiones, universales^^^.

8. Vim corpoream esse aliquid conceptu facile plerumque
existimamus. li tamen qui rem accuratius inspexerunt in diversa
sunt opinione; uti apparet ex mira verborum obscuritate qua
laborant, ubi illam explicare conantur. Torricellius ait vim et
impetum esse res quasdam abstractas subtilesque et quintessen-
tias, qu£e includuntur in substantia corpórea, tanquam in vase

“principio”—the ultímate explanation or originating cause. Cf. sect. 36.
Metaphors, or indeed empty words, are accepted for explanations, it is argued,
when bodily power or forcé, in any form, e.g. gravitation, is taken as the
real cause of motion. To cali these “occult causes” is to say nothing that is
intelligible. The perceived sensible effects and their customary sequences are
all we know. Physicists are still deluded by words and metaphors.

Cf. sect. 53, where sense, imagination, and intelligence are distinguished.

Cf. Principies, Introd. 16, 20, 21; also Alciphron, Dial. VII. sect. 8, 17.

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[504]

mágico Circes^^^. Leibnitius item in naturse vi explicanda hsec
habet— Vis activa, primitiva, quce est évreAeyeia npiúrt], animes
velformes substantiali respondet. Vide Acta Erudit. Lips. Usque
adeo necesse est ut vel summi viri, quamdiu abstractionibus
indulgent, voces nulla certa significatione prseditas, et meras
scholasticorum umbras sectentur. Alia ex neotericorum scriptis,
nec pauca quidem ea, producere liceret; quibus abunde constare!,
metaphysicas abstractiones non usquequaque cessisse mechan-
ic£e et experimentis, sed negotium inane philosophis etiamnum
facessere.

9. Ex illo fonte derivantur varia absurda, cujus generis est illud,
vim percussionis, uteunque exigues, esse infinite magnam. Quod
sane supponit, gravitatem esse qualitatem quandam realem ab
aliis ómnibus diversam; et gravitationem esse quasi actum hujus
qualitatis, a motu realiter distinctum: minima autem percussio
producit effectum majorem quam maxima gravitatio sine motu;
ilia scilicet motum aliquem edit, hsec nullum. Unde sequitur, vim
percussionis ratione infinita excedere vim gravitationis, hoc est,
esse infinite magnam^^^. Videantur experimenta Galilsei, et quse
de definita vi percussionis scripserunt Torricellius, Borellus, et
alii.

10. Veruntamen fatendum est vim nullam per se immediate
sentid; ñeque aliter quam per effectum^^^ cognosci et mensurari.

[La Materia altro non é che un vaso di Circe incantato, il quale serve
per ricettacolo della forza et de' momenti dell' impeto. La forzae l'impeti
sono astratti tanto sottili, sono quintessenze tanto spiritose, che in altre
ampolle non si possono racchiudere, fuor che nell' intima corpulenza de' solidi
naturali, Vide Lezioni Accademiche.] —AUTHOR.fFNS Torricelli (1608-47),
the eminent Italian physicist, and professor of mathematics at Florence, who
invented the barometer.

Borelli (1608-79), Italian professor of mathematics at Pisa, and then of
medicine at Florence; see his De Vi Percussionis, cap. XXIV. prop. 88, and
cap. XXVII.

“per effectum,” i.e. by its sensible effeets—real power or active forcé not
being a datum of the senses, but found in the spiritual efficacy, of which we
have an example in our personal ageney.

De Motu

611

Sed vis mortuse, seu gravitationis simplicis, in eorpore quieseente
subjeeto, nulla faeta mutatione, effeetus nullus est; pereussionis
autem, effeetus aliquis. Quoniam, ergo, vires sunt effectibus
proportionales, eoncludere lieet vim mortuam^^® esse nullam.
Ñeque tamen propterea vim pereussionis esse infinitam: non
enim oportet quantitatem ullam positivam habere pro infinita,
propterea quod ratione infinita superet quantitatem nullam sive
nihil.

11. Vis gravitationis a momento seeerni nequit; momentum
autem sine eeleritate nullum est, quum sit moles in celeritatem
ducta: porro celeritas sine motu intelligi non potest; ergo nec vis
gravitationis. Deinde vis nulla nisi per aetionem innotescit, et per
eandem mensuratur; aetionem autem eorporis a motu prsescindere
non possumus; ergo quamdiu eorpus grave plumbi subjeeti vel
ehordse figuram mutat, tamdiu movetur; ubi vero quiescit, nihil
agit, vel, quod idem est, agere prohibetur. Breviter, voees istse
vis mortua et gravitatio, etsi per abstraetionem metaphysieam
aliquid significare supponuntur diversum a movente, moto, motu
et quiete, re vera tamen id totum nihil est.

12. Siquis diceret pondus appensum vel impositum agere in
chordam, quoniam impedit quominus se restituat vi elástica: dico,
pari ratione eorpus quodvis inferum agere in superius incumbens,
quoniam illud descenderé prohibet: dici vero non potest actio
eorporis, quod prohibeat aliud eorpus existere in eo loco quern
occupat.

13. Pressionem eorporis gravitantis quandoque sentimus.
Verum sensio ista molesta oritur ex motu eorporis istius gravis
fibris nervisque nostri eorporis communicato, et eorundem situm

“vim mortuam.” The only power we can find is the living power of Mind.
Reason is perpetually active in the universe, imperceptible through the senses,
and revealed to them only in its sensible effects. “Power,” e.g. “gravitation,” in
things, per se, is distinguished from perceived “motion” only through illusion
due to misleading abstraction. There is no physical power, intermediare
between spiritual agency, on the one hand, and the sensible changes we see, on
the other. Cf. sect. 11.

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[ 506 ]

immutante; adeoque percussioni accepta referri debet. In hisce
rebus multis et gravibus príejudiciis laboramus, sed illa acri
atque itérala meditatione subigenda sunt^^^, vel potius penitus
averruncanda.

14. Quo probetur quantitatem ullam esse infinitam, ostendi
oportet partem aliquam finitam homogeneam in ea infinities
contineri. Sed vis mortua se habet ad vim percussionis, non ut
pars ad totum, sed ut punctum ad lineam, juxta ipsos vis infinitse
percussionis auctores. Multa in bañe rem adjicere liceret, sed
vereor ne prolixus sim.

15. Ex principiis príemissis lites insignes solvi possunt,
qu£e viros doctos multum exercuerunt. Hujus rei exemplum
sit controversia illa de proportione virium. Una pars dum
concedit, momenta, motus, Ímpetus, data mole, esse simpliciter
ut velocitates, affirmat vires esse ut quadrata velocitatum.
Hanc autem sententiam supponere vim corporis distingui^^^ a
momento, motu, et ímpetu; caque suppositione sublata corruere,
nemo non videt.

16. Quo clarius adhuc appareat, confusionem quandam
miram per abstractiones metaphysicas in doctrinam de motu
inttoductam esse, videamus quantum intersit ínter notiones
virorum celebrium de vi et ímpetu. Leibnitius impetum cum
motu confundit. Juxta Newtonum^^^ ímpetus revera ídem est
cum vi inertise. Borellus^^° asserit impetum non aliud esse
quam gradum velocitatis. Alii impetum et conatum ínter se

“meditatione subigenda sunt.” Cf. Theory of Vision Vindicated, sect. 35,
70.

“distingui.” It is here argued that so-called power within the things of sense is
not distinguishable from the sensibly perceived sequences. To the meaningless
supposition that it is, he attributes the frivolous verbal controversies among the
leamed mentioned in the following section. The province of natural philosophy,
according to Berkeley, is to inquire what the rules are under which sensible
effects are uniformly manifested. Cf. Siris, sect. 236, 247, 249.

Principia Math. Def. III.

De Vi Percussionis, cap. I.

De Motu

613

differre, alii non differre volunt. Plerique vim motricem motui
proportionalem intelligunt. Nonnulli aliam aliquam vim prseter
motricem, et diversimode mensurandam, utpote per quadrata
velocitatum in moles, intelligere prce se ferunt. Sed infinitum
esset hxc prosequi.

17. Vis, gravitas, attractio, et hujusmodi voces, utiles^^^
sunt ad ratiocinia et computationes de motu et corporibus motis;
sed non ad intelligendam simplicem ipsius motus naturam, vel
ad qualitates totidem distinctas designandas. Attractionem certe
quod attinet, patet illam ab Newtono adhiberi, non tanquam
qualitatem veram et physicam, sed solummodo ut hypothesin
mathematicam^^^. Quinetiam Leibnitius, nisum elementarem
seu solicitationem ab Ímpetu distinguens, fatetur illa entia non re
ipsa invenid in rerum natura, sed abstractione facienda esse.

18. Similis ratio est compositionis et resolutionis
virium quarumcunque directarum in quascunque obliquas,
per diagonalem et latera parallelogrammi. Hsec mechanicse
et computationi inserviunt: sed aliud est computationi et
demonstrationibus mathematicis inservire, aliud rerum naturam
exhibere.

19. Ex recentioribus multi sunt in ea opinione, ut putent
motum ñeque destruí nec de novo gigni, sed eandem^^^ semper
motus quantitatem permanere. Aristóteles etiam dubium illud
olim proposuit—utrum motus factus sit et corruptus, an vero ab
seterno? Phys. lib. viii. Quod vero motus sensibilis pereat,
patet sensibus: illi autem eundem impetum, nisum, aut siimmam
virium eandem manere velle videntur. Unde affirmat Borellus,
vim in percussione non imminui, sed expandí; ímpetus etiam

“útiles.” Such words as “forcé,” “power,” “gravity,” “attraction,” are held
to be convenient in physical reasonings about the phenomena of motion,
but worthless as philosophical expressions of the cause of motion, which
transcends sense and mechanical Science. Cf. Siris, sect. 234, 235.

‘^'*2 Cf. sect. 67.

“eandem.” So in recent discussions on the conservation of forcé.

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[ 508 ]

contrarios suscipi et retineri in eodem corpore. Item Leibnitius
nisum ubique et semper esse in materia, et ubi non patet sensibus,
ratione intelligi contendit.— Hecc autem nimis abstracta esse et
obscura, ejusdemque fere generis cum formis substantialibus et
entelechiis, fatendum.

20. Quotquot ad explicandam motus causam atque originem,
vel principio hylarchico, vel naturse indigentia, vel appetitu, aut
denique instinctu naturali utuntur, dixisse aliquid potius quam
cogitasse censendi sunt. Ñeque ab hisce multum absunt qui sup-
posuerint^^^ partes terree esse se moventes, aut etiam spiritus iis
implantatos ad instar formee, ut assignent causam accelerationis
gravium cadentium: aut qui dixerit^^^, in corporeprceter solidam
extensionem debere etiam poni aliquid unde virium considerado
oriatur. Siquidem hi omnes vel nihil particulare et determinatum
enuntiant; vel, si quid sit, tarn difficile erit illud explicare, quam
id ipsum cujus explicandi causa adducitur^^^.

21. Frustra ad naturam illustrandam adhibentur ea quse nec
sensibus patent, nec ratione intelligi possunt. Videndum ergo
quid sensus, quid experientia, quid demum ratio iis innixa,
suadeat. Dúo sunt siimma rerum genera— corpus et anima. Rem
extensam, solidam, mobilem, figuratam, aliisque qualitatibus
qu£e sensibus oceurrunt prseditam, ope sensuum; rem vero
sentientem, percipientem, intelligentem, conscientia quadam
interna cognovimus. Porro, res istas plañe Ínter se diversas
esse, longeque heterogéneas, cernimus. Loquor autem de rebus
cognitis: de incognitis enim disserere nil juvat^^^.

[Borellus.]—AUTHOR.{FNS See De Vi Percussionis, cap. XXIII.

[Leibnitius.]—AUTHOR.{FNS

On Berkeley's reasoning all terms which involve the assumption that real
causality is something presentable to the senses are a cover for meaninglessness.
Only through self-conscious experience of personal activity does real meaning
enter into the portion of language which deais with active causation. This is
argued in detail in sect. 21-35.

Our concrete experience is assumed to he confined to (a) bodies, i.e. the data
of the senses, and (b) mind or spirit —sentient, intelligent, active—revealed

De Motu

615

22. Totum id quod novimus, cui nomen corpus indidimus,
nihil in se continet quod motus principium seu causa efficiens
esse possit. Etenim impenetrabilitas, extensio, figura nullam
includunt vel connotant potentiam producendi motum; quinimo
e contrario non modo illas, verum etiam alias, quotquot sint,
corporis qualitates sigillatim percurrentes, videbimus omnes esse
revera passivas, nihilque iis activum inesse, quod ullo modo
intelligi possit tanquam fons et principium motus^^^. Gravitatem
quod attinet, voce illa nihil cognitum et ab ipso effectu sensibili,
cujus causa quseritur, diversum significan jam ante ostendimus.
Et sane quando corpus grave dicimus, nihil aliud intelligimus,
nisi quod feratur deorsum; de causa hujus effectus sensibilis nihil
omnino cogitantes.

23. De corpore itaque audacter pronunciare licet, utpote
de re comperta, quod non sit principium motus. Quod si
quisquam, prseter solidam extensionem ejusque modificationes,
vocem corpus qualitatem etiam occultam, virtutem, formam,
essentiam complecti sua significatione contendat; licet quidem
illi inutili negotio sine ideis disputare, et nominibus nihil distincte
exprimentibus abuti. Cseterum sanior philosophandi ratio videtur
ab notionibus abstractis et generalibus (si modo notiones dici
debent quse intelligi nequeunt) quantum fieri potest abstinuisse.

24. Quicquid continetur in idea corporis novimus; quod vero

by internal consciousness. Cf. Principies, sect. 1, 2, in which experience is
resolved into ideas and the active intelligence which they presuppose. Here the
Word idea disappears, but, in accordance with its signification, “bodies” is still
regarded as aggregates of external phenomena, the passive subjects of changes
of place and State: the idealisation of the material world is tacitly implied, but
not obtruded.

“nihilque,” &c. Cf. Principies of Human Knowledge, e.g. sect. 26, 65,
66. where the essential passivity of the ideas presented to the senses, i.e. the
material world, is maintained as a cardinal principie—on the positive ground
of our percipient experience of sensible things. To speak of the cause of motion
as something sensible, he argües (sect. 24), is merely to shew that we know

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novimus in corpore, id non esse principium motus constat^^^.
Qui prseterea aliquid incognitum in corpore, cujus ideam nullam
habent, comminiscuntur, quod motus principium dicant, ii revera
nihil aliud quam principium motus esse incognitum dicunt. Sed
hujusmodi subtilitatibus diutius immorari piget.

25. Prseter res corpóreas alterum est genus rerum
cogitantium^^^. In iis autem potentiam inesse corpora movendi,
propria experientia didicimus^^^; quandoquidem anima nostra
pro lubitu possit ciere et sistere membrorum motus, quacunque
tándem ratione id fiat. Hoc certe constat, corpora moveri ad
nutum animse; eamque proinde haud inepte dici posse principium
motus: particulare quidem et subordinatum, quodque ipsum
dependeat a primo et universali Principio^^^.

26. Corpora gravia feruntur deorsum, etsi nullo impulsu
apparente agitata; non tamen existimandum propterea in iis
contineri principium motus: cujus rei bañe rationem assignat
Aristoteles^^^;— Gravia et levia (inquit) non moventur a seipsis;
id enim vitale esset, et se sistere possent. Gravia omnia una
eademque certa et constanti lege centrum telluris petunt, ñeque
in ipsis animadvertitur principium vel facultas ulla motum istum

nothing about it. Cf. sect. 28, 29, infra.

The phenomena that can be presented to the senses are taken as the measure
of what can be attributed to the material world; and as the senses present only
conditioned change of place in bodies, we must look for the active cause in the
invisible world which internal consciousness presents to us.

“genus rerum cogitantium.” Cf. Principies, sect. 2.

“experientia didicimus.” Can the merely empirical data even of internal
consciousness reveal this causal connexion between volition and bodily
motions, without the venture of theistic faith?

“a primo et universali Principio” i.e. God, or the Universal Spirit, in whom
the universe of bodies and spirits finds explanation; in a way which Berkeley
does not attempt to unfold articulately and exhaustively in philosophical
System.

Phys. 0. 4. 255 a 5-7.

De Motu

617

sistendi, minuendi, vel, nisi pro rata proportione, augendi, aut
denique ullo modo immutandi: habent adeo se passive. Porro
Ídem, striete et aecurate loquendo, dieendum de eorporibus
percussivis. Corpora ista quamdiu moventur, ut et in ipso
pereussionis momento, si gerunt passive, perinde scilieet atque
eum quieseunt. Corpus iners tam agit quam eorpus motum, si
res ad verum exigatur: id quod agnoseit Newtonus, ubi ait, [5io]
vim inertise esse eandem eum impetu^^^. Corpus autem iners et
quietum nibil agit, ergo nee motum.

27. Revera eorpus seque perseverat in utrovis statu, vel motus
vel quietis. Ista vero perseverantia non magis dicenda est aetio
eorporis, quam existentia ejusdem aetio dieeretur. Perseverantia
nibil aliud est quam eontinuatio in eodem modo existendi,
quse proprie diei aetio non potest. Cseterum resistentiam,
quam experimur in sistendo corpore moto, ejus actionem esse
fingimus vana speeie delusi. Revera enim ista resistentia quam
sentimus^^^, passio est in nobis, ñeque arguit eorpus agere, sed
nos pati: constat utique nos ídem passuros fuisse, sive eorpus
illud a se moveatur, sive ab alio prineipio impellatur.

28. Aetio et reaetio dicuntur esse in eorporibus: nee
ineommode ad demonstrationes meebanieas^^^. Sed cavendum,
ne propterea supponamus virtutem aliquam realem, quse motus
causa sive principium sit, esse in iis. Etenim voces illse eodem
modo intelligendse sunt ac vox attractio', et quemadmodum bsec
est bypotbesis solummodo matbematica^^^, non autem qualitas
pbysica: ídem etiam de ibis intelligi debet, et ob eandem
rationem. Nam sicut veritas et usus tbeorematum de mutua

Princip. Math. Def. III.

“resistentia.” Our muscular sensation of resistance is apt to be accepted
empirically as itself active power in the concrete, entering very much, as has
been said, into the often inaccurate idea of power which is formed. See Editor's
Preface.

“nec ineommode.” Cf. sect. 17, and note.

“hypothesis mathematica.” Cf. sect. 17, 35, 36-41, 66, 67; also Siris, sect.
250-251.

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corporum attractione in philosophia mechanica stabiles manent,
utpote unice fundati in motu corporum, sive motus iste causari
supponatur per actionem corporum se mutuo attrahentium, sive
per actionem agentis alicujus a corporibus diversi impellentis
et moderantis corpora; pari ratione, qusecunque tradita sunt de
regulis et legibus motuum, simul ac theoremata inde deducta,
manent inconcussa, dum modo concedantur effectus sensibiles, et
ratiocinia iis innixa; sive supponamus actionem ipsam, aut vim
horum effectuum causatricem, esse in corpore, sive in agente
incorpóreo.

29. Auferantur ex idea corporis extensio, soliditas, figura,
remanebit nihil^^^. Sed qualitates istse sunt ad motum
indifferentes, nec in se quidquam habent quod motus principium
dici possit. Hoc ex ipsis ideis nostris perspicuum est. Si
igitur voce corpas significatur id quod concipimus, plañe consta!
inde non peti posse principium motus: pars scilicet nulla aut
attributum illius causa efficiens vera est, quse motum producá!.
Vocem autem proferre, et nihil concipere, id demum indignum
esset philosopho.

30. Datur res cogitans, activa, quam principium motus ...
in nobis experimur^^^. Hanc animam, mentem, spiritum ...
Datur etiam res extensa, iners, impenetrabilis, ... quse a priori
toto coelo differt, novumque genus^^*’ ... Quantum intersit

“nihil.” This section sums up Berkeley's objections to crediting matter with
real power; the senses being taken as the test of what is contained in matter.
It may be compared with David Hume, Thomas Brown, and J.S. Mili on
Causation. Berkeley differs from them in recognising active power in spirit,
while with them he resolves causation among bodies into invariable sequence.

Can the data presented to us reveal more than sequence, in the relation
between our volitions and the corresponding movements of our bodies? Is
not the difference found in the moral presupposition, which supernaturalises
man in his voluntary or morally responsible activity? This obliges us to see
ourselves as absolutely original causes of all bodily and mental States for which
we can be morally approved or blamed.

“novumque genus.” Cf. sect. 21. We have here Berkeley's antithesis of mind
and matter—spirits and external phenomena presented to the senses—persons

De Motu

619

Ínter res eogitantes et extensas, primus omnium deprehendens
Anaxagoras, vir longe sapientissimus, asserebat mentem nihil
habere cum eorporibus commune, id quod constat ex primo libro
Aristotelis De Anima^^^. Ex neotericis idem optime animadvertir
Cartesius^^^. Ab eo alii^^^ rem satis elaram voeibus obscuris
impeditam ae difficilem reddiderunt.

31. Ex dictis manifestum est eos qui vim activam, aetionem,
motus principium, in eorporibus revera inesse affirmant,
sententiam nulla experientia fundatam ampleeti, eamque terminis
obseuris et generalibus adstruere, nee quid sibi velint satis [5i2]
intelligere. E eontrario, qui mentem esse prineipium motus
volunt, sententiam propria experientia munitam proferunt,
hominumque omni revo doetissimorum suffragiis comprobatam.

32. Primus Anaxagoras^^^ tóv voüv introduxit, qui motum
inerti materire imprimeret. Quam quidem sententiam probat
etiam Aristoteles^^^, pluribusque confirmat, aperto pronuncians
primum movens esse immobile, indivisibile, et nullam habens
magnitudinem. Dieere autem, omne me vum esse mobile,
reete animadvertit idem esse ac s diceret, omne redifieativum
esse redificabile, Physic, lib Plato insuper in Timreo^^^ tradit

in contrast to passive ideas.

De Anima, I. ii. 13,22,24.

“Cartesius.” The antithesis of extended things and thinking things pervades
Descartes; but not, as with Berkeley, on the foundation of the new conception
of what is truly meant by matter or sensible things. See e.g. Principia, P. I. §§

63, 64.

“alii.” Does he refer to Locke, who suggests the possibility of matter
thinking?

See Aristotle, De Anima, I. ii. 5, 13; Diogenes Laertius, Lib. VI. i. 6.

Nat. Ausc. VIII. 15; also De Anima, III, x. 7.

Hardly any passage in the Timeeus exactly corresponds to this. The
following is, perhaps, the most pertinent:—Ktvr|aiv yetp áttévetpev aÚTW rfiv
ToO awparot; otKetav, twv éTtrá rfiv ttepi voüv xat tppóvriatv páA-tara oüaav
(p. 34 a). Aristotle quotes the Timeeus in the same connexion. De Anima, I. iii.
ii.

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machinam hanc corpo seu mundum visibilem, agitari et animari
a mente, sensum omnem fugiat. Quinetiam hodie philosophi
siani^^^ principium motuum naturalium Deum agnoscun. Et
Newtonus^^^ passim nec obscure innuit, non solummodo
motum ab initio a numine profectum esse, verum adhuc
systema mundanum ab eodem actu moved. Hoc sacris literis
consonum est: hoc scholasticorum calculo comprobatur. Nam
etsi Peripatetici naturam tradant esse principium motus et
quietis, interpretantur tamen naturam naturantem esse Deum^^^.
Intelligunt nimirum corpora omnia systematis hujusce mundani a
mente prsepotenti juxta certam et constantem rationem^’*’ moveri.

33. Cseterum qui principium vitale corporibus tribuunt,
obscurum aliquid et rebus parum conveniens fingunt. Quid enim
aliud est vitali principio prseditum esse quam vivere? aut vivere
quam se movere, sistere, et statum suum mutare? Philosophi
autem hujus sseculi doctissimi pro principio indubitato ponunt,
omne corpus perseverare in statu suo, vel quietis vel motus
uniformis in directum, nisi quatenus abunde cogitur statum ilium
mutare: e contrario, in anima sentimos esse facultatem tam
statum suum quam aliarum rerum mutandi; id quod proprie
dicitur vitale, animamque a corporibus longe discrimina!.

34. Motum et quietem in corporibus recentiores consideran!
velut dúos status existendi, in quorum utrovis corpus omne
sua natura iners permaneret^’^ nulla vi externa urgente. Unde

“philosophi Cartesiani.” Secundum Cartesium causa generalis omnium
motuum et quietum est Deus.—Derodon, Physica, I. ix. 30.

Principia Mathematica —Scholium Generale.

“naturam naturantem esse Deum”—as we might say, God considered as
imminent cause in the universe. See St. Thomas Aquinas, Opera, vol. XXII.
Quest. 6, p. 27.

“juxta certam et constantem rationem.” While all changes in Nature are
determined by Will, it is not capricious but rational Will. The so-called
arbitrariness of the Language of Nature is relative to us, and from our point of
view. In itself, the universe of reality expresses Perfect Reason.

“permaneret.” Cf. sect. 51.

De Motu

621

colligere licet, eandem esse causam motus et quietis, quse est
existentise corporum. Ñeque enim quserenda videtur alia eausa
existentise corporis successivse in diversis partibus spatii, quam
illa unde derivatur existentia ejusdem corporis successiva in
diversis partibus temporis. De Deo autem Optimo Máximo
rerum omnium Conditore et Conservatore tractare, et qua
ratione res cunctse a siimmo et vero Ente pendeant demonstrare,
quamvis pars sit scientise humanse príecellentissima, spectat
tamen potius ad philosophiam primam^^^, seu metaphysicam
et theologiam, quam ad philosophiam naturalem, quse hodie
fere omnis continetur in experimentis et mechanica. Itaque
cognitionem de Deo vel supponit philosophia naturalis, vel
mutuatur ah aliqua scientia superiori. Quanquam verissimum sit,
naturse investigationem scientiis altioribus argumenta egregia
ad sapientiam, bonitatem, et potentiam Dei illustrandam et
probandam undequaque subministrare.

35. Quod hsec minus intelligantur, in causa est, cur
nonnulli immerito repudient physicse principia mathematica, eo
scilicet nomine quod illa causas rerum efficientes non assignant:
quum tamen revera ad physicam aut mechanicam spectet
regulas^^^ solummodo, non causas efficientes, impulsionum
attractionumve, et ut verbo dicam, motuum leges tradere; ex iis
vero positis phsenomenon particularium solutionem, non autem
causam efficientem assignare.

36. Multum intererit considerasse quid proprie sit principium,
et quo sensu intelligenda sit vox illa apud philosophos^’^.

“spectat potius ad philosophiam primam.” The drift of the De Motu is to
distinguish the physical sequences of molecular motion, which the physical
Sciences articúlate, from the Power with which metaphysics and theology are
concemed, and which we approach through consciousness.

“regulas.” Cf. Siris, sect. 231-235.

Having, in the preceding sections, contrasted perceived motions and their
immanent originating Power—matter and mind—physics and metaphysics—he
proceeds in this and the seven following sections to explain more fully what ha
means by principium and also the two meanings (metaphysical and mechanical)

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Causa quidem vera efficiens et conservatrix rerum omnium jure
Optimo appellatur fons et principium earundem. Principia vero
philosophise experimentalis proprie dicenda sunt fundamenta
quibus illa innititur, seu fontes unde derivatur, (non dico
existentia, sed) cognitio rerum corporearum, sensus utique ex
experientia. Similiter, in philosophia mechanica, principia
dicenda sunt, in quibus fundatur et continetur universa disciplina,
leges illse motuum primarise, quse experimentis comprobatse,
ratiocinio etiam excultse sunt et redditse universales^^^. Hse
motuum leges commode dicuntur principia, quoniam ab iis
tam theoremata mechanica generaba quam particulares tcov
9 atvopévcov explicationes derivantur.

37. Tum nimirum dici potest quidpiam explican mechanice,
cum reducitur ad ista principia simplicissima et universalissima,
et per accuratum ratiocinium, cum iis consentaneum et connexum
esse ostenditur. Nam inventis semel naturse legibus, deinceps
monstrandum est philosopho, ex constanti harum legum
observatione, hoc est, ex iis principiis phsenomenon quodvis
necessario consequi: id quod est phsenomena explicare et solvere,
causamque, id est rationem cur fiant, assignare.

38. Mens humana gaudet scientiam suam extendere et dilatare.
Ad hoc autem notiones et propositiones generales efformandse
sunt, in quibus quodam modo continentur propositiones et
cognitiones particulares, quse turn demum intelligi creduntur
cum ex primis ibis continuo nexu deducuntur. Hoc geometris
notissimum est. In mechanica etiam prsemittuntur notiones,
hoc est definitiones, et enunciationes de motu prirnse et
generales, ex quibus postmodum methodo mathematica
conclusiones magis remotse et minus generales colliguntur.

of solutio. By principium, in philosophy, he understands universally efficient
supersensible Power. In natural philosophy the term is applied to the orderly
sequences manifested to our senses, not to the active cause of the order.

“ratiocinio ... redditte universales.” Relations of the data of sense to
universalising reason are here recognised.

De Motu

623

Et sicut per applieationem theorematum geometrieorum,
eorporum partieularium magnitudines mensurantur; ita etiam
per applieationem theorematum mechanices universalium,
systematis mundani partium quarumvis motus, et phsenomena
inde pendentia, innotescunt et determinantur: ad quem seopum
uniee collineandum physico.

39. Et quemadmodum geometrse, disciplinse eausa, multa
comminiscuntur, quse nee ipsi describere possunt, nee in rerum
natura invenire; simili prorsus ratione mechanicus voces quasdam
abstractas et generales adhibet, fingitque in corporibus vim,
actionem, attractionem, solicitationem, &c. quse ad theorias et
enunciationes, ut et computationes de motu apprime útiles sunt,
etiamsi in ipsa rerum veritate et corporibus actu existentibus
frustra qusererentur, non minus quam quse a geometris per
abstractionem mathematicam finguntur.

40. Revera ope sensuum nil nisi effectus seu qualitates
sensibiles, et res corpóreas omnino passivas, sive in motu sint
sive in quiete, percipimus: ratioque et experientia activum
nihil prseter mentem aut animam esse suadet. Quidquid ultra
fingitur, id ejusdem generis esse cum aliis hypothesibus et
abstractionibus mathematicis existimandum: quod penitu sanimo
infigere oportet. Hoc ni fiat, facile in obscuram scholasticorum
subtilitatem, quse per tot ssecula, tanquam dirá qusedam pestis,
philosophiam corrupit, relabi possumus.

41. Principia mechanica legesque motuum aut naturse
universales, sseculo ultimo feliciter inventse, et subsidio
geometrise tractatse et applicatse, miram lucem in philosophiam
intulerunt. Principia vero metaphysica causseque reales
efficientes motus et existentise eorporum attributorumve
corporeorum nullo modo ad mechanicam aut experimenta
pertinent; ñeque eis lucem daré possunt, nisi quatenus, velut
prsecognita, inserviant ad limites physicse prsefiniendos, caque
ratione ad tollendas difficultates qusestionesque peregrinas.

42. Qui a spiritibus motus principium petunt, ii vel rem

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corpoream vel incorpoream voce spiritus intelligunt. Si rem
corpoream, quantumvis tenuem, tamen redit difficultas: si
incorpoream, quantumvis id verum sit, attamen ad physicam
non proprie pertinet. Quod si quis philosophiam naturalem ultra
limites experimentorum et mechanicse extenderit, ita ut rerum
etiam incorporearum, et inextensarum cognitionem complectatur,
latior quidem illa vocis acceptio tractationem de anima, mente,
seu principio vitali admittit. Cseterum commodius erit, juxta
usum jam fere receptum, ita distinguere Ínter scientias, ut singulse
propriis circumscribantur cancellis, et philosophus naturalis totus
sit in experimentis, legibusque motuum, et principiis mechanicis,
indeque depromptis ratiociniis; quidquid autem de aliis rebus
protulerit, id superiori alicui scientise acceptum referat. Etenim
ex cognitis naturse legibus pulcherrirnse theorise, praxes etiam
mechanicse ad vitam útiles consequuntur. Ex cognitione autem
ipsius naturse Auctoris considerationes longe prEestantissimse
quidem illse, sed metaphysicEe, theologicse, morales oriuntur.

43. De principiis hactenus: nunc dicendum de natura
motus^’^. Atque is quidem, cum sensibus clare percipiatur,
non tam natura sua, quam doctis philosophorum commentis
obscuratus est. Motus nunquam in sensus nostros incurrit sine
mole corpórea, spatio, et tempore. Sunt tamen qui motum,
tanquam ideam quandam simplicem et abstractam, atque ab
ómnibus aliis rebus sejunctam, contemplari student. Verum
idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima^’^ intellectus aciem eludit: id

“natura motus.” Sect. 43-66 treat of the nature of the effect —i.e. perceptible
motion, as distinguished from its true causal origin iprincipium) in mind or
spirit. The origin of motion belongs to metaphysics; its nature, as dependent on
percipient experience, belongs to physics. Is motion independent of a plurality
of bodies; or does it involve bodies in relation to other bodies, so that absolute
motion is meaningless? Cf. Principies, sect. 111-116.

“idea illa tenuissima et subtilissima.” The difficulty as to definition of
motion is attributed to abstractions, and the inclination of the scholastic mind
to prefer these to concrete experience.

De Motu

625

quod quilibet secum meditando experiri potest. Hiñe naseuntur
magnse difficultates de natura motus, et definitiones, ipsa re quam
illustrare debent longe obscuriores. Hujusmodi sunt definitiones
illse Aristotelis et Scholasticorum^’^, qui motum dicunt esse
actum mobilis quatenus est mobile, vel actum entis in potentia
quatenus in potentia. Hujusmodi etiam est illud viri^^^ Ínter
reeentiores eelebris, qut asserit nihil in motu esse reale prceter
momentaneum illud quod in vi ad mutationem nitente constitui
debet. Porro constat, horum et similium definitionum auetores
in animo habuisse abstractam motus naturam, seelusa omni
temporis et spatii eonsideratione, explieare: sed qua ratione
abstraeta ilia motus quintessentia (ut ita dieam) intelligi possit,
non video.

44. Ñeque hoe contenti, ulterius pergunt, partesque ipsius
motus a se invieem dividunt et seeernunt, quarum ideas distinctas,
tanquam entium revera distinetorum, efformare conantur. Etenim
sunt qui motionem a motu distinguant, illam velut instantaneum
motus elementum speetantes. Velocitatem insuper, conatum,
vim, impetum totidem res essentia diversas esse volunt, quarum
quseque per propriam atque ab aliis ómnibus segregatam et
abstraetam ideam intelleetui objieiatur. Sed in hisce rebus
discutiendis, stantibus iis quse supra disseruimus^^*’, non est cur
diutius immoremur.

45. Multi etiam per transitum^^^ motum definiunt, obliti,
seilicet, transitum ipsum sine motu intelligi non posse, et per
motum definiri oportere. Verissimum adeo est definitiones,
sieut nonnullis rebus lueem, ita vicissim aliis tenebras afferre.
Et prefecto, quascumque res sensu percipimus, eas clariores

Motion is thus defined by Aristotle:—Aló rj KÍvr|ai<; ¿vreA-éxeioc toO
Kwr|ToO, f| Kivr|TÓv. Nat. Ausc. III. ii; see also i. and iii. Cf. Derodon, Physica,
I. ix.

Newton.

Cf. sect. 3-42.

Descartes, Principia, P. II. § 25; also Borellus, De Vi Percussionis, p. 1.

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aut notiores definiendo efficere vix quisquam potuerit. Cujus rei
vana spe allecti res fáciles difficillimas^^^ reddiderunt philosophi,
mentesque suas difficultaübus, quas utplurimum ipsi peperissent,
implicavere. Ex bocee definiendi, simul ac absttahendi studio,
multse tam de motu quam de aliis rebus natse subtilissirnse
quEestiones, esedenique nullius utilitatis, hominum ingenia frusfra
torserunt; adeo ut Aristóteles nitro et ssepius fateatur motum esse
actum quendam cognitu dijficilem^^^, et nonnulli ex veteribus
usque eo nugis exercitati deveniebant, ut motum omnino esse
negarent^^^.

46. Sed hujusmodi minutiis distineri piget. Satis sit fontes
solutionum indicasse: ad quos etiam illud adjungere libet: quod ea
qu£e de infinita divisione temporis et spatii in mathesi traduntur,
ob congenitam rerum naturam paradoxa et theorias spinosas
(quales sunt illse omnes in quibus agitur de infinito^^^) in
speculationes de motu intulerunt. Quidquid autem hujus generis
sit, id omne motus commune habet cum spatio et tempore, vel
potius ad ea refert acceptum.

47. Et quemadmodum ex una parte nimia abstractio seu
divisio rerum vere inseparabilium, ita ab altera parte compositio
seu potius confusio rerum diversissimarum motus naturam
perplexam reddidit. Usitatum enim est motum cum causa
motus efficiente confundere^*^. Unde accidit ut motus sit quasi
biformis, unam faciem sensibus obviam, alteram caliginosa nocte
obvolutam habens. Inde obscuritas et confusio, et varia de motu
paradoxa originem trahunt, dum effectui perperam tribuitur id
quod revera causse solummodo competit.

48. Hiñe oritur opinio illa, eandem semper motus quantitatem

“res fáciles difficillimas.” Cf. Principies, “Introduction,” sect. 1.

Kai 6rá toüto Sq xoAeitóv aÚTf|v AapeTv tí éarív. Nat. Ausc. III. ii.

e.g. Zeno, in his noted argument against the possibility of motion, referred
to as a signal example of fallacy.

“de infinite, &c.” Cf. Principies, sect. I30-I32, and the Analyst passim, for
Berkeley's treatment of infinitesimals.

“confundere.” Cf. sect. 3-42 for illustrations of this confusión.

De Motu

627

conservari^^^. Quod, nisi intelligatur de vi et potentia eausse,
sive causa ilia dicatur natura, sive vouc;, vel quodcunque tándem
agens sit, falsum esse cuivis facile constabit. Aristoteles^^^
quidem 1. viii. Physicorum, ubi qurerit utrum motus factus sit et
corruptus, an vero ab reterno tanquam vita immortalis insit rebus
ómnibus, vitale principium potius, quam effectum externum, sive
mutationem loci^^^, intellexisse videtur.

49. Hiñe etiam est, quod multi suspicantur motum non esse
meram passionem in corporibus. Quod si intelligamus id quod
in motu corporis sensibus objicitur, quin omnino passivum sit
nemo dubitare potest. Ecquid enim in se habet successiva
corporis existentia in diversis loéis, quod actionem refera!, aut
aliud sit quam nuduset iners effectus?

50. Peripatetici, qui dicunt motum esse actum unum utriusque,
moventis et moti^^*^, non satis discriminan! causam ab effectu.
Similiter, qui nisum aut conatum in motu fingunt, aut idem
Corpus simul in contrarias partes ferri putant, eadem idearum
confusione, eadem vocum ambiguitate ludificari videntur.

51. Juvat multum, sicut in aliis ómnibus, ita in scientia de
motu accuratam diligentiam adhibere, tam ad aliorum conceptus
intelligendos quam ad suos enunciandos: in qua re nisi peccatum
esset, vix credo in disputationem trahi potuisse, utrum corpus
indifferens sit ad motum et ad quietem, necne. Quoniam enim
experientia consta!, esse legem naturre primariam, ut corpus
perinde persevere! in statu motus ac quietis, quamdiu aliunde
nihil accidat ad statum istum mutandum\ et propterea vim
inertire sub diverso respectu esse vel resistentiam, vel impetum,
colligitur: hoc sensu prefecto corpus dici potest sua natura

The modem conception of the “conservation of forcé.”

Aristotle States the question in Nat. Ausc. VIH. cap. i, and solves it in cap.
iv.

*** “mutatio loci” is the effect, i.e. motion perceived by sense; “vitale
principium” the real cause, i.e. vital rational agency.

990 íL • • 5 ? •

moventis et moti, i.e. as concauses.

1519]

628

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[520]

indifferens ad motum vel quietem. Nimirum tam difficile est
quietem in corpus motum, quam motum in quiescens inducere:
cum vero corpus pariter conservet statum utrumvis, quidni dicatur
ad utrumvis se habere indifferenter?

52. Peripatetici pro varietate mutationum, quas res aliqua
subiré potest, varia motus genera distinguebant. Hodie de
motu agentes intelligunt solummodo motum localem^^^. Motus
autem localis intelligi nequit nisi simul intelligatur quid sit
locus: is vero a neotericis^^^ definitur pars spatii quam corpus
occupat: unde dividitur in relativum et absolutum pro ratione
spatii. Distinguunt enim Ínter spatium absolutum sive verum, ac
relativum sive apparens. Volunt scilicet dari spatium undequaque
immensum, immobile, insensibile, corpora universa permeans et
continens, quod vocant spatium absolutum. Spatium autem
a corporibus comprehensum vel definitum, sensibusque adeo
subjectum, dicitur spatium relativum, apparens, vulgare.

53. Fingamus itaque corpora cuneta destruí, et in nihilum
redigi. Quod reliquum est vocant spatium absolutum, omni
relatione quse a situ et distantiis corporum oriebatur, simul
cum ipsis corporibus, sublata. Porro spatium illud est
infinitum, immobile, indivisibile, insensibile, sine relatione et
sine distinctione. Hoc est, omnia ejus attributa sunt privativa vel
negativa: videtur igitur esse merum nihil^^^. Parit solummmodo

“motum localem.” Sect. 52-65 discuss the reality of absolute or empty
space, in contrast with concrete space realised in perception of the local
relations of bodies. The meaninglessness of absolute space and motion is
argued. Cf. Principies, sect. 116, 117. See Locke's Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13,
15, 17; also Papers which passed between Mr. Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke in
1715-16, pp. 55-59; 73-81; 97-103, &c. Leibniz calis absolute space “an ideal
of some modern Englishman.”

Newton's Principia, Def. Sch. III. See also Derodon, Physica, P. I. cap. vi.
§ 1 .

Cf. Locke on a vacuum, and the “possibility of space existing without
matter,” Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13.

De Motu

629

difficultatem aliquam quod extensum sit. Extensio autem est
qualitas positiva. Verum qualis tándem extensio est illa quse
nee dividí potest, nec mensurar!, cujus nullam partem, nec sensu
percipere, nee imaginatione depingere possumus? Etenim nihil
in imaginationem cadit, quod, ex natura rei, non possibile est ut
sensu pereipiatur; siquidem imaginatio^'^^ nihil aliud est quam
facultas representatrix rerum sensibilium, vel actu existentium,
vel saltem possibilium. Eugit insuper intellectum purum, quum
facultas illa versetur tantum circa res spirituales et inextensas,
cujusmodi sunt mentes nostrse, earumque habitus, passiones,
virtutes, et similia. Ex spatio igitur absoluto auferamus modo
vocabula, et nihil remanebit in sensu, imaginatione, aut intellectu:
nihil aliud ergo iis designatur, quam pura privado aut negatio,
hoc est, merum nihil.

54. Confitendum omnino est nos circa bañe rem gravissimis
prEejudiciis tener!, a quibus ut liberemur, omnis animi vis
exercenda. Etenim multi, tantum abest quod spatium absolutum
pro nihilo ducant, ut rem esse ex ómnibus (Deo excepto) unicam
existiment, quse annihilari non possit: statuantque illud suapte
natura necessario existere, seternumque esse et increatum, atque
adeo attributorum divinorum particeps^^^. Verum enimvero
quum certissimum sit, res omnes, quas nominibus designamus,
per qualitates aut relationes, vel aliqua saltem ex parte cognosci [52i]
(ineptum enim foret vocabulis uti quibus cogniti nihil, nihil
notionis, idese vel conceptus subjiceretur), inquiramus diligenter,
utrum formare liceat ideam ullam spatii illius puri, realis, absoluti,
quod post omnium corporum annihilationem perseveret existere.

Ideam porro talem paulo acrius intuens, reperio ideam esse
nihili purissimam, si modo idea appellanda sit. Hoc ipse siimma

Note the account here given of imagination and intellect, as distinguished
from sense, which may be compared with aia0r|at(;, (pavTaoía, and vo0<; in
Aristotelian psychology.

“attributorum divinorum particeps.” See Samuel Clarke, in bis
Demonstration, and in the Papers between Clarke and Leibnitz.

630

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[522]

adhibita diligentia expertos sum: hoc alios parí adhibita diligentia
experturos reor.

55. Decipere nos nonnunquam solet, quod aliis ómnibus
corporibus imaginatione sublatis, nostrurn^^^ tamen manere sup-
ponimus. Quo supposito, motum membrorum ab omni parte
liberrimum imaginamur. Motus autem sine spatio concipi non
potest. Nihilominus si rem atiento animo recolamus, constabit
primo concipi spatium relativum partibus nostri corporis defini-
tum: 2°. movendi membra potestatem liberrimam nullo obstáculo
retusam: et prseter hsec dúo nihil. Falso tamen credimus tertium
aliquod, spatium videlicet immensum, realiter existere, quod
liberam potestatem nobis faciat movendi corpus nostrum: ad hoc
enim requiritur absentia solummodo aliorum corporum. Quam
absentiam, sive privationem corporum, nihil esse positivum
fateamur necesse est^^’.

56. Cffiterum hasce res nisi quis libero et acri examine
perspexerit, verba et voces parum valent. Meditanti vero, et
rabones secum reputanti, ni fallor, manifestum erit, quEecunque
de spatio puro et absoluto prsedicantur, ea omnia de nihilo
prsedicari posse. Qua ratione mens humana facillime liberatur
a magnis difficultatibus simulque ab ea absurditate tribuendi
existentiam necessariam^^^ ulli rei príeterquam soli Deo optimo
máximo.

57. In proclivi esset sententiam nostram argumentis a
posteriori (ut loquuntur) ductis confirmare, qusestiones de spatio
absoluto proponendo; exempli graba, utrum sit substantia vel
accidens? utrum creatum vel increatum? et absurditates
ex utravis parte consequentes demonstrando. Sed brevitati

“nostrum,” se. corpus. When we imagine space emptied of bodies, we are
apt to forget that our own bodies are part of the material world.

[Vide qute contra spatium absolutum disseruntur in libro De
Principas Cognitionis Humana, idiomate anglicano decem abhine annis
edito.]—AUTH0R.{FNS He refers to sect. 116 of the Principies.

He treats absolute space as nothing, and relative space as dependent on
Perception and Will.

De Motu

631

consulendum. Illud tamen omitti non debet, quod sententiam
hancce Democritus olim calculo suo comprobavit, uti auctor est
Aristóteles 1. i. Phys.^^^ ubi bree habet: Democritus solidum et
inane ponit principia, quorum aliud quidem ut quod est, aliud ut
quod non est esse dicit. Scrupulum si forte injiciat, quod distinctio
illa Ínter spatium absolutum et relativum a magni nominis
philosophis usurpetur, eique quasi fundamento inredificentur
multa prreclara theoremata, scrupulum istum vanum esse, ex iis
qure secutura sunt, apparebit.

58. Ex prremissis patet, non convenire ut definiamus locum
verum corporis esse partem spatii absoluti quam occupat corpus,
motumque verum seu absolutum esse mutationem loci veri
et absoluti. Siquidem omnis locus est relativus, ut et omnis
motus. Veruntamen ut hoc clarius appareat, animadvertendum
est, motum nullum intelligi posse sine determinatione aliqua
seu directione, qure quidem intelligi nequit, nisi praeter corpus
motum, nostrum etiam corpus, aut aliud aliquod, simul
intelligatur existere. Nam sursum, deorsum, sinistrórsum,
dextrorsum, omnesque plagre et regiones in relatione aliqua
fundantur, et necessario corpus a moto diversum connotant et
supponunt. Adeo ut, si reliquis corporibus in nihilum redactis,
globus, exempli gratia, unicus existere supponatur; in illo motus
nullus concipi possit: usque adeo necesse est, ut detur aliud
corpus, cujus situ motus determinari intelligatur. Hujus sententire
veritas clarissime elucebit, modo corporum omnium tam nostri
quam aliorum, prreter globum istum unicum, annihilationem
recte supposuerimus.

59. Concipiantur porro dúo globi, et prreterea nil corporeum,
existere. Concipiantur deinde vires quomodocunque applicari:
quicquid tándem per applicationem virium intelligamus, motus
circularis duorum globorum circa commune centrum nequit per
imaginationem concipi. Supponamus deinde coelum fixarum

Phys. a. 5. 188a. 22, 23.

632

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

creari: súbito ex concepto appulsu globorum ad diversas coeli
istius partes motus concipietur. Scilicet cum motus natura sua
sit relativus, concipi non potuit priusquam darentur corpora
correlata. Quemadmodum nec ulla relatio alia sine correlatis
[523] concipi potest.

60. Ad motum circularem quod attinet, putant multi, crescente
motu vero circulan, corpus necessario magis semper magisque
ab axe niti. Hoc autem ex eo provenit, quod, cum motus
circularis spectari possit tanquam in omni momento a duabus
directionibus ortum trahens, una secundum radium, altera
secundum tangentem; si in hac ultima tantum directione Ímpetus
augeatur, tum a centro recedet corpus motum, órbita vero desinet
esse circularis. Quod si sequaliter augeantur vires in utraque
directione, manebit motus circularis, sed acceleratus conatu,
qui non magis arguet vires recedendi ab axe, quam accedendi
ad eundem, auctas esse. Dicendum igitur, aquam in situla
circumactam ascenderé ad latera vasis, propterea quod, applicatis
novis viribus in directione tangentis ad quam vis particulam aquse,
eodem instanti non applicentur novse vires sequales centripetse.
Ex quo experimento nullo modo sequitur, motum absolutum
circularem per vires recedendi ab axe motus necessario dignosci.
Porro qua ratione intelligendse sunt voces istse, vires corporum
et conatus, ex prsemissis satis superque innotescit.

61. Quo modo curva considerari potest tanquam constans ex
rectis infinitis, etiamsi revera ex ibis non constet, sed quod ea
hypothesis ad geometriam utilis sit, eodem modo motus circularis
spectari potest tanquam a directionibus rectilineis infinitis ortum
ducens, quse suppositio utilis est in philosophia mechanica. Non
tamen ideo affirmandum, impossibile esse, ut centrum gravitatis
corporis cujusvis successive existat in singulis punctis peripheriae
circularis, nulla ratione habita directionis ullius rectilinese, sive
in tangente sive in radio.

62. Haud omittendum est, motum lapidis in funda, aut aquse
in situla circumacta, dici non posse motum vere circularem.

De Motu

633

juxta mentem eorum qui per partes spatii absoluti definiunt loea
vera eorporum; eum sit mire eompositus ex motibus non solum
situlse vel fundíe, sed etiam telluris diurno circa proprium axem,
menstruo circa commune centrum gravitatis terrse et lunse, et
annuo circa solem: et propterea particula qusevis lapidis vel aquse
describat lineam a circulari longe abhorrentem. Ñeque revera
est, qui creditur, conatus axifugus, quoniam non respicit unum
aliquem axem ratione spatii absoluti, supposito quod detur tale
spatium: proinde non video quomodo appellari possit conatus [524]
unicus, cui motus vere circularis tanquam proprio et adaequato
effectui respondet.

63. Motus nullus dignosci potest, aut mensurari, nisi per
res sensibiles. Cum ergo spatium absolutum nullo modo in
sensus incurrat, necesse est ut inutile prorsus sit ad distinctionem
motuum. Prseterea determinatio sive directio motui essentialis
est, ilia vero in relatione consistit. Ergo impossibile est ut motus
absolutus concipiatur.

64. Porro quoniam pro diversitate loci relativi varius sit
motus ejusdem corporis, quinimo uno respectu moved, altero
quiescere dici quidpiam possit^*^®*’; ad determinandum motum
verum et quietem veram, quo scilicet tollatur ambiguitas, et
consulatur mechanicse philosophorum, qui systema rerum latius
contemplantur, satis fuerit spatium relativum fixarum coelo,
tanquam quiescente spectato, conclusum adhibere, loco spatii
absoluti. Motus autem et quies tali spatio relativo definiti,
commode adhiberi possunt loco absolutorum, qui ab illis nullo
symptomate discerní possunt. Etenim imprimantur utcunque
vires, sint quicunque conatus, concedamus motum distinguí per
actiones in corpora exercitas; nunquam tamen inde sequetur,
dari spatium illud et locum absolutum, ejusque mutationem esse
locum verum.

65. Eeges motuum, effectusque, et theoremata eorundem

See Locke, Essay, Bk. II. ch. 13, §§ 7-10.

634

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[525]

proportiones et cálculos continentia, pro diversis viarum figuris,
accelerationibus itidem et directionibus diversis, mediisque plus
minusve resistentibus, bsec omnia constant sine calculatione
motus absoluti. Uti vel ex eo patet quod, quum secundum illorum
principia qui motum absolutum inducunt, nullo symptomate
scire liceat, utrum integra rerum compages quiescat, an moveatur
uniformiter in directum, perspicuum sit motum absolutum nullius
corporis cognosci posse.

66. Ex dictis patet ad veram motus naturam perspiciendam
summopere juvaturum, 1°. Distinguere Ínter hypotheses
mathematicas et naturas rerum: 2°. Cavere ab abstractionibus:
3°. Considerare motum tanquam aliquid sensibile, vel saltem
imaginabile; mensurisque relativis esse contentos. Quse si
fecerimus, simul clarissima quseque philosophise mechanicse
theoremata, quibus reserantur naturse recessus, mundique
systema calculis humanis subjicitur, manebunt intemerata, et
motus contemplatio a mille minutiis, subtilitatibus, ideisque
abstractis libera evadet. Atque hsec de natura motus dicta
sufficiant.

67. Restat, ut disseramus de causa communicationis
motuum^°°^ Esse autem vim impressam in corpus mobile
causam motus in eo, plerique existimant. Veruntamen illos
non assignare causam motus cognitam, et a corpore motuque
distinctam, ex prsemissis constat. Patet insuper vim non esse rem
certam et determinatam, ex eo quod viri summi de ilia multum
diversa, immo contraria, proferant, salva tamen in consequentiis
veritate. Siquidem Newtonus**’®^ ait vim impressam consistere in

Sect. 67-72 treat of the supposed ejection of motion from the striking body
into the body struck. Is this only metaphorical? Is the motion received by the
latter to be supposed identical with, or equivalent to, that given forth by the
former?

1002 J)gf jv.

De Motu

635

actione sola, esseque actionem exercitam in corpus ad statum ejus
mutandum, nee post actionem manere. Torricellius^®*’^ cumulum
quendam sive aggregatum virium impressarum per percussionem
in Corpus mobile recipi, ibidemque manere atque impetum
constituere contendit. Idem fere Borellus^°°^ aliique prsedicant.

At vero, tametsi Ínter se pugnare videantur Newtonus et
Torricellius, nihilominus, dum singuli sibi consentaneaproferunt,
res satis commode ab utrisque explicatur. Quippe vires omnes
corporibus aitributse tam sunt hypotheses mathematicse quam
vires attractivse in planetis et solé. Cseterum entia mathematica
in rerum natura stabilem essentiam non habent: pendent autem a
notione definientis; unde eadem res diversimode explicari potest.

68. Statuamus motum novum in corpore percusso conservan,
sive per vim insitam, qua corpus quodlibet perseverat in statu
suo vel motus vel quietis uniformis in directum; sive per vim
impressam, durante percussione in corpus percussum receptam
ibidemque permanentem; ídem erit quoad rem, differentia
existente in nominibus tantum. Similiter, ubi mobile percutiens
perdit, et percussum acquirit motum, parum refert disputare, [526]
utrum motus acquisitus sit ídem numero cum motu perdito,
ducit enim in minutias metaphysicas et prorsus nominales de
identitate. Itaque sive dicamus motum transiré a percutiente in
percussum, sive in percusso motum de novo generari, destruí
autem in percutiente, res eodem recidit. Utrobique intelligitur
unum corpus motum perdere, alterum acquirere, et prseterea nihil.

69. Mentem, quse agitat et continet universam hancce molem
corpoream, estque causa vera efficiens motus, eandem esse,
proprie et stricte loquendo, causam communicationis ejusdem
haud negaverim. In philosophia tamen physica, causas et
solutiones phsenomenon a principiis mechanicis petere oportet.
Physice igitur res explicatur non assignando ejus causam vere
agentem et incorpoream, sed demonstrando ejus connexionem

Lezioni Accademiche.

De Vi Percussionis, cap. IX.

636

The Works of George Berkeley. Vol. 1 of 4.

[527]

cum principiis mechanicis: cujusmodi est illud, actionem et
reactionem esse semper contrarias et cequales^^^, a quo,
tanquam fonte et principio primario, eruuntur regulse de motuum
communicatione, quse a neotericis, magno scientiarum bono, jam
ante repertse sunt et demonstratse.

70. Nobis satis fuerit, si innuamus principium illud alio
modo declarari potuisse. Nam si vera rerum natura potius
quam abstracta mathesis spectetur, videbitur rectius dici, in
attractione vel percussione passionem corporum, quam actionem,
esse utrobique sequalem. Exempli graba, lapis fuñe equo alligatus
tantum trahitur versus equum, quantum equus versus lapidem:
Corpus etiam motum in aliud quiescens impactum, patitur
eandem mutationem cum corpore quiescente. Et quoad effectum
realem, percutiens est item percussum, percussumque percutiens.
Mutatio autem illa est utrobique, tam in corpore equi quam in
lapide, tam in moto quam in quiescente, passio mera. Esse autem
vim, virtutem, aut actionem corpoream talium effectuum vere
et proprie causatricem non constat. Corpus motum in quiescens
impingitur; loquimur tamen active, dicentes illud hoc impeliere:
nec absurde in mechanicis, ubi idese mathematicse potius quam
verse rerum naturse spectantur.

71. In physica, sensus et experientia, quse ad effectus
apparentes solummodo pertingunt, locum habent; in mechanica,
notiones abstractse mathematicorum admittuntur. In philosophia
prima, seu metaphysica, agitur de rebus incorporéis, de causis,
veritate, et existentia rerum. Physicus series sive successiones
rerum sensibilium contemplatur, quibus legibus connectuntur, et
quo ordine, quid prsecedit tanquam causa, quid sequitur tanquam
effectus, animadvertens. Atque hac ratione dicimus corpus
motum esse causam motus in altero, vel ei motum imprimere,

Newton's third law of motion.

Berkeley sees in motion only a link in the chain which connects the sensible
and intelligible worlds—a conception unfolded in bis Siris, more than twenty
years later.

De Motu

637

trahere etiam, aut impeliere. Quo sensu eausse seeundse corporese
intelligi deben!, nulla ratione habita verse sedis virium, vel
potentiarum actricum, aut causse realis cui insunt. Porro dici
possunt causse vel prineipia mechanica, ultra eorpus, figuram,
motum, etiam axiomata scientise meehanicse primaria, tanquam
eausse eonsequentium speetata.

72. Causse vere aetivse meditatione tantum et ratioeinio e
tenebris erui quibus involvuntur possunt, et aliquatenus cognosci.
Spectat autem ad philosophiam primam, seu metaphysicam, de
iis agere. Quodsi euique scientise provineia sua^^*^^ tribuatur,
limites assignentur, prineipia et objecta aeeurate distinguantur,
quse ad singulas pertinent, traetare licuerit majore, cum facilítate,
tum perspicuitate.

1007 “pj-Qvincia sua.” The De Motu, so far as it treats of motion perceptible to
the senses, is assigned to physics; in contrast to theology or metaphysics, alone
concemed with active causation.

Footnotes

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